David M. Fredrich v. Farmers Group Property & Casualty Ins. Co.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 10, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP992 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV4410

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

DAVID M. FREDRICH AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
ROBERT L. JAKULSKI,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

FARMERS GROUP PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS. CO.,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES AND NETWORK HEALTH
PLAN,

DEFENDANTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
WILLIAM W. BRASH, III, Reserve Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with
directions.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.
No. 2024AP992

¶1 GEENEN, J. David M. Fredrich, by his guardian ad litem Robert L.
Jakulski (“Fredrich”), appeals from a circuit court order granting summary
judgment to Farmers Group Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Farmers”). The
circuit court concluded that Fredrich was excluded from receiving underinsured
motorist (“UIM”) benefits under the Farmers insurance policy issued to Fredrich’s
mother and brother because Fredrich owned an uninsured vehicle. It granted
summary judgment to Farmers and denied Fredrich’s motion for declaratory
judgment. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order granting
summary judgment to Farmers and remand the cause with directions that the court
grant Fredrich’s motion for declaratory judgment because the exclusion relied upon
by Farmers is an unlawful “drive other car” exclusion under WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32(5)(j) (2021-22).1

BACKGROUND

¶2 The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. Fredrich was injured
when he was hit by an underinsured driver while riding his bicycle. At the time of
the accident, Fredrich lived with his mother and brother, and he owned an uninsured
2005 Toyota Corolla. Fredrich’s mother and brother were issued a policy of
automobile insurance by Farmers (the “Policy”) that was in effect at the time
Fredrich was injured, and the Policy contained an Underinsured Motorists Coverage
Endorsement (the “UIM Endorsement”).

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version.

2
No. 2024AP992

¶3 The UIM Endorsement stated that Farmers will pay compensatory
damages sustained by an “insured” caused by an underinsured vehicle.2 The UIM
Endorsement defined “insured” as “you or any relative.” The main body of the
Policy defined “relative” as “a person, other than you, who is a resident of your
household, and is related to you by blood, marriage, civil union, registered domestic
partnership, or adoption.” The Policy also contained a Wisconsin State Provisions
Endorsement. This endorsement added the following language to the definition of
“relative” contained in the main body of the Policy: “Relative excludes any person
who, or whose spouse, owns or insures an auto, motorcycle, or motor home, other
than a covered auto.”

¶4 Fredrich sued Farmers claiming that he was entitled to UIM benefits
under the Policy because he was a “relative” of the named insureds. Farmers moved
for summary judgment, and Fredrich moved for declaratory judgment. Fredrich
argued that the Policy’s language with respect to who qualified as a “relative” was
contradictory and ambiguous, and as a consequence, that ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of coverage. Fredrich also argued that the language added to the
definition of “relative” by the Wisconsin State Provisions Endorsement constituted
a “drive other car” exclusion,3 and because the exclusion did not conform to WIS.
STAT. § 632.32(5)(j), it could not be enforced.

¶5 Farmers argued that the plain terms of the Policy unambiguously
excluded any person who owned an uncovered vehicle from the definition of

2
When quoting the Policy, we retain the Policy’s bolding of certain words and phrases
because the bolding indicates to the insured that the bolded words and phrases are specially defined
by the Policy.
3
A drive other car exclusion typically prevents a policyholder from insuring all the cars
in one household by taking out just one policy on one vehicle, and paying only one premium. See,
e.g., Agnew v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989).

3
No. 2024AP992

“relative,” and because Fredrich owned the uninsured Toyota Corolla, he fell
outside the Policy’s definition of “relative.” Farmers also argued that the
exclusionary language added to the definition of “relative” by the Wisconsin State
Provisions Endorsement did not qualify as a “drive other car” exclusion because
Fredrich was seeking to invoke personal and portable UIM coverage under a family
member’s insurance policy. Whether Fredrich is entitled to UIM benefits depends
upon whether he qualifies as an “insured,” and because this potential coverage is
tied to Fredrich and not a vehicle, WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) does not apply.

¶6 The circuit court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment. It
did not consider the Policy to be ambiguous as to the applicable definition of
“relative,” and moreover, it construed the definition as a term limiting initial grants
of coverage rather than a definition that excludes coverage after an initial grant of
coverage under the Policy’s insuring agreement. The circuit court further concluded
that, if it were to construe the definition of “relative” as an exclusion, the exclusion
would not be prohibited by WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j). The circuit court reasoned
that § 632.32(5)(j) describes a permissible exclusion and that it would be
unreasonable to interpret the provision “as prohibiting an otherwise lawful
exclusion.”

