U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee of LB-Ranch Series V Trust v. Duncan Homes, LLC, and Conrad Legal Corporation

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Fall 2025 Term
FILED
_____________________ November 13, 2025
released at 3:00 p.m.
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
No. 24-ICA-398
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
_____________________ OF WEST VIRGINIA

U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
as Trustee of LB-RANCH SERIES V TRUST,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner,

v.

DUNCAN HOMES, LLC,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Below, Respondent,

and

CONRAD LEGAL CORPORATION,
Third-Party Defendant Below, Respondent.
___________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
Honorable Bridget Cohee, Judge
Civil Action No. CC-02-2023-C-15

AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED
_________________________________________________________

Submitted: September 3, 2025
Filed: November 13, 2025

Lakyn Cecil, Esq. J. Peter Glaws IV, Esq.
Samuel I. White, P.C. Carr Maloney P.C.
Morgantown, West Virginia Washington, D.C.
Counsel for Petitioner Counsel for Respondent, Conrad Legal
Corporation

Eric S. Black, Esq.
Berkeley Springs, West Virginia
Counsel for Respondent, Duncan Homes,
LLC
JUDGE WHITE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
WHITE, JUDGE:

Petitioner U.S. Bank Trust National Association, as Trustee of LB-Ranch

Series V Trust (“U.S. Bank”) appeals the August 23, 2024, order from the Circuit Court of

Berkeley County which denied its motion for summary judgment and granted the summary

judgment motions filed by Respondent Duncan Homes, LLC (“Duncan Homes”), and

Respondent Conrad Legal Corporation (“CLC”).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves an action to set aside a tax sale deed issued after a

delinquent tax sale held on August 29, 2019 (“2019 Tax Sale”). However, the circuit court

determined that the events surrounding a prior tax sale for the subject property, which was

held on or about November 14, 2012 (“2012 Tax Sale”), were dispositive of the present

case. The facts of record are as follows:

A. 2012 Tax Sale

In June of 2000, Richard S. Palmer owned the subject property located in

Martinsburg, West Virginia. He obtained a loan from Associates Financial Services of

America, Inc. (“Associates Financial”) which was secured by a Deed of Trust recorded

against the property on June 21, 2000. According to the Deed of Trust, Associates Financial

had the right, but not the duty, to pay any taxes or assessments on the subject property if

they were not paid when due by Mr. Palmer. After this loan, taxes on the property were not

1
paid, resulting in RAI Custodian WV TL, LLC (“RAI”), purchasing the delinquent tax lien

at the 2012 Tax Sale. RAI attempted to serve a notice to redeem on Associates Financial

by certified mail, regular mail, and publication, but the notice was returned.1 Associates

Financial failed to redeem its interest, and a tax sale deed was issued vesting sole ownership

of the property with RAI on April 1, 2014 (“RAI Deed”). This tax sale deed was recorded

on April 21, 2014.

On June 12, 2014, RAI quitclaimed the property to American Pride

Properties, LLC (“American Pride”), which recorded the conveyance on June 30, 2014.

American Pride quitclaimed the property back to Mr. Palmer on July 14, 2016. The

quitclaim deed returning the property to Mr. Palmer was recorded on August 9, 2016.

On September 22, 2016, Associates Financial2 assigned its June 21, 2000,

Deed of Trust to CitiFinancial, Inc., which immediately assigned the interest to Bayview

Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”). Both assignments were recorded on October 4, 2016.

The certified letter to Associates Services [sic] came back “RETURN TO
1

SENDER ATTEMPTED-NOT KNOWN UNABLE TO FORWARD.”
2
At the time of this conveyance, Associates Financial was known as Associates
First Capital Corporation. We will use the designation of Associates Financial for clarity.
2
B. 2019 Tax Sale

Following American Pride’s 2016 conveyance to Mr. Palmer, the taxes on the

property again fell into delinquency. Duncan Homes purchased the delinquent tax lien at

the 2019 Tax Sale. Duncan Homes retained CLC to conduct a title search on the property

and prepare the notice to redeem form for the state auditor. Through its title search, CLC

determined that Mr. Palmer and Associates Financial were among the persons and entities

entitled to receive the notice to redeem, but Bayview was not included on the notice to

redeem form. No person or entity receiving notice redeemed the property. Thereafter,

Duncan Homes was vested with ownership of the property by tax sale deed recorded on

May 15, 2020.

