* Darrion Holiwell, Respondent V. Grenadinah Dela Llana, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
GRENADINAH DELA LLANA,
Appellant,
v.
DARRION HOLIWELL,
Respondent.
No. 86474-2-I
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PUBLISH
The appellant, Grenadinah Dela Llana, having filed a motion to publish opinion,
and the hearing panel having reconsidered its prior determination and finding that the
opinion will be of precedential value; now, therefore it is hereby:
ORDERED 	that the unpublished 	opinion filed 	November 	3, 2025, 	shall 	be
published and printed in the Washington Appellate Reports.
For the Court:
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GRENADINAH DELA LLANA,
Appellant,
v.
DARRION HOLIWELL,
Respondent.
No. 86474-2-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. — Grenadinah Dela Llana appeals the trial court’s order
declining to incarcerate Darrion Holiwell until such time as he credibly accounts for
the location of approximately 70 weapons and surrenders those weapons, if any,
in his possession or control. 	We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
In January 2022, Dela Llana filed a petition for a domestic violence
protection order (DVPO) seeking protection from Darrion Holiwell. The trial court
entered a temporary order for protection and an order to surrender and prohibit
weapons. 	The surrender order required Holiwell to immediately surrender all
firearms and dangerous weapons.
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No. 86474-2-I
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Holiwell subsequently filed a declaration of non-surrender, stating he did not
possess any firearms or dangerous weapons to surrender pursuant to the order.
That same day, the King County domestic violence firearms unit produced a report
listing 70 firearms registered to Holiwell. Soon after, the trial court determined that
Holiwell was not in compliance with the surrender order.
Holiwell filed another declaration of non-surrender on March 10, 2022. He
stated:
I acknowledge that I previously purchased and owned numerous
firearms registered under my name during the period from 1995-
2014, as indicated in the Firearms Information filed in this case on
February 9, 2022. 	However, during that period of time, I sold and
transferred many of my registered firearms in private, off-market
transactions 	with 	fellow 	competition 	shooters, 	friends, 	and
colleagues 	at 	the 	King 	County 	Sheriff’s 	Office 	(my 	former
employer). [1] Many of the firearms listed on the Firearms Information
were transferred out of my ownership and possession through these
private transactions. Unfortunately, I do not have official receipts or
transfer documents from these private transactions.
Holiwell further explained that law enforcement had seized any remaining firearms
in 2014 when he was convicted of promoting prostitution in the second degree,
theft in the first degree, and a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(all felony offenses) and sentenced to 17 months of incarceration.
Having claimed that he no longer owned, possessed, or had access to any
of 	the firearms listed on the report but lacked “official receipts or transfer
documents,” 	Holiwell informed the trial court that he would “make every effort to
gather the requisite documentation.” 	The court determined that Holiwell was not
in compliance with the weapons surrender order.
1 Holiwell is a former deputy with the King County Sheriff’s Office. Among his roles as a
deputy, Holiwell served as the chief firearms instructor and a member of the SWAT team.
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No. 86474-2-I
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On March 16, 2022, the trial court entered a DVPO protecting Dela Llana
and her children from Holiwell for ten years and another order for Holiwell to
immediately surrender all firearms and dangerous weapons. Later that month, the
trial court again found Holiwell was not in compliance with the surrender order.
Between April 2022 and November 2023, the trial court held approximately
twenty hearings concerning Holiwell’s compliance with the surrender order. 	The
court never found him in compliance. 	Beginning June 30, 2022, the court held
Holiwell in contempt for failure to comply and imposed increasing financial
sanctions and terms of imprisonment to coerce compliance.
In August 2023, Dela Llana filed a motion requesting that the court impose
the 	remedial 	contempt 	sanction 	of 	imprisonment 	until 	compliance 	with 	the
surrender order. She noted that Holiwell “has been willing to serve approximately
a total of 115 days (served in increasing increments of 5, 10, 30, and 70 days) in
jail now and incur substantial financial obligations to the court in order to keep his
guns and/or not account for them.” 	She argued that without this sanction the
surrender order is ineffective, and she is denied substantive due process.
The trial court entered its final order in January 2024. The court found that
Holiwell remained in contempt of court. 	Further, “[h]e has remained defiantly
opposed to following this Court’s order, despite this Court’s repeated determination
that he understands the Order, is capable of following the Order, but is electing to
disobey it. 	His explanations in mitigation of the contempt status have been
unavailing.” 	Nonetheless, 	the 	court 	declined 	to 	impose 	imprisonment 	until
compliance 	as 	Dela 	Llana 	requested, 	stating 	“[t]he 	undersigned 	judge 	is
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No. 86474-2-I
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unconvinced that that indeterminate sanction of incarceration would [be] effective
or that it would be the right outcome in this matter.”
Concluding “that the sanctions contemplated under RCW 7.21.030(2)(a)
and (b) would be ineffective to compel Mr. Holiwell’s compliance with the Order to
Surrender,” the court imposed a sanction of $100,000 due 30 days from entry of
the order. 	Holiwell could purge contempt by surrendering the outstanding
weapons, at which point “[t]he Court will schedule a contempt review hearing at
short notice if he accomplishes that task.” Lastly, the court stated that no further
hearings would be set until Holiwell complied with the order and sought to purge
contempt.
Dela Llana appeals.