¶7 Fredrich appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review.

¶8 Fredrich appeals from the circuit court’s order granting summary
judgment to Farmers. We review summary judgments de novo, applying the same
methodology employed by the circuit court. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

4
No. 2024AP992

American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶22, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65. Summary
judgment is appropriate where, based on the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories,
and affidavits on file, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and a party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2); American Girl,
268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶22.

¶9 Fredrich argues that the definition of “relative” that applies to UIM
coverage under the Policy is ambiguous and that ambiguity should have been
construed in favor of coverage. Fredrich also argues that the amended definition of
“relative” in the Wisconsin State Provisions Endorsement is an unlawful “drive
other car” exclusion because it does not conform to WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j).
Interpreting and applying § 632.32(5)(j) and the Policy to undisputed facts are
questions of law subject to independent appellate review. Vieau v. American Fam.
Mut. Ins. Co. & Acuity, 2006 WI 31, ¶11, 289 Wis. 2d 552, 712 N.W.2d 661.

II. The definition of “relative” unambiguously excludes any person who
owns an uncovered vehicle.

¶10 Fredrich argues that he is a “relative” as that term is defined by the
main body of the Policy. Therefore, the circuit court should have concluded that he
was an “insured” under the UIM Endorsement and that there was coverage for his
UIM claim. Fredrich further argues that the amended definition of “relative” is an
exclusion in disguise because it conflicts with and makes meaningless several
provisions in the main body of the Policy. According to Fredrich, the conflicts
between these provisions render ambiguous the applicable definition of “relative,”
and this ambiguity should have been resolved in favor of coverage.

¶11 Farmers argues that the Policy is easy to follow, and a reasonable
insured would understand that the Wisconsin State Provisions Endorsement added

5
No. 2024AP992

language to the definition of “relative” in the main body of the Policy, specifying
that “Relative excludes any person who, or whose spouse, owns or insures an auto,
motorcycle, or motor home, other than a covered auto.” Farmers also argues that
there is no conflict between the amended definition of “relative” and the provisions
of the Policy highlighted by Fredrich because those provisions involve hypothetical
scenarios not at issue here.

¶12 Judicial interpretation of an insurance policy, like other contracts,
seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties. American
Girl, 268 Wis. 2d 16, ¶23. “Insurance policies are construed as they would be
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the insured.” Id. “However,
we do not interpret insurance policies to provide coverage for risks that the insurer
did not contemplate or underwrite and for which it has not received a premium.”
Id.

¶13 We agree with Farmers that a reasonable insured would understand
that the definition of “relative” unambiguously excludes any person who owns an
uncovered vehicle. The Policy is relatively short and not difficult to follow. The
first page of the Declarations instructs the insured that “Coverages are defined in
the policy and are subject to the terms and conditions contained in the policy,
including amendments and endorsements.” The General Definitions contained in
the main body of the Policy set forth definitions for both “insured” and “relative.”

¶14 Upon reaching the UIM Endorsement, a reasonable insured would
understand that although the General Definition for “insured” was changed for the
purposes of UIM coverage, the General Definition of “relative” remained in effect.
The UIM Endorsement’s definition of “insured” includes “you or any relative.”
Upon reaching the Wisconsin State Provisions Endorsement, a reasonable insured

6
No. 2024AP992

would understand that this endorsement was adding the following language to the
General Definition of “relative”: “Relative excludes any person who, or whose
spouse, owns or insures an auto, motorcycle, or motor home, other than a covered
auto.”

¶15 Thus, a reasonable insured would understand that the UIM
Endorsement’s definition of “insured” for purposes of UIM coverage included
“you and any relative.” A reasonable insured would understand that “relative” is
a specially defined term, and the applicable definition is contained in the main body
of the Policy, with the additional language set forth in the Wisconsin State
Provisions Endorsement:

RELATIVE means a person, other than you, who is a
resident of your household, and is related to you by blood,
marriage, civil union, registered domestic partnership, or
adoption.

Relative excludes any person who, or whose spouse, owns
or insures an auto, motorcycle, or motor home, other than a
covered auto.

¶16 Fredrich argues that the amended definition of “relative” renders
superfluous three other provisions in the UIM Endorsement. First, the definition of
“underinsured motor vehicle” excludes autos “owned by, leased to, regularly
furnished or available for the use of you or any relative.” Second, Exclusion A
states that Farmers “do[es] not cover any person occupying or struck by a motor
vehicle owned by you or a relative, other than a covered auto.” Third, Exclusion G
states that Farmers “do[es] not cover a relative who owns, leases or has available
for their regular use, an auto which is insured for underinsured motorists coverage
on a primary basis under any other policy.” We disagree that the amended definition
of “relative” renders these provisions superfluous. All three of these provisions

7
No. 2024AP992

would be effective in certain factual situations that the amended definition of
“relative” does not address.

