Pan Abode Homes, Inc, Respondent V. Tahraoui Abdulfhafid, Appellant

Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PAN ABODE HOMES, INC., a
Washington corporation,
Respondent,
v.
TAHRAOUI ABDULFHAFID, a/k/a
HAFID ABDULFHAFID, a single man,
Appellant.
No. 79670-4-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — Tahraoui Abdulfhafid appeals the denial of his motion to
vacate an order extending a judgment against him and to quash a writ of execution.
We affirm because the trial court did not err in denying these motions.
FACTS
In July 2006, the trial court entered a $58,124.34 judgment in favor of Pan
Abode Homes, Inc. against Abdulfhafid. 	The court ordered the clerk to disburse
Abdulfhafid’s $20,000 bond held in the court registry in partial satisfaction of the
judgment. After deducting a $10 service fee from the bond, the court clerk issued
Pan Abode a check for $19,990. 	This disbursement, however, was neither
reflected in the original judgment summary nor noted by the clerk on the execution
docket.

No. 79670-4-I/2
- 2 -
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment and bond application. 	Pan Abode
Homes, Inc. v. Abdulfhafid, No. 58545-2-I, 2007 WL 2823284, at *4 (Oct. 1, 2007),
review denied, 164 Wn.2d 1014 (2008).
In July 2016, Pan Abode filed an ex parte petition to extend its judgment
against Abdulfhafid for an additional 10 years. The petition attached a copy of the
2006 judgment and indicated, erroneously, that Abdulfhafid had paid nothing
toward the judgment. 	The court granted the petition and entered an order
extending the judgment (“extended judgment”). 	The judgment summary stated
that the balance owing on the judgment was $58,124.34.
Pan Abode obtained a writ of execution in December 2018 directing the
King County Sheriff to levy and sell Abdulfhafid’s interest in a pending eminent
domain action. 	It voluntarily cancelled the sheriff’s sale because the writ did not
contain the exact amount Abdulfhafid owed under the judgment. Pan Abode later
provided the sheriff with an itemized statement reflecting the total amount due.
This itemization reflected Abdulfhafid’s $19,990 bond payment. Nevertheless, with
the $19,990 payment, the total amount owing as of January 29, 2019 was
$95,542.82, because of the 12 percent interest. 	Abdulfhafid does not challenge
this calculation. In January 2019, Pan Abode obtained a new writ of execution that
correctly referenced payment of $19,990 from the court registry.
In February 2019, Abdulfhafid moved to vacate the extended judgment and
to quash the writ of execution based on the error in the balance owing as reflected
in the judgment summary. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Abdulfhafid’s
motion. 	Abdulfhafid then filed a second motion to quash the writ of execution,

No. 79670-4-I/3
- 3 -
contending that he had no monetary interest in the condemnation action and the
sheriff lacked authority to execute against it under RCW 6.17.160(7). 	The court
denied this motion in March 2019.
Abdulfhafid appeals.
ANALYSIS
Abdulfhafid raises numerous assignments of error. 	We address them
largely in the order presented.
Motion to Vacate
Abdulfhafid contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate
the extended judgment. 	We review a court’s denial of a motion to vacate for an
abuse of discretion. 	Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wn. App. 682, 686, 42 P.3d 447
(2002). 	“Discretion is abused when exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons.” Id.
CR 60(b) empowers a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding under specified grounds, including the following pertinent ones
Abdulfhafid raised in his motion to vacate below:
(4) 	Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(5) The judgment is void;
. . .
(11) 	Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
CR 60(b)(4), (5), (11).
CR 60(b)(4) - Fraud or Misrepresentation
Abdulfhafid argues that Pan Abode deceived the court in its motion to
extend the judgment by falsely representing that Abdulfhafid had made no