According to U.S. Bank, shortly after the 2019 Tax Sale, Bayview and Mr.

Palmer entered into a loan modification agreement on March 1, 2020. In connection with

the modification agreement, Bayview conducted a title search for the property in October

of 2019.3 On July 14, 2022, Bayview4 assigned its interest to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

(“Nationstar”) which recorded the assignment on July 15, 2022.

3
The record does not indicate whether this 2019 title search resulted in discovery
of the 2012 Tax Sale and 2014 tax deed. However, petitioner’s counsel indicated during
oral argument that when Mr. Palmer stopped making payments pursuant to the modified
loan agreement in 2020, his loan was referred to foreclosure counsel, who discovered that
there was a tax sale deed, and that discovery resulted in the filing of this action to quiet
title.
4
At the time of the assignment, Bayview had changed its name to Community Loan
Servicing. For clarity we will continue to refer to this entity as Bayview.
3
C. Circuit Court Decision

On January 13, 2023, Nationstar initiated this action to set aside the deed

issued after the 2019 Tax Sale. Duncan Homes was one of the named defendants. In

response, Duncan Homes filed its answer and a counterclaim against Nationstar, requesting

the circuit court declare it the fee simple and sole owner of the subject property. Later,

Duncan Homes filed an amended answer, which added a third-party complaint against

CLC, alleging legal malpractice in connection with its earlier title search and failure to

include Bayview on the notice to redeem form.

On October 10, 2023, the circuit court entered an order granting Nationstar’s

motion to substitute U.S. Bank as its successor in interest. Following the close of discovery,

the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on April 12, 2024. Of note, evidence

of the 2012 Tax Sale was not disclosed during discovery. Nonetheless, in support of its

motion for summary judgment, Duncan Homes contended that any interest Associates

Financial held in the property was extinguished when it failed to redeem its interest

following the 2012 Tax Sale, and the RAI Deed was issued. Thus, Duncan Homes

contended that no successor in interest to Associates Financial’s chain of title, such as

Bayview or U.S. Bank, held any title to the property. CLC made a similar argument in

support of its motion for summary judgment. CLC contended it had not negligently

performed the title search or prepared the notice to redeem form because the 2012 Tax Sale

extinguished Associates Financial’s interest, and therefore, Bayview had no legal interest

in the property and was not entitled to notice. In response, U.S. Bank filed a motion in
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limine and a motion to strike, seeking to exclude evidence of the 2012 Tax Sale, contending

that the late disclosure of the 2012 Tax Sale and deed was prejudicial, and deprived U.S.

Bank of the opportunity to conduct discovery to contradict Duncan Homes’ contentions.

The circuit court held a hearing on May 17, 2024, with respect to the parties’

cross motions for summary judgment. At this hearing, the court specifically heard argument

regarding the property’s chain of title and need for expert testimony. Finding that an

additional hearing was necessary to address U.S. Bank’s motions regarding the 2012 Tax

Sale, the circuit court set the matter for hearing on May 30, 2024. At that hearing, the circuit

court did not hear argument regarding U.S. Bank’s motions in limine or motion to strike.

However, the court did inform the parties it was denying U.S. Bank’s motion for summary

judgment.

The circuit court memorialized its summary judgment ruling by order dated

August 23, 2024. In that order, the circuit court determined that U.S. Bank’s claims failed

because it held no legal interest or marketable title to the property due to the 2012 Tax Sale.