¶17 Accordingly, we conclude that the Policy’s definition of “relative”
unambiguously excludes any person who owns an uncovered vehicle.

III. The amended definition of “relative” is an unlawful “drive other car”
exclusion prohibited by WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j).

¶18 Fredrich argues that the amended definition of “relative” amounts to
an invalid “drive other car” exclusion. Fredrich claims that all “drive other car”
exclusions must conform to the conditions set forth in WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j),
and because the definitional exclusion of “relative” in the Wisconsin State
Provisions Endorsement does not conform to those statutory conditions, it is
unenforceable against Fredrich. We agree with Fredrich.

¶19 We begin by examining WIS. STAT. § 632.32, which governs motor
vehicle insurance. “The statutory scheme provides for insurance clauses that are
mandatory, prohibited, and permissive.” Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 WI 8, ¶24,
352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373. Statutory interpretation begins with the
language of the statute, and if the meaning of the language is plain, we ordinarily
stop the inquiry. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45,
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. The context in which statutory language is used,
as well as the structure of the statute in which the operative language appears, is
important to meaning. Id., ¶46. “Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd
or unreasonable results.” Id.

8
No. 2024AP992

¶20 WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.32(5)(e) states that “[a] policy may provide
for exclusions not prohibited by sub. (6) or other applicable law. Such exclusions
are effective even if incidentally to their main purpose they exclude persons, uses
or coverages that could not be directly excluded under sub. (6)(b).” Our supreme
court “has fashioned a two-part test to determine the validity of a particular
exclusion” under the statute. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶12,
234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467 (citing Clark v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co.,
218 Wis. 2d 169, 174, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998)). “First, we must direct our focus to
WIS. STAT. § 632.32(6) and decide whether the exclusion fits the description of any
of the enumerated prohibitions.” Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶13. If it does not,
“we proceed to the second part of the test, which requires that we examine any ‘other
applicable law’ that may prohibit the exclusion.” Id. “Absent any other applicable
law prohibiting the exclusion, it remains valid.” Id.

¶21 Both parties agree, as do we, that our supreme court’s decision in
Vieau controls the first part of the test (i.e., whether WIS. STAT. § 632.32(6)(b)
prohibits the exclusion).4 Following Vieau, we conclude that the amended
definition of “relative” in the Wisconsin State Provisions Endorsement is

4
In Vieau v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. & Acuity, 2006 WI 31, 289 Wis.
2d 552, 712 N.W.2d 661, the court dealt with a definitional exclusion functionally identical to the
one at issue in the instant case. The policy defined “insured person” as “you or a relative,” and
“relative” was defined as “a person living in your household, related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption. It does not include any person who, or whose spouse, owns a motor vehicle other than
an off-road motor vehicle.” Id., ¶7 (citation modified). While WIS. STAT. § 632.32(6)(b)1.
prohibits excluding from coverage persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, or adoption,
§ 632.32(5)(e) states that “[s]uch exclusions are effective even if incidentally to their main purpose
they exclude persons, uses or coverages that could not be directly excluded under sub. (6)(b).” The
court concluded the exclusion was permissible under § 632.32(5)(e) because although the exclusion
would have the effect of excluding persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, or adoption,
this effect was incidental to the main purpose of the exclusion, which was “to prevent resident
relatives who own their own vehicles from piggybacking on the … UIM coverage of a single
insured.” Vieau, 289 Wis. 2d 552, ¶29.

9
No. 2024AP992

permissible under § 632.32(5)(e) because although it has the effect of excluding
persons related to the insured, see § 632.32(6)(b)1., that effect is incidental to the
main purpose of the exclusion, which is to prevent resident relatives who own their
own vehicles from piggybacking on the UIM coverage of a single insured, see
§ 632.32(5)(e); Vieau, 289 Wis. 2d 552, ¶¶7, 29.

¶22 With respect to the second part of the test, Fredrich maintains that the
amended definition of “relative” is prohibited by “other applicable law.”5 In
particular, Fredrich points to WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) and our supreme court’s
decision in Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, arguing that the amended definition
of “relative” constitutes a prohibited “drive other car” exclusion. In Blazekovic,
the court concluded that “drive other car” exclusions are prohibited unless they
conform to the conditions set forth in § 632.32(5)(j). Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587,
¶¶21-22. Fredrich claims that because the amended definition of “relative” does
not conform to the conditions set forth in § 632.32(5)(j), it is prohibited under
Blazekovic.

