State v. Christopher W. LeBlanc

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 23, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1517-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF721

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CHRISTOPHER W. LEBLANC,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Kenosha County: BRUCE E. SCHROEDER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP1517-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Christopher W. LeBlanc appeals from a judgment
of conviction for use of a computer to facilitate a child sex crime and an order
denying his postconviction motion. He argues the circuit court erroneously
exercised its sentencing discretion by improperly considering LeBlanc’s views on
extramarital sex and by failing to craft an individualized sentence. LeBlanc also
asserts the circuit court’s sentencing remarks demonstrated objective bias that
violated his due process rights. Finally, LeBlanc advances a claim for vindictive
sentencing based on the prior exercise of his appeal rights. We reject LeBlanc’s
arguments as set forth below and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 LeBlanc arranged to meet a 15-year-old after engaging in sexting
with her using the Internet and cell phones.1 He was charged in a multi-count
criminal complaint and pled guilty to a single count of using a computer to
facilitate a child sex crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.075(1r) (2023-24).2
LeBlanc was sentenced to fifteen years’ initial confinement and twenty years’
extended supervision. He then filed a postconviction motion seeking resentencing,
which the circuit court denied.

¶3 LeBlanc appealed, and we reversed and remanded for resentencing.
See State v. LeBlanc, No. 2020AP62-CR, unpublished slip op. (July 30, 2021).
We determined the extended supervision portion of LeBlanc’s sentence was
excessive. We declined to address LeBlanc’s alternative argument that he had

1
Law enforcement had taken over communications shortly before the planned meeting.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

been sentenced based on an improper factor—namely his belief that extramarital
sex was not sinful.3

¶4 At resentencing before a different judge, the circuit court stated it
had reviewed the presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared in 2019 at the
time of LeBlanc’s original sentencing.4 The PSI described LeBlanc’s sexual
history, including the fact that he had engaged in extramarital sex during his
marriage. LeBlanc recounted his various sexual encounters with men and women
while he was employed as a truck driver. With respect to his views on sexual
activity, LeBlanc stated, “I don’t think it’s sinful. I don’t believe that you have to
be married to have sex.” The PSI author concluded that LeBlanc’s “occupation
and lifestyle subjects the public to an extreme amount of unnecessary risk in
multiple state jurisdictions.”

¶5 The circuit court also reviewed the transcript of the postconviction
hearing, where LeBlanc’s counsel had argued that LeBlanc’s permissive attitude
toward extramarital sex did not make him a danger to the public. The court at the
resentencing hearing extensively commented upon what it viewed as the cultural
problems arising from such “selfish behavior.”

3
Despite not reaching the issue, we did set forth the “appropriate standards that apply at
all sentencings,” noting that if LeBlanc had been actually sentenced based on his religious beliefs
or his “permissive attitudes towards sexual practices,” those would constitute improper
sentencing considerations. See State v. LeBlanc, No. 2020AP62-CR, unpublished slip op.,
¶¶14-18 (July 30, 2021).
4
The Honorable Jason A. Rossell presided over LeBlanc’s original sentencing hearing.
The resentencing occurred before the Honorable Bruce E. Schroder.

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

¶6 The circuit court stated its comments in this regard were a “reaction
to what I have read here from the defendant’s prior attorney” and would not affect
LeBlanc’s sentence:

I want it understood that the defendant’s views on the
institution of marriage or about sexual mor[es], which, by
the way, … do have sponsorship in the State statutes which
makes policy decisions all the time, but, you know, that
isn’t necessary to touch any of that in dealing with this
case, so I explicitly state that while I have sounded off
about it, nothing in the sentence that is imposed today is
reflective of condemnation of the defendant’s views[,] … it
is not figuring any kind of religious or moral beliefs into
the sentencing except to the extent that they are moral
beliefs that underlie things like you don’t have sexual
relations with children, 15-year-old girls.

¶7 The circuit court echoed in its consideration of the sentencing factors
that LeBlanc’s views about the propriety of extramarital sex would play no role in
the sentencing decision. The court stated,

you don’t have to make any conclusions about his
religiosity or lack thereof or his opinions about how sexual
practices should be regulated, if at all. None of that has got
any bearing on just making it loud and clear here these are
the things we don’t tolerate, and one of them is tormenting
and victimizing a … 15-year-old girl.

After focusing on the underlying facts, the court stated that general deterrence was
the single most important factor underlying the sentence. It discounted LeBlanc’s
rehabilitative potential. Ultimately, the court imposed a thirty-five year sentence,
consisting of twenty years’ initial confinement and fifteen years’ extended
supervision.

