State v. Jamon W. Washington

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 10, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1369-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF3749

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JAMON W. WASHINGTON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: STEPHANIE ROTHSTEIN and MARK A. SANDERS,
Judges. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Donald, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP1369-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jamon W. Washington appeals from a judgment of
conviction for first-degree intentional homicide and an order of the trial court
denying Washington’s postconviction motion.1 For the reasons set forth below,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On August 14, 2019, police officers found Maurice Grimes in the
driver’s seat of a parked vehicle with a single gunshot wound to his head. Grimes
was pronounced dead at the scene. Surveillance video recovered during the
investigation showed a dark-colored SUV park in the vicinity at the time of the
shooting. A male then exits the SUV, enters Grimes’ vehicle, a flash of light
believed to be a muzzle flash comes from inside Grimes’ vehicle, the male exits
Grimes’ vehicle, and then he leaves in the SUV.

¶3 Further investigation uncovered a similar looking SUV—a dark-
green GMC Yukon—listed on a social media account connected to Grimes.
Police believed the Yukon to be the one in the surveillance video primarily based
on the similarity of the color, the body shape, and an American flag sticker seen
on the right rear bumper. Police then connected the Yukon to Washington using
parking tickets issued to the Yukon while parked outside Washington’s residence.
Police also connected the Yukon to Washington from a prior encounter that
occurred on August 11, 2019, where Washington called police to his residence to
investigate what Washington believed was an explosive placed on the back of the

1
The Honorable Stephanie Rothstein presided over Washington’s trial, imposed
sentence, and entered the resulting judgment of conviction. The Honorable Mark A. Sanders
entered the order denying Washington’s postconviction motion. For ease of reference, we refer to
each as the trial court.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

Yukon. At that time, Washington represented the Yukon to be his vehicle.
Officers surveilling Washington in the days following the shooting additionally
noticed that the Yukon was parked outside Washington’s residence.

¶4 Police also discovered during the investigation that on August 8,
2019, just days before Grimes’ death, Washington reported to police that someone
burglarized his residence by taking money, firearms, and a Playstation gaming
console and controllers. Washington further indicated at the time that he reported
the burglary that he believed Grimes was a culprit. He indicated that Grimes had
been staying with him, and around the time that Grimes stopped staying with him,
Washington noticed the missing items.

¶5 On August 18, 2019, Washington was stopped for a traffic violation
and arrested,2 and Washington was later charged with first-degree intentional
homicide. A subsequent search of the Yukon on August 19, 2019, uncovered a
garbage bag of blood-stained clothing consistent with the clothing worn by the
male in the surveillance video. DNA analysis later conducted on the clothing
positively identified the blood as Grimes’ blood and identified Washington as the
primary contributor of DNA found on the inside and collars of the clothing.

¶6 Police further spoke with Washington’s landlord during the
investigation. Washington’s landlord indicated that he followed up with
Washington about Washington’s burglary complaint, and at that time, Washington

2
Washington was driving a Chrysler at the time of the stop. Washington alerted police
to the presence of firearms in the vehicle, and a search of the Chrysler at the time of the traffic
stop uncovered several firearms, including assault rifles, which were sitting on the front and back
seats of the vehicle. No evidence connected to the shooting was uncovered during the search of
the Chrysler at the time of Washington’s stop and arrest.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

told him that the person he suspected of the burglary was recently found dead.
When the landlord expressed concern to Washington that Washington might
become a suspect, Washington indicated to his landlord that he was out of town
attending his father’s funeral in Ohio at the time of the shooting. Police, however,
located Washington’s father alive and spoke with Washington’s father.

¶7 Washington filed motions challenging his stop and arrest and the
search of the Yukon. He argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop him and lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant, and he also
argued that the search warrant for the Yukon failed to establish probable cause to
search.3 The trial court held a hearing on Washington’s motions. The detective
who prepared the search warrant and the officers involved in Washington’s stop
and arrest testified. The trial court denied both motions, and the case proceeded to
a jury trial.

¶8 Following a five-day trial at which the State presented several
witnesses and numerous exhibits, the jury found Washington guilty, and
Washington was given a life sentence but made eligible for extended supervision
after 40 years.

