* Personal Restraint Petition Of Martin Pang

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN THE MATTER OF THE
PERSONAL RESTRAINT OF
MARTIN SHAW PANG,
Petitioner.
No. 73994-8-1
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	January 17, 2017
PER CURIAM - Following Martin Pang's 1998 convictions for four counts
of manslaughter, the court imposed a sentence that included discretionary legal
financial obligations (LFOs). 	In 2015, Pang filed a motion in superior court for an
"individualized inquiry" into his ability to pay his discretionary LFOs. Citing RCW
10.01.160(3) and State v. Blazina,1 	Pang argued that he never received the
requisite inquiry into his ability to pay and that the court should perform that
inquiry and waive his discretionary financial obligations. 	The court ruled the
motion was untimely and transferred it to this court under CrR 7.8(c)(2) for
resolution as a personal restraint petition.
While the petition was pending, the State Supreme Court decided In re
Flippo, 	Wn.2d 	, 385 P.3d 128 (2016). 	The Flippo court held that the
failure to inquire into Flippo's ability to pay discretionary LFOs did not render his
judgment 	and 	sentence 	invalid, 	and 	that 	Blazina's 	holding 	requiring 	such
inquiries was not a significant change in the law requiring retroactive application.
1 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015)(holding that under RCW 10.01.160(3), courts
must determine, on the record, the defendant's current and future ability to pay before
imposing discretionary financial obligations).
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No. 73994-8-1 / 2
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed
Flippo's personal restraint petition as untimely. 	The parties here agree, and we
concur, 	that 	Flippo 	controls 	Pang's 	arguments 	under 	Blazina 	and 	RCW
10.01.160(3). Accordingly, his petition/motion is untimely under RCW 10.73.090.
Pang argues in the alternative that this court should "construe Mr. Pang's
motion as a motion to remit costs [under RCW 10.01.160(4)], and . . . remand for
a hearing on the motion." 	Petitioner's Supp. Br. at 7. 	We decline to do so.
Pang's motion below rested on RCW 10.01.160(3), not the remittance statute,
RCW 10.01.160(4). 	If Pang seeks to remit his discretionary financial obligations,
the 	appropriate 	procedure 	is to file 	a 	motion 	for 	remittance 	under 	RCW
10.01.160(4) with "the sentencing court." 	RCW 10.01.160(4). 	The sentencing
court, not this court, will then determine whether he is entitled to remittance or
modification of the method of payment. 	RCW 10.01.160(4).
The petition is denied.
For the Court:
K\oUe sj 	Q c_
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