Hannah G. v. Eric S.

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
HANNAH G.,
August 6, 2025
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
Respondent Below, Petitioner INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 24-ICA-513 (Fam. Ct. Cabell Cnty. Case No. FC-06-2017-D-703)

ERIC S.,
Petitioner Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Hannah G.1 (“Mother”) appeals the Family Court of Cabell County’s
November 25, 2024, order denying her petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan.
Respondent Eric S.2 (“Father”) did not participate in the appeal.3

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the family court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

By way of background, Mother and Father were never married but share one child
(“Child”), born in 2013. Early on, both parties were consistently active and involved in
Child’s life. By order entered in May 2018, Mother was designated as the primary
residential parent. Sometime thereafter, Mother married Shawn G., with whom she shares
young children. Shawn G. eventually became physically abusive. In May 2022, with
Mother’s agreement to keep Child away from Shawn G., the family court entered an order
designating Father as the primary residential parent and granting Mother supervised

1
To protect the confidentiality of the juveniles involved in this case, we refer to the
parties’ last name by the first initial. See, e.g., W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e); State v. Edward
Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 645 n.1, 398 S.E.2d 123, 127 n.1 (1990).
2
Mother is self-represented.
3
We recognize our limited and circumspect review of a family court order in an
uncontested appeal, like this one, when the respondent fails to participate on appeal to
support the order.

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parenting time twice weekly through a third-party professional agency, as well as FaceTime
calls.

Sometime thereafter, Mother filed a petition for modification. A hearing was held
on Mother’s petition on October 17, 2024, during which she was given the opportunity to
ask questions of witnesses and present evidence. During the hearing, she also moved for a
continuance and for the appointment of a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child, both of
which were denied. Also, during the hearing, Father’s counsel asserted that Mother had
recently submitted an outdated family court order to Child’s school in an attempt to contact
Child, and that she tried to get added to Child’s online school app despite the family court’s
previous order that only permitted Mother to contact Child through supervised visitations.
The family court entered an order denying Mother’s petition for modification on November
25, 2024, holding that no change of circumstances had occurred and reiterating that Mother
was to have no contact with Child due to the trauma that Child previously endured while
in Mother’s care. The court also noted in this order that it was waiting for Mother to
complete her parental fitness evaluation to determine what, if any, parenting time she may
receive in the future. It is from the November 25, 2024, order that Mother now appeals.

For these matters, we apply the following standard of review:

When a final order of a family court is appealed to the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review the
findings of fact made by the family court for clear error, and the family
court’s application of law to the facts for an abuse of discretion. The
Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review questions of law de novo.

Syl. Pt. 2, Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53, 902 S.E.2d 185 (2024); accord W.
Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying standards for appellate court review of family
court orders).

On appeal, Mother raises seven assignments of error, which we have consolidated
into two issues for decision. See generally Tudor’s Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley, 229
W. Va. 396, 402, 729 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2012) (stating that “the assignments of error will
be consolidated and discussed accordingly”).

In her first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Mother asserts that the
family court showed bias against her by denying her motion to continue, talking down to
her during the hearing, communicating with a third party about the case, and by not
requiring Father to present evidence in support of his arguments. We are unpersuaded by
these arguments. Upon review of the hearing, we find no evidence of bias and no
deprivation of Mother’s due process rights, as the family court granted her the opportunity
to present evidence and to question witnesses. Further, the family court noted that it would
reevaluate any parenting time that Mother may receive in the future upon its receipt of her

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parental fitness evaluation. While Mother may not agree with the credibility determinations
made by the family court, the same is not tantamount to bias. Mother’s mere disagreement
with the court’s weighing of evidence does not entitle her to relief. See State v. Guthrie,
194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995) (“An appellate court may not
decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function and
task of the trier of fact.”). Moreover, a party seeking a modification has the burden of proof
to establish a change of circumstances warranting the modification. See Lori B. v. Danny
F., No. 23-ICA-499, 2024 WL 4051646 (W. Va. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2024) (memorandum
decision) (holding that the burden is on the party seeking the modification to establish the
required substantial change in circumstances).

In her fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error, Mother contends that the family
court’s “no contact” ruling negatively affects her other children.4 Specifically, she argues
that it has forced her to send her other children to private school and prevents them from
participating in their desired sports. Mother also asserts that the court’s no contact
provision wrongfully denies her the right to access Child’s records. We disagree. West
Virginia Code § 51-2A-2a (2015) states as follows:

(a) A family court in its discretion may, at any time during the pendency of
any action prosecuted under chapter forty-eight of this code, restrict contact
between the parties thereto without a finding of domestic violence under
article twenty-seven of said chapter. This order shall not be considered a
protective order for purposes of section five hundred seven, article twenty-
seven, chapter forty-eight of this code. A court may enter a standing order
regarding the conduct expected of the parties during the proceeding. Any
standing order may restrict the parties from:
(1) Entering the home, school, business or place of employment of the other
for the purpose of bothering or annoying the other;
(2) Contacting the other, in person, in writing, electronically or by telephone,
for purposes not clearly necessary for the prosecution of the underlying
action or any obligation related thereto or resulting therefrom.

Under this statute, the family court has the authority to limit contact between parties and
prevent a party from entering a school or business. Mother’s arguments have failed to
establish clear error or an abuse of discretion by the family court.5 Her brief primarily

4
Mother’s other children are not parties to the underlying action and not subject to
the family court’s jurisdiction.
5
A no contact order entered by the family court pursuant to West Virginia Code §
51-2A-2a shall remain in effect until a time specified in the order. See W. Va. Code § 51-
2A-2a(d). Here, the family court held that the no contact order was required until Child’s
therapist rendered an opinion that continuing contact would not impair Child’s mental
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consists of her displeasure with the proceedings below and fails to cite any statutory
authority or precedent to support her arguments as required by Rule 10 of our Rules of
Appellate Procedure. As such, we find no basis in law to warrant relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the family court’s November 25, 2024, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: August 6, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

health. Mother does not argue on appeal that the family court’s further-opinion-of-a-
psychologist condition is insufficient to constitute a “time specified” for purposes of West
Virginia Code § 51-2A-2a, so a further analysis of limitations on indefinite no-contact
orders is not preserved in this appeal.
4