¶9 Washington filed a motion for a new trial and raised four main
arguments: (1) he challenged the trial court’s decisions denying his motions to
suppress; (2) he argued that the State’s evidence was insufficient because it
required pyramiding inferences; (3) he maintained that the real controversy was
not tried because the jury was erroneously instructed on the use of circumstantial

3
Washington additionally argued that the detective who prepared the affidavit made
false statements. Washington has not pursued this line of argument on appeal.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

evidence; and (4) he indicated that he had newly discovered evidence in the form
of testimony from a defense witness who he argued was prevented by the State
from appearing at trial as a result of an altercation with Grimes’ family in the
hallway at the courthouse.

¶10 The trial court denied the motion. In its written decision, the trial
court rejected Washington’s argument challenging the prior decisions denying
Washington’s motions to suppress saying that “homicide investigators compiled
an ample body of evidence, which met the probable cause standard” and “[b]y
August 18, 2019, the likelihood of the defendant’s involvement in the homicide
had become more than a mere possibility.” The trial court construed
Washington’s second argument as an argument challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence and denied Washington’s argument, stating that “[t]he evidence
presented during the defendant’s trial overwhelmingly linked him to the homicide
of Maurice Grimes.” The trial court next rejected Washington’s argument as to
the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence, noting that Washington failed to
object to the instruction and the instruction was a correct statement of the law.
The trial court finally rejected Washington’s argument related to newly discovered
evidence primarily because the defense witness “ha[d] no independent knowledge
about who killed Grimes” and her testimony “would have done little to assist the
defense.” The trial court further recognized that the existing record did not reflect
that the State interfered with the witness’s appearance as a result of an altercation
in the hallway with Grimes’ family.

¶11 Washington now appeals. Additional relevant facts will be noted
below as necessary.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

DISCUSSION

¶12 Washington raises four main arguments on appeal. As the trial court
and the State has done, we frame the issues as follows: (1) whether Washington’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest and the search of the Yukon;
(2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Washington’s
conviction for first-degree intentional homicide; (3) did the trial court err in its
instruction to the jury on circumstantial evidence; and (4) whether Washington is
entitled to a hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence. We address each
argument in turn.

I. Washington’s Stop and Arrest and Search of the Yukon

¶13 On appeal, Washington first argues that the officers lacked probable
cause to arrest him and the search warrant failed to establish probable cause to
search the Yukon. Thus, he argues that the trial court erroneously denied his
motions to suppress.

¶14 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence
using a two-step standard. State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶21, 346 Wis. 2d 523,
828 N.W.2d 552. We will uphold the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous, and we review independently the application of the facts to the
constitutional principles. Id.

A. Probable Cause to Arrest Washington

¶15 Washington argues that no probable cause existed to target him for
Grimes’ shooting. He contends that all police had to support probable cause prior
to Washington’s arrest was the belief that the Yukon was the same SUV in the
surveillance video of the shooting and, further, that the information police used to

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

connect the Yukon to the SUV in the surveillance video was “too vague” both to
identify the Yukon as the SUV in the surveillance video and to support
Washington as “an investigatory target.” We are not persuaded that the
information used by the police to identify the Yukon as the SUV in the
surveillance video or to identify Washington as a suspect was too vague to support
probable cause.

¶16 Rather, we are persuaded that Washington’s arrest can be upheld for
two reasons. First, Washington was lawfully arrested following a stop for a traffic
violation. Second, Washington was lawfully arrested because police had probable
cause to believe Washington was responsible for Grimes’ murder.

¶17 At the multi-day hearing on Washington’s motions to suppress,
officers testified that they stopped and subsequently arrested Washington after
observing that Washington failed to stop at a stop sign. At the time of the stop,
Washington alerted officers to the presence of firearms in his vehicle, and the
subsequent search of the vehicle confirmed the presence of assault-style rifles in
the vehicle. While this was a basis for upholding Washington’s stop and arrest
below, Washington does not address this on appeal. We, therefore, consider any
argument that Washington could raise to challenge this as a lawful basis for his
stop and arrest to be conceded. See Schlieper v. DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525
N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1994). Nevertheless, we also agree with the alternate finding
that Washington was lawfully stopped and arrested based on probable cause that
Washington shot and killed Grimes.

