Benjamin Paul Meeuwsen v. Darci Lynn Meeuwsen

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 21, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP418 Cir. Ct. No. 2012FA685

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

BENJAMIN PAUL MEEUWSEN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

DARCI LYNN MEEUWSEN,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Brown County:
MICHAEL T. JUDGE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2020AP418

¶1 PER CURIAM. Darci Meeuwsen, pro se, appeals postdivorce
orders regarding property division.1 Darci argues the circuit court erred when it
offset amounts that she allegedly owed against equalization payments owed to her
by her former husband, Benjamin. Darci contends that Benjamin’s lump sum
payment of the entire equalization payment—rather than his payment of that sum
over the fifteen years the court permitted—prevented Darci from receiving interest
payments over the period. Darci further argues the court erred by failing to hold a
de novo hearing regarding unpaid variable expenses that Darci allegedly owed.
Additionally, Darci argues that the court should never have appointed a guardian
ad litem (GAL) to help represent her best interests, while she simultaneously
argues that the court erred by failing to accommodate her disability. We reject
these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Darci and Benjamin were married in July 1995. Benjamin filed for
divorce in June 2012, and in December 2013, the circuit court entered a partial
divorce judgment pertaining to legal custody and physical placement. A contested
divorce hearing regarding maintenance and property division subsequently took
place in 2014.

¶3 The circuit court entered a decision and order addressing those
issues on February 26, 2015.2 The court awarded $90,000 in yearly maintenance

1
For ease of reading, because the parties share the same surname, we refer to the parties
by their given names for the remainder of this opinion.
2
The Honorable John P. Zakowski presided over the divorce trial and entered the initial
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Divorce. The Honorable Michael T.
Judge presided over the remainder of the divorce proceedings.

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to Darci, for a period of five years. With respect to property division, the court
awarded to Benjamin the family business with a stipulated value of $2.64 million,
and ordered Benjamin to begin making property division equalization payments to
Darci in the total amount of $1,298,697 after completion of the five-year
maintenance period. In addition, Darci was awarded the marital residence and
cottage. The court further ordered that Benjamin pay the full amount of the
equalization payment within fifteen years after the maintenance payments were
completed. A “floor” payment of $53,000 was ordered to be paid each year, with
interest accruing on the unpaid balance at the rate of three percent per year
commencing when the first equalization payment was due in March 2020.
Benjamin was also ordered to pay all additional profits derived from the family
business every year. Benjamin’s attorney was directed to draft a judgment
consistent with the court’s February 26 order. A supplemental divorce judgment
was entered on March 5, 2015.3

¶4 At an October 2015 hearing, the circuit court, on its own motion
under WIS. STAT. § 806.07 (2019-20),4 revisited three issues arising from the
divorce judgment to rectify “mistakes in its original decision.” Specifically, the
court: (1) amended the interest rate on the equalization payments from three to
five percent; (2) provided a mechanism to secure the equalization payments;

3
Darci filed a notice of appeal from the divorce judgment on August 19, 2015. By order
dated October 12, 2015, we dismissed that appeal, No. 2015AP1715, concluding we lacked
jurisdiction to review the divorce judgment due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. An
additional appeal resulted in an unpublished opinion dated May 23, 2017, affirming each of the
circuit court’s decisions. See Meeuwsen v. Meeuwsen, No. 2015AP2578, unpublished slip op.
(WI App May 23, 2017). A third appeal, No. 2016AP1223, was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
4
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2020AP418

and (3) ordered Benjamin to provide Darci with financial information, including
quarterly financial statements. Thereafter, Benjamin filed a motion seeking to
enforce provisions of the divorce judgment, including that Darci pay her required
variable expenses and requiring her to refinance the mortgages for the two pieces
of real estate that she received under the divorce judgment.

¶5 In January 2019, a family court commissioner entered an order
awarding Benjamin $18,438.03 for unpaid variable expenses that Darci had been
responsible for paying. The circuit court later confirmed the amount in a March
2019 order. Shortly thereafter, based on Darci’s allegation that she is disabled and
unable to appear or represent herself during hearings, the court entered an order
appointing a GAL for Darci “to [e]nsure that [Darci’s] best interests are
adequately represented.”

