State v. Donald Lee Billings

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 19, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP605-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF413

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DONALD LEE BILLINGS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Winnebago County: DANIEL J. BISSETT, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Neubauer and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2022AP605-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Donald Lee Billings appeals a judgment convicting
him of first-degree intentional homicide and unlawfully possessing a firearm as a
previously convicted felon. He also appeals an order denying his motion for
postconviction relief. He argues: (1) that he was denied the right to a trial by a fair
and impartial jury; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
support his conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. We affirm.

¶2 Billings was charged with first-degree intentional homicide and
unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon in the death of Adam Baith. A jury
convicted him of both counts. Billings moved for postconviction relief, arguing a
violation of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the State and the defense stipulated
to facts that served as the basis for the claim. The circuit court denied the motion.
This appeal follows.

¶3 Billings first argues that his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community was violated because the jury venire significantly
underrepresented Black Americans. According to the stipulated facts, jury venires
in Winnebago County in 2021, as well as the jury panel called for this case, were
drawn from a random list of people provided by the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV). In addition, Black Americans constituted 2.5% of the population in
Winnebago County per the United States Census Bureau, but Black Americans
constituted only .81% of the jury venire panels in Winnebago County. Billings
claims that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion stemming from
the jury selection process.

¶4 The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a
defendant the right to a “jury selected from a fair cross section of the community.”

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No. 2022AP605-CR

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1979). To show a prima facie violation
of the fair cross section requirement, a defendant must establish:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive”
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process.

Id. at 364. Whether Billings has made a prima facie case under Duren is a question
of law that we review independently. See State v. Arrington, 2022 WI 53, ¶33, 402
Wis. 2d 675, 976 N.W.2d 453.

¶5 We focus on the third prong of the Duren test. Billings argues that
the jury selection process in Winnebago County systematically underrepresents
Black Americans because Winnebago County uses records from the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) to draw its jury pool, and those records disproportionately
exclude minorities, who are less likely to have driver’s licenses. He also contends
that Wisconsin statutes excluding felons from jury service disproportionately limit
the number of Black Americans in the jury pool, citing statistical evidence on racial
disparities in incarceration rates.

¶6 Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that Billings has carried
his burden of showing that Black Americans are underrepresented in the jury venires
of Winnebago County, Billings has not carried his burden of showing that the
underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion of Black Americans.
Although Wisconsin courts have apparently not addressed when
underrepresentation of a distinct group is systematic under Duren, we believe the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court is persuasive: “[a] defendant does not
discharge the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to

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No. 2022AP605-CR

systematic exclusion merely by offering statistical evidence of a disparity. A
defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper
feature of the jury selection process.” People v. Henriquez, 406 P.3d 748, 763 (Cal.
2017) (alteration in original; citation omitted). The Henriquez court further
explained that “[w]here … a county’s jury selection criteria are neutral with respect
to the distinctive group, the defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in
which those criteria are applied that is not only the probable cause of the disparity
but also constitutionally impermissible.” Id.

¶7 Billings has not shown that the disparity here is the result of some
constitutionally impermissible feature of Winnebago County’s jury selection
process. Billings contends that randomly drawing potential jurors from DMV
records disproportionately excludes minorities, but he has not shown that any other
available governmental list or method of procuring potential jurors would have
produced a jury venire that is more representative of the population. Without
evidence showing that an alternative source of potential jurors would expand the
diversity of the jury pool, and thus include more Black Americans, Billings’
argument lacks a proper evidentiary underpinning.

¶8 Moreover, Billings provides no legal authority to support his
argument that Wisconsin’s felon exclusion law results in constitutionally
impermissible jury pools. This is an argument that has been routinely rejected by
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979). In sum, without evidence
regarding the effect of using other sources to create jury venires or legal authority
to support his felon exclusion law argument, Billings has not established that he
meets the third prong of the Duren test—that the underrepresentation was due to
systemic exclusion.

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No. 2022AP605-CR

¶9 Billings next argues that his conviction was not supported by
sufficient evidence. “[A]n appellate court may not reverse a conviction unless the
evidence, viewed most favorably to the [S]tate and the conviction, is so insufficient
in probative value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no trier of fact,
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). The standard for
reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is the same as the standard
for reviewing a conviction based on direct evidence. Id. “[T]he trier of fact is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and alone is charged with the duty of
weighing the evidence.” State v. Below, 2011 WI App 64, ¶4, 333 Wis. 2d 690, 799
N.W.2d 95. “When more than one inference can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence, the inference which supports the trier of fact’s verdict must be the one
followed on review unless the evidence is incredible as a matter of law.” Id.

¶10 The jury viewed a surveillance video showing Billings and Baith
talking at a bar and leaving together. Billings’ friend, Cristafer Berdell, testified
that he was with Dominica Propst and Billings at the bar. When the bar closed, they
left to follow Baith to his home with the intention of continuing to drink. Berdell
further testified that upon arrival at Baith’s home, he and Propst stayed in the car
talking and smoking while Billings and Baith went inside. Berdell heard gunshots
seven or eight minutes later and called 911, fearing that Billings had been shot.

¶11 Propst testified that she left the bar with Berdell and Billings. She
saw Billings and Baith enter Baith’s home and heard gunshots a while later.

¶12 One of the responding police officers testified that he saw a man leave
through the back door of Baith’s house but lost sight of him. Upon entering the
home, the police found Baith dead. Billings’ DNA and his palm prints were found

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No. 2022AP605-CR

inside. The medical examiner testified that Baith died from multiple gunshot
wounds, with evidence suggesting close-range firing. Baith’s wallet and Billings’
cell phone were found on nearby property, suggesting a possible attempt to dispose
of evidence.

¶13 Shortly after Baith’s murder, surveillance footage captured Billings
arriving at his girlfriend’s home nearby and then leaving shortly thereafter. Billings’
girlfriend testified that Billings arrived at her house at around 4:30 a.m., was acting
suspiciously and demanded that she immediately drive him to Milwaukee.

¶14 The evidence presented at trial, briefly summarized above, which
included witness testimony, physical evidence, and forensic analysis provided a
robust basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Billings was
responsible for the death of Baith. We reject the argument that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that Billings was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of first-degree intentional homicide.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2021-22).

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