State v. Holly J. Grimslid

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 16, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP954-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2023CM225

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

HOLLY J. GRIMSLID,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse County:
SCOTT L. HORNE, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GRAHAM, J.1 Holly Grimslid was arrested for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), and her blood was drawn pursuant to a warrant.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(f) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version.
No. 2024AP954-CR

Grimslid moved to suppress the results of the blood test on Fourth Amendment
grounds because the officer refused her requests to use the bathroom for a period
of time after the arrest. The circuit court denied the motion, and Grimslid was
convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration,
second offense. Grimslid appeals her conviction, arguing that her motion should
have been granted. I disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in March 2023, an officer noticed a vehicle that was being
operated without its headlights illuminated, and further observed that the driver
incorrectly signaled a turn. The officer stopped the vehicle, which was driven by
Grimslid, after it pulled into a parking lot. As the officer questioned Grimslid, she
admitted to having “probably two drinks.” She spoke with slurred speech and
contradicted herself, and the officer detected an odor of intoxicants coming from
inside her vehicle.

¶3 The officer asked Grimslid to exit the vehicle and participate in field
sobriety testing. Grimslid exited the vehicle, but appeared to be unsteady on her
feet and did not consistently follow the officer’s directions. The officer stopped
field sobriety testing and arrested Grimslid. He placed Grimslid in the back of his
squad car and drove to the Mayo hospital where her blood could be drawn and
later tested for alcohol content.

¶4 Outside the hospital, and pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent
law, the officer read the “Informing the Accused” form to Grimslid. The form
explained, among other things, that Grimslid would be subject to penalties if she
refused to submit to a blood test. See WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4). The officer gave
Grimslid several opportunities to consent to testing, but her initial responses were

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No. 2024AP954-CR

conditional and equivocal. The officer said, “it’s a yes or no question,” and he
told Grimslid that if she did not answer, “it’s gonna be a refusal.” When, for a
final time, the officer asked Grimslid whether she would submit to a blood test,
she responded:

Uh, I will [pause] no, I’ll, you can take me into Mayo.
Take me into Mayo right now. I would wonderfully go into
May—Mayo right now. And, yeah, I would love to. Let’s
go. Let’s go to Mayo right now.

The officer later testified that he understood Grimslid’s responses to mean that she
was not consenting to testing.

¶5 The officer then began to prepare an application for a warrant to
draw Grimslid’s blood. Meanwhile, Grimslid remained handcuffed in the back of
the squad car.

¶6 As the officer finished preparing the application, Grimslid asked to
use the bathroom, and the officer responded, “No, not until I’m done.” Grimslid
repeated her request several times as the officer waited for the warrant application
to be approved. The officer did not always respond, but when he did, he repeated
that she could use the bathroom after “this process is done.” In total, it took more
than forty minutes for the warrant application to be approved.

¶7 After the warrant application was approved, the officer escorted
Grimslid into the hospital for a blood draw. Inside the hospital, Grimslid again
asked to use the bathroom several times, and the officer responded that she could
use the bathroom when they “get down to the jail.” After Grimslid’s blood was
drawn at the hospital, she was transported to the jail, where she was presumably
allowed to use the bathroom.

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No. 2024AP954-CR

¶8 The State filed a complaint that charged Grimslid with, among other
things, operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration and
while under the influence of an intoxicant, both as second offenses.2

¶9 Grimslid filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to
suppress the results of the blood test. In her motion, Grimslid alleged the arresting
officer violated the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement when he
“denied [her] the basic human right to relieve herself.” Grimslid asked the court
to suppress the results of the blood test on that basis.

