State Of Washington, Respondent V. Robert Alan Wolfe, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52124-5-II
Respondent,
v.
ROBERT ALAN WOLFE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
CRUSER, J. — Robert Alan Wolfe appeals his convictions for maintaining a premise for
using controlled substances, unlawful possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of
heroin, and bail jumping. Wolfe argues that (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence found in his residence, (2) the to-convict jury instruction for bail jumping was
improper, and (3) insufficient evidence supported his bail jumping conviction.
We disagree and (1) hold that the trial court properly denied Wolfe’s motion to suppress
because the warrant was supported by probable cause, (2) decline to address Wolfe’s challenge to
the bail jumping to-convict instruction because Wolfe’s claim does not involve a manifest
constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3), and (3) hold that sufficient evidence supported his bail
jumping conviction. We affirm.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 10, 2020

No. 52124-5-II
2
FACTS
I. BACKGROUND
Wolfe resided in a house in Kitsap County and rented rooms to three or four people.
Wolfe’s mother owned the house but resided elsewhere. In early September 2017, Wolfe’s
neighbor, Tim Calnan, made a complaint to the police department regarding Wolfe’s residence.
Calnan owned two properties across the street. Calnan complained about the constant number of
people coming and going from Wolfe’s residence.
Detective Cory Manchester of the Kitsap County Sheriff’s Office investigated Calnan’s
complaint and executed an affidavit in support of a search warrant for Wolfe’s residence on
October 23, 2017. The detective sought the search warrant based on a compilation of information,
including Calnan’s complaint. The relevant information in the affidavit included the following:
 During the first week of September 2017, the detective received Calnan’s
complaint regarding Wolfe’s residence. Calnan stated that people were constantly
coming and going from the house and that the door was at times left open. During
this time, Calnan had workers at his residence. The workers confirmed that there
was heavy traffic coming and going out of the house. The detective referred to this
as “short stay traffic,” something he knew “to be an indicator of possible narcotics
dealing.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 26.
 One of Calnan’s workers, Jeffery Whallon, stated that people were
“consistently” coming and going from the house. Id. at 27. He stated the activity
usually started at about 7:00 AM. On September 20, 2017, Whallon reported that
he saw 12 different visitors in a 30-minute time period. Whallon also stated that
there was often a piece of paper in the window indicating that the house is not taking
visitors.
 Calnan stated that many of Wolfe’s visitors arrived in cars and would often
park in front of his yard. Calnan complained of a syringe and multiple syringe caps
on his lawn next to where the visitors would park. On September 21, 2017, the
detective also observed a syringe and several caps on Calnan’s lawn.
 In 2014, “similar suspected narcotic activity” was reported at Wolfe’s
residence. Police investigated the report, but the investigation did not lead to any
arrests.
 On September 21, 2017, the detective observed Angela Smiley on the
driveway of Wolfe’s residence. The detective knew Smiley “from multiple

No. 52124-5-II
3
contacts . . . over the years,” and he knew Smiley “to be a local drug user, and . . .
to associate with other drug users.” Id. at 28. Smiley has four felony convictions
under the Uniform Controlled Substance Act, ch. 69.50 RCW.
 In June 2017, a different detective investigated Smiley. In an attempt to
locate Smiley, the detective went to Wolfe’s residence. While at the residence, the
detective arrested Corbin Egeler for an outstanding warrant. Egeler was “known to
associate with the local Heroin crowd.” Id. at 27.
 On October 8, 2017, a police officer was patrolling the area around Wolfe’s
residence. Cynthia Sylvester, “former drug user,” contacted the officer. Id. at 28
(italics omitted). Sylvester reported that “not too long ago,” people at Wolfe’s
residence took her dog and other items as payment during a “drug rip.” Id. at 29
(italics omitted). Sylvester reported that “[h]eroin is being sold from this house for
sure.” Id. (italics omitted).
 The officer patrolling the area observed Corey Butler, a known “drug user
and thief,” walking from Wolfe’s residence. Id. (italics omitted). The officer knew
Corey from past contacts and stated that Corey is “known to [steal] things and trade
them for drugs.” Id. (italics omitted). When the officer asked Corey about using
drugs at Wolfe’s residence, Corey “made a motion that he might have.” Id. (italics
omitted). Corey stated that he uses heroin. The officer found unused syringes in
Corey’s pocket.
 The patrolling officer also observed Shawna Orlowski exit a car and walk
to Wolfe’s residence. The officer “observed a square piece of tin foil with black
burnt residue in the center console.” Id. at 30 (italics omitted). The officer
recognized this “as smoked [h]eroin.” Id. (italics omitted). Later that evening, the
officer made contact with Orlowski and told her that she “need[s] to be more careful
with [her] drug paraphernalia.” Id. (italics omitted). Orlowski was in denial but
quickly “thanked [the officer] when she realized” the officer would not arrest her.
Id. at 31 (italics omitted). Orlowski stated that “drugs are being used” at Wolfe’s
residence and that “she sees other people” using drugs at the residence. Id. (italics
omitted).
 On October 17, 2017, Calnan contacted the detective and stated that the
traffic coming to and from Wolfe’s residence had not slowed down. Five days later,
Calnan reported finding a syringe on his property where Wolfe’s visitors parked
and a syringe in his shed located on the same property.
The court issued a search warrant based on the detective’s affidavit. The warrant stated
that it incorporated the affidavit by reference. The warrant permitted a search of Wolfe’s residence
to “seize any fruits, instrumentalities and/or evidence of the crime” of maintaining a premise for