¶8 LeBlanc filed a motion for postconviction relief, again challenging
his sentence. The court concluded it had considered the proper sentencing factors,
had not based the sentence on LeBlanc’s views on extramarital sex, had not

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

engaged in judicial misconduct, and had not improperly punished LeBlanc for
exercising his appellate rights. LeBlanc appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 LeBlanc renews his four postconviction arguments that: (1) the
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by basing the sentence on
LeBlanc’s views on extramarital sex; (2) the court erroneously exercised its
discretion by failing to craft an individualized sentence; (3) LeBlanc’s due process
right to be sentenced by an impartial judge was violated; and (4) LeBlanc was
punished for exercising his appellate rights. We reject each of these arguments.

I. LeBlanc has failed to demonstrate the circuit court actually relied on an
improper factor, as the court explicitly stated that LeBlanc’s views on
extramarital sex played no part in his sentence.

¶10 LeBlanc contends he was sentenced based on an improper factor: his
views on extramarital sex. A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion
when it bases a defendant’s sentence on clearly irrelevant or improper factors.
State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶31, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749. The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the court’s reliance on such factors
by clear and convincing evidence. Id. This, in turn, requires “evidence indicating
that it is ‘highly probable or reasonably certain’ that the circuit court actually
relied on [an improper factor] when imposing its sentence.” State v. Harris, 2010
WI 79, ¶35, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409.

¶11 LeBlanc has not satisfied this burden. A sentencing court’s mere
discussion of a particular factor does not demonstrate actual reliance. See State v.
Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶26, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662. Here, the circuit
court was crystal clear that although it was commenting upon some of defense

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

counsel’s prior arguments, its opinions about the propriety of LeBlanc’s views on
extramarital sex would have no impact on its sentencing decision. The court also
acknowledged this court’s “guidance language,” in which we indicated that
LeBlanc’s “permissive attitudes towards sexual practices” were not proper
sentencing factors insofar as they did not pertain to the specific crime for
sentencing. See LeBlanc, 2020AP62-CR, ¶18. Accordingly, we reject LeBlanc’s
actual-reliance argument.

II. LeBlanc’s sentence was based on a consideration of proper sentencing
factors and objectives and did not result from an erroneous exercise of
discretion.

¶12 Next, LeBlanc argues the circuit court’s exercise of sentencing
discretion failed to comply with State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d
535, 678 N.W.2d 197. He asserts the court was required, but failed, to engage in a
comprehensive and on-the-record explanation of its skepticism toward LeBlanc’s
rehabilitative potential, why it was rejecting all the mitigating factors LeBlanc
offered, why the sentence imposed was the minimum necessary under all the
circumstances, and why lifetime sex offender registration was warranted.
Additionally, LeBlanc asserts the court’s sentencing remarks were littered with
irrelevant sentencing considerations.

¶13 We disagree that the circuit court’s discussion of the relevant
sentencing considerations was inadequate. Gallion requires an on-the-record
examination of the reasons underlying the sentence imposed. See Gallion, 270
Wis. 2d 535, ¶28. The three primary factors a circuit court must consider at
sentencing are the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the
defendant’s rehabilitative needs. State v. Bolstad, 2021 WI App 81, ¶14, 399

6
No. 2023AP1517-CR

Wis. 2d 815, 967 N.W.2d 164. The amount of explanation necessary will vary
from case to case. Id., ¶16.

¶14 The circuit court viewed the factors relevant to LeBlanc’s sentencing
as “clearcut.” The court stated the facts themselves were controlling the sentence:

He drove himself all these miles, planned it for days,
equipped himself with all kinds of sexual toys and devices
so that he wouldn’t leave any evidence behind and set up
an interlude with this 15-year-old child who he watched on
the school bus so he could have sexual relations with her.

The court expressed skepticism at LeBlanc’s rehabilitative potential and
incredulity that the PSI identified LeBlanc as a low recidivism risk, particularly
given that LeBlanc had “plenty of sexual outlets with both men and women over a
lengthy period of time” but still chose to prey on a child. It is clear from the
court’s comments that both the gravity of the offense and the need for deterrence
played significant roles in the court’s sentencing decision.