II
Dela Llana argues the trial court abused its discretion by declining to impose
her requested contempt sanction of 	incarceration until compliance with the
surrender order and by terminating the weapons surrender proceedings. 	We
agree.
“A finding of contempt and punishment, including sanctions, lies within the
trial court’s sound discretion, and we will not disturb such findings and sanctions
absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Berty, 136 Wn. App. 74, 83, 147 P.3d
1004 (2006). 	Relevant here, a trial court abuses its discretion if a decision is
manifestly unreasonable, which occurs when the decision “is outside the range of
acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard.” 	In re
Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
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No. 86474-2-I
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The trial court found Holiwell in contempt due to his failure to comply with
the court’s surrender order. 	When a court orders the surrender of weapons
pursuant to a DVPO, “law enforcement and judicial processes must emphasize
swift and certain compliance with court orders prohibiting access, possession, and
ownership of all firearms.” 	RCW 9.41.801(1). 	Courts must “verify timely and
complete compliance with orders to surrender and prohibit weapons.” 	RCW
9.41.801(6)(a). If a court has any indication that the respondent has possession,
custody, or control of a dangerous weapon, “a compliance review hearing shall be
held” during which “[t]he respondent must be present and provide proof of
compliance with the court’s order.” 	RCW 9.41.801(6)(a). 	The party ordered to
surrender weapons has the burden to prove compliance by a preponderance of
the evidence. 	Braatz v. Braatz, 2 Wn. App. 2d 889, 898, 413 P.3d 612 (2018).
The court must determine whether the party has met the burden of proof of
compliance. Id. at 899.
RCW 9.41.801 includes provisions that enable the trial court to enforce the
surrender order. If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe the
respondent has failed to surrender all firearms and a crime occurred, the court
“shall 	issue 	a 	warrant 	describing 	the 	firearms 	or 	dangerous 	weapons 	and
authorizing a search of the locations where the firearms and dangerous weapons
are reasonably believed to be and the seizure of all firearms and dangerous
weapons discovered pursuant to such search.” 	RCW 9.41.801(4). 	Additionally,
where the court has probable cause to believe the respondent was aware of and
failed to fully comply with the order “pursuant to its authority under chapter 7.21
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RCW, the court may issue an arrest warrant and initiate a contempt proceeding to
impose remedial sanctions.” RCW 9.41.801(7)(a).
The trial court attempted to coerce Holiwell to comply with the surrender
order by imposing remedial contempt sanctions under RCW 7.21.030(2). A court
may find a person in contempt of court if “that person has failed or refused to
perform an act that is yet within the person’s power to perform.” RCW 7.21.030(2).
With a finding of contempt, a court may order (a) imprisonment, which “may extend
only so long as it serves a coercive purpose,” (b) “[a] forfeiture not to exceed two
thousand dollars for each day the contempt of court continues,” and/or (c) “[a]n
order 	designed 	to 	ensure 	compliance 	with 	a 	prior 	order 	of 	the 	court.”
RCW 7.21.030(2)(a)-(c). The statute also authorizes trial courts to impose “[a]ny
other remedial sanction other than the sanctions specified in (a) through (c) of this
subsection [listed above] if the court expressly finds that those sanctions would be
ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court.” RCW 7.21.030(2)(d).
After months of unsuccessful terms of imprisonment pursuant to RCW
7.21.030(2)(a) and financial sanctions pursuant to RCW 7.21.030(2)(b), the trial
court found those sanctions would be ineffective to compel Holiwell’s compliance.
Additionally, the court was “unconvinced” that indeterminate incarceration would
be effective or “the right outcome in this matter.” 	Instead, the court imposed a
remedial sanction under RCW 7.21.030(2)(d) requiring Holiwell to pay $100,000
within 30 days. 	Holiwell could purge contempt by complying with the surrender
order, but otherwise the court would not hold additional compliance or contempt
hearings.
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By entering this order, the court discontinued its oversight of Holiwell’s
compliance with the surrender order until such time as Holiwell surrendered the
outstanding weapons. In so doing, the trial court effectively released Holiwell from
his legal obligations without credibly accounting for the location of approximately
70 weapons. This is an abandonment of the statutory duty imposed on the court
by RCW 9.41.801. The trial court acknowledged, “the Legislature has demanded
that the person subject to an Order to Surrender be responsible for accounting for
their weapons.” The court further acknowledged that Holiwell had failed to comply
with this statutory mandate: “He has consistently shared the same, unpersuasive,
message with this Court which can be summarized as ‘I don’t have the guns and I
don’t know where they are.’ 	Mr. Holliwell’s assertions here are not credible and
they have not been credible since the outset.” 	But rather than hold Holiwell
accountable in accordance with the legislative mandate, the trial court imposed a
sanction with little coercive value2 and ended its oversight without ensuring
compliance.
Given the facts of Holiwell’s intransigence and the requirements of RCW
9.41.801, the trial court’s order was “outside the range of acceptable choices” and,
therefore, manifestly unreasonable. Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 47. While the court’s
frustration with Holiwell’s intractable behavior is understandable, the order it
entered only enables his continued defiance of the surrender order. The trial court
failed to ensure “swift and certain compliance with court orders prohibiting access,
possession, and ownership of all firearms.” 	RCW 9.41.801(1). 	Accordingly, we
2 By the time the court issued the order, Holiwell claimed to be indigent and was
represented by a public defender.
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reverse the court’s order and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
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