No. 52124-5-II
4
using controlled substances under RCW 69.50.402(1)(f),1 including any suspected drugs and drug
paraphernalia. Id. at 36.
Police executed the search warrant on October 25, 2017. The officers found numerous
items used for consuming controlled substances, including multiple boxes of new and used
syringes, pipes consistent with the use of methamphetamine consumption, and burnt foil consistent
with the use of heroin consumption. The officers also found heroin and methamphetamine inside
the residence.
The State charged Wolfe with one count of maintaining a premise for using controlled
substances,2 one count of possession of a controlled substance methamphetamine,3 and one count
of possession of a controlled substance heroin.4
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. OMNIBUS HEARING
Wolfe was released on bail. The order for pretrial release stated that Wolfe “shall appear”
on December 19, 2017 for an omnibus hearing, and that failure to appear when required by the
court is a crime. Ex. 58 at 2. At the hearing on December 19, Wolfe’s counsel stated, “He is here”
1 Under RCW 69.50.402(1)(f), it is unlawful to knowingly “keep or maintain any store, shop,
warehouse, dwelling, building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure or place, which is resorted
to by persons using controlled substances in violation of this chapter for the purpose of using these
substances, or which is used for keeping or selling them in violation of this chapter.”
2 RCW 69.50.402(1)(f).
3 RCW 69.50.4013, .206(d)(2).
4 RCW 69.50.4013, .204(b)(13).

No. 52124-5-II
5
and requested the court reset the omnibus hearing to January 19, 2018 and continue trial. Ex. 64
at 2.
The court granted his request and entered an order resetting the omnibus hearing for
January 19, 2018 in open court. The court also entered an order on counsel’s motion to continue,
which reflected that Wolfe appeared at the December 19 hearing and confirmed that “[w]ritten and
oral notice [was] given to defendant” of the new set date for the omnibus hearing. Ex. 61 at 1.
Wolfe failed to appear for the January 19, 2018 omnibus hearing. The court issued a bench
warrant. Wolf appeared on the warrant on January 25, 2018. The State filed an amended
information that also charged Wolfe with one count of bail jumping under RCW 9A.76.170.
B. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Wolfe moved to suppress all seized evidence from his residence pursuant to CrR 3.6.
Wolfe argued that the affidavit was absent of any information establishing a nexus between the
short-stay traffic reported at his residence and drug trafficking. Wolfe also argued that assertions
based on information provided by Sylvester and Orlowski must be disregarded because they fail
to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli5 test, and Butler’s statements were insufficient to establish probable
cause for maintaining a drug house. Wolfe also argued that evidence regarding syringes was
“irrelevant and innocuous” because syringes are legal items with many legitimate uses. CP at 14.
The court denied Wolfe’s motion.
5 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), abrogated by Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969), abrogated by Gates, 462 U.S. 213.

