Andrew J. Baxter v. Jessica L. Baxter

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 20, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1236 Cir. Ct. No. 2019FA260

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

ANDREW J. BAXTER,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

JESSICA L. BAXTER,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Chippewa County:
JAMES M. ISAACSON, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2022AP1236

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jessica Baxter appeals from an order
supplementing the circuit court’s previous property division and maintenance
awards on her divorce from Andrew Baxter.1 On appeal, Jessica asserts that her
maintenance award should be higher based upon the court’s stated intention to
equalize the parties’ income. Jessica also asserts that the court erred by failing to
include, without explanation, some assets in the marital estate.

¶2 We conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in determining the amount of maintenance payable to Jessica and
dividing the parties’ property. Specifically, the court failed to adequately explain
how it determined the amount of maintenance awarded to Jessica, and on our
review of the record, we cannot find a basis for the amount awarded. The court
similarly failed to make any factual findings supporting its decision to exclude
certain vehicles from the marital estate. We therefore reverse the portions of the
court’s order setting Andrew’s maintenance obligation and the equalization award.
We remand with instructions for the court to explain how it reached the
maintenance award, or alternatively, to recalculate the maintenance award to
reflect an amount that is actually equalized, along with an explanation of how it
arrived at that amount. We further remand with directions for the court to
reconsider whether the vehicles at issue were properly excluded, and if not, to
determine their fair market value.

1
Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names throughout
the remainder of this opinion.

2
No. 2022AP1236

BACKGROUND

¶3 The parties married in April 2000 and had two children together.2
Andrew filed for divorce in October 2019.

¶4 A final contested divorce hearing took place in December 2020, at
which the primary issues were property division and maintenance. Following
testimony from the parties and other witnesses, the circuit court orally granted a
judgment of divorce but reserved ruling on the contested issues until the parties
submitted further evidence and briefed the issues.3

¶5 After a hearing and briefing, the circuit court addressed the contested
issues in a written decision on April 13, 2021. The court ordered Andrew to pay
Jessica $1,200 per month in maintenance for ten years, specifically saying that it
was doing so in “an attempt to equalize their income.” The court also divided the
parties’ assets and debts, and it ordered Andrew to make an equalization payment
of $33,764 to Jessica. The court entered another order on April 29, 2021,
concerning the refinancing of a vehicle loan and a mortgage on the parties’ home.
The April 29 order also stated that the court would entertain motions for
reconsideration and clarification of prior orders.

¶6 Jessica and Andrew filed separate motions for reconsideration of the
circuit court’s April 13 and 29, 2021 decisions. Andrew argued for an amendment
to the initial asset and debt division. Conversely, and as relevant to this appeal,

2
By the time the judgment of divorce was entered, both children had reached the age of
majority.
3
The court memorialized these rulings in a January 2021 judgment.

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No. 2022AP1236

Jessica argued that Andrew should be required to pay additional maintenance in
order to fully account for Andrew’s higher income. Jessica also argued that she
was entitled to a greater equalization payment because the court included some,
but not all, of Andrew’s vehicles in its property division analysis, despite the fact
that Jessica had established the existence of those vehicles.4

¶7 In August 2021, the circuit court entered a written “decision on
motion to reconsider,” addressing Andrew’s motion by reducing the debts
assigned to Jessica and amending the equalization payment to reflect the reduced
debts. This resulted in a reduced equalization payment due to Jessica in the
amount of $1,661.25. The August decision did not address Jessica’s motion for
reconsideration. Jessica sent a letter to the court in November 2021 requesting
that it address, among other things, her motion for reconsideration of the
April 13, 2021 decision as it related to the property division and the vehicles.

¶8 A hearing was held to address the remaining issues between the
parties, including Jessica’s motion for reconsideration. With respect to the
property division and the vehicles, the circuit court denied Jessica’s motion for
reconsideration in a December 2021 written order. The court did not address
Jessica’s motion for reconsideration of the maintenance award.