¶10 Following an evidentiary hearing, at which the arresting officer
testified and his body camera footage was admitted into evidence, the circuit court
denied Grimslid’s motion. In so doing, the court acknowledged that some aspects
of the body camera footage were cringeworthy, and speculated that perhaps more
could have been done to allow Grimslid to use the bathroom while at the same

2
In a separate civil proceeding, La Crosse County Case No. 2023TR692, the State
sought to revoke Grimslid’s operating privileges on the ground that she refused the officer’s
request to submit to a blood test. See WIS. STAT. § 343.305(9)(a) (addressing refusal
proceedings). The transcript of the refusal hearing was included as a supplement to the appellate
record in this criminal case. In that transcript, the circuit court determined that Grimslid’s final
response to the officer’s request “lack[ed] some clarity,” but that under the circumstances, the
court was “not able to find that the State ha[d] met its burden of proof of establishing that there
was in fact a refusal.” See § 343.305(9)(a)5.c. (allowing a person to challenge, during a refusal
hearing, whether “[t]he person refused to permit the test”).

Later, during its oral decision in this criminal case, the circuit court characterized its prior
determination at the refusal hearing as an affirmative finding that Grimslid consented to the
search. I question that framing, and I further question whether a determination that the State
failed to satisfy its burden of proof on refusal is equivalent to a finding that a person in fact
consented to testing, such that a warrant would not have been constitutionally required to draw
her blood. See State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 (addressing
the factual and legal requirements for voluntary consent). However, I need not address the issue
further because it is undisputed that, whether due to the warrant that the officer obtained or
Grimslid’s alleged consent, there was a constitutional basis for the blood draw.

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No. 2024AP954-CR

time “safeguard[ing] the integrity of the [blood] sample that was about to be
obtained.” However, the court determined, there was a “lack of nexus between”
the officer’s denial of Grimslid’s requests to use the bathroom and the lawful basis
for the blood draw. Although the court could envision a situation in which a
person might consent to a blood draw based on an urgent need to use the
bathroom, that was not what had happened in Grimslid’s case.3

¶11 Following the denial of her pretrial motions, Grimslid pled guilty to
one count of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration,
second offense, and the circuit court entered a judgment of conviction. Grimslid
appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 The review of an order granting or denying a suppression motion
presents a question of constitutional fact. State v. Johnson, 2013 WI App 140, ¶6,
352 Wis. 2d 98, 841 N.W.2d 302. On appeal, I will uphold a circuit court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and I review de novo the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. Id.

¶13 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also WIS. CONST. art. I,

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On appeal, Grimslid points to comments that the circuit court made during the refusal
hearing about the lapse of time before Grimslid was allowed to use the bathroom, and she asserts
that the court “found that [the officer] acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” This
assertion mischaracterizes the court’s comments and the record. Although the court speculated
that more could have been done to allow Grimslid to use the restroom, it declined to weigh in on
whether the officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment because, it determined, she would
not be entitled to the remedy of suppression even if she was able to prove a constitutional
violation.

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No. 2024AP954-CR

§ 11 (providing similar protections). Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be suppressed as a
consequence of the unconstitutional search or seizure. State v. Dearborn, 2010
WI 84, ¶15, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97.

¶14 Accordingly, to demonstrate that the blood test results should have
been suppressed, Grimslid must first demonstrate that she was subject to an
unconstitutional search or seizure. However, Grimslid fails to show she was
unconstitutionally searched or seized.

¶15 I begin with the law that governs the constitutionality of a seizure.
Courts recognize two types of seizures: investigatory stops and “full-blown”
arrests. State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶¶20-22, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.
An officer may detain a person in an investigatory stop based on reasonable
suspicion;4 and an arrest is constitutionally justified if it is supported by probable
cause.5 Id. Here, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Grimslid’s vehicle
after he observed Grimslid operating the vehicle without headlights and using an
incorrect turn signal, and based on the officer’s observations during the stop, he
had probable cause to arrest Grimslid for an OWI offense. Indeed, during the
circuit court proceedings, Grimslid expressly conceded that she was not
challenging the basis for the investigatory stop or the subsequent arrest.