Specifically, the court found by virtue of the 2016 Assignments, Associates Financial was

a predecessor in title to Bayview and U.S. Bank; but when Associates Financial failed to

redeem the property, any legal interest within U.S. Bank’s chain of title was extinguished

by the RAI Deed. The circuit court also found that pursuant to West Virginia Code § 11A-

5
4-4(a) (1994),5 U.S. Bank was precluded from challenging the validity of the 2012 Tax

Sale and the notice provided to Associates Financial because more than three years had

elapsed since the issuance of the RAI Deed.

The circuit court concluded that because Bayview never held legal title to the

property, it was not among the entities that Duncan Homes was required to provide with a

notice of the 2019 Tax Sale and, thus, U.S. Bank, as a successor in interest, lacked standing

to challenge the sale. The circuit court’s order then granted summary judgment to Duncan

Homes and CLC. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In West Virginia, it is well established that “[a] circuit court’s entry of

summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451

S.E.2d 755 (1994). In conducting a de novo review, this Court applies the same standard

for granting summary judgment that a circuit court must apply, and that standard states,

“[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no

genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify

the application of the law.” United Bank, Inc. v. Blosser, 218 W. Va. 378, 383, 624 S.E.2d

5
Effective June 10, 2022, West Virginia Code § 11A-4-4(a) was amended to impose
a two-year limitations period. However, the former version imposed a three-year
limitations period, and it was the controlling limitations period in effect at the time of the
2012 Tax Sale and issuance of the RAI Deed.
6
815, 820 (2005) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Painter, 192 W. Va. at 190, 451 S.E.2d at 756).

“Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented . . . the

nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the

case that it has the burden to prove.” Syl. Pt. 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va.

52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises various assignments of error, but we find the following issue

to be dispositive: whether the original Deed of Trust, and the subsequent assignments

thereof, made Bayview a party in interest entitled to notice of the 2019 Tax Sale and its

right of redemption because they show that Bayview had been authorized to make tax

payments by Mr. Palmer.6 Because we find that Bayview was entitled to pay taxes upon

the subject property, it was entitled to notice, and therefore we reverse the order of the

circuit court.

It has long been recognized that when a tax sale deed is duly obtained and

recorded by the purchaser of a tax sale lien, the purchaser is vested with all interest and

6
Because we find this issue to be dispositive, we do not address whether the circuit
court erred in considering the 2012 Tax Sale and 2014 tax deed when they had not been
disclosed in discovery, or whether the quitclaim deed reconveying the subject property to
Mr. Palmer effectively rescinded the 2012 Tax Sale and reinstated Associates Financial’s
lien.
7
title to the subject property. For example, Syllabus Point 2 of Summers v. Kanawha County,

26 W. Va. 159 (1885), holds that:

If at the time of such sale the land sold be under a mortgage or
deed of trust, or if there be any other lien or incumbrance
thereon, and such mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, lienor or
incumbrancer shall fail to redeem the same within the time
prescribed by law, then all the right, title and interest of such
mortgagee, trustee, cestui que trust, lienor or incumbrancer,
shall pass to and be vested in the purchaser at such tax-sale,
and his title to the premises shall in no way be affected or
impaired by such mortgage, deed of trust, lien or incumbrance.

This legal principle is also recognized by West Virginia Code § 11A-3-62(a) (1994), which

states:

Whenever the purchaser of any tax lien on any real estate sold
at a tax sale, his heirs or assigns, shall have obtained a deed for
such real estate from the deputy commissioner or from a
commissioner appointed to make the deed, he or they shall
thereby acquire all such right, title and interest, in and to the
real estate, as was, at the time of the execution and delivery of
the deed, vested in or held by any person who was entitled to
redeem, unless such person is one who, being required by law
to have his interest separately assessed and taxed, has done so
and has paid all the taxes due thereon, or unless the rights of
such person are expressly saved by the provisions of section
forty-nine of this article or section two, three, four or six, article
four of this chapter.
The tax deed shall be conclusive evidence of the acquisition of
such title. If the property was sold for nonpayment of taxes, the
title so acquired shall relate back to the first day of July of the
year in which the taxes, for nonpayment of which the real estate
was sold, were assessed. If the property was sold for nonentry

8
pursuant to section thirteen of this article, or escheated to the
state, or is waste and unappropriated property, the title shall
relate back to the date of sale.7

To obtain the benefits of a tax deed, however, due process requires the

purchaser to provide proper notice of the tax sale and the right to redeem to every interested

party who can be readily identified from public records or otherwise. Archuleta v. US Liens,

LLC, 240 W. Va. 519, 521, 813 S.E.2d 761, 763 (2018).