No. 79670-4-I/4
- 4 -
payment on the judgment. He claims that, in order to be entitled to an extension
of a judgment, RCW 6.17.020(3)1 required Pan Abode to provide the court with an
updated judgment summary that confirmed the amount Abdulfhafid owed on the
judgment. Because Pan Abode’s updated judgment summary did not deduct the
$19,990 it received from the bond, Abdulfhafid contends Pan Abode obtained the
extension through fraud.
To prevail on a CR 60(b)(4) motion, the moving party must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that an adverse party obtained the judgment through
fraud. 	Peoples State Bank v. Hickey, 55 Wn. App. 367, 371-72, 777 P.2d 1056
(1989). 	The fraudulent conduct must cause the entry of the judgment “such that
the losing party was prevented from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense.”
Lindgren v. Lindgren, 58 Wn. App. 588, 596, 794 P.2d 526 (1990).
The record does not contain evidence supporting Abdulfhafid’s claim of
fraud. 	First, although Pan Abode’s 2016 petition provided the court with an
inaccurate updated judgment summary, Pan Abode submitted a declaration from
the attorney who filed the petition stating that, as of June 2016, he was unaware
that a disbursement from the court registry had been made in partial satisfaction
of the judgment and, had he known, he would have informed the court and
arranged for the filing of a partial satisfaction of judgment. 	The existence of a
clerical error is not evidence of fraud. 	CR 60(b)(4) is aimed at judgments “which
were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually incorrect.” Hickey, 55 Wn.
App. at 372.
1 Under RCW 6.17.020(3), the order granting the petition “shall contain an updated
judgment summary as provided in RCW 4.64.030.”

No. 79670-4-I/5
- 5 -
Second, Pan Abode’s petition also provided the court with a copy of the
2006 order directing the court clerk to apply Abdulfhafid’s $20,000 bond to the
judgment. 	This fact supports the trial court’s conclusion that Pan Abode had not
attempted to hide any information from the court when it sought to extend the
judgment.
Lastly, as the trial court indicated at the hearing, there are multiple entries
in the court record “show[ing] that the $20,000 was deposited and forfeited so there
is no duplicity.” 	Abdulfhafid does not challenge the trial court’s finding that there
was no deception on Pan Abode’s part.
Because there is no evidence Pan Abode fraudulently withheld payment
information from the court when it sought to extend its judgment, the court properly
denied Abdulfhafid’s CR 60(b)(4) motion.
CR 60(b)(5) - Void Judgment
Abdulfhafid contends that the order extending the judgment was void
because the judgment summary was inaccurate. 	“Whether a judgment is void is
a question of law that we review de novo.” Ha v. Signal Elec., Inc., 182 Wn. App.
436, 447, 332 P.3d 991 (2014). A void judgment is a judgment entered by a court
that lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks the inherent
power to make or enter the particular order involved. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d
241, 245, 543 P.2d 325 (1975).
Abdulfhafid argues the trial court lacked the inherent power to enter the
order extending Pan Abode’s judgment because Pan Abode failed to provide the
court with an updated judgment summary. But Abdulfhafid relies on a misreading

No. 79670-4-I/6
- 6 -
of the statute giving superior courts the authority to extend judgments. 	RCW
6.17.020(3) does not mandate that the petitioner provide an updated judgment
summary to the court. It provides merely that “[t]he order granting the application
shall contain an updated judgment summary as provided in RCW 4.64.030.”
Although King County Superior Court Local Civil Rule 7(b)(5)(C) requires a moving
party to submit a proposed order with any motion, the court’s authority to sign an
order extending a judgment is statutory and does not arise from this local rule.
And Pan Abode did provide the court with an updated judgment summary—
just one containing an error. We have found no authority for the contention that a
trial court lacks the inherent authority to sign a judgment when the judgment
happens to contain a clerical error. Indeed, CR 60(a) provides that clerical errors
in judgments may be corrected by a court at any time on its own initiative or on the
motion by any party. 	Even judgments containing clerical errors in mathematical
computations may be corrected by the court under CR 60(a). 	See K ARL B.
TEGLAND, 4 W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES OF PRACTICE CR 60, author’s comment
3 (6th ed. March 2020 Update). 	The error in Pan Abode’s proposed judgment
summary did not deny the court the authority to consider and rule on the motion to
extend the judgment.
We are unaware of any case holding that a clerical error in an updated
judgment 	summary 	renders 	an 	extended 	judgment 	void. 	Abdulfhafid
acknowledges that “there is no case law on point addressing this exact issue.”
Where, as here, the original judgment was valid and Pan Abode filed its petition to
extend the judgment in a timely manner, there is no basis for concluding the clerical