¶9 Afterward, the parties further litigated a number of remaining
issues—none relevant to this appeal—including allocating medical bills and loans.
The circuit court issued a supplemental decision addressing the remaining issues

4
One of the “vehicles” that Jessica claims Andrew owns is actually a trailer. For
simplicity’s sake, and in line with the parties’ briefing, we refer to all of Andrew’s alleged
unaccounted for items as “vehicles.”

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No. 2022AP1236

in March 2022. In May 2022, the court issued amended findings of fact and a
supplemental order that incorporated the March 2022 decision into the
April 13, 2021 decision. Ultimately, the court ordered Andrew to make an
equalization payment of $3,852.92 to Jessica. Andrew’s maintenance obligation
remained at $1,200 per month.

¶10 Jessica now appeals from the May 2022 order. Additional facts will
be provided below as necessary.

DISCUSSION

I. Maintenance

¶11 Jessica first argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by ordering Andrew to pay her $1,200 per month in maintenance.
Jessica contends that if the court truly intended to “equalize” the parties’ income,
the maintenance award should be $1,408 per month.

¶12 Upon issuing a judgment of divorce, a circuit court “may grant an
order requiring maintenance payments to either party for a limited or indefinite
length of time … after considering all of the” factors enumerated in WIS. STAT.
§ 767.56(1c)(a)-(j) (2021-22),5 including the length of the marriage, the division of
property, the earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, and “[s]uch other
factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.” Id.
“These factors reflect and are designed to further the two primary objectives of
maintenance—‘to support the recipient spouse in accordance with the needs and

5
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2022AP1236

earning capacities of the parties’ and ‘to ensure a fair and equitable financial
arrangement between the parties.’” Ladwig v. Ladwig, 2010 WI App 78, ¶17, 325
Wis. 2d 497, 785 N.W.2d 664 (citation omitted).

¶13 The determination of maintenance in a divorce action is a decision
entrusted to the discretion of a circuit court and it is “not disturbed on review
unless there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion.” LeMere v. LeMere,
2003 WI 67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789. “A circuit court’s
discretionary decision is upheld as long as the court ‘examined the relevant facts,
applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process,
reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.’” Id. (citation omitted).
“A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it makes an error of law or
neglects to base its decision upon facts in the record.” Id., ¶14 (citation omitted).

¶14 The circuit court “assumed” that Andrew’s annual income was
$112,619 and Jessica’s income was $58,920.6 The court stated that the $1,200 per
month awarded to Jessica for maintenance was based upon “an attempt to equalize
[the parties’] income” after it considered the following facts: the parties were
married for nearly twenty years; Jessica “was the parent primarily responsible for
the custodial duties in raising two children during which time she was, if not
completely out of the workforce, … employed at entry level employment earning
entry level income”; and Jessica, even with a registered nurse license, “will likely
not ever achieve the income level of [Andrew] or become self supporting at a

6
The circuit court found that Andrew “earns more than he disclosed…. Probably
substantially more.” However, the court stated that Jessica “could not prove up an exact number”
and that it would not “speculate” as to Andrew’s actual income. Neither party on appeal
challenges the income figures relied upon by the court. We will therefore assume, without
deciding, that the court correctly relied upon the stated income figures.

6
No. 2022AP1236

standard of living the parties enjoyed while married.” The court ordered Andrew
to pay the maintenance award for ten years to allow Jessica “time to pursue a
specialty if she chooses where she may be able to earn more income.” Neither
party challenged, or challenges on appeal, the court’s finding that a maintenance
award for a period of ten years was appropriate under these circumstances.

¶15 Using a tax software program—TaxCalc21—Jessica argued in her
motion for reconsideration that to “equalize” the parties’ incomes, the circuit court
would need to order Andrew to pay maintenance of $1,408 per month. This figure
represents the equalization of the parties’ “net spendable income.”