¶18 “[T]he proper inquiry in an arrest challenge is whether probable
cause exists to believe that a particular suspect has committed a crime.” State v.
Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶20, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621. “Probable cause to

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

arrest is the quantum of evidence within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the
time of the arrest which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the
defendant probably committed or was committing a crime.” State v. Secrist, 224
Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999). Probable cause requires “more than a
possibility or suspicion that the defendant committed an offense, but the evidence
need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is
more likely than not.” Id. The test for probable cause is objective and requires
considering the totality of the circumstances. State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶20,
372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554.

¶19 Based on the information learned through the police investigation,
we conclude that there was probable cause to arrest Washington for the shooting.
The connections established between Washington, Grimes, and the Yukon by the
police investigation is more than sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest
Washington for the shooting death of Grimes. Officers both testified to these
connections during the hearing on Washington’s motions to suppress and
reinforced the existence of these connections with their testimony at Washington’s
trial. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Washington’s argument that his arrest was not
supported by probable cause.

B. Probable Cause to Search the GMC Yukon

¶20 Washington also argues that the warrant to search the Yukon failed
to establish probable cause that the Yukon was in some way connected to the
shooting death of Grimes and should be subject to search. As with his argument
related to his arrest, he argues that the information obtained by the police was “too
vague” to establish probable cause. We again are unpersuaded.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

¶21 “Search warrants may issue only upon ‘a finding of probable cause
by a neutral and detached magistrate.’” State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶21, 231
Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 (citation omitted). “[W]e accord great deference to
the determination made by the warrant-issuing magistrate,” and the defendant
bears the burden to show “that the facts are clearly insufficient to support a
probable cause finding.” Id.

¶22 Similar to probable cause to arrest, probable cause in the context of a
search warrant is “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit” that “there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v.
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 990, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (citation omitted).
“[A] probable cause determination must be based upon what a reasonable
magistrate can infer from the information presented by the police.” Ward, 231
Wis. 2d 723, ¶26. “The test is not whether the inference drawn is the only
reasonable inference. The test is whether the inference drawn is a reasonable
one.” Id., ¶30.

¶23 In this case, Detective Fedel prepared the affidavit attached to the
search warrant for the Yukon. In his affidavit, Detective Fedel listed the evidence
that led police to believe that evidence of Grimes’ death would be found in the
Yukon. He described the surveillance video depicting a dark-colored SUV with a
small sticker on the rear passenger side bumper. He indicated that police found a
Yukon for sale on Grimes’ social media account that police believed to be the
same SUV in the surveillance video based on the consistency of the Yukon’s
appearance with the SUV in the surveillance video, including the bumper sticker.
He stated that police subsequently identified a possible location for the Yukon

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

based on parking tickets and that the nearby residence was associated with
Washington.

¶24 Detective Fedel then stated that police were aware of a burglary
complaint by Washington in which Washington identified Grimes as the potential
culprit. He further identified that Washington reported that a Playstation gaming
system was taken and that a matching Playstation was found in Grimes’ vehicle.
Additionally, Detective Fedel stated that the Yukon was observed parked outside
Washington’s residence in the days following the shooting, and he indicated that
Washington and Grimes were connected because Grimes had lived with
Washington in the days before the shooting but had moved out shortly before.

¶25 The totality of the circumstances provided in Detective Fedel’s
affidavit supports a reasonable inference that the Yukon was the SUV in the
surveillance video connected to Grimes’ shooting and a search of the Yukon
would uncover evidence of the shooting, and we conclude that the search warrant
establishes probable cause to search the Yukon.

¶26 Overall, we reject Washington’s arguments that police lacked
probable cause to support his arrest and the search of the Yukon. In so doing, we
note that the State has raised alternative arguments to support Washington’s arrest
and the search of the Yukon. As a result of our conclusions that the police had
both probable cause to arrest Washington and probable cause to search the Yukon,
we do not address the alternative arguments raised by the State. State v. Blalock,
150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[C]ases should be
decided on the narrowest possible ground[.]”).

