* In re Recall of Suggs

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Recall of
LATRISHA SUGGS,
Position 1, City Council Member;
KATE DEXTER,
Position 4, Mayor of Port Angeles;
NAVARRA CARR,
Position 6, City Council Member; and
LINDSEY SCHROMEN-WAWRIN,
Position 3, City Council Member
No. 103314-1
EN BANC
Filed: March 27, 2025
STEPHENS, C.J.—John Worthington filed petitions seeking to recall the
mayor of Port Angeles as well as three Port Angeles city council members.
Worthington is not a legal voter in Port Angeles, and the issue here is whether he
has standing to seek the recall of Port Angeles’ elected officials. The superior court
held that Worthington lacks standing and dismissed the recall petitions. We affirm.
The Washington Constitution states that an elective public officer is subject
to recall “by the legal voters of the state, or of the political subdivision of the state,
from which [they were] elected.” 	WASH. CONST . art. I, § 33. 	The recall statute,
RCW 29A.56.110, sets forth the requirements for when “any legal voter of the state
or of any political subdivision thereof . . . desires to demand the recall and discharge
of any elective public officer of the state or of such political subdivision, as the case
FILE
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
MARCH 27, 2025
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
MARCH 27, 2025
SARAH R. PENDLETON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
2
may be.” 	Worthington argues that because he is a legal voter of the state, he may
petition to recall a public officer of any political subdivision. 	This is incorrect.
When a recall petition concerns elected public officers of a political subdivision,
only legal voters in that political subdivision may seek their recall.
BACKGROUND
John Worthington filed recall petitions for the mayor of Port Angeles as well
as three Port Angeles city council members. 	Worthington does not live in Port
Angeles. He is a resident of Sequim. Worthington sought recall of the mayor and
council members for several reasons, all centered around the city’s membership in
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI). 	ICLEI is a
global network of local and regional governments focused on improving global
sustainability through cumulative local actions. 	Worthington alleged in his recall
petitions that because Port Angeles joined the ICLEI network, the mayor and council
members are no longer qualified to hold office because they voluntarily relinquished
U.S. citizenship, failed to post bond, and violated the doctrine of incompatible
offices.
Counsel for the mayor and council members e-mailed Worthington before the
recall hearing in superior court to inform him of their position that he lacked standing
because he is not a Port Angeles resident and to request that Worthington dismiss
the petitions. 	Worthington did not do so. 	Counsel again e-mailed Worthington,
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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asking if he would agree to a continuance and suggesting they come up with an
agreed briefing schedule. 	Counsel expressly noted that he could not comment on
the merits of the case at that time. Counsel later followed up, stating that he was not
asking Worthington to give up any of the issues he wished to raise but merely to
agree to a briefing schedule. No further agreements were indicated.
At the recall hearing, the superior court focused on standing. 	The court
dismissed the petitions with prejudice on the ground that Worthington is not a legal
voter in the city of Port Angeles. 	The mayor and council members moved for
attorney fees, which the court granted. 	Worthington made several motions,
including a motion to strike the mayor and council members’ motion for attorney
fees under anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statutes, a
motion for sanctions, and a motion to recuse the judge who had dismissed his
petitions, all of which the court denied. The court also denied Worthington’s motion
for reconsideration. 	Worthington objected to entry of judgment, but the court
overruled his objections and entered judgment for the mayor and council members.
Worthington appealed.
ISSUES
1. 	Whether a person who is not a legal voter in a political subdivision may seek
recall of public officials in that political subdivision.
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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2. 	Whether the mayor and council members are entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
ANALYSIS
1. Worthington Lacks Standing To File This Recall Petition
Washington’s constitutional recall provision helps enforce the principle that
public officials in a representative democracy should be accountable to their
constituents. 	Article I, section 33 of the Washington Constitution states, “Every
elective public officer of the state of Washington . . . is subject to recall and discharge
by the legal voters of the state, or of the political subdivision of the state, from which
[they were] elected.” RCW 29A.56.110 outlines the processes for “[w]henever any
legal voter of the state or of any political subdivision thereof . . . desires to demand
the recall and discharge of any elective public officer of the state or of such political
subdivision, as the case may be.”