¶16 Andrew does not dispute that the $1,408 per month figure would
constitute an equalization of the parties’ incomes after taxes were considered.
Rather, he argues that circuit courts are permitted to use “many methodologies” to
achieve equalization. According to Andrew, “within each of those methodologies,
there is variability depending on what assumptions the person using the program
inputs, such as tax elections.” Andrew states that a monthly award of $1,200,
which would result in a “2% deviation from a 50% award, is not a clearly
erroneous award of maintenance.”

¶17 A circuit court must “illuminate its reasoning in reaching” a
maintenance award. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 84, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982).
Here, the circuit court considered the factors listed in WIS. STAT. § 767.56(1c) and
determined that without maintenance, Jessica would not be able to become
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed
during the marriage. See Ladwig, 325 Wis. 2d 497, ¶17.

¶18 Critically, however, the circuit court failed to provide any
explanation for how it arrived at the $1,200 per month figure from the parties’

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No. 2022AP1236

incomes. In Ladwig, the circuit court calculated maintenance using the
“Mac Davis computer program,” which “makes necessary tax calculations, such as
after-tax income and the effect of tax exemptions.” Id., ¶29 & n.15. Although the
court’s maintenance decision articulated how it reached the maintenance award
figure, it did not provide its reasoning for awarding one spouse both dependency
exemptions or for not accounting for real estate tax deductions. Id., ¶31. This
court remanded with directions for the circuit court to reconsider these issues
because it failed to articulate its reasoning regarding the same. Id.

¶19 As in Ladwig, the circuit court’s reasoning here does not permit us
to determine how the court calculated the maintenance award figure. The record
does not demonstrate whether the court considered the parties’ tax consequences
and elections—such as through the use of a Mac Davis or TaxCalc21 computer
program—or whether it based the figure on some other variable or methodology.
Although we are permitted to search the record for evidence supporting a circuit
court’s discretionary decision, see Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶7, 235
Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737, after doing so, we are unable to determine why
$1,200 per month in maintenance payable to Jessica constitutes an equalization of
the parties’ income, or how that amount meets the fairness and support objectives
for an award of maintenance. See Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d at 82; Steinke v. Steinke,
126 Wis. 2d 372, 388, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985). We therefore reverse the portion
of the court’s order setting Andrew’s maintenance obligation and remand with
instructions for the court to either explain how it reached the $1,200 per month
figure, or, alternatively, to recalculate the maintenance award to reflect an amount

8
No. 2022AP1236

that is actually equalized, along with an explanation of how it arrived at that
amount.7

II. Property division

¶20 Jessica next contends that the circuit court erred by dividing the
parties’ property without including, or explaining why it was not including, twelve
vehicles in the marital estate.8

¶21 Upon every judgment of divorce, a circuit court “shall divide the
property of the parties.” WIS. STAT. § 767.61(1). Section 767.61(2)(a) “identifies
property that is subject to division by describing the limited types of property that
generally are not subject to division on divorce.” McReath v. McReath, 2011 WI
66, ¶23, 335 Wis. 2d 643, 800 N.W.2d 399.

¶22 “The general rule is that assets and debts acquired by either party
before or during the marriage are divisible upon divorce.” Derr v. Derr, 2005 WI
App 63, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 681, 696 N.W.2d 170 (formatting altered). A circuit
court “shall presume that all property not described in [WIS. STAT. § 767.61(2)(a)]