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶27 Washington next argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient
evidence at trial to support his conviction for first-degree intentional homicide.
He contends that the State’s case was built entirely on circumstantial evidence and
that it required the jury to engage in what he contends is the prohibited practice of
pyramiding inference upon inference. He further contends that the evidence
presented by the State was “scant,” “supposition, and conjecture,” and he takes
issue with the fact that the case was “entirely circumstantial” where no one
testified that they saw Washington shoot Grimes. He further contends that “[n]ot
one iota of physical evidence places [] Washington” in the SUV at the time of the
shooting. We disagree.

¶28 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court

may not reverse a conviction unless the evidence, viewed
most favorably to the [S]tate and the conviction, is so
insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said
as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably,
could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). “[A]n
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact,” and
“[i]f any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate
inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt, an
appellate court may not overturn a verdict.” Id. at 507. Whether the evidence is
direct or circumstantial, the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
remains the same. Id. at 503. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d
410.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

¶29 Given the overwhelming amount of evidence presented by the State
over the course of the five-day jury trial, we would be hard pressed to conclude
that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that Washington did indeed
commit first-degree intentional homicide. The trial court summarized the trial
evidence as follows:

The centerpiece of this evidence was the Yukon found at
[Washington]’s residence, which bore unique identifiers
matching those seen in surveillance footage near the crime
scene. Notably, [Washington]’s attempts to distance
himself from the vehicle were contradicted by testimony
and records indicating his exclusive use of it. Furthermore,
clothing recovered from the Yukon aligned with what
[Washington] was observed wearing on the day of the
murder, while DNA evidence implicated him further.
Connections between the defendant and Grimes, including
a prior burglary report and [Washington]’s suspicious
statements to his landlord, underscored their relationship.
A jail phone call in which [Washington] discussed “dirty
laundry” tied him directly to the bloodstained clothing
found in the vehicle.

Thus, we conclude that the State introduced sufficient evidence at trial to support
Washington’s conviction of first-degree intentional homicide for Grimes’ death.

¶30 In so concluding, we note that Washington mainly takes issue with
the State’s case being based entirely on circumstantial evidence and inferences
made from that evidence. “It is well established that a finding of guilt may rest
upon evidence that is entirely circumstantial and that circumstantial evidence is
oftentimes stronger and more satisfactory than direct evidence.” Poellinger, 153
Wis. 2d at 501. Thus, we do not consider it problematic that, as Washington
contends, the State did not present an eyewitness to the shooting or other direct
evidence placing Washington at the crime scene.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

III. Jury Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence

¶31 Washington further argues that the jury was improperly instructed on
the use of circumstantial evidence and, because of this, the real controversy was
not fully tried. Setting aside Washington’s failure to consider evidence beyond
that gathered in the initial stages of the investigation in making his argument, the
record reflects that Washington failed to lodge an objection at the time of trial to
the allegedly improper jury instruction. The failure to object to a jury instruction
at the time of trial results in the forfeiture of any error in the instruction. See WIS.
STAT. § 805.13(3) (2023-24).4 Washington argues that this court should overlook
the lack of an objection to the jury instructions at the time of trial, but this court
“has no power to reach an unobjected-to jury instruction.” See State v. Trammell,
2019 WI 59, ¶25, 387 Wis. 2d 156, 928 N.W.2d 564. Consequently, we do not
discuss Washington’s argument any further.

IV. Newly Discovered Evidence

¶32 Washington last raises a claim of newly discovered evidence. He
asserts that a defense witness failed to appear at trial as a result of actions
attributable to the State. As a result, his due process rights were violated, and the

4
We note that WIS. STAT. § 805.13(3) uses the term waiver. “Although cases sometimes
use the words ‘forfeiture’ and ‘waiver’ interchangeably, the two words embody very different
legal concepts. ‘Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is
the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21,
¶¶28-32, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (citation omitted). Thus, while the statute uses the
term waiver, the appropriate term to apply here is forfeiture.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

witness’s testimony amounts to newly discovered evidence for which he is entitled
to a hearing.5

¶33 To decide whether Washington is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his claim of newly discovered evidence, we first “determine whether the
motion on its face alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant
to relief.” State v. McAlister, 2018 WI 34, ¶25, 380 Wis. 2d 684, 911 N.W.2d 77
(citation omitted). This is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Id.
However, “if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to
relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief,” the trial court has
discretion to grant or deny a hearing. Id., ¶26 (citation omitted).