No. 52124-5-II
6
C. TRIAL
Wolfe’s case proceeded to trial on all counts. The court instructed the jury on the elements
of bail jumping. The instruction read in relevant part,
To convict the defendant of the crime of Bail Jumping as charged in Count
IV, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt—
1[.] That on or about January 19, 2018, the defendant failed to appear before a
court;
2[.] That the defendant was charged with a class B or C felony;
3[.] That the defendant had been released by court order with knowledge of the
requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before that court; and
4[.] That these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
Id. at 92. Wolfe did not object to this instruction.
The jury found Wolfe guilty on all counts. Wolfe appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Wolfe argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his motion
to suppress evidence seized from his residence because the affidavit in support of the search
warrant failed to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found in his residence.
We disagree.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
We review the issuance of a search warrant for abuse of discretion and we give great
deference to the issuing judge’s probable cause determination. State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d 177, 182,
196 P.3d 658 (2008). We also afford appropriate deference to the issuing judge’s findings on
reliability and credibility. In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d 789, 800, 42 P.3d 952 (2002). At a
suppression hearing, the trial court acts in an appellate-like capacity. Neth, 165 Wn.2d at 182. We

No. 52124-5-II
7
review de novo the trial court’s conclusion of whether an affidavit is supported by probable cause
to issue a search warrant. Id.
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution, a search warrant may be issued only upon a showing of probable
cause. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 462, 158 P.3d 595 (2007). “Probable cause requires
more than suspicion or conjecture, but it does not require certainty.” Id. at 476. An affidavit in
support of a warrant application must contain “facts and circumstances sufficient to establish a
reasonable inference that the defendant is involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the
crime can be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Scherf, 192 Wn.2d 350, 363, 429 P.3d
776 (2018). The issuing judge “is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the facts and
circumstances set forth in the affidavit.” Id. at 363.
When examining the trial court’s conclusion, we examine “‘whether the qualifying
information as a whole amounts to probable cause.’” State v. Emery, 161 Wn. App. 172, 202, 253
P.3d 413 (2011) (quoting Petersen, 145 Wn.2d at 800), aff’d, 174 Wn.2d 741, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).
Individual facts that would not support probable cause when standing alone can support probable
cause when viewed together with other facts in the search warrant affidavit. State v. Garcia, 63
Wn. App. 868, 875, 824 P.2d 1220 (1992). The application for a search warrant must be judged
in the light of common sense and we resolve all doubts in favor of upholding the warrant.
Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 477.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED
Wolfe argues that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because (1) allegations
of “known drug users” present at the house are improperly conclusory (Br. of Appellant at 13), (2)

No. 52124-5-II
8
many of the allegations were stale or failed to provide a timeframe of when drug activity occurred
at the residence, (3) statements from informants alleging drug activity at the house failed to pass
the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability test, (4) allegations regarding short-stay traffic were insufficient to
establish probable cause, (5) Wolfe’s criminal history was irrelevant to criminal activity at the
residence, and (6) the presence of syringes on a neighbor’s property was insufficient to establish
probable cause. We disagree.
While none of the circumstances when viewed in isolation established probable cause, the
warrant as a whole was supported by probable cause. Garcia, 63 Wn. App. at 875. First, the
affidavit outlined in detail the extent of short-stay traffic at Wolfe’s residence. The affidavit
provided factual statements from two citizen informants and the detective, all who readily
observed multiple people coming and going from Wolfe’s residence during short time periods.
The affidavit contained Whallon’s statement that “he sees people at the house consistently, coming
and going,” and on one day he noted 12 different visitors during a 30-minute time period. CP at
28. The detective referred to short-stay traffic as something he knew “to be an indicator of possible
narcotics dealing.” Id. at 26.
In addition to heavy and consistent short-stay traffic at Wolfe’s residence, Calnan found
multiple syringes and several syringe caps on his front lawn where Wolfe’s frequent visitors
parked their cars. Wolfe argues that because short-stay traffic and the syringes have innocent and
legitimate explanations, this evidence does not support a probable cause finding.
When items or circumstances have legitimate and innocent explanations, they are alone
insufficient to support probable cause. Neth, 165 Wn.2d at 185 (“[i]nnocuous objects that are
equally consistent with lawful and unlawful conduct do not constitute probable cause to search”).