7
Jessica asks this court “to correct the [circuit court’s] error and determine that the
appropriate amount of maintenance … is $1,408 per month.” However, as Andrew points out and
as is evident from the issue presented here, there are different methods by which a court may
equalize the parties’ income. Thus, we refuse to amend the maintenance amount when the
original amount may not simply stem from a mathematical error. See Schinner v. Schinner, 143
Wis. 2d 81, 100 & n.10, 420 N.W.2d 381 (Ct. App. 1988) (modifying to a specific amount a
portion of a circuit court’s equalization award because that portion of the judgment resulted from
an easily traceable mathematical error).
8
These vehicles included: (1) a 2014 Chevrolet Camaro; (2) a 2000 BMW 323 CI; (3) a
blue 2015 Chevrolet Impala LTZ; (4) a 2007 Chevrolet K2500 Silverado; (5) an unknown color
2015 Chevrolet Impala LTZ; (6) a 2013 Chevrolet K2500 Silverado; (7) a 2013 GMC Sierra;
(8) a 2017 Chevrolet K1500 Silverado; (9) a 2004 Chevrolet Trailblazer; (10) a black 2015
Chevrolet Impala LTZ; (11) a 1998 United Express Line trailer; and (12) a 2006 ATV.

9
No. 2022AP1236

is to be divided equally between the parties.” Sec. 767.61(3). “When a party to a
divorce asserts that property, or some part of the value of property, is not subject
to division, that party has the burden of showing that the property is non-divisible
at the time of the divorce.” Derr, 280 Wis. 2d 681, ¶11.

¶23 In addition,

any asset with a fair market value of $500 or more that
would be considered part of the estate of either or both of
the parties if owned by either or both of them at the time of
the action and that was transferred for inadequate
consideration, wasted, given away, or otherwise
unaccounted for by one of the parties within one year prior
to the filing of the [divorce] petition … is rebuttably
presumed to be property subject to division under [WIS.
STAT. §] 767.61 and is subject to the [financial] disclosure
requirement of [WIS. STAT. §] 767.127.…

WIS. STAT. § 767.63. “WISCONSIN STAT. § 903.01 describes … how
presumptions are handled in civil cases.” Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of
Wauwatosa, 2013 WI App 131, ¶8, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893. It states:

Except as provided by statute, a presumption recognized at
common law or created by statute, including statutory
provisions that certain basic facts are prima facie evidence
of other facts, imposes on the party relying on the
presumption the burden of proving the basic facts, but once
the basic facts are found to exist the presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than its existence.

Sec. 903.01.

¶24 Classifying property as divisible or non-divisible “involves both fact
finding and legal questions.” Derr, 280 Wis. 2d 681, ¶10. Conversely, the
allocation of divisible property is left to the sound discretion of a circuit court,
McReath, 335 Wis. 2d 643, ¶21, and the “determination of the value of an asset of

10
No. 2022AP1236

the marital estate is a finding of fact,” Preuss v. Preuss, 195 Wis. 2d 95, 107, 536
N.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶25 Throughout the divorce action, Jessica accused Andrew of not fully
disclosing his ownership of several vehicles, twelve of which are at issue on
appeal. See WIS. STAT. § 767.127. She also accused him of violating a stipulated
temporary order prohibiting the sale of assets during the pendency of the divorce
and of violating a scheduling order requiring the parties to disclose all vehicle
ownership. See WIS. STAT. § 767.117(1)(b).

¶26 The circuit court found that there was a “shell game” going on and
that Andrew’s testimony at the final contested hearing regarding the vehicles was
“incredible.” The court also noted that Jessica was unreasonably “shooting at the
moon and hoping to get the stars.” Ultimately, in its April 13, 2021 order, the
court assigned a number of vehicles to Andrew in the property division, but it did
not include in the property division any of the twelve vehicles at issue here. The
court did include in the property division a camper and a red 2015 Chevrolet
Impala, which Andrew stated he purchased using the funds from the sale of
vehicle 1. See supra n.8. The court stated that it was “convinced” Andrew “owns
more [vehicles] than he disclosed” but that Jessica failed to “prove up an exact
number.” The court did not expressly address WIS. STAT. §§ 767.61 or 767.63.

¶27 On appeal, Jessica argues that the circuit court erred by not including
the twelve vehicles in the property division because she made a prima facie
showing that the vehicles “were in Andrew’s name and now unaccounted for.”
See WIS. STAT. § 767.63. She argues that the “burden then shifted to Andrew, as
the person in control of the evidence, to provide the necessary evidence to rebut
that presumption.”

