Byong Jik Choi & In Sook Choi, Appellant V. Christopher D. & Megan E. Adams, Respondents

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ROBERT E. ORDAL, trustee of the Robert
E. Ordal, PLLC profit-sharing plan; JOHN
ORDAL, trustee of the Pulmonary
Consultants, P.C. 401(k) profit sharing
plan trust; BRAD DECKER and LAURA
DECKER, husband and wife; JOY M.
ORDAL, a single woman; VIRGINIA
RYNING, a single woman; DAVID ORDAL,
a married man as his separate estate:
STUART WALKER, a married man as his
separate estate; VIKING RETIREMENT
ASSETS, custodian FBO Kit Wright IRA
#004293; and RSH GRANT, INC., a
Washington corporation,

Plaintiffs,
Vv.

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant,

BYONG JIK CHOI and IN SOOK CHOI,
husband and wife,

Appellants,

CHRISTOPHER D. ADAMS and MEGAN
E ADAMS, his wife, and the marital
community comprised thereof; and
ADAMS & DUNCAN, INC., P.S., a
Washington professional services
corporation,

Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 71832-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: June 8, 2015

GG:8 RY 8~ HAP S102

Lungs

iy

1
q

Sv 40 J1VLS

Wadd

NOLORIH
LAIQS4 v2

No. 71832-1-1/2
Appelwick, J. — The Chois appeal the summary judgment dismissal of
their 	legal 	malpractice 	claim. 	Adams, 	an 	attorney, 	performed 	certain 	legal
services for their son when 	he fraudulently 	borrowed 	money in their names
secured by their commercial property. 	The Chois fail to identify a genuine issue
of material fact for trial or a legal basis on which Adams owed them a duty of
care as clients or non-clients. We affirm.
FACTS
Attorney Patrick Vail referred 	his client, 	Ron Choi ("Ron"), to attorney
Christopher Adams of Adams & Dunn, P.S. 	After exchanging e-mail messages
with Vail, Adams exchanged e-mails with Ron. 	Ron told Adams that his legal
name was Byong Jik Choi and his wife's name was In Sook Choi and that they
wanted to obtain a business loan secured by their commercial property. 	At Ron's
request, Adams prepared four letters for two different lenders indicating that he
"reviewed with Byong Jik Choi and In Sook Choi the use of loan proceeds," was
"advised by Byong Jik Choi and In Sook Choi that all loan proceeds will be used
for commercial and business investment purposes," and was "further advised
that 	no 	portion 	of the 	loan 	proceeds 	will 	be 	used 	for 	personal, 	family 	or
household purposes." 	Adams billed Ron, and Ron paid Adams for some of his
work.
However, Byong Jik and In Sook Choi are actually Ron's parents. 	Ron is
unmarried and has no ownership interest in his parents' commercial property. 	By
presenting the letters prepared by Adams to lenders and 	forging his parents'

No. 71832-1-1/3
signatures on promissory notes and deeds of trust, Ron obtained loans of more
than $550,000 and then fled to Canada.
The Chois sued Adams, asserting legal malpractice and a violation of the
Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), 	chapter 19.86 RCW. 	Adams
moved for summary judgment dismissal of the Chois' claims, arguing they lacked
standing to 	pursue 	a 	legal 	malpractice 	claim and 	they 	had 	not 	identified a
genuine issue for trial as to whether they suffered damages in connection with
their 	claim 	under the WCPA. 	The trial court granted 	Adams's 	motion 	and
dismissed the Chois' 	claims. 	The Chois appeal the dismissal of their legal
malpractice claim.1
DISCUSSION
We review summary judgment orders de novo. 	Hadlev v. Maxwell. 144
Wn.2d 306, 310-11, 27 P.3d 600 (2001). 	Summary judgment is appropriate only
where there are 	no genuine issues of material fact and 	the 	moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	CR 56(c); Peterson v. Groves, 111 Wn.
App. 306, 310, 44 P.3d 894 (2002). 	When considering the evidence, we draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 	Schaaf
v. Hiqhfield, 127 Wn.2d 17, 21, 896 P.2d 665 (1995). 	If a plaintiff fails to make a
showing 	sufficient to establish the existence of an 	element essential to that
party's case, summary judgment is appropriate. 	Hiatt v. Walker Chevrolet Co..
1 The Chois have filed a motion to supplement the record with various documents
concerning 	separate 	claims 	asserted 	by 	another 	party. 	Because 	such
documents are not directly relevant to our review of the order on appeal, we deny
the motion.

