Pavloski Development, LLC v. David Lulich

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 22, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1337 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV176

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

PAVLOSKI DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND
ISLAND LAKE AT COPPER POINT, LLC,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V.

DAVID LULICH AND LULICH LANDSCAPING, LLC,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Juneau County:
STACY A. SMITH, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Kloppenburg, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2021AP1337

¶1 PER CURIAM. Pavloski Development, LLC and Island Lake at
Copper Point, LLC (together, “Pavloski Development”) appeal a circuit court
judgment, following a bench trial, dismissing their suit against David Lulich and
Lulich Landscaping, LLC (together, “Lulich Landscaping”). For the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts and procedural history are undisputed unless
otherwise noted. Pavloski Development owns a residential property development
in Juneau County, comprising approximately 400 lakefront properties, called
Island Lake at Copper Point (“Island Lake”). Brad Pavloski is a member of
Pavloski Development. David Lulich owns Lulich Landscaping, LLC, a
landscaping company.

¶3 Island Lake is subject to an “amended and restated declaration of
covenants, conditions and restrictions” (“the Covenants”), whose general purpose
is to preserve the aesthetic and commercial value of the properties and the
development as a whole. The Covenants set forth requirements for architectural
uniformity and establish an architectural control committee (“the Committee”) to
pre-approve certain construction projects. The Committee is part of the Island
Lake homeowner’s association, and Pavloski is a member of the Committee.

¶4 In January 2017, Pavloski Development recorded the following
amendment to the Covenants (“the Approved Builder Restriction”), which requires
lot owners to contract only with builders, contractors, and subcontractors on
Pavloski Development’s “approved list”:

No builder, general contractor, or subcontractor shall
commence construction of any structure or improvement

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without the prior written approval of the Committee.
Developer[1] and the Committee shall have the sole right to
prohibit builders, general contractors and subcontractors
including … landscapers … from building structure or
improvements on the Lots. There is an approved builder,
contractor and subcontractor list. Each Lot owner shall
have the obligation to determine if a builder, contractor or
subcontractor is on Developer’s approved list prior to
entering into any contract for the construction of
improvements.

This amendment also provides that “[t]he Owner’s Association, on behalf of the
… Committee … shall have the right to assess fines against the Lot Owner if work
has begun prior to the approval of plans associated with construction ….”

¶5 In addition to the Covenants between Pavloski Development and the
lot owners, Pavloski Development has an agreement with certain landscaping
companies permitted to do work on Island Lake properties. Pavloski testified that
he made unwritten “[h]andshake agreements” with these companies “to be able to
[stay] on the [approved] list,” under which the companies agreed to “cost share
with our marketing [expenses]” by paying Pavloski Development 8% of the
landscaping quote. Pavloski testified that this “shared marketing agreement”
reimbursed Pavloski Development for its “marketing costs” while allowing the
landscapers to have “jobs … simply handed to them.” Pavloski testified that
Pavloski Development received “over $100,000” under this arrangement in 2020
alone. Lulich Landscaping, in contrast, describes this arrangement as a “kickback
scheme.” In this opinion, we refer to the unwritten “commission” arrangement

1
Although “Developer” is defined in the Covenants and various amendments as Copper
Point Investments, Inc.—a separate entity—we understand that Pavloski, who is a member of
Pavloski Development, is also a member of Copper Point Investments and exercises control over
the approved contractor list. Lulich Landscaping does not argue that Plaintiff-Appellant Pavloski
Development is not a party to the Covenants and amendments or is not the proper party to bring
this suit; accordingly, we do not address these issues.

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between Pavloski Development and certain landscapers as the “handshake
agreement.”

¶6 Before the Covenants were amended to include the Approved
Builder Restriction, Lulich Landscaping had been permitted to perform, and had
performed, landscaping work on Island Lake properties. After the amendment
was recorded, however, Pavloski told Lulich that Lulich Landscaping would not
be on the “approved list” of landscapers. Pavloski testified that he did not want
Lulich Landscaping on this list primarily because he was unhappy with the quality
of Lulich Landscaping’s work. Lulich, in contrast, testified that Pavloski kept his
company off of the list because Lulich refused to pay Pavloski Development a
percentage of the total contract price on future projects.