No. 52124-5-II
9
For example, in Neth, the court concluded that possession of “small baggies may well create
reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation, but this fact alone does not rise to the level
of probable cause.” Id. at 185 n.3. The court further reasoned that “[a]dditional information such
as being in a high drug crime area, baggies with the appearance of having once contained illicit
substances, or observations of transactions involving the baggies may well have been sufficient”
to support a finding of probable cause. Id.
The affidavit at issue here did not just contain evidence of syringes and short-stay traffic.
While investigating Calnan’s complaint, the detective reported that he witnessed four individuals
known to police for drug-related activity at Wolfe’s residence. While the presence of known drug
users alone is not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, it is a relevant consideration in
determining whether probable cause exists. State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429
(1980) (prior drug use may lead to the suspicion of current drug use but does not in itself support
probable cause); State v. Weyand, 188 Wn.2d 804, 817, 399 P.3d 530 (2017) (a visit to a “known”
drug house alone did not justify an investigative stop).
However, three of the known drug users provided additional information to the officer that
created a nexus between the short-stay traffic at Wolfe’s residence, syringes and syringe caps on
Calnan’s lawn, and the presence of known drug users to criminal activity inside of Wolfe’s
residence. Butler, a known drug user, was seen walking from Wolfe’s residence. Butler told the
officer that he is an active drug user and had syringes in his pocket. The officer also witnessed
Orlowski, a known drug user, exit her car and enter Wolfe’s residence. Drug paraphernalia was
visible in the center console of her car. After leaving Wolfe’s residence, Orlowski admitted to
current drug use and told the officer that she witnessed people use drugs at Wolfe’s residence. On

No. 52124-5-II
10
the same night, Sylvester reported that individuals sold drugs out of Wolfe’s residence and that
individuals associated with Wolfe’s residence recently stole her dog and other personal items as
payment for drugs. This information was sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that Wolfe
was involved in criminal activity and that evidence of the crime could be found at his residence.
See Scherf, 192 Wn.2d at 363.
Wolfe also contends that we should not consider Whallon’s, Orlowski’s, or Sylvester’s
statements when determining whether probable cause exists because their statements fail to meet
the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability test. However, the Aguilar-Spinelli reliability test applies only to
information provided by a confidential informant or an anonymous tipster. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at
413; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15; State v. O’Connor, 39 Wn. App. 113, 120, 692 P.2d 208 (1984)
(“[T]he Aguilar/Spinelli strictures were aimed primarily at unnamed police informers.”).
In this case, Whallon, Orlowski, and Sylvester were mere witnesses, not anonymous
tipsters or confidential informants. In the absence of a claim that the detective omitted material
information from the affidavit that might have borne upon their credibility, the magistrate was
entitled to evaluate their credibility and find them reliable for purposes of evaluating probable
cause. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 479 (“[O]nly material falsehoods or omissions made recklessly
or intentionally will invalidate a search warrant.”). Because all of the witnesses were named in
the warrant affidavit, the Aguilar-Spinelli test does not apply. O’Connor, 39 Wn. App. at 120.
The decision to issue a search warrant is highly discretionary. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at
477. The issuing judge “is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances
set forth in the affidavit” and we resolve all doubts in favor of upholding the warrant. Scherf, 192

No. 52124-5-II
11
Wn.2d 363. Based on the information outlined above, we hold that the issuing judge did not abuse
its discretion because the affidavit was supported by probable cause.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
For the first time on appeal, Wolfe argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury
in a manner that relieved the State of its burden to prove that Wolfe “received notice” of the
January 19, 2018 hearing and failed to appear “as required,” which is the language used in RCW
9A.76.170(1). Wolfe argues that this error violated his due process rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the
Washington Constitution.
We decline to address Wolfe’s challenge to the to-convict instruction because Wolfe’s
challenge does not involve a manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3).
A. UNPRESERVED CHALLENGE
Wolfe argues that the claim of error he raises, that the instruction relieved the State of its
burden to prove Wolfe “received notice” of the hearing and failed to appear “as required,” is a
manifest constitutional error as a matter of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal. We
disagree.
Wolfe did not object to the to-convict instruction at trial. “Generally, a party who fails to
object to jury instructions below waives a claim of instructional error on appeal.” State v. Edwards,
171 Wn. App. 379, 387, 294 P.3d 708 (2012). But an appellant does not waive a manifest error
affecting a constitutional right by failing to object below. RAP 2.5(a)(3). To merit review of this
issue on appeal, the appellant must show that (1) the error is of constitutional magnitude and (2)
the error is manifest. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

