State v. Joseph J. Yeoman

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 20, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2148-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF227

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JOSEPH J. YEOMAN,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Ozaukee County: PAUL V. MALLOY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP2148-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Joseph J. Yeoman appeals his convictions for
burglary and felony bail jumping, contending that the State introduced insufficient
evidence at his jury trial to convict him of these offenses.1 Though circumstantial,
the evidence at trial—which included Yeoman’s DNA on a piece of a latex glove
found in the burglarized house—was nevertheless sufficient to support the jury
verdict. We therefore affirm.

¶2 The State charged Yeoman with burglary and felony bail jumping in
connection with the burglary of a private home from which more than ten thousand
dollars’ worth of property was stolen. According to the complaint, the burglary was
discovered by a housekeeper who was taking care of the residence while its owners
were out of state. The housekeeper found a piece of a latex glove inside the home
in an entry area, which was later tested and shown to contain Yeoman’s DNA, as
well as a bedroom that “looked like a tornado” had passed through it. She called
the police, who came to the scene and discovered not only the “ransacking” of
bedrooms but of other areas, including an office area in which it appeared that a
reciprocating saw had been used to cut open a desk. Investigators found that a barn
on the property contained an open first aid kit containing latex gloves consistent
with the glove piece found in the home and were told that two reciprocating saws
were taken from the barn.

¶3 At Yeoman’s jury trial, the housekeeper testified that when she
entered the house on the day in question, she noticed there was a part of a glove on
the floor as well as some decorative pillows out of place. She called the owner of
the house, who said the glove likely belonged to a contractor who was doing some

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Yeoman is not challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief,
in which he sought to be found eligible for the Substance Abuse Program and the Challenge
Incarceration Program. Therefore, we will not discuss that postconviction motion in this decision.

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

remodeling work. She picked up the glove piece and put it on a dresser next to the
front door. After she went upstairs and saw a bedroom “in disarray,” she fled from
the house and called 911.

¶4 After the owners of the home testified regarding items stolen in the
burglary, the State called as witnesses two police detectives who were dispatched to
the home on the day the burglary was discovered. The officers testified that they
did not notice any evidence of forced entry into the house and that they could not
find a viable fingerprint to lift around any exterior doors or around an unlocked
window near the front door. They testified that they had spoken with the contractor
doing the remodeling work on the property in their investigation, and that he told
them some tools were missing from the barn, including two reciprocating saws. The
officers also testified they had collected a reciprocating saw blade from the house
that they believed was used to cut open a credenza and that they discovered an open
first aid kit containing latex gloves consistent with the glove piece found by the
housekeeper in the barn. They believed that “maybe the person responsible for the
burglary had taken those gloves from the first aid kit as they were going through the
outbuildings and then entered into the main house,” although they did not submit an
exemplar to the crime lab to confirm that the glove piece found in the house was
from the kit found in the barn. The detectives’ “operating theory at the time was
that [the glove] ripped from whoever was wearing it and fell behind.”

¶5 Next, the contractor who had been doing the remodeling work on the
property testified that, although he was not on the premises, one of his employees
was working there on the day in question. That employee’s girlfriend—the
contractor’s stepdaughter—was also there to give the employee a ride home after
work.

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

¶6 Finally, a DNA analyst from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory
testified regarding DNA testing conducted as part of the investigation of the case.
She stated that there was a “two-person mixture” of DNA found on the latex glove
piece from inside the house. There was a “major male contributor,” whose DNA
was found both on the inside and on the exterior of the glove, and a “minor
contributor,” whose DNA (which could not be identified as being that of a male or
female) was found only on the exterior of the glove. Buccal swabs taken from the
contractor, his employee, the employee’s girlfriend, and the two owners of the house
were analyzed, and all of those individuals were ruled out as the minor contributor
to the DNA mixture on the glove. The crime lab was able to definitively identify
Yeoman as the major contributor of the DNA found on the glove piece.

¶7 Yeoman stipulated that, at the time of the burglary, he was charged
with a felony and released on bail and that one of the conditions of his bail was that
he commit no crime. Yeoman did not testify in his own defense, nor did he call any
witnesses.

¶8 At the close of the State’s case, Yeoman moved for dismissal or a
directed verdict “based on the State’s inability to prove the elements of the crimes.”
Defense counsel argued that “there hasn’t been a nexus shown between Mr. Yeoman
and that building or how that piece of glove might have gone there” which meant
“there has not been sufficient evidence … to sustain a finding of guilt on the
burglary charge.” The trial court denied Yeoman’s motion, concluding that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the State was for the jury to weigh.

¶9 The State argued in closing that “the glove itself … is undeniably the
piece of evidence that connects Mr. Yeoman to this offense” and that “Yeoman’s
DNA on this glove does not walk itself into the [victims]’ residence.” Although

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

Yeoman did not dispute that his DNA was on the glove material, defense counsel
argued to the jury that “someone else’s DNA is on that piece of latex” and that “a
reasonable hypothesis” is that “[s]omebody picked up this piece of whatever and
put it there” as a way to “throw the cops off.” The jury ultimately convicted Yeoman
on both counts with which he was charged, and the circuit court entered judgment.
Yeoman appeals, contending that the State did not present sufficient evidence to
convict him of burglary and felony bail jumping.

