State v. Jermarro Shandere Dantzler

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT I
October 26, 2021
To:
Hon. Jeffrey A. Wagner
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
John Barrett
Clerk of Circuit Court
Milwaukee County
Electronic Notice
Philip J. Brehm
Electronic Notice
John D. Flynn
Electronic Notice
Lisa E.F. Kumfer
Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2020AP1823-CR
2020AP1824-CR
State of Wisconsin v. Jermarro Shandere Dantzler
(L.C. # 2015CF4454)
State of Wisconsin v. Jermarro Shandere Dantzler
(L.C. # 2016CF2154)
Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Jermarro Shandere Dantzler appeals judgments of conviction, following no-contest pleas,
to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child and bail jumping. He also appeals from
the postconviction orders denying his motions to withdraw his no-contest pleas and for
reconsideration. Upon our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this

Nos. 2020AP1823-CR
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2
matter is appropriate for summary disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2019-20).1 We
summarily affirm.
In Milwaukee County Circuit Court case No. 2015CF4454, the State charged Dantzler
with one count of first-degree sexual assault. According to the criminal complaint, Dantzler
anally raped a fifteen-year-old victim, causing the victim to sustain an anal tear. Dantzler’s
DNA was found on multiple swabs taken from the victim.
In Milwaukee County Circuit Court case No. 2016CF2154, the State charged Dantzler
with conspiracy to commit perjury and bail jumping. The charges stemmed from allegations that
Dantzler enlisted several people to create a false alibi and fabricate evidence. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Dantzler agreed to plead no-contest to second-degree sexual assault of a child in case
No. 2015CF4454 and bail jumping in case No. 2016CF2154. The circuit court sentenced
Dantzler to a total sentence of eighteen years of initial confinement and eight years of extended
supervision.
Dantzler subsequently moved to withdraw his pleas alleging, as relevant to this appeal,
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that he would be required to
register as a sex offender for life. Dantzler argued that counsel told him the registration
requirement was only fifteen years. Dantzler claimed he would not have entered his pleas if he
was aware he would be registered as a sex offender for life. The circuit court held a Machner2
hearing and denied the motion. This appeal follows.
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
2 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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On appeal, Dantzler argues that he is entitled to withdraw his pleas because counsel was
ineffective for providing inaccurate sex offender registration information and because he was
under the impression that he would register immediately after sentencing, thus allowing the
registration period to end prior to the end of his sentence.
“A circuit court should freely allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing
if it finds any fair and just reason for withdrawal, unless the prosecution [is] substantially
prejudiced[.]” State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 861, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). A defendant who
is not aware of a sex offender registry requirement has a fair and just reason for moving to
withdraw a plea before sentencing. See State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶31, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605
N.W.2d 199. Where a defendant moves to withdraw his plea after sentencing, however, the
defendant faces a more significant challenge: the defendant must show by clear and convincing
evidence that there will be a manifest injustice if the defendant is not allowed to withdraw the
plea. See State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶24, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482. The manifest
injustice test is met if a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Bentley,
201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate
that his lawyer performed deficiently and that deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A court may reject a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on either ground. Id. at 697. “Whether a person was deprived of the
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and
fact.” State v. Hunt, 2014 WI 102, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 576, 851 N.W.2d 434. We will uphold the
circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See id. Whether counsel’s

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performance was deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced are questions of law that
we decide de novo based on the circuit court’s factual findings. See id.
At the Machner hearing, trial counsel testified that she could not say with certainty that
she accurately informed Dantzler about a lifetime sex offender registration; rather, counsel stated
that it was “highly likely” she informed him the registration time period was fifteen years. Trial
counsel also did not recall whether she told Dantzler when the registry went into effect. Dantzler
also testified, telling the circuit court that he and trial counsel discussed sex offender registration
multiple times, that counsel told him he would be on the registry for fifteen years, and that he
thought he would register immediately after sentencing. Dantzler stated that learning about the
lifetime registration felt like “a life sentence” and he would not have entered the pleas if he was
aware of the lifetime registration requirement. The postconviction court found that Dantzler was
not prejudiced by any misinformation about the sex offender registration requirements and
determined that he was not a credible witness.
We agree that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance warranting plea
withdrawal because the requirement to register as a sex offender is a collateral consequence of a
plea. See Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶27. Failing to advise a defendant of a collateral
consequence does not invalidate an otherwise valid plea, see State v. Myers, 199 Wis. 2d 391,
394-95, 544 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1996), and “cannot form the basis of a claim of manifest
injustice requiring plea withdrawal.” State v. Merten, 2003 WI App 171, ¶11, 266 Wis. 2d 588,
668 N.W.2d 750.
Relying on State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, 276 Wis. 2d 559, 687 N.W.2d 543,
Dantzler argues that even though sex offender registration is a collateral consequence, he is

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5
entitled to withdraw his pleas because his attorney provided misinformation and he assumed that
the registration period would run from the time he began his sentence. Dantzler’s reliance on
Brown is misplaced.
In Brown, the plea agreement at issue was specifically structured to avoid the sex
offender registration requirement. The prosecutor agreed that the charges Brown would plead to
would not require sex offender registry and would not subject Brown to WIS. STAT. ch. 980
commitment after his sentence. Brown, 276 Wis. 2d 559, ¶2. However, “[a]fter his sentence
commenced, Brown learned that the plea agreement did not accomplish what the parties had
intended.” Id. ¶3. Two of the charges required sex offender registration, and one was a ch. 980
offense. Brown, 276 Wis. 2d 559, ¶3. The circuit court allowed Brown to withdraw his pleas
because the whole purpose of the plea agreement was to avoid sex offender registration. Id.,
¶13.
Here, Dantzler was aware that he would be required to register as a sex offender. He
claims that he was misinformed about the registration period; however, there is no evidence
suggesting that the registration period had any bearing on the plea agreement. As the
postconviction court noted, the State’s plea offer “spared [Dantzler] a mandatory minimum 25
years of confinement … [and] a trial during which the State would have presented overwhelming
evidence of guilt.” (Italics in original.) Thus, because Dantzler’s sex offender registration
requirement was an indirect consequence of his conviction and did not go to the core of his plea
agreement, counsel was not ineffective for any alleged misinformation pertaining to the
registration period.

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There is also no support for Dantzler’s inaccurate understanding of when the registration
period was to begin. Indeed, Dantzler admitted at the Machner hearing that his attorney did not
tell him when the sex offender registration requirement would begin; rather, he “just assumed …
that it started right away,” and he did not find out until later that it would not begin until he
completed his sentence.
Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance and
Dantzler is not entitled to withdraw his no-contest pleas. We therefore affirm the circuit court.
IT IS ORDERED that the judgments and orders are summarily affirmed. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Court of Appeals