¶7 In April 2018, Lulich provided a landscaping quote to Ryan
Callahan, an Island Lake property owner. Shortly after that, Lulich Landscaping
began landscaping work on Callahan’s property. Pavloski learned of the project
and told Callahan that his plans were not approved. Callahan agreed to stop
Lulich Landscaping from doing any further work. Pavloski also called Lulich,
told him to stop working on Callahan’s property, and reminded him that he was
not on the approved landscaper list. Lulich Landscaping did not do any further
work on Callahan’s property. Instead, an approved landscaper—Abba
Landscaping—finished the Callahan job at the price that Lulich Landscaping had
quoted. Pavloski testified that he did not charge Abba Landscaping the usual 8%
“commission” because he “did not want to have [Abba Landscaping] working
there for free or for a loss.”

¶8 In August 2018, Pavloski Development sent Lulich a cease and
desist letter, threatening suit if Lulich Landscaping did not agree to stop “its

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misrepresentations to lot owners in Pavloski’s developments that Lulich
Landscaping can do work in those developments.” In September 2018, Pavloski
Development filed the instant suit against Lulich Landscaping for tortious
interference with contract. In addition, Pavloski Development sought a permanent
injunction prohibiting Lulich Landscaping from: (1) “informing owners of lots …
that [it] can perform landscaping work on such lots,” (2) “performing landscaping
work on lots in Island Lake,” and (3) “making representations to any other person
or entity that [it] can perform landscaping work on lots in Island Lake.”

¶9 The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which Pavloski and Lulich
were the only witnesses. On its tortious interference claim, Pavloski Development
sought approximately $1,800 in damages, representing the 8% “commission” for
the Callahan job that it did not collect from Abba Landscaping.2

¶10 At the close of evidence, the circuit court found that Pavloski
prohibited Lulich Landscaping from working on Island Lake properties not
because of the quality of its work but solely because Lulich had refused to
participate in the handshake agreement. In addition, the court found that the
handshake agreement “[wa]s a kickback scheme”3 and that Pavloski Development
did not have “clean hands.” The court further found that Island Lake property
owners were largely unaware of the handshake agreement and that the owners
were shouldering the additional cost of the “commission,” meaning that the
owners were unknowingly “paying eight percent more on anything dealing with

2
Pavloski Development also sought punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs.
3
The circuit court stated that the handshake agreement might violate federal law;
however, it expressly declined to decide the point, stating, “I’m not making that ruling today on
anything along that line.”

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landscaping.” Moreover, the court acknowledged the fact that Lulich Landscaping
was not a party to the Covenants, and it therefore determined that Lulich
Landscaping owed no duty to Pavloski Development stemming from the
Covenants.

¶11 The circuit court concluded that Pavloski Development had not
established its claim for tortious interference with contract. The court further
declined to issue an injunction, and it dismissed Pavloski Development’s suit with
prejudice. Pavloski Development appeals. We will set forth additional facts
where relevant.

DISCUSSION

I. Tortious Interference with Contract

¶12 Our review of the circuit court’s dismissal, following a bench trial,
of Pavloski Development’s claim of tortious interference with contract presents a
mixed question of fact and law. Cf. Halverson v. River Falls Youth Hockey
Ass’n, 226 Wis. 2d 105, 115, 593 N.W.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1999) (post-trial ruling
on plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment presented a mixed question of fact and
law). We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we determine
de novo whether the court correctly applied the law to the facts found. See WIS.
STAT. § 805.17(2) (2019-20)4; Halverson, 226 Wis. 2d at 115.

¶13 The elements of a claim of tortious interference with contract are:

4
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted.

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(1) the plaintiff had a contract or a prospective contractual
relationship with a third party, (2) the defendant interfered
with that relationship, (3) the interference by the defendant
was intentional, (4) there was a causal connection between
the interference and damages, and (5) the defendant was
not justified or privileged to interfere.