Worthington argues that article I, section 33 allows any legal voter in
Washington to initiate a recall of any elected public official in the state, regardless
of whether they are eligible to vote for the public official. 	Although both the
constitution and the statute use the word “or,” the disjunctive is not used to indicate
that either a legal voter of the state or a legal voter of a political subdivision in the
state can recall any elective public officer. Instead, a natural reading of the provision
as a whole is that the word “or” indicates that a legal voter of the state may recall an
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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elective public officer of the state or a legal voter of a political subdivision may
recall 	an 	elective 	public 	officer 	of 	such 	political 	subdivision. 	Accepting
Worthington’s interpretation would render the words “or of any political subdivision
thereof” and “or of such political subdivision, as the case may be” superfluous
because every legal voter of a political subdivision in the state is necessarily a legal
voter of the state. The language providing further refinement would be unnecessary.
While there are no published cases on this issue, the Court of Appeals came
to the same conclusion in the unpublished case Knedlik v. Snohomish County. 	In
Knedlik, a King County voter petitioned to recall an executive of Snohomish County.
No. 71790-1-I, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2015) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/717901.pdf. The Court of Appeals held
that because Knedlik was not a legal voter in Snohomish County, he could not
petition to recall a Snohomish County executive. 	Id. 	The court based its decision
on the language of RCW 29A.56.110 and article I, section 33 of the state
constitution, concluding that the plain meaning of both was that “only voters from
an official's constituency may recall the official.” 	Id. at 4. 	The court also cited
Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580, 583, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985), which notes that
“an officer's constituency can initiate recall proceedings.” 	Knedlik, No. 71790-1-I,
slip op. at 3-4. We find this reasoning persuasive and hold that only legal voters in
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
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the political subdivision from which a public official was elected may seek recall of
that public official.
This reading of the relevant constitutional and statutory language aligns with
several of our prior decisions. In In re Recall of Boldt, this court declined to reach
the issue of whether the petitioner lacked standing to recall a city council member
because he did not reside in her district. 	187 Wn.2d 542, 556 n.6, 386 P.3d 1104
(2017). In the course of our opinion, however, we noted that the relevant issue for
standing 	purposes 	is 	whether 	“political 	subdivision” 	refers 	to 	an 	“officer’s
constituency,” inferring that not every legal voter of the state can recall a local
elective public official without regard to their legal authority to vote in the local
election. Id. Additionally, in In re Recall of White, 196 Wn.2d 492, 495, 474 P.3d
1032 (2020), this court stated, “Under our constitution, any legal voter in the political
subdivision that elected a person to a legislative or executive office may file a
petition to recall that person from office.” 	Though we were not determining a
question of standing but merely addressing whether the recall petition in that case
was 	legally 	and 	factually 	sufficient, 	this 	language 	in 	White 	reflected 	our
understanding of the foundation for the recall power. 	Id. at 502-04. 	Although
neither of these cases issued a holding regarding standing, they support our
conclusion that Worthington lacks standing here.
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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Worthington 	makes 	several 	other 	standing 	arguments, 	which 	we 	find
unavailing. First, he argues that the mayor and council members “opted out” of their
political subdivision and created a two-county political subdivision through the
operation of multiple nonprofits on the Olympic Peninsula. However, participation
in nonprofits outside of Port Angeles does not somehow create a new political
subdivision. Worthington cites no authority supporting this proposition.
Second, he contends that the court should have decided the petitions on the
merits because counsel for the mayor and council members agreed to an express
contract to hold a hearing on the merits. This misstates the record. The parties did
not enter into such a contract. Counsel for the mayor and council members reached
out to attempt to secure a continuance and agreed briefing schedule. While counsel
noted in an e-mail that entering into an agreed briefing schedule would not mean
Worthington had to give up the issues he wished to raise, this acknowledgment did
not create a contract wherein counsel agreed to have the petitions decided on the
merits.
Lastly, Worthington argues that the mayor and council members waived their
standing argument because they sought affirmative relief by requesting sanctions,
attorney fees, and entry of judgment. Worthington cites Grange Insurance Assn. v.
State, 110 Wn.2d 752, 757 P.2d 933 (1988). However, in Grange, we addressed that
the Court of Appeals had previously discussed whether the defense of lack of
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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jurisdiction had been waived, and it noted that this defense can be waived by seeking
affirmative relief, which invokes the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 765. Even if the
defense of lack of standing could be waived in the same way, a proposition
Worthington has not established, the mayor and council members did not seek
affirmative relief. “Affirmative relief” is “[r]elief for which defendant might
maintain an action independently of plaintiff's claim.” Id. at 765-66 (alteration in
original) (quoting BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY 56 (5th ed. 1979)). Here, the mayor
and council members sought attorney fees, sanctions, and entry of judgment, all of
which they would not have had a right to if Worthington had not filed the recall
petitions.