No. 71832-1-1/4
120 Wn.2d 57, 66, 837 P.2d 618 (1992). 	We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. 	State v. Norlin. 134 Wn.2d 570, 582, 951 P.2d 1131 (1998).
Legal malpractice requires a showing of the existence of an attorney-client
relationship giving rise to a duty of care on the part of the attorney to the client.
Hizev v. Carpenter. 119 Wn.2d 251-61, 260, 830 P.2d 646 (1992). 	Although
determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship involves questions of
fact, 	summary judgment is 	proper if reasonable 	minds could 	reach 	but 	one
conclusion. 	Bohn v. Cody. 119 Wn.2d 357, 363, 832 P.2d 71 (1992).
The 	existence of 	an 	attorney-client 	relationship 	"'turns 	largely on 	the
client's subjective belief that it exists,'" as long as "'it is reasonably formed based
on the attending circumstances, including the attorney's words or actions.'" 	jd.
(quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding of McGlothlan. 99 wn.2d 515, 522, 663
P.2d 1330 (1983)). 	The essence of the relationship "is whether the attorney's
advice or assistance is sought and received on legal matters." 	Id.
Here, 	it 	is 	undisputed 	that 	the 	Chois 	did 	not 	believe 	that 	Adams
represented them in any capacity. 	They did not seek or receive Adams's advice
or assistance on any legal matter. 	Despite these facts and without citation to
relevant authority or cogent argument, the Chois now claim that their subjective
belief as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed is irrelevant. 	They
assert it is enough that Adams believed he was representing them. 	This court
generally will not consider arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority
or meaningful analysis. 	Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wn.2d

No. 71832-1-1/5
801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); Saunders
v. 	Lloyd's 	of 	London. 	113 	Wn.2d 	330, 	345, 	779 	P.2d 	249 	(1989) 	(issues
unsupported by adequate argument and authority); RAP 10.3(a).
Moreover, the Chois' characterization of the evidence in the record 	is
inaccurate. 	Adams presented a declaration in support of his motion for summary
judgment stating that he agreed to represent and provided legal services to Ron,
referred to his client by the name provided by Ron, and "did not know that [Ron]
had living parents." 	Nothing in the record suggests Adams believed that he
represented anyone other than Ron and his wife, despite knowing them by other
names. 	The Chois fail to identify any genuine issue of material fact for trial as to
the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Adams and them.
In the alternative, the Chois argue Adams owed them a duty even in the
absence of an 	attorney-client relationship. 	Although 	an 	attorney traditionally
could be held liable for malpractice only to the attorney's own client, an attorney
may owe a duty to a non-client under the six-element test of Trask v. Butler, 123
Wn.2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994). 	To determine whether an attorney owes the
plaintiff a duty of care in a particular transaction, the court must determine:
1. 	The extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit the
plaintiff;
2. 	The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
3. 	The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
4. 	The closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury;
5. 	The policy of preventing future harm; and

No. 71832-1-1/6
6. 	The extent to which the profession would be unduly burdened by a
finding of liability.
Id. 	Under this test, "the threshold question is whether the plaintiff is an intended
beneficiary of the transaction to which the advice pertained. 	While the answer to
this threshold question does not totally resolve the issue, no further inquiry need
be made unless such an intent exists." ]a\
Again without citation to authority or the record, or reasonable analysis,
the Chois claim that Adams intended to benefit them as "his believed actual
clients." 	The record demonstrates that Ron asked Adams to prepare attorney
letters to assist him in obtaining a 	business loan secured by his commercial
property. 	Adams contends he did not know Ron had living parents or that he
was using their names. 	There is no evidence that Ron's words or actions led
Adams to believe that Ron's parents existed or would benefit from his services or
that someone other than 	Ron 	and 	his wife 	owned the commercial 	property.
Moreover, 	there 	is 	ample 	evidence 	indicating 	that 	Ron 	actually 	intended 	to
defraud the Chois and the lenders in the transaction.2 	The Chois fail to identify
any evidence suggesting that this "transaction was intended to benefit" them, and
they cite 	no authority establishing that an 	attorney's duty to 	non-clients can
extend to this situation. 	Id 	The trial court properly dismissed the Chois' legal
malpractice claim.
We affirm.
2 Without citation to authority, 	the Chois suggest it would 	be "hypocritical" to
determine that Adams owed them no duty when the trial court refused to dismiss
a legal malpractice claim asserted against Adams by certain lenders based on
the same transaction. 	As no other party's malpractice claims are properly before
this court in this appeal, we do not address this argument.

No. 71832-1-1/7
WE CONCUR:
COX, J.
7