Briesemeister v. Lehner, 2006 WI App 140, ¶48, 295 Wis. 2d 429, 720 N.W.2d
531. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving elements (1) through (4) of the
above test. See Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 2004 WI App 110,
¶18, 274 Wis. 2d 719, 685 N.W.2d 154. Element (5) is essentially a defense to the
tort, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that it was justified or
privileged to interfere. Id., ¶38.

¶14 Pavloski Development argues that the circuit court erred by finding
that Pavloski Development was required to prove that Lulich Landscaping was a
party to and in privity with the contract. Pavloski Development contends that a
claim of tortious interference with contract necessarily rests on there being a party
not privy to the contract who interfered with the contract. See Briesemeister, 295
Wis. 2d 429, ¶48.

¶15 As we address further below, in its oral ruling, the circuit court did
indeed discuss the fact that Lulich Landscaping was not a party to the Covenants.
Moreover, at times, the court did not specifically distinguish its analysis of the
tortious interference claim from its analysis of the claim for a permanent
injunction. However, after considering the court’s ruling in full, we conclude that
any discussion of Lulich Landscaping as a “party” to a contract was meant to
address Lulich Landscaping’s argument that an injunction was not warranted
because Lulich Landscaping owed no duty to Pavloski Development—meaning
that Lulich Landscaping could not “violate a right of” Pavloski Development
through any allegedly harmful future conduct. See Kocken v. Wisconsin Council

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40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 2007 WI 72, ¶27 n.12, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d
828 (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Accordingly, we
conclude that the court’s comments do not demonstrate a misapplication of the law
of tortious interference with contract.

¶16 We further agree with Lulich Landscaping that Pavloski
Development’s claim for tortious interference with contract fails as a matter of law
because—at a minimum—Pavloski Development has not established the fourth
element of its claim, i.e., that “there was a causal connection between the
interference and damages.” See Briesemeister, 295 Wis. 2d 429, ¶48. On appeal,
as before the circuit court, Pavloski Development identifies the Covenants’
Approved Builder Restriction as the contract with which Lulich Landscaping
allegedly interfered. Pavloski Development’s damages, however, do not stem
from any alleged interference with the Approved Builder Restriction. Pavloski
Development does not argue, for example, that Lulich Landscaping’s alleged
interference decreased property values or impeded its ability to sell Island Lake
properties.

¶17 Instead, Pavloski Development’s damages of approximately $1,800
stem from the “commission” it did not receive under an entirely separate
contract—the handshake agreement. The Covenants, however, do not reference or
incorporate the handshake agreement. Nor do the Covenants depend in any way
on the handshake agreement.5

5
In fact, the Covenants are potentially at odds with the handshake agreement. The
purpose of the Covenants is to protect the aesthetic and commercial value of the Island Lake
properties and the development as a whole. Presumably to this end, the Covenants’ Approved
Builder Restriction requires property owners to choose from an approved list of builders,
contractors, and subcontractors. According to Pavloski, however, the purpose of the handshake
(continued)

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¶18 Pavloski Development does not meaningfully respond to Lulich
Landscaping’s argument that Pavloski Development failed to prove a causal
connection between Lulich Landscaping’s alleged interference with the Covenants
and Pavloski Development’s damages. Instead, Pavloski Development merely
states that the two contracts—the Covenants’ Approved Builder Restriction and
the handshake agreement—are “interconnected.” But this cursory statement does
not address Lulich Landscaping’s central argument, which is that, under the
causation standard for a claim of tortious interference with contract, damages must
necessarily stem from the contract with which the defendant allegedly interfered.
See id. Accordingly, Pavloski Development’s argument is undeveloped, and we
will not consider it further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d
633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“We may decline to review issues inadequately briefed.”).

¶19 In sum, even if Pavloski Development could show that Lulich
Landscaping intentionally interfered with the terms of the Covenants, it cannot
show that this interference caused it to incur any damages under the Covenants.
Because Pavloski Development’s damages stem from the operation of a second
and wholly separate contract, its claim fails as a matter of law.

agreement is to allow Pavloski Development to recoup some or all of its “marketing expenses.”
Thus, the handshake agreement arguably undercuts the Covenants: it excludes potentially high-
quality landscapers from doing work on Island Lake properties (while incidentally causing
owners to unknowingly pay additional costs for landscaping services). Here, for example, the
circuit court found that Lulich Landscaping was prohibited from doing work on Island Lake
properties not because of the quality of its work but solely because it declined to participate in the
handshake agreement. The record supports this finding: Lulich testified to this effect; moreover,
he testified that his company was still permitted to do work on other developments owned by
Pavloski Development that were not subject to the handshake agreement.