As a prerequisite to receiving a deed to property sold for
delinquent taxes, W. Va. Code § 11A-3-19 requires the tax
purchaser to “[p]repare a list of those to be served with notice
to redeem and request the State Auditor to prepare and serve
the notice as provided in sections twenty-one [§ 11A-3-21] and
twenty-two [§ 11A-3-22] of this article.” …. The statute also
makes clear that, “[i]f the purchaser fails to meet these
requirements, he or she shall lose all the benefits of his or her
purchase.” (Emphasis added).

Id. at 522, 813 S.E.2d at 764 (footnotes omitted). Failure to comply with the mandatory

notice requirements “is a jurisdictional defect not subject to curative measures.” Id.

7
West Virginia Code § 11A-3-30 (2010), which was repealed in 2022, similarly
provided that the purchaser of a tax lien, on receipt of the tax deed, “shall acquire all right,
title and interest, in and to the real estate, as was, at the time of the execution and delivery
of the deed, vested in or held by any person who was entitled to redeem.” W. Va. Code §
11A-3-30 (2010).

9
Thus, following the 2019 Tax Sale, Duncan Homes was required by West

Virginia Code § 11A-3-19 (2018)8 to prepare a list of those persons and entities entitled to

notice of their right to redeem. West Virginia Code 11A-3-23(a) (2019) provided that “the

owner of, or any other person who was entitled to pay the taxes on, any real estate for which

a tax lien on the real estate was purchased by an individual [could] redeem at any time

before a tax deed [was] issued for the real estate.” As the Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia noted in Syllabus Point 4 of Rollyson v. Jordan, 205 W. Va. 368, 518 S.E.2d

372 (1999):

The persons entitled to notice to redeem . . . are those persons
who are permitted to redeem the real property subject to a tax
lien or liens, as contemplated by [West Virginia Code] § 11A–
3–23(a) . . . which persons include “the owner” of such
property and “any other person who was entitled to pay the
taxes” thereon.

Under the undisputed facts of this case, Bayview was an interested party entitled to notice

of the tax sale and its right to redemption.

In June of 2000, Mr. Palmer owned the subject property located in

Martinsburg, West Virginia. He obtained a loan from Associates Financial secured by a

deed of trust that was recorded on June 21, 2000. This deed of trust provided that Associates

8
We acknowledge that this statute, as amended, was subsequently repealed by the
Legislature, effective June 10, 2022. However, it was in effect at the time that events
surrounding this litigation arose.
10
Financial had the right, but not the duty, to pay any taxes or assessments on the property if

they were not paid when due by Mr. Palmer.

According to Petitioner, public tax records and payment history reflect that

it and its predecessors paid taxes on the subject property, but the tax office mistakenly

applied them to another property in Martinsburg owned by Mr. Palmer. 9 A person may

authorize a third party to pay his or her taxes, and under those circumstances, the lender

would qualify as someone who was entitled to pay taxes. In determining that Bayview was

not a party in interest at the time of the 2019 Tax Sale, the circuit court’s order simply stated

that Bayview was not entitled to pay taxes on the property at the time of the 2019 Tax Sale.