¶15 LeBlanc contends this analysis ignored many mitigating factors and
reflects an inadequate consideration of both his rehabilitative potential and
whether the sentence imposed was the minimum necessary to achieve the circuit
court’s sentencing objectives. We agree with the State that the court’s sentencing
remarks were adequate. The nature and specific facts of the offense informed the
court’s overall sentence and its skepticism of LeBlanc’s future willingness to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The kind of granular
examination of every potentially applicable sentencing consideration is not
required by our precedent, and the weight to be given to any secondary factors that
the court does address is a matter for the court’s discretion. State v. Davis, 2005
WI App 98, ¶18, 281 Wis. 2d 118, 698 N.W.2d 823; see also State v. Ziegler,
2006 WI App 49, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 594, 712 N.W.2d 76 (“The sentencing court

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

need not discuss all of these factors, but rather only those relevant to the particular
case.”).

¶16 Finally, as to the circuit court’s alleged failure to address the reasons
for the lifetime sex offender registration, we cannot divorce the registration
discussion from the remainder of the court’s sentencing remarks. See Harris, 326
Wis. 2d 685, ¶45 (“Our obligation is to review the sentencing transcript as a
whole ….”). The court’s explanation of the reasons for the incarceration portion
of the sentence, particularly its emphasis on the facts of the offense and the need
for general deterrence, apply with equal force to its decision to impose lifetime sex
offender registration. We reject LeBlanc’s assertion that the court’s on-the-record
discussion in this regard was insufficient.

III. The circuit court’s sentencing remarks did not establish that it was
objectively biased against LeBlanc.

¶17 A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced by an impartial
judge. State v. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d
385. A biased tribunal constitutes structural error and entitles the defendant to
resentencing before a different judge. See State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143,
¶10, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114.

¶18 Here, LeBlanc argues the circuit court’s sentencing remarks created
the appearance of bias against him in violation of due process principles. Under
the appearance-of-bias standard, LeBlanc must demonstrate that “a reasonable
person—taking into consideration human psychological tendencies and
weaknesses—concludes that the average judge could not be trusted to ‘hold the
balance nice, clear and true’ under all the circumstances.” Id., ¶24.

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

¶19 LeBlanc argues that the circuit court displayed objective bias for two
reasons. First, he focuses on the court’s discussion of what LeBlanc characterizes
as “improper and irrelevant factors as well as an apparent disdain for [the
Department of Correction’s] favorable recommendations” toward LeBlanc and
certain other offenders. Second, LeBlanc contends his sentence was “one of the
harshest sentences ever given by any judge in the State of Wisconsin” for his
crime. The appearance of bias on this latter point is enhanced, LeBlanc argues,
because the court “did not consider applicable mitigating factors and LeBlanc’s
rehabilitative needs.”

¶20 We agree with the State that none of these matters approach the
“extreme circumstances” that constitute a due process violation. See State v.
Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶94, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207. General discussions
of perceived societal ills, as well as sentencing remarks that identify a personal
connection to a type of crime, do not necessarily demonstrate objective bias. See
State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶¶13-18, 48-66, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d
772. And they particularly do not demonstrate objective bias here, where the
circuit court explicitly stated that those matters would play no part in its
sentencing decision.

¶21 Nor does skepticism toward a PSI author’s sentencing
recommendation indicate objective bias. The PSI in this case recommended six to
eight years of initial confinement and five to six years of extended supervision.
The circuit court explained why it believed that amount of incarceration was
grossly inadequate. The court’s comments about the “irrational” nature of some
Department of Corrections recommendations it had seen were made in that
context. The comments are not indicative of an inability to hold the balance “nice,
clear and true.”

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

¶22 Finally, we reject LeBlanc’s assertion that a “harsh” sentence, even
in comparison to that of other defendants convicted of the same crime,
demonstrates the appearance of bias. Relevant to this consideration, we note that a
sentence within the applicable penalty range is, generally speaking, not so
excessive or unduly harsh as to shock the public sentiment and violate the
judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the
circumstances. See State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶31, 255 Wis. 2d
632, 648 N.W.2d 507. We perceive no basis to conclude that a sentence on the
upper end of the available punishment suggests to a reasonable observer, under the
circumstances of this case, that the judge was objectively biased against LeBlanc.

IV. LeBlanc has failed to demonstrate his sentence was animated by a
vindictive motive for his exercise of his appellate rights.

¶23 It is well-established that due process protections prohibit the
imposition of a vindictive sentence on a defendant who has successfully attacked a
conviction. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on
other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). LeBlanc acknowledges
that, even when a resentencing court’s sentence is longer than the original
sentence, no presumption of vindictiveness applies when different judges preside
over the sentencings. State v. Naydihor, 2004 WI 43, ¶52, 270 Wis. 2d 585, 678
N.W.2d 220.