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II. Permanent Injunction

¶20 The circuit court’s decision to deny injunctive relief to Pavloski
Development was committed to its sound discretion, meaning that we review that
ruling for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266,
¶¶24-25. “A circuit court’s discretionary decision will be sustained if the circuit
court has examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, and,
using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable court
could reach.” Id., ¶25.

¶21 To obtain a permanent injunction, “a plaintiff must show a sufficient
probability that future conduct of the defendant will violate a right of and injure
the plaintiff.” Id., ¶27 n.12 (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
“A permanent injunction will not be granted unless there is the threat of
irreparable injury that cannot be compensated with a remedy at law.” Id. “In
other words … to warrant an injunction, the injury must be real, serious, material,
and permanent, or potentially permanent; the right to the injunction must be clear;
and the reasons for granting it strong and weighty.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and quoted source omitted).

¶22 As stated, Pavloski Development sought a permanent injunction
prohibiting Lulich Landscaping from: (1) “informing owners of lots … that [it]
can perform landscaping work on such lots,” (2) “performing landscaping work on
lots in Island Lake,” and (3) “making representations to any other person or entity
that [it] can perform landscaping work on lots in Island Lake.” It is unclear from
the phrases “can perform landscaping work” whether Pavloski Development
sought an injunction to prevent Lulich Landscaping from falsely telling lot owners
that Lulich Landscaping was somehow approved to do landscaping work in Island

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Lake. (Emphasis added.) If this is the basis for the claim, however, Pavloski
Development has not provided any evidence from the record (nor have we
identified any) to support the premise that Lulich Landscaping made any such
misrepresentations. To the contrary, Lulich’s unrefuted testimony was that he
provided quotes to owners and attempted to perform landscaping work on Island
Lake properties but that he never misrepresented his status as a landscaper
approved to work in the development. Accordingly, to the extent this request is
premised on Lulich Landscaping’s misrepresentations to lot owners, the circuit
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying the injunction request.
See Johnson v. Roma II-Waterford LLC, 2013 WI App 38, ¶34, 346 Wis. 2d 612,
829 N.W.2d 538 (we may independently review the record to identify reasons
supporting the circuit court’s exercise of discretion).

¶23 As to the injunction request more generally—including the request
to enjoin Lulich Landscaping from performing landscaping work—we agree with
the circuit court that Pavloski Development failed to establish any basis for that
request. As the court noted, Lulich Landscaping indisputably was not a party to
the Covenants, which governed only the actions of property owners vis-a-vis the
Committee and Pavloski Development. Thus, the court correctly concluded that
Lulich Landscaping owed no duty to Pavloski Development stemming from the
Covenants. Pavloski Development points to no other source of duty that Lulich
Landscaping might owe to Pavloski Development that would require Lulich
Landscaping to refrain from providing quotes to property owners or to refrain
from performing work on property owners’ lots. See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266,

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¶27 n.12. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise
its discretion in rejecting Pavloski Development’s request for an injunction.6

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court judgment
dismissing Pavloski Development’s suit with prejudice.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

6
The circuit court may have also determined that an injunction was unwarranted because
there were “strong and weighty” reasons against granting it, namely, that Pavloski Development
was involved in a potentially illegal kickback scheme that Lulich was attempting to circumvent
through legal and appropriate means. See Kocken v. Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, 2007 WI 72, ¶27 n.12, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 (internal quotation marks and
quoted source omitted). Moreover, the court may have determined that an injunction was
unwarranted because Pavloski Development had an adequate remedy at law, namely, to directly
sue any lot owners for damages caused by Lulich Landscaping’s unapproved work. See id. We
need not reach, and therefore do not address, these potential additional bases for denying the
injunction.

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