State Of Washington, Respondent V. Jason R. Stomps, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47546-4-II
Respondent,
v.
JASON ROBERT STOMPS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEE, J. — Jason Robert Stomps appeals his first degree burglary, three counts of second
degree kidnapping, and three counts of second degree assault convictions. He argues sufficient
evidence does not exist to support his convictions. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Stomps worked as a bail bond recovery agent. One evening, Stomps went to the home of
Annette and Bill Waleske looking for Courtney Barnes. Barnes was free on bail, and his girlfriend,
Sinan Hang, guaranteed the bail bond. Hang listed the Waleskes’ address as her address. Hang
was friends with Annette1 and had used the Waleskes’ address in the past, but she did not have
permission to use it on the bail bond application. Barnes listed a separate address. When Barnes
failed to appear for a court hearing, the bail bond company contracted with Stomps to locate him.
When Stomps arrived at the Waleskes’ residence, Annette and Bill were out, but their
daughter, Tayler Waleske; son, Quincey Waleske; and daughter’s boyfriend, Nathan Panosh, were
at the home. Tayler and Nathan were watching a movie when they heard pounding on the door.
1 Since several of the individuals have the same last name, we respectfully use first names for
clarity.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
July 19, 2016

No. 47546-4-II
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They walked towards the door and heard Stomps yell, “I’m looking for Courtney Barnes. Open up
your door, or I’ll kick your fucking door down.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 114. Tayler did
not know anyone by the name of Courtney Barnes. Tayler was frightened by Stomps, and yelled
out, “We don’t know Courtney. You need to leave.” RP at 115. The pounding and yelling
continued. Tayler and Nathan went upstairs to get Quincey. Tayler then called 911.
While Tayler was on the phone with the 911 operator, Stomps broke down the front door
with a railroad tie driver, which is similar to a sledgehammer. Once inside, he ordered everyone
downstairs. Even though he recognized that the three individuals were not the fugitive he was
looking for and that Barnes was not in the house, Stomps pointed his gun at them and ordered
Quincey, who had just gotten out of the shower and had only a towel wrapped around him, to
handcuff himself to Nathan and then ordered all three to get on the floor. Stomps then identified
himself as a bail bond recovery agent. The parties dispute whether this was the first time Stomp
identified himself. Nathan then repeatedly asked for the key to unlock the handcuffs, but Stomps
refused.
Police arrived at the residence and detained Stomps. The State ultimately charged Stomps
with first degree burglary, three counts of first degree kidnapping, and three counts of second
degree assault; each charge included a special allegation that he was armed with a firearm.
During trial, Stomps admitted he did not first check the address listed for Barnes before
going to the address listed for Barnes’ girlfriend. Also during trial, Nathan testified that he did not
feel free to leave when Stomps handcuffed him and pointed a gun at him. Quincey testified, “I
was intimidated. I didn’t want—I felt like my life was in danger.” RP at 91. He further testified
he did not feel free to leave because he was wrapped in a towel and being held at gunpoint. Tayler

No. 47546-4-II
3
also testified that she did not feel free to leave because she “had a gun pointed at [her]” and was
afraid she “was going to get shot.” RP at 128-29. The 911 recording was also admitted where
Tayler tells the operator they were scared.
A jury found Stomps guilty as charged. Stomps appeals.
ANALYSIS
Stomps contends he was denied due process because sufficient evidence does not exist to
support his convictions. We disagree.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Evidence is sufficient if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it permits a
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Tilton, 149 Wn.2d 775, 786, 72 P.3d 735 (2003). Courts must draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the State and interpret the evidence most strongly against the
defendant. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Circumstantial evidence
receives the same weight as direct evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970
(2004). Appellate courts defer to the fact finder on the resolution of conflicting testimony,
credibility determinations, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Id. at 874-75.
The purpose of the sufficiency inquiry is to “‘ensure that the trial court fact finder
‘rationally appl[ied]’ the constitutional standard required by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which allows for conviction of a criminal offense only upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Berg, 181 Wn.2d 857, 867, 337 P.3d 310 (2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Rattana Keo Phuong, 174 Wn. App. 494, 502, 299 P.3d 37 (2013),
review denied, 182 Wn.2d 1022 (2015)). Our review is de novo. Berg, 181 Wn.2d at 867.

