Beth A. Redden f/k/a Beth Hughes Ross v. Community Health Systems, Inc. d/b/a AccessHealth, and Raleigh General Hospital

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
BETH A. REDDEN f/k/a March 24, 2025
BETH HUGHES ROSS, ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 24-ICA-198 (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Cnty. Case No. CC-41-2023-C-54)

COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. d/b/a
ACCESSHEALTH, and
RALEIGH GENERAL HOSPITAL, LLC,
Defendants Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Beth A. Redden appeals the Raleigh County Circuit Court’s April 2, 2024,
order which dismissed Ms. Redden’s amended complaint. Respondents Community Health
Systems, Inc. (“AccessHealth”) and Raleigh General Hospital, Inc. (“Raleigh General”)
timely filed separate responses in support of the circuit court’s order. Ms. Redden did not
file a reply.1

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the circuit court’s order but no
substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of
Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for reversal in a memorandum decision.
For the reasons set forth below, the circuit court’s order is affirmed, in part, reversed, in
part, and remanded.

On February 25, 2023, Ms. Redden filed the underlying civil action in the Circuit
Court of Raleigh County. AccessHealth subsequently removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. While the case was pending in
the district court, Ms. Redden filed an amended complaint. After Ms. Redden filed her
amended complaint, the district court remanded the case to the state circuit court.

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Ms. Redden is represented by James D. McQueen, Jr., Esq. AccessHealth is
represented by Arie M. Spitz, Esq., and Clayton T. Harkins, Esq. Raleigh General is
represented by Constance H. Weber, Esq.
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As alleged in the amended complaint, Ms. Redden was employed as a nurse midwife
by AccessHealth at Raleigh General. On April 16, 2021, Ms. Redden was assigned to
Patient X, who was pregnant, for treatment. Eventually, Patient X’s unborn child died while
in the care of Ms. Redden at Raleigh General. The attending physician admitted Patient X
with plans to deliver the demised fetus at Raleigh General. However, the complaint alleges
that the nursing staff failed to notify Ms. Redden that Patient X would remain in-house and
Ms. Redden would be responsible for her care. As a result, Ms. Redden missed the delivery
of the stillborn fetus.

The complaint goes on to allege that on April 29, 2021, Ms. Redden was told by a
senior nurse midwife that she needed to find another job. She was later informed by the
same person that her privileges at Raleigh General were being terminated and therefore she
was unable to perform her contractual duties to AccessHealth. She was also informed that
a peer review process had been undertaken and the results were not in her favor.

Ms. Redden’s amended complaint asserted the following counts: Count I - breach
of contract against AccessHealth for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing for, among other things, firing her without an interview or telling her how she
violated the standard of care in her treatment of Patient X; Count II - constitutional tort
against Raleigh General and AccessHealth for firing her without due process of law; Count
III - tortious interference against Raleigh General for interfering in her employment
contract with AccessHealth by allegedly falsely stating it was going to deny her privileges
at Raleigh General thereby preventing her from fulfilling her contractual obligations to
AccessHealth; and Count IV - civil conspiracy against Raleigh General and AccessHealth
for acting in concert to improperly terminate her.

Both Respondents moved to dismiss and after briefing and a hearing, the circuit
court dismissed the amended complaint. At the hearing, in response to the arguments for
dismissal of Counts I and II, counsel for Ms. Redden stated,

Your Honor, I’m not going to stand up here and argue to the Court about
Counts 1 and 2. . . I recognize that the breach of contract on an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a stand alone cause of action
and I also recognize that its been declared that the constitution only applies
to claims against the state . . . So what I want to talk about, and what I think
survives the motion to dismiss, two counts, . . . the tortious interference
claim, Count 3, and, Count 4, the civil conspiracy claim.

Following the hearing, the circuit court entered the order on appeal. Specifically,
the circuit court found that in regard to Counts I and II for breach of contract and
constitutional tort, counsel for Ms. Redden admitted at the hearing that he knew the law
was not on his side but drafted the complaint based on what he believed the law should be,
and therefore the complaint failed to state a claim in regard to Counts I and II.

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In regard to Count III for tortious interference, the circuit court concluded that the
claim must fail because “[a]lthough the manner in which Raleigh General drew their
conclusion that suspension of Plaintiff’s midwife privileges was appropriate could be
questioned, the Plaintiff has not shown even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that they did
so for the purpose of intentionally interfering with her employment[.]” (emphasis added).
In regard to Count IV, having disposed of the remaining claims, the circuit court concluded
that the civil conspiracy cannot go forward as there is no underlying tort to predicate it on.
It is from this order that Ms. Redden appeals.

“Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint
is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.
Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). “A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint should
view the motion to dismiss with disfavor, should presume all of the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true, and should construe those facts, and inferences arising from those
facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC
v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., 244 W. Va. 508, 520, 854 S.E.2d 870, 882 (2020) (citing
Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 160 W. Va. 530, 538, 236 S.E.2d 207, 212 (1977)).