4
“Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer possess specific and articulable
facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Young, 2006 WI 98,
¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.
5
Probable cause requires that an arresting officer have sufficient knowledge at the time
of the arrest to lead the officer to reasonably believe that the defendant “probably committed or
was committing a crime.” State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 212, 589 N.W.2d 387 (1999).

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No. 2024AP954-CR

¶16 I now turn to the law that addresses the constitutionality of a search.
When law enforcement collects a blood sample for chemical testing, it conducts a
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966). A search is constitutional if it is authorized by a warrant that
complies with certain Fourth Amendment requirements.6 State v. Tate, 2014 WI
89, ¶28, 357 Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota,
579 U.S. 438, 474 (2016) (an officer must ordinarily obtain a warrant to obtain a
blood sample incident to an OWI arrest). Here, the officer obtained a warrant
authorizing the blood draw, and Grimslid does not challenge any aspect of the
warrant. Therefore, she does not establish that she was subjected to an
unconstitutional search.

¶17 Instead of arguing that the search or seizure was unconstitutional,
Grimslid argues that the blood test results must be suppressed based on the
conditions that she was subjected to after she was seized. More specifically,
Grimslid cites several federal cases that stand for the premise that the Fourth
Amendment may be violated by unreasonable conditions of confinement. See
Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464
F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Dart, 967
F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2020); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007);
Flores v. Lackage, 938 F. Supp. 2d 759 (N.D. Ill. 2013). She then argues that the

6
A warrant satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements if it constitutes prior authorization
by a neutral, detached magistrate; is based on a demonstration upon oath or affirmation that there
is probable cause to believe that evidence sought will aid in a particular conviction for a particular
offense; and contains a particularized description of the places to be searched and items to be
seized. State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, ¶20, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317.

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No. 2024AP954-CR

officer’s refusal to allow her to use the bathroom made the conditions of
confinement unreasonable, and that the proper remedy is to suppress the evidence.

¶18 I need not decide whether Grimslid has established a Fourth
Amendment violation for purposes of resolving this appeal. Although these are
not small assumptions in Grimslid’s favor, I assume without deciding that the
officer’s refusal to allow Grimslid to use the bathroom made the conditions of her
confinement objectively unreasonable, and might constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation. Even with those assumptions, I conclude that Grimslid is not entitled to
the remedy she seeks for two reasons.

¶19 First, Grimslid does not cite any authority to support the premise that
suppression of evidence in a criminal case is an available remedy for unreasonable
conditions of confinement. See Techworks, LLC v. Wille, 2009 WI App 101, ¶27,
318 Wis. 2d 488, 770 N.W.2d 727 (an appellate court need not address arguments
that are underdeveloped because they lack legal support). The conditions-of-
confinement cases that Grimslid cites do not contemplate suppression as a
remedy—instead, these cases address civil claims against the government, and
they support the premise that unreasonable conditions of confinement may be
remedied with monetary damages. See Currie, 728 F.3d at 628-31; Lopez, 464
F.3d at 717, 718-20; Williams, 509 F.3d at 401-03; Flores, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 763,
775-78.

¶20 Second, even if I were to assume that suppression could be an
available remedy for unreasonable conditions of confinement, I would not impose
that remedy here. The case law addressing the exclusionary rule specifies that
there must be a connection between a Fourth Amendment violation and the
evidence that a defendant is seeking to suppress. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467

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No. 2024AP954-CR

U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (“cases implementing the exclusionary rule ‘begin with the
premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal
governmental activity’” (citation omitted)). Here, Grimslid fails to establish any
such connection. As mentioned, her blood was drawn pursuant to a lawful
warrant, and the circuit court determined that there was no “connection between
denial of the request to use the restroom and the [blood draw].” Grimslid makes
no attempt to challenge this determination on appeal, and I agree with the circuit
court that there is a lack of nexus between the officer’s refusal to allow Grimslid
to use the bathroom and the collection of the blood sample.

¶21 Accordingly, for all these reasons, I conclude that the circuit court
did not err when it denied Grimslid’s motion to suppress evidence.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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