¶23 WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) states:

(j) A policy may provide that any coverage under the policy
does not apply to a loss resulting from the use of a motor
vehicle that meets all of the following conditions:

1. Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by
the named insured’s spouse or a relative of the named
insured if the spouse or relative resides in the same
household as the named insured.

2. Is not described in the policy under which the
claim is made.

5
The Vieau court did not discuss the second part of the test (i.e., whether “other applicable
law” prohibits the exclusion). Vieau, 289 Wis. 2d 552, ¶23 n.6.

10
No. 2024AP992

3. Is not covered under the terms of the policy as a
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle.

¶24 Prior to the enactment of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j), courts frequently
invalidated “drive other car” exclusions based on the “broad purpose” that such
coverage is personal and portable “under all circumstances.” Blazekovic, 234 Wis.
2d 587, ¶19 (citation omitted). The goal of these exclusions was to address the “free
rider” problem. Belding, 352 Wis. 2d 359, ¶36.

Wisconsin courts have long recognized that the purpose of
the drive other cars exclusion is to provide coverage to the
insured when he or she has infrequent or casual use of a
vehicle other than the one described in the policy, but to
exclude coverage of a vehicle that the insured owns or
frequently uses for which no premium has been paid.

Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶11, 266 Wis. 2d 569, 669
N.W.2d 166; see also Agnew v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 341,
350, 441 N.W.2d 222 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of the drive-other-car provision is to
prevent a policyholder from insuring all the cars in one household by taking out just
one policy and paying only one premium.”).

¶25 Our supreme court explained that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) “has
replaced the broad proposition … that uninsured motorist coverage is available in
all circumstances,” because “[t]here is a particular type of ‘drive other car’
exclusion that now is allowed under the statute.” Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶22.
However, the statute “has not eviscerated the general prohibition against ‘drive
other car’ exclusions.” Id.

¶26 The circuit court concluded that the amended definition of “relative”
did not violate WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) because the statute describes a permissible
exclusion, and it would be unreasonable to interpret the statute “as prohibiting an
otherwise lawful exclusion.” This reasoning was specifically rejected by our

11
No. 2024AP992

supreme court in Blazekovic. The insurer in Blazekovic argued that § 632.32(5)(j)
“represents a permissive statute and nothing therein reflects a prohibitory intent.”
Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶17. The Blazekovic court did not dispute the
permissive nature of § 632.32(5)(j), but it did not discern an intent to approve “drive
other car” exclusions except those that complied with the statutory requirements.
Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶¶24, 27. The Blazekovic court also concluded that
such an interpretation would render § 632.32(5)(j) superfluous. “There would be
no need to separately provide for a permitted exclusion because by virtue of not
being enumerated in [§] 632.32(6) an exclusion would be rendered valid.”
Blazekovic, 234 Wis. 2d 587, ¶30. Accordingly, we cannot accept the circuit court’s
reasoning because it is in conflict with Blazekovic.

¶27 While Fredrich maintains that the amended definition of “relative”
constitutes a “drive other car” exclusion that must meet the conditions of WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32(5)(j) in order to be valid, Farmers argues that the amended definition of
“relative” is not a “drive other car” exclusion because it is not tied to the use of a
motor vehicle.

¶28 Farmers misreads the statute. Indeed, it is precisely because the
exclusion is not tied to the use of a motor vehicle that it fails to conform to WIS.
STAT. § 632.32(5)(j). A valid “drive other car” exclusion under § 632.32(5)(j) does
not arise solely by owning a vehicle that meets the statutory criteria. The statute
plainly requires that the loss result from the “use” of that motor vehicle. See Kalal,
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. Here, however, the Policy excludes UIM coverage for
resident relatives if they own an uncovered vehicle, and it does not matter whether
the uncovered vehicle was “used” at all.

12
No. 2024AP992

¶29 WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) requires that valid “drive other car”
exclusions be tied to the “use” of a vehicle meeting the statutory criteria. The
Policy’s amended definition of “relative” is not tied to the “use” of the other
vehicle, requiring only that a “relative” own an uncovered vehicle in order to be
excluded from UIM benefits under the Policy. The exclusion, therefore, does not
conform to the requirements of § 632.32(5)(j) and cannot be enforced.6

6
Farmers argues that the amended definition of “relative” applies to determine whether
there is an initial grant of coverage and, because the definition informs the initial coverage
determination, it does not exclude claims otherwise within the scope of coverage. Fredrich argues
that applying the amended definition at the first step, to determine initial coverage, is—
essentially—an unlawful work around to an otherwise prohibited exclusion. Fredrich argues that
binding caselaw demands that we treat the amended definition of “relative” as an exclusion
because the definition functions as an exclusion, and treating a definition differently from an
exclusion “merely because it is couched in the definition section of the policy would be to exalt
form over substance[.]” Rodey v. Stoner, 180 Wis. 2d 309, 313, 509 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1993),
superseded by statute as recognized in Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶23, 245 Wis. 2d
134, 628 N.W.2d 916.