On appeal, Ms. Redden generally asserts that the circuit court erred by failing to
follow proper procedures when evaluating the Respondents’ motions to dismiss. 2 We
agree, at least in part. Here, as mentioned previously, the circuit court concluded that Ms.
Redden failed to put forth “even a scintilla of evidence” in order to defeat the motions to
dismiss in regard to Count III. However, Ms. Redden is not required to establish a prima
facie case at the pleading stage. Mountaineer Fire, 244 W. Va. at 525, 854 S.E.2d at 887.
A circuit court should not dismiss a complaint merely because it doubts that the plaintiff

2
The Court notes that evaluation of this matter was made more challenging by the
shortcomings of Ms. Redden’s brief and its failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Ms. Redden’s brief opens with a list of three assignments of error but does not
address the assignments of error in any organized manner. Ms. Redden’s brief does not
contain an argument section. Instead, it includes an eleven-page summary of argument
section, which does not “contain an argument clearly exhibiting the points of fact and law
presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, under
headings that correspond with the assignments of error.” W. Va. R.A.P. 10(c)(7). Ms.
Redden’s brief also does not include a conclusion section “specifying the relief the party
seeks.” W. Va. R.A.P. 10(c)(8). Further, Ms. Redden’s brief appears to be pieced together
in a haphazard manner by cutting and pasting memoranda previously submitted to the
circuit court. We remind counsel that, “[l]awyers who fail to follow our appellate rules
inevitably generate a disjointed, poorly written, or difficult to understand brief, and they
should not anticipate that this Court will find or make their arguments for them.” Metro
Tristate, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 245 W. Va. 495, 502, 859 S.E.2d 438, 445
(2021).

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will prevail in an action. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 196 W. Va. 720, 725, 474 S.E.2d 900, 905
(1996) (per curiam).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must set
forth enough information to outline the elements of a claim or permit inferences to be
drawn that these elements exist. Mountaineer Fire, 244 W. Va. at 521, 854 S.E.2d at 883
(citation omitted). As correctly cited by the circuit court, the elements of tortious
interference in West Virginia are: (1) existence of a contractual or business relationship or
expectancy; (2) an intentional act of interference by a party outside that relationship or
expectancy; (3) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and (4) damages.
Hatfield v. Health Mgmt. Assocs. of W. Va., 223 W. Va. 259, 267, 672 S.E.2d 395, 403
(2008). Ms. Redden’s amended complaint specifically alleges that she had a contractual
relationship with AccessHealth that was intentionally and tortiously interfered with by
Raleigh General and that she was damaged thereby. Ms. Redden’s amended complaint sets
forth enough information to outline the elements of a claim for tortious interference, or to
permit inferences to be drawn that the elements exist. Accordingly, since the circuit court
erred by applying the wrong standard at the motion to dismiss stage by requiring Ms.
Redden to put forth evidence and because Ms. Redden’s amended complaint sets forth
enough information to outline the elements of a claim for tortious interference, or to permit
inferences to be drawn that the elements exist, the circuit court’s conclusion in regard to
Count III is reversed.3

In regard to Count IV for civil conspiracy, “civil conspiracy is not a per se, stand-
alone cause of action; it is instead a legal doctrine under which liability for a tort may be
imposed on people who did not actually commit a tort themselves but who shared a
common plan for its commission with the actual perpetrator(s).” Syl. Pt. 9, Dunn v.
Rockwell, 225 W. Va. 43, 689 S.E.2d 255 (2009). Here, Ms. Redden’s complaint
specifically alleges that her civil conspiracy claim is predicated on Count III as the
underlying tort. Having already determined that the circuit court’s conclusion in regard to
Count III should be reversed, this Court likewise reverses the circuit court as to its ruling
on Count IV.

As to Counts I and II, as found by the circuit court, Ms. Redden failed to argue
against dismissal of these counts below. On appeal, Ms. Redden has waived these causes
of action as she has failed to specifically allege error by the circuit court in this regard. See
Noland v. Virginia Ins. Reciprocal, 224 W. Va. 372, 378, 686 S.E.2d 23, 29 (2009) (“Issues
not raised on appeal or merely mentioned in passing are deemed waived.”) (citing Tiernan

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While this Court reverses the circuit court’s conclusion as to Count III due to, at
least in part, application of the wrong standard at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court in
no way precludes the circuit court from reaching the same conclusion at the summary
judgment stage, should it be appropriate at that time.
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v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W. Va. 135, 140 n.10, 506 S.E.2d 578, 583 n.10
(1998)). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court in regard to Counts I and II.

Therefore, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the circuit court’s April 2, 2024,
order. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, and Remanded.

ISSUED: March 24, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

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