¶10 Yeoman has a heavy burden in attempting to set aside the jury’s
verdicts because our rules for review strongly favor sustaining them. See State v.
Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681; State v. Allbaugh,
148 Wis. 2d 807, 808-09, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989). “[T]he standard for
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is the same in
either a direct or circumstantial evidence case.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d
493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). We must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State, and we may reverse only if it “is so insufficient in probative
value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting
reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Although
Yeoman cites Poellinger for the proposition that “[a] finding of guilt may rest on
circumstantial evidence if the evidence is sufficiently strong and convincing to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant’s innocence,”
that case makes clear that the standard applicable to the trier of fact “is not the test
on appeal.” Id. at 503. Indeed, we “must accept and follow the inference drawn by
the trier of fact unless the evidence on which that inference is based is incredible as
a matter of law.” Id. at 507.

¶11 Yeoman cannot meet his heavy burden. The State introduced
evidence of Yeoman’s DNA on a piece of a latex glove found in the burglarized

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

house, which is circumstantial evidence of his being in that house. The glove piece
itself—being consistent with the type of gloves kept in a barn on the property from
which a saw used in the burglary was apparently also taken—and the circumstances
of its discovery—in a private home in which Yeoman’s presence was not
authorized—were sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that Yeoman dropped the
glove upon entering or exiting the home in the course of committing the burglary.
That the jury rejected defense counsel’s proffered explanation for Yeoman’s DNA
being found inside the house (that the object containing his DNA was dropped by
the burglar in an attempt to frame Yeoman) is not for this court to question. “It is
the jury’s task, … not this court’s, to sift and winnow the credibility of the
witnesses” and to make reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. See
State v. Toy, 125 Wis. 2d 216, 222, 371 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1985). Regardless
of whether we might conclude, upon an independent review of the evidence in the
Record, that there are reasonable theories consistent with Yeoman’s innocence, we
cannot “replace[] the trier of fact’s overall evaluation of the evidence with [our]
own.” See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 506. We must simply determine whether
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the requisite guilt was introduced,
as it clearly was here, and affirm if it was. See id. at 507.

¶12 We reject Yeoman’s argument based on United States v. Strayhorn,
743 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 2014), that the State’s evidence is insufficient because
Yeoman’s DNA was found on a movable object. In Strayhorn, the prosecution
secured a conviction by relying on evidence of a defendant’s partial fingerprint on
duct tape (a readily movable object) that had been used to bind the legs of a victim
in the robbery of a store. 743 F.3d at 921. The prosecution’s expert witness
“testified that he could not determine when” the fingerprint had been made on the
duct tape and that it could have been as long as a year before the robbery. Id. The

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

Fourth Circuit vacated the conviction, holding “that in challenges to convictions
involving fingerprints on movable objects, in the absence of evidence regarding
when the fingerprints were made, the government must marshal sufficient additional
incriminating evidence so as to allow a rational juror to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. at 923.

¶13 Obviously, the Fourth Circuit’s Strayhorn decision is not binding on
this court. In addition, as the State aptly points out and as we have mentioned above,
the piece of glove and the circumstances of its discovery in this case are sufficient
incriminating evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer Yeoman’s guilt.
Unlike the movable object in Strayhorn, the glove piece was found not in a public
place but in a private home that Yeoman was not authorized to enter.

¶14 Our decision in State v. Scott, 2000 WI App 51, 234 Wis. 2d 129, 608
N.W.2d 753, is more applicable and supports the jury’s verdicts. Scott was
convicted of burglary based on his fingerprint found on a “desk dock” from which
a computer was stolen. Id., ¶2. On appeal, he argued that this evidence was
insufficient because the State failed to preempt alternative theories, including that
his fingerprint was on the dock station before it entered the building from which it
was stolen and had somehow survived delivery and use. Id., ¶¶13, 15. This court
pointed out the correct standard of review (as we have done above) and affirmed the
conviction, stating that Scott’s argument was based on “specious speculation” and
noting that the State’s evidence established not only that Scott’s fingerprint was on
the dock station from which the computer was stolen, but that Scott had no business
being on the premises, which was a private building not permitting “casual entry.”
Id., ¶¶15-16. These facts led to the reasonable inference that Scott committed the
burglary. Id., ¶16. Likewise, the State’s evidence in this case established that

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No. 2023AP2148-CR

Yeoman was not authorized to be in the burglarized house and it was equally
sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer Yeoman’s guilt.

¶15 Finally, with respect to his conviction for felony bail jumping,
Yeoman concedes that the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction
depends only on whether the conviction for burglary stands. Because, as described
above, Yeoman has not succeeded in showing that his burglary conviction must be
overturned, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).

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