No. 52124-5-II
12
To determine whether the error was manifest, RAP 2.5(a)(3) requires the appellant to show actual
prejudice. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99. We focus on “whether the error is so obvious on the record
that the error warrants appellate review.” Id. at 99-100.
RCW 9A.76.170(1) states that a person is guilty of bail jumping if the person is released
by court order “with knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before
any court” and “fails to appear . . . as required.” (Emphasis added.) The elements of bail jumping
are that the defendant “‘(1) was held for, charged with, or convicted of a particular crime; (2) was
released by court order or admitted to bail with the requirement of a subsequent personal
appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required.’” State v. Williams, 162 Wn.2d 177,
183-84, 170 P.3d 30 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pope, 100 Wn. App. 624, 627,
999 P.2d 51 (2000)).
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the bail jumping using a to-convict
instruction that was modeled on 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions:
Criminal 120.41, at 570 (4th ed. 2016). Two of the instruction’s elements were that Wolfe “failed
to appear before a court” and that he “had been released by court order or with knowledge of the
requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before that court.” CP at 92.
B. “RECEIVED NOTICE” ELEMENT
Wolfe argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury in a manner that relieved the
State of its burden to prove that Wolfe “received notice,” therefore the State did not prove that he
had knowledge of the January 19, 2018 hearing. We disagree.
RCW 9A.76.170(1) requires that the defendant have “knowledge of the requirement of a
subsequent personal appearance before any court.” The knowledge requirement is satisfied “when

No. 52124-5-II
13
the State proves that the defendant has been given notice of the required court dates.” State v.
Fredrick, 123 Wn. App. 347, 353, 97 P.3d 47 (2004). In Fredrick, the court held that evidence
that the defendant knew she had a court date was sufficient to prove the “knowledge” element of
bail jumping. Id. at 355. Prior to the missed hearing, Fredrick signed a scheduling order that listed
the required court date. Id. at 350.
Wolfe relies on State v. Cardwell, where the court held that there was insufficient evidence
that the defendant knew that he had a required scheduled appearance. 155 Wn. App. 41, 47-48,
226 P.3d 243 (2010), modified on remand, 166 Wn. App. 1011 (2012). The State’s notice of the
required hearing was mailed to Cardwell but did not reach him until after the scheduled
appearance. Id. at 47. Citing Fredrick, 123 Wn. App. at 353, we concluded that without any notice
of the required hearing date, the State could not prove knowledge. Id. We further concluded that
if the State proves receipt of notice, then the element of knowledge is satisfied. Id.
Based on the foregoing cases, Wolfe argues that the State was required to prove that he
received notice of the required hearing in order to prove knowledge. But Wolfe’s argument relies
on the logical fallacy of the inverse or “denying the antecedent.” State v. Brush, 183 Wn.2d 550,
568 n.8, 353 P.3d 213 (2015) (Wiggins, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). This
fallacy occurs when one assumes that the inverse of a true statement is also true. For example, if
the conditional statement, “‘If P, then Q’” is true, then “‘if not P, then not Q’” must also be true.
Id. This premise is flawed because denying the truth of the P (the antecedent) does not necessitate
the denial of Q (the consequent). Id. As applied here, Wolfe points to our holding that if the State
proves receipt of notice, then the knowledge element is satisfied (if P, then Q). Wolfe claims that
the inverse is also true, or if the State does not prove receipt of notice, then the knowledge element