¶34 Newly discovered evidence requires that “a defendant must prove:
‘(1) the evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the defendant was not
negligent in seeking the evidence; (3) the evidence is material to an issue in the
case; and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative.’” State v. Plude, 2008 WI
58, ¶32, 310 Wis. 2d 28, 750 N.W.2d 42 (citation omitted).

¶35 “If the defendant is able to prove all four of these criteria, then it
must be determined whether a reasonable probability exists that had the jury heard
the newly[]discovered evidence, it would have had a reasonable doubt as to the

5
Washington again raises the argument that the real controversy was not fully tried, and
in this context, he grounds his argument on the fact that the defense witness did not testify. As a
result of our conclusion, we reject Washington’s argument. Washington also makes a reference
that he is entitled to a hearing if he makes a legally and facially sufficient claim of newly
discovered evidence and any case law in Wisconsin allowing a contrary result is invalid as a
result of the Supremacy Clause. We consider any argument on this point undeveloped, and we
decline to address it further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.
App. 1992).

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

defendant’s guilt.” Id. “A reasonable probability of a different result exists if
there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the old and the new
evidence, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” State v.
Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶25, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60. “A court reviewing
the newly discovered evidence should consider whether a jury would find that the
evidence ‘had a sufficient impact on other evidence presented at trial that a jury
would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶36 The trial court denied Washington’s claim of newly discovered
evidence finding that the witness did not demonstrate that she had any knowledge
of who shot Grimes and because her testimony that she overheard Grimes arrange
a drug deal on the phone would not have altered the outcome of the trial given the
overwhelming amount of evidence pointing to Washington as the shooter. We
discern no error in the trial court’s denial of Washington’s claim of newly
discovered evidence for this reason, and the record conclusively demonstrates that
the witness’s testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial.

¶37 Washington, however, argues that the role the State played in the
witness’s non-appearance at trial violated his due process rights and excuses the
typical showing for demonstrating newly discovered evidence. Washington points
to the fact that, in her affidavit, the witness indicates that she appeared at trial
ready to testify, but she contends that an altercation occurred in the hallway
between her and Grimes’ family. She further maintains that the bailiff instructed
her to return home and that she would be contacted if she was needed to testify.

¶38 Based upon a review of the record, we are unpersuaded that
Washington’s due process rights were violated because the State is somehow
responsible for his witness’s non-appearance. Contrary to the witness’s assertions,

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

the record instead reflects that she simply failed to appear despite trial counsel’s
attempts to contact her. At the outset of the defense case, Washington’s trial
counsel informed the trial court that he received a text message from his
investigator that she “was efforting to get [the witness] here” and trial counsel
requested permission to search the hallway for his witness. When trial counsel
discovered that his witness was not in the hallway, he requested a body attachment
because the witness had been subpoenaed but had not appeared. The trial court
then issued a warrant for the witness. The following day, trial counsel updated the
trial court that his efforts to locate to the witness were unsuccessful.

¶39 The record pertaining to the witness’s non-appearance contains no
discussion of any altercation in the hallway outside the courtroom and no
discussion that the bailiff advised her to go home and return if contacted. Indeed,
as the trial court recognized in denying Washington’s motion, the same bailiff who
instructed the witness to return home was presumably present at the proceedings
and the bailiff would have been derelict in failing to inform the court of the
altercation and his instruction to the witness to leave. Rather than support the
witness’s account of her non-appearance, the record instead reflects that trial
counsel did try to contact the witness and the trial court issued a warrant at trial
counsel’s request in furtherance of securing the witness’s appearance at trial.
Those efforts, though, were ultimately unsuccessful.

¶40 Therefore, we are unpersuaded by Washington’s claim that his
witness amounts to newly discovered evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶41 In sum, we reject Washington’s arguments challenging the trial
court’s decision to deny Washington’s motions to suppress, Washington’s claim

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No. 2024AP1369-CR

that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial to support his
conviction for first-degree intentional homicide for Grimes’ death, that the jury
was improperly instructed on the use of circumstantial evidence, and that he has
made a claim for newly discovered evidence. We, therefore, affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17