¶24 Instead, LeBlanc bears the heavy burden of proving his new
sentence was prompted by actual vindictiveness for the exercise of his appeal
rights. See id., ¶33. With only the sentencing transcript as his proof, he has failed
to meet that burden. The circuit court explained in its sentencing remarks that a
lengthy sentence was necessitated by the facts of the case and the need for the

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No. 2023AP1517-CR

sentence to have a general deterrent effect. There was no vindictive element
apparent in the court’s sentencing rationale.

¶25 LeBlanc appears to argue a vindictive motive was implied by the
resentencing court’s review of the earlier sentencing materials and its opinion that
“Judge Rossell did a really excellent job in discussing this matter.” Notably, that
comment occurred at the inception of the court’s remarks regarding LeBlanc’s
views on extramarital sex, which the court explicitly stated played no part in its
sentencing decision. Ultimately, LeBlanc has not provided any authority
establishing it is improper for a judge at resentencing to review the prior
sentencing materials, nor has he connected the resentencing court’s review of
those materials to a vindictive motive for the sentence ultimately imposed.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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No. 2023AP1517(D)

¶26 LAZAR, J. (dissenting). “The [court] doth protest too much,
methinks.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.

¶27 This judge has concerns that sentencing courts make overly broad
use of “exculpatory” language to obscure the use of inappropriate factors when
sentencing a defendant. Here, the second sentencing judge 1 made great noise
about how LeBlanc’s unacceptable views on extramarital sex violated society’s
and religious mores, but that—despite that scandalous way of life—the court was
not considering that depravity, that selfishness, that immorality in its deliberations.
So just what did the re-sentencing court—protesting loudly methinks—not rely
upon. In response to LeBlanc’s first counsel’s argument in the original sentencing
that “the attitudes of having extramarital sex does not make him a danger to the
public,” that court stated “I don’t agree with that at all.” The re-sentencing court
then continued, in what can best be described as a diatribe:

History is just riddled -- ... the history of what we see in
the ruined lives of children who are victims of this kind of
selfish behavior, and if that doesn’t put the public in
danger, we should look around at what culture we are
living in today.

....

And we don’t even realize it. It is like putting
somebody in a bathtub and raising the temperature of the
water by one degree every ten minutes, and the bather
never knows that he is getting scalded because he’s

1
To avoid confusion, the second sentencing court, the Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder,
shall be referred to as either the re-sentencing court or the circuit court.
No. 2023AP1517(D)

desensitized to it by just the slowness of it, but we are
living in a police state that police have to be in the schools.
This is the culture that we are living in. It’s sick. It’s sick.
And to try to divorce the results that we have, the open
gunfire on the streets, the wild abuse of drugs, the requests
in spite of scientific evidence to the contrary to try to
legalize drugs, this is a cesspool we are getting into, and it
is largely due to the destruction of the -- what I grew up
with, the sanctity of the family.

And one could go into the history books, as I said, and
read about empires lost because of adulteress [sic]
behavior, and as I say, the children, they are talking about
how many suicides there were last year of little children,
about all the abandoned children. There are enormous
numbers of abandoned children.

The media never talks about that because that is not part
of their agenda, but the fact of the matter is we have huge
numbers of children who are living in emotional poverty
because their fathers aren’t involved with their lives.

….

… We are living in a state of fear, and it’s all because
in my estimation the destruction of the institutions that we
once revered.

So the idea that this kind of behavior doesn’t -- it ruins
families and that it doesn’t cause problems for society is
nonsense. Now, I’m not saying any of that to -- I’m saying
it in reaction to what I have read here from the defendant’s
prior attorney, and I am not commenting on the court of
appeals’ decision other than -- well, I’m not commenting
on it.

I want it understood that the defendant’s views on the
institution of marriage or about sexual mor[es], which, by
the way, as was pointed out by [the prior judge], do have
sponsorship in the State statutes which makes policy
decisions all the time, but, you know, that isn’t necessary to
touch any of that in dealing with this case, so I explicitly
state that while I have sounded off about it, nothing in the
sentence that is imposed today is reflective of
condemnation of the defendant’s views of -- it is not
figuring any kind of religious or moral beliefs into the
sentencing except to the extent that they are moral beliefs
that underlie things like you don’t have sexual relations
with children, 15-year-old girls. It incenses me. I was
incensed in reading some of these things and what I think

2
No. 2023AP1517(D)

are irrational statements that are made, but the fact that -- I
hear irrational statements all the time and they don’t affect
me. I just go, “Oh.”

….

… What induces this man who has had plenty of sexual
outlets with both men and women over a lengthy period of
time and who has no attitudes about the wrongfulness of
sexual behavior of any kind, that is what he says, and I
make no comment on that, but what is going to deter him
from this kind of conduct in the future?