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No. 2022AP1236

¶28 Andrew does not dispute that the twelve vehicles at issue would be
subject to property division as part of the parties’ marital estate pursuant to WIS.
STAT. §§ 767.61 and 767.63. Rather, Andrew contends that “the record includes
more than sufficient support to affirm the [circuit] court’s decision” not to include
the vehicles, however Andrew fails to identify any evidence supporting the court’s
decision to exclude the twelve vehicles.

¶29 We agree with Jessica that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by failing to make factual findings regarding why it excluded the twelve
vehicles from the parties’ property division. As Andrew concedes, Jessica made a
prima facie showing that the twelve vehicles should be included in the marital
estate. This showing included numerous official records, private investigator
testimony, and her own testimony and, contrary to the court’s finding, included
evidence beyond speculation.

¶30 Specifically, at the final contested hearing, there was substantial
testimony regarding the alleged ownership of the vehicles. A private investigator
testified at the hearing that he was hired by Jessica to locate vehicles owned by
Andrew. The investigator compiled a list of vehicles titled in Andrew’s name,
including all but one of vehicles at issue on appeal, using a database and Division
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records. Jessica submitted specific DMV documents
for vehicles 3, 4, 8, and 9, and she also submitted estimated values for each of the
twelve vehicles based on the Kelley Blue Book; all of the vehicles were valued at
over $500.

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No. 2022AP1236

¶31 Further, Jessica introduced evidence that vehicles 2, 3, and 8-11
were titled to and/or insured by Andrew during the marriage and prior to the
judgment of divorce in December 2020.9 See WIS. STAT. § 767.61; Derr, 280
Wis. 2d 681, ¶10. Jessica also introduced a 2018 loan application, which listed
vehicle 12 and valued it at $1,000. Moreover, Andrew conceded that he owned
vehicle 1 and sold it in June 2020.

¶32 Jessica also introduced evidence that vehicles 4-7 were titled to
Andrew but were transferred within one year prior to October 2019. See WIS.
STAT. § 767.63. Not only were vehicles 4-7 not disclosed, they were potentially
sold for far less than their actual value. Andrew testified that he sold six vehicles
in the two years preceding the final hearing for roughly $5,000 in total. The
circuit court found it “[i]ncredible that [Andrew] would expect the court to believe
that he has flipped vehicles valued at $113,000.00 within the 12 months of filing
this action for divorce but [did] not hav[e] any funds to show for it.” Contrary to
the court’s reasoning, the mere fact that Jessica could not prove the “exact
number” of vehicles owned by Andrew is not a sufficient reason for the court’s
failure to avoid including in the property division the twelve vehicles Jessica did
demonstrate were owned by Andrew.

¶33 Furthermore, we note that the circuit court could not ignore the
twelve vehicles at issue when defining the marital estate simply because it was

9
On appeal, Jessica argues that vehicle 8 was transferred within one year prior to the
action for divorce. However, DMV records submitted into evidence show that the vehicle’s title
was transferred in November 2019, one month after the action was commenced. Therefore,
vehicle 8 would not fit within the period provided for in WIS. STAT. § 767.63, but it would still
presumptively be considered marital property under WIS. STAT. § 767.61 because it was acquired
during the marriage.

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No. 2022AP1236

difficult to assess a precise value for each vehicle. Although assigning the
vehicles a value might prove to be a difficult task given Andrew’s lack of
cooperation—including his failure to provide records of vehicle purchases and
sales—“[t]he fact that an asset is impossible to value on the day of divorce … is
not sufficient reason to ignore the asset when dividing the marital estate.”
See Weiss v. Weiss, 122 Wis. 2d 688, 697, 365 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1985); see
also Lellman v. Mott, 204 Wis. 2d 166, 173, 554 N.W.2d 525 (Ct. App. 1996)
(“The fact that [the petitioner] by his deliberate conduct frustrated an accurate
calculation of his net income … does not preclude the [circuit] court from making
the appropriate finding of fact.”). Indeed, the “[v]aluation of all assets … is
admittedly somewhat speculative.” Rumpff v. Rumpff, 2004 WI App 197, ¶24,
276 Wis. 2d 606, 688 N.W.2d 699 (alteration in original; citation omitted). As
Jessica contends on appeal, “there was evidence from which the court could
conclude that the vehicles should be in the marital estate and [could determine]
their value.”