¶6 In September 2019, the circuit court noted that with the interest on
the equalization payment balance accruing at 5% per annum, the $53,000 annual
equalization payments ordered as part of the divorce judgment would pay for only
a portion of the interest and pay nothing toward the principal balance due. The
court therefore reduced the interest on the equalization payments to 3.5% per
annum to be more in line with what the court had originally intended in the
divorce judgment.

¶7 In a November 2019 order, the circuit court discharged the GAL
based on a request Darci made through her power of attorney—her mother, Anita
Leatham. The September 2019 order was then vacated. The circuit court entered
an order that the parties pay $5,198.85 in already incurred GAL fees “from real
estate sale proceeds and as determined by further order of the court.” On
January 10, 2020, the court issued a decision stating:

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This court, therefore, reaffirms the original Judgment,
Decisions and Order of Judge Zakowski in that Ben shall
pay commencing March 1, 2020, an annual floor payment
of $53,000 plus the annual profits of the Fourinox
Corporation which cannot be determined until the end of
the 2020 tax year, interest at 5% shall accrue but is not
required to be paid on an annual basis.

Further, the parties have disputes as it concerns variable
expense payments and sale of parcels of real estate. When
and if the parties wish to address these issues, please call
my judicial assistant to schedule a hearing in that regard.

¶8 In February 2020, the circuit court amended its January 10, 2020
order. In June 2020, however, the court issued a subsequent decision and order
vacating the February 2020 order and reinstating its January 10, 2020 order in full
as follows:

a. Although interest shall accrue on the equalization
payment as set forth in Judge Zakowski’s Order dated
November 20, 2015, Benjamin is not obligated to make any
additional monthly payment towards accrued interest. All
such accrued-interest payments shall be made via [the
family business’s] net profit payments. Any additional
monthly payment obligation set forth in the Court’s
February 24 Decision and March 12 Order are vacated. By
way of clarification, the Court’s prior orders that Benjamin
make monthly equalization payments in the amount of
$7,500 are hereby vacated and of no further force or effect.

b. As set forth in Judge Zakowski’s original March 2015
Decision, Benjamin’s minimum annual payment obligation
is $53,000 plus all net profits from [the family business].
Subject to the provisions set forth below in Subsections 2.c
and 2.d, Benjamin shall make his minimum monthly
payments via wage assignment to the Wisconsin Support
Collections Trust Fund, P.O. Box 74200, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin 53274-0200. Benjamin’s minimum annual
payments of $53,000 shall be made in the amount of
$2,038.46 per biweekly pay period. Benjamin’s annual net
profit payments shall be made promptly each year
following the closing of [the family business’s] preceding
year’s books.

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No. 2020AP418

Thereafter, Leatham filed a UCC Financing Statement with the Wisconsin
Department of Financial Institutions attempting to record a lien against Benjamin
and his current wife’s property. The court ultimately ordered the UCC lien
stricken and expressly limited any liens “to the terms of the divorce judgment.”

¶9 In November 2020, in an effort to end the ongoing discord,
Benjamin claimed that he was able to secure sufficient financing to “pay off his
entire equalization payment.” Darci now appeals. Additional facts are included in
the discussion below.

DISCUSSION

¶10 As an initial matter, Benjamin argues that his payment in full of the
property division equalization payments renders moot any issues regarding the
amount of monthly equalization payments due. We generally do not consider
moot issues. State ex rel. Olson v. Litscher, 2000 WI App 61, ¶3, 233 Wis. 2d
685, 608 N.W.2d 425. An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical
effect on the underlying controversy. Id. The record on appeal, however, is
entirely unclear as to whether the circuit court approved the full payment with
offsets, as articulated by Benjamin. Given the uncertainty in the record, we
assume without deciding that the issues regarding the manner and amounts of the
equalization payments are not moot.

¶11 The division of property and the determination of maintenance in a
divorce proceeding are within the circuit court’s discretion, and we will not disturb
the court’s determinations unless the court erroneously exercised its discretion.
LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789. We will
uphold a circuit court’s discretionary decision as long as the court examined the
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and used a demonstrated rational

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process to reach a reasonable conclusion. Id., ¶13. Because the notion of
discretion is fundamental to the circuit court’s ability to fulfill its role in the legal
system, we will search the record for reasons to sustain its exercise of discretion.
Roy v. St. Lukes Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, ¶11, 305 Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d
256.