No. 52124-5-II
14
is not satisfied (if not P, then not Q). This conclusion is invalid because negating the antecedent
does not necessitate the denial of the consequent. Id. Additionally, Wolfe’s argument confuses
what is necessary and what is sufficient to prove knowledge. Wolfe argues that if the State can
prove knowledge by showing a defendant received notice of the hearing, then it must be the case
that the State is required to prove the defendant received notice even if the State produces other
evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge of the requirement to appear. This premise is also
flawed because although showing that a defendant received notice is sufficient to prove
knowledge, it is not the only way to prove knowledge.
Our conclusion is supported by the plain language of RCW 9A.76.170(1), which does not
require that the State prove that a defendant received notice. RCW 9A.76.170(1) expressly states
that the defendant must have “knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance.”
Moreover, it is axiomatic that if the State proves that the defendant had knowledge of the missed
hearing, the defendant must have received notice of the hearing at some point.
In sum, the knowledge element may be satisfied by proving that the defendant was given
notice of the missed court date, but receipt of notice is not an essential element of bail jumping
under RCW 9A.76.170(1). Because receipt of notice is not an element, the trial court did not err
by not including receipt of notice in the to-convict instruction. Therefore, Wolfe’s challenge on
this ground does not involve a manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3), and we decline
to address it.
C. “AS REQUIRED” ELEMENT
Wolfe also argues that the to-convict instruction was improper because it did not state that
Wolfe failed to appear “as required,” which permitted the jury to find him guilty regardless of

No. 52124-5-II
15
whether he was actually required to attend the January 19 hearing. Wolfe further argues that we
should decline to follow State v. Hart,6 where we addressed an identical argument, because its
reasoning is erroneous.
We disagree and decline to address this argument because under our decision in Hart, the
challenge to the to-convict instruction does not involve a manifest constitutional error under RAP
2.5(a)(3).
Here, the to-convict instruction instructed the jury that to convict Wolfe of bail jumping, it
was required to find that he “failed to appear before a court.” CP at 92. The instruction omitted
the statutory language that requires that a defendant failed to appear “as required.” RCW
9A.76.170(1). However, the instruction required the jury to find that Wolfe “had been released by
court order with knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before that
court.” CP at 92.
In Hart, we addressed the argument Wolfe makes here, that the to-convict instruction
relieved the State of its burden to prove that he had failed to appear at a court hearing “as required.”
195 Wn. App. at 455. The trial court’s to-convict instruction in Hart also did not include “as
required” after “the defendant failed to appear before a court.” Id. at 454. However, the instruction
required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “had been released by
court order or admitted to bail with knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal
appearance before that court.” Id. The court held that the instruction did not violate Hart’s due
6 195 Wn. App. 449, 455, 381 P.3d 142 (2016), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Burns, 193
Wn.2d 190, 438 P.3d 1183 (2019).

No. 52124-5-II
16
process rights because the instruction included the element of a required subsequent appearance.
Id. at 456.
Wolfe contends that Hart was wrongly decided because (1) its reasoning is erroneous in
cases such as his where a defendant is released with knowledge of a required subsequent personal
appearance, but is charged with bail jumping for failing to appear at a hearing other than the
hearing the defendant had notice of at the time of release and (2) its reasoning conflates two
different elements of bail jumping.
Wolfe draws a distinction between (1) evidence that the defendant failed to appear in court
“‘as required’” and (2) evidence that the court ordered a hearing that the defendant was required
to attend. Br. of Appellant at 35-36. Wolfe argues that the to-convict instruction did nothing to
inform the jury of the first prong that he actually failed to appear as he had been ordered to on
December 19, 2017, rather than on the date his hearing was reset for, on January 19, 2018. He
also argues that the holding in Hart renders superfluous the language “as required” in RCW
9A.76.170(1).
We hold that the reasoning in Hart is not flawed. First, Wolfe’s distinction between the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her required attendance at a future hearing and the defendant’s
actual failure to appear in court “as required” is unsupported by the reasoning in Hart or the
language of RCW 9A.76.170(1). Hart specifically references the previous phrase “with
knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance,” which makes it clear that a
defendant cannot be convicted of bail jumping for failing to appear in court where there was no
prior requirement that the defendant do so. Id. at 456 (emphasis omitted). Further, a defendant
cannot have a valid claim that he or she did not fail to attend the hearing “as required” when the