No. 79670-4-I/7
- 7 -
error in the updated judgment summary rendered the extended judgment void.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to vacate based on CR 60(b)(5)
grounds.
CR 60(b)(11) - Any Other Reason Justifying Relief from Judgment
Abdulfhafid contends the trial court should have vacated the order under
CR 60(b)(11) because he did not receive notice before the court entered the
extended judgment and was thus denied the opportunity to oppose Pan Abode’s
petition or appeal the extended judgment.
Abdulfhafid concedes that RCW 6.17.020 was amended by the legislature
to permit a judgment creditor to petition the court ex parte for an extension of the
judgment without notice to the judgment debtor. He admits he “was not entitled to
notice under RCW 6.17.020(3).”
But because of the ex parte nature of the proceeding, Abdulfhafid contends
CR 	60(b)(11) 	is 	the 	only 	mechanism 	by 	which 	he 	could 	raise 	procedural
irregularities that would otherwise be available under CR 60(b)(1). 	Relief under
CR 60(b)(11) is limited to “‘extraordinary circumstances not covered by any other
section of the rule.’” 	In re Marriage of Yearout, 41 Wn. App. 897, 902, 707 P.2d
1367 (1985) (quoting State v. Keller, 32 Wn. App. 135, 140, 647 P.2d 35 (1982)).
Even though Abdulfhafid did not know Pan Abode was seeking an extension
of the judgment, he had multiple paths for challenging the amount of the extended
judgment 	after-the-fact. 	As 	noted 	above, 	CR 	60(a) 	would 	have 	permitted
Abdulfhafid to move to amend the judgment to correct any clerical mistake in the
amount he owes. 	The one-year time bar of CR 60(b)(1) does not apply to

No. 79670-4-I/8
- 8 -
CR 60(a). Because CR 60(a) covers the situation Abdulfhafid faced here, namely
the existence of a clerical error in the judgment summary, CR 60(b)(11) does not
apply.
Additionally, RCW 4.56.100(1) requires the clerk of court to note on the
execution docket any partial or full satisfaction of judgment. Courts have inherent
power to determine whether a judgment has been satisfied. 	47 AM . JUR . 2D
Judgments § 765 (May 2020 Update). 	If Pan Abode refused to file a partial
satisfaction of judgment to reflect payment it received from the bond proceeds, the
court could have ordered it to do so.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to vacate the order extending
Pan Abode’s judgment.
Order Nunc Pro Tunc
Abdulfhafid next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sua
sponte amending the extended judgment nunc pro tunc.2 He claims because Pan
Abode made the error in preparing the extended judgment, rather than the judicial
officer who signed it, amending it in 2019 and making it retroactive to 2016 was
inappropriate.
There are two problems with this argument. 	First, the trial court did not
amend the extended judgment and did not sign any order making an amendment
retroactive to 2016. 	During the hearing on Abdulfhafid’s motion to vacate the
extended judgment and to quash Pan Abode’s writ of execution, the trial court
2 “A nunc pro tunc order allows a court to date a record reflecting its action back to the time
the action in fact occurred.” State v. Hendrickson, 165 Wn.2d 474, 478, 198 P.3d 1029 (2009).
Such an order is “generally appropriate to correct only ministerial or clerical errors, not judicial
errors.” Id. at 479.

No. 79670-4-I/9
- 9 -
suggested that entering an order nunc pro tunc could eliminate any problems with
the writ of execution. Counsel for Pan Abode asked “are you suggesting [] an order
nunc pro tunc amending the extended judgment? 	Because I certainly can
cooperate with [Pan Abode’s counsel] to do that.” The court stated that the parties
could discuss that issue but indicated it would not take such a step “at this time.”
Abdulfhafid concedes in his brief that “the trial court didn’t enter a written nunc pro
tunc order extending judgment.” 	Under these circumstances, there is no order
nunc pro tunc to review.
Second, 	even 	had 	the 	court 	amended 	the 	judgment 	and 	made 	the
amendment retroactive to 2016, there would have been no abuse of discretion. A
trial court misuses its nunc pro tunc power and abuses its discretion when it uses
such an order to change its mind or to rectify a mistake of law. Hendrickson, 165
Wn.2d at 479. “But where the record demonstrates that the court intended to take,
and believed it was taking, a particular action only to have that action thwarted by
inartful drafting, a nunc pro tunc order stands as a means of translating the court’s
intention into an order.” Id.
In this case, the court signed an order extending a valid judgment for ten
years, intending for that judgment to reflect the actual amount Abdulfhafid owed to
Pan Abode. 	Because of inartful drafting by Pan Abode, it entered an extended
judgment that failed to reflect a partial payment on that judgment. No one disputes
that had Pan Abode’s counsel known of the payment, he would have reflected it in
the amount of the proposed extended judgment. 	When this clerical error was