¶12 Turning to the merits, Darci argues5 that the circuit court violated
WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1c)(b) by modifying the property division after the divorce
judgment was entered. She argues that the while the court “does have authority to
construe ambiguities” in the divorce judgment, interpretation of the judgment is a
matter of law, not an exercise of discretion. More specifically, Darci asserts that
the court erred in modifying the amount of interest payable on the equalization
amount and then modifying the terms of Benjamin’s payment. Darci further
asserts that the divorce judgment was ambiguous, in that it was subject to two
different interpretations, and that the court misinterpreted it as requiring a base
payment of $53,000 per year, plus all of Benjamin’s corporate profit. Darci
instead claims that the court’s reference that the equalization payment will be in
the form of a “15 year mortgage” meant the amount payable must be amortized
with interest over fifteen years.

5
Darci fails to fully develop many of her arguments and her brief lacks many necessary
record cites. We are not required to sift through the record for facts to support Darci’s argument;
rather, it is Darci’s responsibility to provide proper references to the record. See Keplin v.
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 319, 324, 129 N.W.2d 321 (1964); see also WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(e). Additionally, it is unclear from what orders Darci appeals. Benjamin asks
this court to dismiss Darci’s appeal for the above reasons. However, because we generally
provide pro se litigants a degree of leeway in complying with the rules expected of lawyers, we
decline to do so. See Rutherford v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 66, ¶27, 309 Wis. 2d 498, 752 N.W.2d
897.

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No. 2020AP418

¶13 Darci’s citations to the record and authority are inaccurate. In the
original divorce judgment, the circuit court ordered:

The court therefore orders that the equalization payment of
$1,298,878 be paid from [Benjamin] to Darc[i] by having
[Benjamin] pay a minimum amount of $53,000 each year
and all profits from [the family business] to her every year
beginning March 1, 2020. Interest is to accrue on the
unpaid balance at 3% per year. Full payment is due and
payable within 15 years, or by February 1, 2036. The
equalization payment will thus be in the form of a 15 year
mortgage (Current interest rates on a 15 year mortgage are
near 3%). Interest does not begin to accrue until the first
payment in March 2020. Thus for five years [Benjamin]
pays nothing on the buyout while paying maintenance.

Darci argues that the court’s use of the term “mortgage” was meant to reflect the
court’s intention that the equalization payment be fully amortized, including the
accruing of interest. The divorce judgment, however, does not contain any
provision requiring that the equalization payment be fully amortized or that it
cannot be paid off in full sooner. In fact, the court’s order identified that the
payments occur over no more than fifteen years, not that they last a duration of
fifteen years. While Darci may disagree with the result, her disagreement alone
does not establish an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Reinders v.
Washington Cnty. Sch. Comm., 15 Wis. 2d 517, 526, 113 N.W.2d 141 (1962).
The court ultimately modified its postdivorce orders concerning the interest rate
payable and manner of the equalization payment to those ordered in the divorce
judgment. Thus, the court order did not modify the divorce judgment property
division as it reinstated the original order.

¶14 Darci also claims that the circuit court erred in allowing Benjamin
“to deduct from [Darci’s] property division payments to pay the GAL fee … and
then pay himself for … variable expenses [Benjamin] had filed against Darci.”

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We disagree. The court retained the original property division, and the offsets
were ordered to ensure that all of the obligations of each party were followed.
When Darci failed to pay the amounts due and the resulting outstanding judgment
negatively affected Benjamin’s credit and ability to borrow the money to fund the
equalization payments, the court properly ordered the fees and judgment to be
offset. Nothing about the credits the court granted with regard to the equalization
payments reduced Darci’s net receipt under the property division. Rather, the
offsets merely allowed for partial distribution of Darci’s equalization payments to
her creditors as required under the various, already existing garnishment orders.
Accordingly, the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in this regard.