No. 52124-5-II
17
defendant knows that the court had ordered him or her to return for a future hearing, and the
defendant fails to attend that hearing.
Second, Wolfe’s reading of RCW 9A.76.170(1) creates a distinction between the trial
court’s initial order requiring Wolfe to return for the December 19, 2017 hearing and the trial
court’s subsequent order requiring Wolfe to return for the January 19, 2018 hearing. Wolfe’s
distinction is unnecessary because regardless of any potential scheduling changes of the hearing
itself, the defendant still knows that he or she is required to make a subsequent personal appearance
at that hearing when it does occur.
We follow Hart and hold that Wolfe’s challenge to the to-convict instruction is not a
manifest constitutional error because we have already determined that identical language satisfies
due process. Accordingly, we decline to review Wolfe’s challenge.
III. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Wolfe argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of bail jumping
because no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wolfe received notice
to appear at the hearing and that his appearance was required. . Because we conclude that receipt
of notice is not an element of bail jumping, we review whether the State presented insufficient
evidence that Wolfe knowingly failed to appear at the court hearing as required. We hold that the
State presented sufficient evidence.
Due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a
charged crime. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 584, 355 P.3d 253 (2015). Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of law that we review de novo.
State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016).

No. 52124-5-II
18
The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). In a
sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant admits the truth of the evidence and the court
views the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. Id. at 265-66. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. Id.
at 266.
Wolfe was charged with bail jumping under RCW 9A.76.170(1), which reads,
Any person having been released by court order or admitted to bail with knowledge
of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this
state, or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for service of sentence,
and who fails to appear or who fails to surrender for service of sentence as required
is guilty of bail jumping.
As discussed above, the elements of bail jumping are that the defendant “‘(1) was held for,
charged with, or convicted of a particular crime; (2) was released by court order or admitted to bail
with the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and (3) knowingly failed to appear as
required.’” Williams, 162 Wn.2d at 183-84 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pope, 100 Wn. App. at
627).
At trial, the State presented Wolfe’s order for pretrial release, which was signed by Wolfe
and received in open court on October 27, 2017. The order stated that Wolfe “shall appear” on
December 19, 2017, and that failure to appear when required by the court is a crime. Ex. 58 at 2.
The State also presented the transcript from the December 19, 2017 hearing at trial. At the
hearing, Wolfe’s counsel stated, “He is here” and requested the court to continue the hearing to
January 19, 2018. Ex. 64 at 2. The court granted counsel’s request, and entered an order resetting

No. 52124-5-II
19
the omnibus hearing for January 19, 2018 in open court. The court also entered an order on
counsel’s motion to continue, which reflected that Wolfe appeared at the December 19, 2017
hearing and that “[w]ritten and oral notice [was] given to defendant” of the new set date for the
omnibus hearing. Ex. 61 at 1. Wolfe failed to appear for the January 19, 2018 omnibus hearing.
In raising a sufficiency of the evidence claim, Wolfe admits the truth of the evidence and
we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the State. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 265-66. In viewing Wolfe’s counsel’s
statement that “[h]e is here” in the light most favorable to the State, we draw a reasonable inference
that Wolfe was present at the December 19, 2017 hearing. Ex. 64 at 2. Furthermore, Wolfe admits
the truth of the court’s order reflecting that Wolfe appeared at the December 19, 2017 hearing and
was given “[w]ritten and oral notice” of the new set date for the omnibus hearing. Ex. 61 at 1.
This evidence, coupled with the trial court’s order entered in open court resetting the omnibus
hearing for January 19, 2018, created a reasonable inference that Wolfe had knowledge of the
January 19, 2018 hearing date.
Furthermore, Wolfe’s order for pretrial release stated that Wolfe was required to appear on
December 19, 2017 and that failure to appear when required by the court is a crime. As stated
above, Wolfe appeared for the hearing, but his counsel rescheduled. Since the matter was reset, a
reasonable juror could also find that Wolfe knew his appearance would also be required at the
subsequent January 19, 2018 hearing.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that the evidence
was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Wolfe knowingly failed

No. 52124-5-II
20
to appear at the January 19, 2018 hearing as required. Accordingly, we hold that there was
sufficient evidence to support Wolfe’s conviction.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not err by denying Wolfe’s motion to suppress because the
State had probable cause to enter Wolfe’s residence. We decline to address Wolfe’s challenge to
the bail jumping to-convict instruction because Wolfe’s claim does not involve a manifest
constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3). Finally, we hold that sufficient evidence supports
Wolfe’s bail jumping conviction. We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
CRUSER, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, J.
LEE, A.C.J.