The circuit court, however, failed to address whether Bayview was entitled to pay taxes

because it had been authorized to do so by Mr. Palmer in the loan agreements he signed.10

See Rollyson v. Jordan, 205 W. Va. 368, 374-76, 518 S.E.2d 372, 376-80 (1999) (note

holders were entitled to notice of right to redeem where the deed of trust securing their note

9
Instead of applying the payments to the subject property located at 264 Dale
Earnhardt Lane, the tax office allegedly credited the payments to the taxes owing on
another property owned by Mr. Palmer located at 209 Dale Earnhardt Lane.
10
We note in passing that West Virginia Code § 11A-1-9 (1941) provides in
pertinent part that “[o]ne who pays taxes on the interest of any other person shall be
subrogated to the lien of the State upon such interest.” This section also provides, however,
that “[h]e shall lose his right to the lien, however, unless within thirty days after payment
he shall file with the clerk of the county court his claim in writing against the owner of
such interest, together with the tax receipt or a duplicate thereof.” There is no indication in
the record that petitioner filed a written claim with the clerk so as to trigger application of
this section.

11
provided that they might “at their option” pay taxes, charges and assessments). Persons

entitled to notice of the right to redeem include not only the owners of property but “any

other person who was entitled to pay the taxes thereon.” Id. at 370, 518 S.E.2d at 374, Syl.

Pt. 4.11

The 2014 tax deed extinguished only “such right, title and interest, in and to

the real estate, as was, at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed, vested in or

held by any person who was entitled to redeem.” W. Va. Code § 11A-3-62. The contractual

right to pay taxes is not “a right, title and interest in and to the real estate.” Thus, that right

was not extinguished by the 2014 tax deed. Associates Financial continued to have the right

to pay taxes on the property pursuant to its original deed of trust even though its lien had

been extinguished. The 2016 assignment of the Associates Financial deed of trust put the

public on notice that the right to pay taxes had been assigned to Bayview. See Mike Ross,

Inc. v. Bergdorf, No. 16-1046, 2017 WL 4712793, at *4 (W. Va. Oct. 20, 2017)

(memorandum decision) (“[g]enerally whatever is sufficient on the face of the record of

title to land to direct a purchaser's attention to the prior rights and equities of third persons

will put him upon an inquiry and will amount to notice to him. He is bound to take notice

of everything disclosed by the record.”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Simmons v. Simmons, 85 W.

Va. 25, 100 S.E. 743 (1919)). Thus, Bayview, Petitioner’s predecessor in interest, was

11
We note that redemption statutes must be strictly construed against the purchaser.
Duncan Homes, LLC v. Stallard, 25-ICA-3, 2025 WL 2490384, at *4 (W. Va. Ct. App.
Aug. 29, 2025) (memorandum decision).
12
entitled to notice of the 2019 Tax Sale and its right to redeem. Petitioner was entitled to

summary judgment against Duncan Homes on this issue, and Duncan Homes’ motion for

summary judgment on its counterclaim should have been denied.

On appeal, Petitioner requests this Court to reverse the circuit court’s ruling

granting summary judgment in favor of CLC, as well as its ruling granting summary

judgment in favor of Duncan Homes. CLC, however, raises two issues which are unique

to it, arguing that Petitioner lacked standing to appeal against its favorable ruling because

Petitioner was not its client and did not file any claim against CLC below, and that summary

judgment was properly granted in its favor because Duncan Homes, the party who raised a

crossclaim against CLC, did not produce an expert witness to testify that CLC violated the

applicable standard of care. Neither Petitioner nor Duncan Homes has addressed these

dispositive issues on appeal. Accordingly, we do not disturb the judgment of the circuit

court granting summary judgment to CLC. See Leadmine Comty. Church v. W. Va. Ann.

Conf. of United Methodist Church, No. 24-ICA-475, 2025 WL 2240416, at *3 (W. Va. Ct.

App. Aug. 6, 2025) (memorandum decision).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we reverse the August 23, 2024, order of the Circuit Court of

Berkeley County granting summary judgment to Duncan Homes against U.S. Bank on the

issue of whether U.S. Bank was entitled to receive notice of the 2019 Tax Sale, and remand

13
the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We

affirm the order to the extent it granted summary judgment to CLC.

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded.

14