State v. C. M.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 15, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2024AP1416 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2022TP15
2022TP16
2024AP1417 2022TP174
2024AP1418
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2024AP1416

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.D., A PERSON UNDER THE
AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

C.M.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2024AP1416
2024AP1417
2024AP1418

APPEAL NO. 2024AP1417

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.D., III, A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.

C.M.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2024AP1418

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.D.M., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

C.M.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOSEPH R. WALL, Judge. Affirmed.

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2024AP1417
2024AP1418

¶1 WHITE, C.J.1 Corinna appeals from the orders terminating her
parental rights to her children, Alicia, Curtis, and Ava.2 She argues that the circuit
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it concluded that the termination of
parental rights (TPR) was in the best interests of the children. She asserts that the
circuit court’s finding that there was not a substantial relationship between her and
the children was not supported by the record. Upon review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Corinna is the mother of Alicia, born May 2018, Curtis, born
October 2019, and Ava, born October 2021. After the Division of Milwaukee
Child Protective Services (DMCPS) responded to a call reporting domestic
violence concerns between Corinna and Calvin, the father of the children, Alicia
was detained in August 2019. Curtis was taken into DMCPS custody after his
birth due to continued domestic violence incidents. Despite a no-contact order and
criminal charges, Corinna and Calvin had their third child together, Ava, who was
detained by DMCPS immediately after a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) stay
after her birth in 2021.

¶3 DMCPS filed TPR petitions for Alicia and Curtis in February 2022,
and Ava in September 2022; the matters were joined in October 2022.3 The

1
These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2021-
22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
We refer to the family in this matter by pseudonyms to maintain confidentiality and
privacy, in accordance with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g).
3
Calvin’s parental rights were also terminated in this matter; however, his rights are not
before us in this appeal and we address this no further.

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2024AP1417
2024AP1418

grounds alleged were that the children remain in continuing need of protection or
services (continuing CHIPS) and failure to assume parental responsibility.
Corinna was sentenced to over four years of imprisonment in August 2022 on
multiple charges related to domestic abuse and bail jumping.

¶4 Corinna elected to enter no-contest pleas on each TPR petition in
January 2023 on the continuing CHIPS ground. The circuit court found that the
State proved the ground for the TPR petitions through testimony from the family
case manager.

¶5 The case proceeded to the dispositional phase, during which
testimony was heard from a foster parent for Curtis and Ava; a foster parent for
Alicia; the family case manager; a supervised visitation worker; Calvin; and
Corinna. The circuit court explained that the dispositional phase is based on the
best interests of the children. The court stated that while a parent’s hopes were
relevant to the best interests of the children, this phase focuses on the children.
The court noted that “the legislature has recognized that when reunification in the
family is not possible, parental rights should be terminated at the earliest feasible
time[.]” The court observed that months or weeks of delay that may seem short to
an adult are extraordinarily long for children. The court stated that “[d]epriving
the child of a permanent home deprives the child of his or her childhood[.]”

¶6 After reviewing the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the
circuit court addressed the six required statutory factors.4 As Corinna’s appeal
focuses on the third factor, we recite those facts in detail.

4
In determining the disposition of a TPR petition, the circuit court must consider, but is
not limited to, the following six factors:
(continued)

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2024AP1418

¶7 For the third factor, the circuit court considered whether each child
had a substantial relationship with each parent, and if so, whether there would be
harm to the children to sever those relationships. The court concluded that Curtis
and Ava were too young to have “formed the sort of bonds” considered in this
analysis. The court considered Alicia to have a bond with her mother, but it was
limited by years of separation. The court also acknowledged that the severance of
the legal relationship between the parents and children meant that despite any
good intentions of the foster or adoptive parents to maintain a relationship, there
was no legal requirement for them to continue the relationship. Further, the court
expressed concerns about the children’s cultural experiences and exposures as
Black children being raised by white adoptive parents. However, considering this
third factor as applied to the facts of this case, the court concluded that it was
neutral or weighed slightly in favor of termination.

¶8 Additionally, the court addressed the other five factors. For the first
factor, the court concluded that the likelihood of adoption after termination was

(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the
disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed
from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the
parent or other family members, and whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and
permanent family relationship as a result of the termination,
taking into account the conditions of the child’s current
placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of
prior placements.

WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3).

