Rolfe & Kirstine Godfrey, & Robert Kornfeld, Apps. V. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, Ltd, Et Al Resp.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
ROLFE GODFREY and KIRSTINE
GODFREY, husband and wife and their marital
community composed thereof,
No. 46963-4-II
Appellants,
v.
STE. MICHELLE WINE ESTATES LTD, dba
CHATEAU STE. MICHELE, a Washington
corporation; and SAINT-GOBAIN
CONTAINERS, INC.
Respondents,
and
ROBERT KORNFELD,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Additional Appellant.
LEE, A.C.J. — This case again comes before us on remand from our Supreme Court for
reconsideration in light of State v. Lile, 188 Wn.2d 766, 398 P.3d 1052 (2017). After considering
Lile, we hold that the trial court erred in rejecting an affidavit of prejudice because the stipulated
order extending witness disclosure deadlines was not a discretionary decision. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
In 2010, Godfrey, while working as a server, was injured after a bottle of Ste. Michelle
wine shattered in his hand. In 2012, Godfrey filed a product liability suit against Ste. Michelle,
asserting manufacturing and design defects.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 27, 2018

No. 46963-4-II
2
On June 7, 2013, Judge Garold E. Johnson entered an order amending the case schedule.
The order included dates for the parties to disclose their witnesses and discovery deadlines. The
pretrial conference was set for the week of June 16, 2014. And the trial date was set for July 7,
2014.
On December 19, 2013, Godfrey’s case was reassigned to Judge Katherine M. Stoltz. On
January 6, 2014, Judge Stolz entered a stipulated order extending the deadline for the parties to
disclose witnesses to each other. The stipulated order did not change the pretrial conference date
or the trial date.
On March 3, Godfrey signed an affidavit of prejudice against Judge Stoltz. On March 7,
Godfrey moved to have Judge Stolz recused based on the affidavit of prejudice. Judge Stolz ruled
that Godfrey’s affidavit and motion were not timely because she had already signed a discretionary
order in the case. After the bench trial, the trial court dismissed Godfrey’s product liability claim
and entered judgment in favor of Ste. Michelle.
Godfrey appealed, arguing in relevant part that the trial court erred by rejecting Godfrey’s
affidavit of prejudice. Godfrey v. Ste. Michelle Wine Estates Ltd., noted at 195 Wn. App. 1007, 1-
2 (July 19, 2016). In a previous opinion, we held that the trial court’s signing of a stipulation and
order to extend the parties’ deadline for witness disclosures was not a discretionary decision. Id.
at 2-3. Because signing the stipulation and order was not a discretionary decision, the trial court
erred in rejecting the affidavit of prejudice, and we reversed. Id. at 3.
Our Supreme Court subsequently decided State v. Lile. In Lile, the Court held that the trial
court’s ruling on an agreed motion for trial continuance was a discretionary decision for purposes
of RCW 4.12.050. 188 Wn.2d at 778. The Court reasoned that continuances, regardless of the

No. 46963-4-II
3
parties’ agreement, “have a significant impact on the efficient operation of our courts and the rights
of the parties, particularly in criminal proceedings.” Id.. Following its decision in Lile, the
Supreme Court granted Ste. Michelle’s petition for review in this case, and remanded to this court
for reconsideration in light of Lile.
ANALYSIS
A. STATE V. LILE
In Lile, the parties orally requested that the trial court continue the trial date based on their
agreement. 188 Wn.2d at 771. The trial court orally granted the trial continuance. Id. The
defendant subsequently filed an affidavit of prejudice. Id. The trial court ruled that the affidavit
of prejudice was untimely because its ruling on the agreed continuance was discretionary. Id at
772.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s ruling on the parties’ agreed trial continuance
was a discretionary act for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Id. at 778. The Court emphasized that in
determining whether a ruling involves discretion for purposes of RCW 4.12.050, the most relevant
consideration is the substance and impact of a request—not the form of the request. Id. Where
the request impacts the duties and functions of the trial court, a ruling on the request is discretionary
for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Id. But a ruling on a stipulated agreement is nondiscretionary
where the agreement affects only the rights or convenience of the parties, and does not impact or
interfere with the duties and functions of the court. Id.
Continuances of trial dates, regardless of whether the parties agree, “have a significant
impact on the efficient operation of our courts and the rights of the parties, particularly in criminal
proceedings.” Id.. A ruling on an agreed trial continuance involves discretion because the court

No. 46963-4-II
4
must consider the request’s impact on “ ‘various factors, such as diligence, materiality, due
process, a need for an orderly procedure, and the possible impact of the result on the trial.’ ” Id.
at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Recall of Lindquist, 172 Wn.2d 120, 130,
258 P.3d 9 (2011), as corrected (Sept. 7, 2011)). And because the motion for a continuance
impacted the duties and functions of the trial court, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to continue
the trial date involved discretion. Id. at 778.
B. STIPULATED ORDER EXTENDING WITNESS DISCLOSURE DEADLINES
The stipulated order extending witness disclosure deadlines changed only the dates the
parties had to make witness disclosures to each other; it did not change any court dates. Ste.
Michelle argues that “Lile holds that the inquiry for discretion under RCW 4.12.050 is whether the
parties had the right to the relief sought, or whether the court had discretion to grant or deny the
relief. Lile, 188 Wn.2d at 788.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 6. Ste. Michelle essentially argues that
the inquiry in determining whether a ruling was discretionary under RCW 4.12.050 is whether the
court had discretion. Ste. Michelle’s argument begs the question of how to determine whether a
ruling is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050.
Lile instructs us, however, on how to determine whether a ruling on a stipulated agreement
is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050. Lile expressly held that we determine whether a
ruling on a stipulated agreement is discretionary by considering the substance and impact of the
request. Lile, 188 Wn.2d at 778. If the request impacts the functions and duties of the courts and
the efficient operation of the courts, then the ruling is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050.
If the request impacts only the rights or convenience of the parties, and does not interfere with the
duties and function of the court, then the ruling is nondiscretionary. Id..

No. 46963-4-II
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Here, the stipulated order extending the deadline for the parties to disclose witnesses to
each other impacted only the parties’ convenience. The stipulated order extending witness
disclosure deadlines did not impact the court’s calendar, the operation of the court, the parties’
rights, orderly procedure, or due process because it did not change any of the court dates set in the
case schedule. Unlike in Lile, the parties here did not request a trial continuance or otherwise seek
a change that would impact the court’s schedule.
Under the framework presented in Lile for determining whether a ruling on a stipulated
agreement is discretionary for purposes of RCW 4.12.050, Judge Stolz’s ruling was not
discretionary because the substance and impact of the stipulated order extending witness disclosure
deadlines did not impact the court’s functions or duties. Therefore, we again determine that the
trial court erred by finding that Godfrey’s affidavit of prejudice was untimely. Because the
affidavit of prejudice was timely, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, A.C.J.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Bjorgen, J.