.…

His motive was clear, the wrongfulness of his conduct
was clear, and you don’t have to make any conclusions
about his religiosity or lack thereof or his opinions about
how sexual practices should be regulated, if at all. None of
that has got any bearing on just making it loud and clear
here these are the things we don’t tolerate, and one of them
is tormenting and victimizing a young girl like this who
was especially vulnerable, but I don’t know that he knew
that.

¶28 The majority highlights the insincere disclaimers that are nothing
more than fig leaves in the re-sentencing court’s statements and conveniently
omits the comments that dominated the re-sentencing. Reviewing the statements
in their entirety is sufficient to demonstrate that the court did protest too much—
only after it stated its true and personal views—in order to cover those views and
“disclaim” any inappropriateness in its deliberations. This is entirely the reason
upon which the first sentence was sent back to the circuit court. Yet again,
LeBlanc appears to have been sentenced based on his (lack of) religious beliefs
and/or his “permissive attitudes towards sexual practices,” contrary to the
exhortations of the prior appellate opinion. See State v. LeBlanc,
No.2020AP62-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶14-18 (WI App July 30, 2021).

¶29 Yet now, the majority is comfortable with the re-sentencing court’s
“exercise of discretion” and eagerly hopes that we will all just “ignore the man

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No. 2023AP1517(D)

behind the curtain” and believe the repeated assurances that the re-sentencing
court’s actual personal, inappropriate remarks had no impact on its sentence and
that the sentence was fairly, impartially, and appropriately imposed. Sentencing
courts should not be able to use that blithe sleight of hand. They should be neutral
arbiters, not express their personal views and then claim those views do not impact
the sentence. This was, indeed, a sentence based on clearly irrelevant or improper
factors. See State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶31, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749
(“[A] sentencing court erroneously exercises its discretion when its sentencing
decision is not based on the facts in the record.”). It is, indeed, “highly probable
or reasonably certain” that the re-sentencing court “actually relied on [improper
factors] when imposing its sentence.” See State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶35, 326
Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. Although, the re-sentencing court may have
clearly—crystal clearly—stated that its comments would not impact the sentence,
it only did so after its lengthy diatribe. This judge does not believe that sleight-of-
hand “protestation.”

¶30 Moreover, the Record is replete with more than mere appearance
that the re-sentencing judge was biased against LeBlanc for LeBlanc’s non-
traditional views of sex and his unorthodox sexual history. This calls into question
LeBlanc’s right to be sentenced by an impartial judge. See State v. Goodson,
2009 WI App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. LeBlanc was deemed
selfish, a destroyer of all that is/was good in our society, the reason that children
are abandoned in numbers too high to calculate, and the cause for the prevalence
of drugs on our streets. Adulterers, which LeBlanc admitted he was, have laid
waste to society and fear is now rampant in our streets. The disdain dripping from
the re-sentencing court’s words was such that any reasonable person sitting in the
defendant’s chair would have felt a chill down his spine when he realized that he

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No. 2023AP1517(D)

was about to be sentenced, not for his heinous conduct,2 but for his lifestyle and
free-love beliefs. Anyone sitting in the defendant’s chair would have known that
the sentencing judge “could not be trusted to ‘hold the balance nice, clear and true’
under all the circumstances.” State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶24, 295
Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114. What happened during the re-sentencing was
inappropriate.

¶31 Finally, given the re-sentencing court’s obvious disdain for
LeBlanc’s lifestyle and beliefs, its repeated statements brushing off the
recommendations of the drafters of LeBlanc’s pre-sentence investigation report,
the backhanded comments about our prior opinion remanding the matter, and the
recommendations of the State, LeBlanc has met his burden to establish that there
was additional blowback for his initial, successful appeal. It is not merely that the
new sentence added five more years of initial confinement, it is the manner in
which the sentence was imposed. Vindictiveness peeked through all of the re-
sentencing court’s statements on the depravity of society and the harms that rained
down on adulterers throughout history. Due process demands that a re-sentencing
judge, imposing a new sentence after a successful appeal, must set aside any bad
feelings, lingering anger, or righteous indignation that a defendant had the
impertinence not only to appeal, but to appeal successfully. See North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).

¶32 In my view, LeBlanc has met his burdens to establish three of his
claims: (1) the re-sentencing court actually relied on improper factors in the

2
And, this conduct—preying on young children—is indeed heinous.

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No. 2023AP1517(D)

imposition of his sentence; (2) the court was objectively biased against him; and
(3) his sentence was animated by a vindictive motive due to his exercise of his
appellate rights. It is for all of these reasons that I respectfully dissent.

6