¶34 Once Jessica made a prima facie case regarding the existence of the
vehicles and their values, the burden shifted to Andrew to show why the vehicles
should not be included in the marital estate, or if included, why the vehicle values
proffered by Jessica were incorrect. See WIS. STAT. § 903.01. The circuit court
never found that Andrew rebutted the presumption that the vehicles were required
to be included in the marital estate for property division purposes. In fact, as
outlined previously, the court found that Andrew’s testimony surrounding the
vehicles was “incredible.”

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No. 2022AP1236

¶35 Here, the circuit court did not make any findings as to why it did not
include the twelve vehicles in the marital estate.10 Absent such findings, we are
unable to assess whether the court properly excluded the vehicles from the parties’
property division. See Douglas L. v. Arika B., 2015 WI App 80, ¶18, 365 Wis. 2d
257, 872 N.W.2d 357; Derr, 280 Wis. 2d 681, ¶10. We therefore reverse the
circuit court’s equalization award and remand for the court to make factual
findings regarding whether the twelve vehicles at issue should be included in the
property division, and if so, their fair market values.11

¶36 Finally, Jessica argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by valuing Andrew’s camper at $3,200. Although the court found that
Andrew’s testimony regarding the vehicles was not credible, that finding did not
necessarily extend to every single part of Andrew’s testimony, as Jessica suggests.
Andrew testified that he purchased the camper for $3,200 and that it was priced so

10
Andrew argues that we may search the record for reasons to support the circuit court’s
property division award. Jessica asks this court to conclude that Andrew failed to rebut the
presumption that the vehicles are part of the marital estate and then assign values to the assets in
question. The issue here is whether the vehicles were divisible property—a question of law that
depends on factual findings. See Derr v. Derr, 2005 WI App 63, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 681, 696
N.W.2d 170. The record before us lacks the necessary factual findings for this court to determine
if the divisible assets were accurately selected. See Douglas L. v. Arika B., 2015 WI App 80,
¶18, 365 Wis. 2d 257, 872 N.W.2d 357 (“Without any facts on which to base our de novo
determination, we are unable to make any determination whatsoever.”); Vier v. Vier, 62 Wis. 2d
636, 639, 215 N.W.2d 432 (1974) (“[W]hen there is a failure to make a finding of fact, this court
on appeal may … remand for the making of findings and conclusions.”). Although Andrew
argues that the “record is bursting with examples of an overwhelming abundance of arguments
and evidence received by the court about these vehicles,” he points to no such evidence
supporting the court’s decision to include some vehicles but not others. Thus, we refuse both
parties’ requests to make the missing factual findings on appeal.
11
To the extent the circuit court included the camper and the red 2015 Chevrolet Impala,
but not vehicle 1 (because Andrew purchased the former vehicles using the funds from the sale of
the latter vehicle), the court must articulate how it reached that decision. Specifically, the court
should explain why it valued vehicle 1 at an amount equal to, rather than higher or lower than, the
combined value of the camper and the red 2015 Chevrolet Impala.

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No. 2022AP1236

low because it had a salvaged title and flood damage. This testimony was
corroborated through an exhibit introduced into evidence showing that the
camper’s title stated “rebuilt salvage, flood damage.” Accordingly, the court’s
finding that the value of the camper was lower than Jessica suggested is not clearly
erroneous. See Preuss, 195 Wis. 2d at 107.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

16