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court and hold that only legal voters in the
political subdivision from which a public official was elected may seek recall of that
public official. Unlike other standing doctrines based in common law or statute, this
standing requirement is rooted in our state constitution and is designed to uphold
constitutional principles concerning the accountability of elective public officers to
their constituents. Thus, it cannot be altered by the courts.
2. The Mayor and Council Members Are Entitled to Attorney Fees
The mayor and council members seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP
18.1 and 18.9 because the recall petition was filed in bad faith. RAP 18.1(a) allows
parties to request attorney fees on review if applicable law grants the party the right
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
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to recover reasonable attorney fees. 	RAP 18.9(a) allows appellate courts to order
compensatory damages or sanctions if a party files a frivolous appeal. 	In recall
cases, courts may award attorney fees “when recall petitions are intentionally
frivolous and filed in bad faith.” 	In re Recall of Piper, 184 Wn.2d 780, 787, 364
P.3d 	113 	(2015). 	We 	have 	stated 	that 	bad 	faith 	in 	this 	context 	refers 	to
“‘intentionally frivolous recall petitions brought for the purpose of harassment.’” In
re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 783, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000) (quoting In
re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 266, 961 P.2d 343 (1998)).
Here, the superior court awarded attorney fees after it concluded that the recall
petitions were intentionally frivolous and filed in bad faith because Worthington
knew he was not a legal voter in Port Angeles and knew this was a requirement to
seek recall of Port Angeles officials. 	At the hearing on whether to grant attorney
fees, the court stated that it found the petitions frivolous because it appeared
Worthington had not done research in determining whether he had standing, and a
reasonable inquiry would have included such research. 	The judge also noted that
relevant to frivolousness was the fact that the city’s joining of ICLEI was a
discretionary act that did not appear to have been done in an unreasonable manner.
The superior court’s conclusion is supported by the record. 	It appears that
Worthington knew of the standing issue, as he posted on Facebook that it would take
someone from Port Angeles to initiate a recall and that he may need someone from
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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Port Angeles to sign his petition. Counsel for the mayor and council members also
alerted him to the issue early in the case. Given this as well as the fact that he had
previously filed several recall petitions for all four officials that were denied, the
superior court reasonably concluded that Worthington brought these petitions for the
purpose of harassment and awarded fees below. We additionally award the mayor
and council members attorney fees on appeal. RAP 18.1.1
CONCLUSION
We affirm the superior court’s dismissal of the recall petitions because
Worthington lacks standing to seek the recall of elective public officers in Port
Angeles, as he is not a legal voter in that political subdivision. We grant the mayor
and council members’ motion for attorney fees on appeal as Worthington’s recall
petitions were intentionally frivolous and filed in bad faith.
1 Worthington argues the mayor and council members are equitably estopped from seeking
attorney fees based on his bad faith because they agreed to allow Worthington to present the
issues at the recall hearing. However, as discussed above, there was no such agreement.
Instead, counsel for the mayor and council members simply noted in an e-mail that they
could agree to a briefing schedule without either party waiving the right to raise issues to the
court.
Worthington also contends that attorney fees cannot be granted where the superior
court did not determine the factual and legal sufficiency of his petitions. He cites Rogerson
Hiller Corp. v. Port of Port Angeles, 96 Wn. App. 918, 982 P.2d 131 (1999), for this
proposition. Rogerson did not involve a recall petition. And in Rogerson, the Court of
Appeals discussed what types of bad faith could warrant attorney fees. Id. at 927-29. In
doing so, it mentioned Pearsall-Stipek and noted that, in that case, filing a frivolous recall
petition was not enough to authorize an award of attorney fees because there was no
evidence of improper motive. Id. at 929. Nowhere in Rogerson does it state that a
sufficiency determination must be made before attorney fees can be awarded. Here, we
award fees on appeal because Worthington’s appeal of the dismissal for lack of standing is
frivolous.
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In re Recall of LaTrisha Suggs et al.
No. 103314-1
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WE CONCUR:
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