State v. Jamie P. Poole

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 28, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1058-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF860

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JAMIE P. POOLE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Fond du Lac
County: PETER L. GRIMM, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings with directions.

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP1058-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jamie P. Poole appeals a judgment of conviction
entered upon his guilty pleas to two felony possession-of-drug offenses. He
argues the circuit court erred by denying his suppression motion after concluding
that no constitutional seizure occurred when a police officer parked his squad car
behind Poole’s vehicle such that Poole could not leave and illuminated Poole’s
vehicle with the squad’s spotlight. He also argues that the stop was not
constitutionally permissible. We reverse and remand for further proceedings with
directions to grant the suppression motion.1

BACKGROUND

¶2 In the early morning hours of December 7, 2020, a Fond du Lac
County Sheriff’s Department patrol deputy discovered Poole’s vehicle legally
parked in a parking area at the trailhead to a piece of public land often used for
hiking. The vehicle was running, and the headlights were off. The deputy found
this unusual. In the previous month or so of patrols, he had not seen a vehicle
parked there during his shift. The deputy acknowledged that there was nothing
suspicious about the vehicle itself. However, he testified it was not “uncommon to
have parking areas like that throughout the county … where people park and walk
and try to burglarize homes or do illegal activities.”

1
Poole’s brief-in-chief cites only to his appendix in violation of WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(d) and (e) (2021-22), which requires that the statement of the case and argument
be supported by appropriate references to the appellate record. We admonish Poole’s appellate
counsel that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2021-22).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2023AP1058-CR

¶3 The deputy decided to investigate further. He parked his squad car
behind Poole’s vehicle such that he was blocking the rear passenger corner. This
effectively trapped Poole’s vehicle: Poole could not pull his vehicle forward
because there was a fence surrounding the parking area, and Poole testified he
likely would have hit the squad car if he tried to back up. The deputy then
illuminated Poole’s vehicle with the squad’s headlights and with a spotlight.

¶4 The deputy approached Poole’s vehicle and identified himself as a
sheriff’s deputy. He could see that the two front seats were occupied, and he
asked the individuals what they were doing. Poole, the driver, responded that they
were just talking. The deputy asked for identification, which both occupants
provided. Ultimately, the passenger was taken into custody on an active warrant,
and police seized some narcotics, which Poole claimed ownership of.

¶5 Poole filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from the stop,
alleging he was unlawfully detained. Following an evidentiary hearing at which
the deputy and Poole testified, the circuit court made findings of fact consistent
with the facts described above. The court determined the detention was supported
by reasonable suspicion, emphasizing the rural nature of the area, the time of the
morning, the deputy’s testimony that he had not previously seen anyone there, and
the “officer’s suspicions or concerns that there was crime, whether burglary or
other crimes.” Though it was not argued by the parties, the court also stated it was
a “wise decision by the officer under [the police] community caretaking [function]
to check on the [vehicle] occupants, make sure they’re not passed out from
noxious fumes from the car, and to make sure they weren’t overdosed.” 2 Poole
2
The State’s brief has abandoned any reliance on the community caretaker doctrine to
justify the seizure.

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No. 2023AP1058-CR

then entered guilty pleas to the two possession offenses pursuant to a plea
agreement with the State. He now challenges the suppression ruling pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of
constitutional fact. State v. VanBeek, 2021 WI 51, ¶22, 397 Wis. 2d 311, 960
N.W.2d 32. “[W]e uphold a circuit court’s findings of historic fact unless they are
clearly erroneous.” Id. However, we independently determine whether the facts
known at the time of the seizure justified the government intrusion. Id.

¶7 The parties first dispute when the seizure occurred. The State argues
Poole and his passenger were first seized when the deputy withheld their proof of
identification while awaiting backup on the outstanding warrant. On the other
hand, Poole argues he was seized when the deputy positioned his squad car behind
his vehicle in a way that prevented Poole from leaving without striking the
deputy’s car.

¶8 A seizure occurs when an officer, “by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” County of
Grant v. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, ¶20, 356 Wis. 2d 343, 850 N.W.2d 243 (citing United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980)). The operative test is whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he or she was
not free to leave. Id., ¶24.

¶9 We conclude Poole was seized the moment the deputy parked
behind him and illuminated his vehicle with a spotlight. The State’s argument
emphasizes the deputy’s use of the spotlight, citing State v. Young, 2006 WI 98,

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No. 2023AP1058-CR

¶65 n.18, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729, for the proposition that the use of a
spotlight is not a show of authority sufficient to effect a seizure. But Young was
very clear that the use of a spotlight in conjunction with other displays of authority
may constitute a seizure, id., ¶65, and here, the deputy also prevented Poole from
leaving by placing his squad car within Poole’s only available path of departure.
See State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 247, 258-59, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996)
(holding seizure occurred when officers blocked car with their own vehicle).

¶10 The State rather incredibly asserts that no seizure occurred because
Poole only thought he would hit the squad car if he tried to leave. The State
suggests that maybe Poole was wrong and that he could have performed some
undescribed vehicular maneuver to avoid the squad car that the deputy had placed
directly in the exit path of Poole’s vehicle.

¶11 At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden to prove that a
warrantless seizure is constitutionally reasonable. State v. Radder, 2018 WI App
36, ¶15, 382 Wis. 2d 749, 915 N.W.2d 180. If the State wanted to rely on Vogt,
356 Wis. 2d 343, ¶42, it was incumbent upon the State to prove at the suppression
hearing that there was an avenue by which Poole could have actually left the
scene. It did not do so, and the circuit court’s finding that Poole would have hit
the squad car had he tried to leave is not clearly erroneous.

¶12 We next turn to whether the seizure comports with the constitutional
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. art. IV. An
investigatory stop comports with the Fourth Amendment if the police have
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is
about to be committed. State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961

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No. 2023AP1058-CR

N.W.2d 41. Whether law enforcement would reasonably suspect that criminal
activity is afoot is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. Id., ¶9.

¶13 The State’s argument that the deputy here possessed reasonable
suspicion fails because the State can point to no “specific and articulable facts”
suggesting that anyone in Poole’s vehicle was up to anything nefarious. See id.,
¶8. The State is correct that the time and location at which the deputy observed
Poole’s vehicle is relevant to the analysis. See State v. Matthews, 2011 WI App
92, ¶11, 334 Wis. 2d 455, 799 N.W.2d 911. The deputy’s perceived oddity of a
car lawfully parked in a public area during early morning hours hardly suffices as
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, though. Indeed, even a person’s
presence in a “high crime” area—which nothing suggests this was—adds nothing
to reasonable suspicion absent other factors suggesting criminal behavior. See
State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶15, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.

¶14 The States suggests that something else was present in this case: the
deputy’s knowledge that, in the State’s words, “some stealthy criminals left their
cars in similar areas before burglarizing nearby homes or engaging in other
unlawful activity.” This argument is unconvincing. As Poole explains, there was
no evidence of recent burglaries in the area and no reports of suspicious persons or
burglaries that evening. The State did not even establish at the suppression
hearing that there were feasible burglary targets within walking distance of the
trailhead—the circuit court described the area as “highly rural.”

¶15 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy lacked
specific and articulable facts objectively suggesting that Poole or anyone else in
the vehicle was engaged in anything unlawful. The deputy was operating merely

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No. 2023AP1058-CR

on a hunch, which is insufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Genous,
397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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