It is well established that in resolving questions of insurance coverage, “[f]irst, we examine
the facts of the insured’s claim to determine whether the policy’s insuring agreement makes an
initial grant of coverage.” American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶24,
268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65. “If it is clear that the policy was not intended to cover the claim
asserted, the analysis ends there.” Id. However, “[i]f the claim triggers the initial grant of coverage
in the insuring agreement, we next examine the various exclusions to see whether any of them
preclude coverage of the present claim.” Id.

We observe tension between our published opinion in Miller v. West Bend Mutual
Insurance Co., 2024 WI App 66, 414 Wis. 2d 246, 14 N.W.3d 694, and our supreme court’s
opinion in Vieau with respect to how definitional exclusions must be treated. Miller involved a
policy’s definition of “underinsured motor vehicle” that excluded government-owned vehicles.
Miller, 414 Wis. 2d 246 ¶¶1, 6. We determined that this definitional exclusion “set[] the scope of
UIM coverage within its insurance policies.” Id., ¶3. Because the loss resulted from the use of a
government-owned vehicle, we concluded that “there [was] no initial grant of UIM coverage” for
the accident. Id., ¶¶3, 32-34, 41. However, our supreme court in Vieau dealt with a definitional
exclusion of “relative” functionally identical to the one at issue in the instant case. Vieau, 289
Wis. 2d 552, ¶7. The court in Vieau stated that it “recognize[d] the requirement that a relative not
own another car is part of the definition of ‘relative’ and is not framed as an outright exclusion.
However, we treat the definition the same as an exclusion.” Id., ¶22 n.5. The court cited a previous
case which treated an occupancy requirement contained in the definition of “named insured” as an
exclusion because “[t]he purpose of the occupancy requirement is to exclude coverage for persons
not occupying the … rental car,” and it therefore “produces the same result as an exclusion.” Mau
v. North Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶33, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45.

13
No. 2024AP992

CONCLUSION

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Policy’s definition of
“relative” unambiguously excludes any person who owns an uncovered vehicle.
However, we also conclude that the Policy’s definition of “relative” constitutes a
“drive other car” exclusion, and because it does not conform to the requirements of
WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j), the exclusion cannot be enforced. Accordingly, we
reverse the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment to Farmers and remand
the cause with instructions to grant Fredrich’s motion for declaratory judgment.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

Although Miller was issued after Vieau, Miller did not cite or discuss Vieau or other case law that
address how to treat definitional exclusions in an insurance policy.

Ultimately, we need not resolve the apparent tension between Miller and Vieau. Whether
viewed as an exclusion or a limit on the scope of initial grants of coverage, WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32(5)(j) plainly requires that a motor vehicle meeting the statutory criteria be “used” before
it is determined that coverage does not apply to the loss.

Moreover, we note that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(5)(j) does not use the terms “exclude” or
“exclusion,” while other provisions in §§ 632.32(5)-(6) explicitly use those terms when describing
prohibited and permissible coverage exclusions. Section 632.32(5)(j) states that “[a] policy may
provide that any coverage under the policy does not apply to a loss resulting from the use of a motor
vehicle that meets all of the following conditions[.]” Accordingly, the language of § 632.32(5)(j)
appears to be addressing more than traditional exclusions and can be read to encompass definitional
exclusions like the amended definition of “relative” in the instant case that couches itself in the
definition section of the policy. See Rodey, 180 Wis. 2d at 313.

To the extent we are required to harmonize Miller and Vieau to resolve the instant case,
we observe that the government-owned vehicle was actually used in the loss at issue in Miller,
unlike Fredrich’s Toyota Corolla in the instant case. We further observe that the language at issue
in the instant case is almost identical to the language at issue in Vieau. For those reasons, it appears
that Vieau more closely resembles the instant case than does Miller, and Vieau specifically
instructs courts to treat definitional exclusions as exclusions and not as limits to the scope of initial
grants of coverage. Vieau, 289 Wis. 2d 552, ¶22 n.5.

2