¶15 Darci next argues that the circuit court erred by failing to hold a
de novo hearing regarding the unpaid variable expenses that she allegedly owed.
Darci further claims she opposed the amount of variable expenses sought by
Benjamin in his August 1, 2018 motion.

¶16 The operative order regarding Darci’s unpaid variable expenses due
to Benjamin was filed on January 23, 2019, and it related to expenses incurred
during the period between March 15, 2018, and August 21, 2018. The March
2019 order of the family court commissioner—following the January 2019
order—recognized that the variable expenses issue had already been litigated at
least twice before and confirmed the amount of variable expenses due. Darci,
however, did not file a formal request for a de novo hearing on the variable
expenses issue until June 23, 2019, several months after the family court
commissioner entered the January 2019 order and well past the thirty-day deadline

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established in the Brown County Circuit Court local rules.6 As such, the circuit
court did not err by failing to hold a de novo hearing on the issue of variable
expenses.

¶17 As to Darci’s claim for variable expenses due from Benjamin, she
argues that at a June 27, 2019 hearing, the circuit court erred when it “did not want
to hear the motion and moved on to other issues.” She asserts that Brown County
has no mechanism to address de novo review of the variable expenses issue.

¶18 A hearing was held on February 17, 2020, to address the variable
expenses issue. During that hearing, the circuit court addressed several matters,
including the outstanding joint real estate mortgages and variable expenses.
Benjamin’s counsel specifically addressed the issue of variable expenses. When
asked to respond to the variable expenses issue, neither Darci nor her power of
attorney chose to address the issue. In spite of notice that the issue of variable
expenses would be considered and the court’s invitation for Darci to address the
issue at the hearing, Darci declined to comment. Under the circumstances, Darci
has waived any quarrel regarding the variable expenses issue by failing to address
it despite the court’s invitation. See Gedicks v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 74, 84, 214
N.W.2d 569 (1974) (“The right to object on appeal to what was not objected to
initially, at time of trial, is waived.”). Because Darci has waived any complaint
regarding the court not addressing her motion on variable expenses, we need not
address her complaint that Brown County has no mechanism to address a de novo
review of a court commissioner’s variable expense decision.

6
See BROWN CNTY. CIRC. CT. R. 812.

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¶19 Finally, Darci argues that the circuit court should never have
appointed a GAL to help represent her best interests, while she simultaneously
argues that the court erred by failing to accommodate her disability. Darci asserts
that the court’s appointment of a GAL violated the Americans with Disability Act
(ADA), and that the court’s decision to revoke previous permission allowing
Leatham to act as Darci’s lay advocate violated her rights to a reasonable
accommodation.

¶20 Darci provides no relevant authority for her position, and her
argument is underdeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). We cannot determine if the circuit court somehow
erred in appointing a GAL or violated Darci’s rights under the ADA without more
information about the nature and extent of her claimed disability. If Darci was
truly unable to represent herself and needed assistance, the court very
appropriately appointed a GAL. Following Darci’s persistent objections, the GAL
was discharged. The fact that Darci no longer wanted the GAL’s assistance does
not mean the court erred in the initial appointment

¶21 Further, and contrary to Darci’s wishes, her mother cannot represent
her in a court of law as Leatham is not an attorney. The law on this issue is quite
clear: “Every person who appears as agent … for or on behalf of any other person
… shall be deemed to be practicing law within the meaning of this section.” WIS.
STAT. § 757.30(2). Only individuals in possession of “a license to practice law as
an attorney of a court of record in this state” are permitted to practice law in the
State of Wisconsin. Sec. 757.30(1). The primary purpose of Wisconsin’s
unauthorized practice of law statutes is “to assure that the public is not put upon or
damaged by inadequate or unethical representation.” Littleton v. Langlois, 37
Wis. 2d 360, 364, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967).

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¶22 In addition, the record is clear that Leatham acted improperly by
filing a UCC Financing Statement with the Wisconsin Department of Financial
Institutions in an attempt to record a lien against Benjamin and his current wife’s
property. The circuit court addressed the issue in its July 23, 2020 order
prohibiting Leatham “from further appearing on behalf of [Darci].” Based on the
foregoing, the court committed no error, and, instead, appropriately exercised its
discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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