Ronald L. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Board of Review

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 27, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP669 Cir. Ct. No. 2017CV4572

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. RONALD L. COLLISON,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE BOARD OF REVIEW,

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
GLENN H. YAMAHIRO, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Brash, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Ronald L. Collison, pro se, appeals the circuit
court’s order affirming the Board of Review’s decision. The Board upheld the
No. 2018AP669

City of Milwaukee’s $31,800 tax valuation of his property for 2016. This appeal
is nearly identical in law and fact to Collison’s prior appeal of his 2012 property
tax assessment. See State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee, No.
2013AP2130, unpublished slip op. (WI App Sept. 9, 2014). Collison argues that
the assessment of his property was improper because his property’s fair market
value is zero dollars. He also argues that both the City of Milwaukee
Environmental Contamination Standards (CMECS) and the Wisconsin Property
Assessment Manual conflict with WIS. STAT. § 70.32 (2017-18).1 We affirm.

¶2 On appeal, we review the decision of the Board, not the circuit court.
See State ex rel. Stupar River LLC v. Town of Linwood, 2011 WI 82, ¶16, 336
Wis. 2d 562, 800 N.W.2d 468. Our review is limited in scope to determining:
(1) whether the Board acted within its jurisdiction; (2) whether the Board acted
according to law; (3) whether the Board’s action was arbitrary, oppressive or
unreasonable; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to allow the Board to
reasonably make its decision. See id. “There is a presumption that the assessor’s
valuation is correct.” Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 167 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 482
N.W.2d 326 (1992) (citation omitted). “The burden of producing evidence to
overcome this presumption is upon the person who seeks to attack the
assessment.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶3 Collison first argues that the Board’s assessment of his property was
improper because no one wants to buy his property due to the fact that it contains
environmental pollution, the extent of which is unknown. He contends that the

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted.

2
No. 2018AP669

market value of his property is therefore zero dollars. Collison’s argument is
unavailing.

¶4 WISCONSIN STAT. § 70.32(1) provides: “Real property shall be
valued by the assessor in the manner specified in the Wisconsin [P]roperty
[A]ssessment [M]anual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or from the
best information that the assessor can practicably obtain, at the full value which
could ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.” The Wisconsin Property
Assessment Manual explains that “market value can be derived by using the cost,
income, or sales comparison approaches.” See Allright Props., Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567 (citation
omitted). “[R]eal estate must be valued at its highest and best use.” Id., ¶18.

¶5 City of Milwaukee assessor Jim Wiegand used an income approach
to determine the fair market value of Collison’s property because there were no
recent sales of the property or similar properties. Wiegand testified that the
income approach best reflected the value of the property because the property had
previously been used as a parking lot and thus had, or could have, rental income.
Wiegand testified that the assessor’s office was aware that the site had
environmental contamination, but explained that he had no information about the
extent of the problem or the possible cleanup costs, and therefore could not
conclude that the property was worthless as Collison claimed. Wiegand further
explained that, whether the property was contaminated or not, it could generate
income as a parking lot and that the income approach was thus chosen because it
represented the best use of the property. See id. (real estate should be valued at its
highest and best use).

3
No. 2018AP669

¶6 The assessor’s valuation is presumed to be correct. See WIS. STAT.
§ 70.47(8)(i). “The party challenging a property assessment must show why its
method of valuation is more reliable or accurate than the assessor’s chosen
method.” See ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Board of Review, 231 Wis. 2d 328, 348, 603
N.W.2d 217 (1999). Collison has not shown why his unsubstantiated claim that
the property has a market value of zero dollars is more accurate than Wiegand’s
decision to use an income approach to determine market value based on the best
use of the property as a parking lot. Collison’s contention that he was previously
unable to sell the property does not establish that the property is worthless,
especially given its location in a prime downtown Milwaukee area that has been
increasing in value. There could be a variety of reasons that the property did not
previously sell.2 Collison provided no evidence about the extent of the
environmental contamination and cost to clean it up to support his assertion that
the property has a market value of zero. Therefore, Collison has not overcome the
presumption that the assessor’s evaluation was correct.

¶7 Collison next argues that the CMECS impermissibly allows the City
to ignore WIS. STAT. § 70.32 unless the land owner obtains a Phase II
environmental assessment. We agree with the circuit court’s analysis rejecting
this argument:

[Collison] challenges the legality of a provision of the
CMECS, which states that without at least a Phase II Audit
substantiating property contamination, the property must be

2
For example, Collison previously informed the Board that he gives all potential buyers
a document explaining that “[a]ny party who chooses to conduct a Phase II [environmental]
sampling on the property must enter into an indemnification agreement with [him] to pay, without
qualification, for any remediation costs that result from the discovery of any contamination on the
subject property.” See State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP2130, unpublished
slip op. at ¶5 (WI App Sept. 9, 2014).

4
No. 2018AP669

valued as if uncontaminated. [Collison] contends that this
provision is contrary to the requirement of [WIS. STAT.]
§ 70.32(1m) that “the assessor shall consider the
impairment of value of the property … because of
environmental pollution….” Although [Collison’s]
arguments regarding the CMECS are intriguing and may be
ripe for determination at some future date, his arguments
fail because the assessor and the Board recognized the
contamination even though [Collison] has not completed or
sought a Phase II [A]udit.

Because the assessor did not ignore the contamination of the property in valuing it,
and the Board did not ignore the contamination in upholding that valuation, we
reject Collison’s argument.

¶8 Finally, Collison argues that the Wisconsin Property Assessment
Manual conflicts with WIS. STAT. § 70.32(1m) because it allows properties to be
valued using an income approach, which Collison contends does not reflect the
amount his property would sell for on the open market, the measure Collison
believes is correct under § 70.32(1m). Although the specific contours of this
argument are difficult to discern, Collison is essentially restating his prior
argument that his property assessment was incorrect because the assessor did not
adequately consider the environmental contamination of his property in his
valuation. As we previously explained, the assessor did consider the possible
contamination and therefore used an income approach. This decision was
reasonable because, as the assessor testified, he did not have any information
about the extent of the possible environment problem or the potential costs to
remedy the problem. Therefore, Collison’s challenge to the valuation is
unavailing.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

5
No. 2018AP669

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

6