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“as certain as anything can be in life” with both foster families prepared to adopt
the three children. For the second factor, the court concluded there was nothing in
the children’s ages or current health that would bar them from being adopted if the
TPR petitions were granted. For the fourth factor, the court concluded the
children were too young to express wishes about termination. For the fifth factor,
the court considered the children had been separated from their parents for all of
Ava’s life, substantially all of Curtis’s life, but that Alicia had memories of
Corinna. Nonetheless, the court noted that Alicia had expressed that she wants to
stay with her foster family. For the sixth factor, the court considered that the
children would be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family
relationship if the TPR petitions were granted. The court considered the children’s
current placements to be “excellent,” and that past placements had been difficult.
The court doubted whether the parents would ever meet the conditions to return
the children to their care, leaving the children to remain in foster care.

¶9 The court concluded that “[u]ncertainty is never in a child’s best
interest” and that the foster families offered the children stability. Ultimately, the
circuit court then found it was in the best interests of each child to grant the TPR
petitions for both parents.

¶10 Corinna now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Corinna argues that the circuit court’s conclusion that the
termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the children was an
erroneous exercise of discretion. She asserts that the court’s findings on the third
factor are not supported by the record. This factor requires the court to consider

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whether the child has a substantial relationship with the parent or other family
members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these
relationships. WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). Corinna contends she has a substantial
relationship with her children and it would be harmful to sever those relationships.

¶12 Termination of parental rights is governed by the Wisconsin
Children’s Code. The first step is a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the
grounds exist to terminate parental rights. See WIS. STAT. §§ 48.415, 48.424.
Here, Corinna pled no-contest to the continuing CHIPS ground and the circuit
court heard evidence from the State to prove its case. The second step is the
dispositional phase, in which the circuit court decides whether the evidence
warrants the termination of parental rights and if the termination is in the best
interests of the child. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶23, 246 Wis. 2d 1,
629 N.W.2d 768. “During this step, the best interests of the child are paramount.”
Id. The circuit court must consider at least the six factors in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.426(3). “[T]he record should reflect adequate consideration of and weight to
each factor.” State v Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶35, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610
N.W.2d 475.

¶13 “The ultimate determination of whether to terminate parental rights
is discretionary with the circuit court.” Id., ¶27. We will sustain a circuit court’s
discretionary decision unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion. WIS.
STAT. § 805.17(2). “A circuit court properly exercises its discretion when it
examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, and using a
demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach.” Dane County DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶39, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828
N.W.2d 198.

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¶14 Corinna argues that the circuit court’s consideration of the third
factor failed to take into account her testimony about her love for her children.
The record reflects that Corinna testified about her bond with her children,
providing love, personal care, and favorite foods for Alicia, Curtis, and Ava. She
testified about her plans to improve her life while she is in prison by studying for
her GED and developing better coping skills. She feared that the children would
harbor resentment toward her if they were not raised by family. She was
concerned about instability from the children being with foster families instead of
relatives. The court read into the record a letter Corinna wrote to the court
expressing her hopes for life after prison—volunteering with other women to
protect their children and being with her children.

¶15 We conclude that Corinna’s argument misunderstands the third
factor by focusing on Corinna’s belief in her bond with the children, and not on
any substantial attachment by the children to her. Corinna does not develop an
argument about her children’s attachment to her, much less that the circuit court
disregarded evidence of their substantial bond.

¶16 Further, we note that the circuit court considered the third factor
neutral to only slightly weighing in favor of termination. The circuit court
considered all factors. Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶35. The court did not
need to find all factors weighed in favor of termination to conclude that the TPR
was warranted because it was in each child’s best interests. Id. In our review of
the circuit court’s discretionary decision making, we search for evidence to
support the court’s findings, “not for evidence to support findings the [circuit]
court could have reached but did not.” Noble v. Noble, 2005 WI App 227, ¶15,
287 Wis. 2d 699, 706 N.W.2d 166. Here, the circuit court thoroughly considered

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the statutory factors and the facts of these cases. It focused on the children and
their current and future stability.

¶17 Additionally, Corinna argues that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion when it relied upon the foster parents’ promises to
maintain a relationship with the children’s biological family because such a
promise is unenforceable. This argument does not change our analysis. The
record reflects that the circuit court considered the promises to be in “good faith”
but acknowledged that the TPR severed the legal relationships with Corinna. It
noted that Wisconsin did not offer open adoption, which could change the
analysis. See Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶¶28-30 (discussing the circuit
court’s right to afford due weight on an adoptive parent’s promise to continue
visitation while also bearing in mind that such promises are legally
unenforceable).

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the circuit court
considered the relevant facts under the proper standard of law and employed
rational decision-making to reach a decision a reasonable court could reach.
Mable K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶39. We conclude that the circuit court properly acted
within its discretion when it terminated Corinna’s rights to her children.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

9