No. 47546-4-II
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B. FIRST DEGREE BURGLARY
For the first degree burglary charge, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Stomps entered or remained unlawfully in the Waleskes’ home with the intent to commit a crime
against a person or property therein, while armed with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a).
Stomps contends the State failed to prove he intended to commit a crime when he entered the home
since he was acting in his capacity as a bail bond recovery agent.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, Stomps broke down the
Waleskes’ front door with a railroad tie driver at an address given for the bond co-signor, not
Barnes. And he broke down the door even after being told Barnes was not in the home and that
he needed to leave. While pointing a gun at the three individuals he knew were not Barnes, Stomps
handcuffed two of the teenagers and forced all three to stay downstairs. Stomps did this even after
he had been told that Barnes was not in the house.2
“In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building
may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein,
unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to
2 Under the “Rule of Taylor,” a bail bond recovery agent may pursue a fugitive “‘into another
State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house for that
purpose. The seizure is . . . likened to the re-arrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.’” Johnson
v. County of Kittitas, 103 Wn. App. 212, 217-18, 11 P.3d 862 (2000) (quoting Taylor v. Taintor,
83 U.S. 366, 371, 21 L. Ed. 287, 16 Wall. 366 (1872)). However, a recovery agent may not “sweep
from his path all third parties who he thinks are blocking his search for his client, without liability
to the criminal law.” State v. Portnoy, 43 Wn. App. 455, 466, 718 P.2d 805 (1986). Since Stomps
entered the home of an address given by the bond’s co-signer and not the address of the fugitive,
since he was told by the individuals inside the home that they did not know the individual he was
looking for, and since he still proceeded to forcefully enter the home without permission, Stomps
does not have immunity from Washington criminal laws under Portnoy.

No. 47546-4-II
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have been made without such criminal intent.” RCW 9A.52.040. In this case, a rational trier of
fact could find that Stomps unlawfully entered the Waleskes’ home. Given the circumstances of
the break in and the actions that transpired thereafter, a rational trier of fact can infer he intended
to commit a crime. We defer to the trier of fact on any conflicting testimony as to Stomps’ intent.
Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874.
Given the evidence, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of first degree
burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, sufficient evidence exits to support Stomps’ first
degree burglary conviction.
C. SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING
Stomps next contends sufficient evidence does not support his three second degree
kidnapping convictions. Specifically, Stomps argues that there was insufficient evidence to show
Stomps intentionally abducted the three individuals. We disagree.
“A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she intentionally abducts
another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree.” RCW
9A.40.030(1). “‘Abduct’ means to restrain a person by either (a) secreting or holding him or her
in a place where he or she is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly force.”
Former RCW 9A.40.010(1) (2011).3
Here, Stomps ordered everyone downstairs after he broke the door down and entered the
home. Even though he recognized that none of the three teenagers were Barnes, Stomps pointed
his gun at them and ordered Quincey, who had just gotten out of the shower and had only a towel
3 Our legislature amended an unrelated subsection of RCW 9A.40.010 in 2014 that does not
apply to this appeal.

No. 47546-4-II
6
wrapped around him, to handcuff himself to Nathan and then ordered both men and Tayler to get
on the floor. Nathan repeatedly asked for the key to unlock the handcuffs, but Stomps refused.
Nathan testified that he did not feel free to leave when Stomps handcuffed him and pointed a gun
at him. Quincey testified, “I was intimidated. I didn’t want - - I felt like my life was in danger.”
RP at 91. He further testified he did not feel free to leave because he was wrapped in a towel and
being held at gunpoint. Tayler also testified that she did not feel free to leave because she “had a
gun pointed at [her]” and was afraid she “was going to get shot.” RP at 128-29. The 911 recording
was also admitted where Tayler tells the operator they were scared.
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the State and deferring to the trier of fact
on any conflicting testimony as to Stomps’ intent, we hold a rational trier of fact could find the
essential elements of second degree kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt for each of the three
victims. Thus, sufficient evidence exists to support Stomps’ three second degree kidnapping
convictions.
D. SECOND DEGREE ASSAULT
Lastly, Stomps contends sufficient evidence does not support his three second degree
assault convictions. Specifically, Stomps argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his
intent to create apprehension and fear of bodily injury. Again, we disagree.
“A person is guilty of second degree assault if he or she, under circumstances not
amounting to assault in the first degree, . . . [a]ssaults another with a deadly weapon.” RCW
9A.36.021(1)(c). Assault includes “putting another in apprehension of harm.” State v. Elmi, 166
Wn.2d 209, 215, 207 P.3d 439 (2009).

No. 47546-4-II
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Here, Stomps broke down the front door after yelling and pounding on the door, telling the
occupants to “[o]pen up your door, or I’ll kick your fucking door down.” RP at 114. Stomps then
ordered Tayler, Quincey, and Nathan downstairs. Even though he recognized the three individuals
were not Barnes, Stomps pointed his gun at them, ordered Quincey and Nathan to handcuff
themselves together, and then ordered all three to get on the floor. During trial, Quincey testified
he felt his life was in danger; Tayler testified she felt she was going to die; and on the 911 tape,
Tayler reported to the 911 operator that they were all scared.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold a rational trier of
fact could find the essential elements of second degree assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
sufficient evidence exits to support Stomps’ three second degree assault convictions.
Sufficient evidence exists to support all of Stomps’ convictions. Therefore, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, P.J.
We concur:
Melnick, J.
Sutton, J.