No. 79670-4-I/10
- 10 -
discovered in 2019, there would have been nothing preventing the trial court from
correcting the judgment at that time and making the correction retroactive to 2016.
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
Abdulfhafid next argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to
quash the writ of execution because the clerk issued the writ in reliance on a
factually erroneous order. 	He also maintains that the court erred in denying his
second motion to quash because his interest in a then-pending condemnation
action was not subject to execution under RCW 6.17.090, .160(7). This court will
review a trial court’s denial of a motion to quash for an abuse of discretion. 	See
Paglia v. Breskovich, 11 Wn. App. 142, 144-45, 147, 522 P.2d 511 (1974) (court
has inherent supervisory power over its own processes to enjoin sheriff’s sale on
writ of execution).
RCW 6.17.110(1) provides that a writ of execution “shall intelligibly refer to
the judgment, stating the court, the county where the judgment was rendered, the
names of the parties, the amount of the judgment if it be for money, and the amount
actually due thereon.” 	Here, because the initial writ of execution did not identify
correctly the amount “actually due,” Pan Abode voluntarily cancelled the scheduled
sheriff’s sale and obtained a new writ which correctly identified the amount
Abdulfhafid owed. The second writ of execution explicitly referenced the payment
from the court registry:
WHEREAS, Pan Abode Homes, Inc. . . . recovered judgment against
. . . Hafid Abdulhafid [sic] . . . in the Superior Court of King County,
State of Washington, on the 14th day of July, 2006, for the sum of
$25,600.00, cost of suit, taxed at $2,299.34 and an attorney’s fee of
$30,225.00, interest on judgment, attorney’s fees and costs at the
rate of 12% per annum from July 14th, 2006. A payment of $19,990

No. 79670-4-I/11
- 11 -
was made from the Court Registry, making the total amount owing
$38,134.34 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from July 14th,
2006.
The second writ—and the only one actually used by the sheriff to execute against
Abdulfhafid’s property—correctly stated the amount actually owed. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to quash the writ based on any
error in the extended judgment.
Abdulfhafid contends, alternatively, that his interest in the condemnation
lawsuit is not subject to execution under RCW 6.17.090 or RCW 6.17.160(7). We
disagree. 	RCW 6.17.090 provides that “[a]ll property, real and personal, of the
judgment debtor that is not exempted by law is liable to execution.” 	RCW
6.17.160(7) 	provides 	that 	“intangible 	personal 	property 	may 	be 	levied 	on.”
Abdulfhafid relies on a provision of this statute that provides: “If the property is a
claim on which suit has been commenced, a copy of the writ and of the description
shall also be filed with the clerk of the court in which the suit is pending.” He argues
that his interest in the condemnation lawsuit is not personal property or a “claim on
which suit has been commenced.” 	He also maintains that his interest in the
condemnation lawsuit is limited to “defending against the taking of his leasehold
by the County.” He contends that because he did not initiate the lawsuit and has
not asserted a claim against anyone, whatever interest he has cannot be subjected
to a writ of execution.
Once 	again, 	Abdulfhafid 	misreads 	the 	statute 	and 	misunderstands
Washington creditor/debtor law. RCW 6.17.160(7) does not create an exemption
from execution for condemnation actions or lawsuits in which the debtor is a named

No. 79670-4-I/12
- 12 -
defendant. It merely provides direction as to when a writ of execution must be filed
with a court.
It is well-established that a judgment debtor’s interest in pending litigation is
subject to execution. See Robb v. Kaufman, 81 Wn. App. 182, 189, 913 P.2d 828
(1996). 	Although the record is sparse, it appears Abdulfhafid owns a sole
proprietorship named Amana Global Company and in July 2018, King County
brought a condemnation action against Amana to acquire its leasehold interest in
a parcel of land. 	The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,
determining that the land under leasehold was needed to construct and operate a
flood 	control 	project. 	The 	court 	subsequently 	denied 	Amana’s 	motion 	for
reconsideration, because “the condemnation of the real property interest is for
flood protection (capital project). 	The project secondarily provides for salmon
habitat restoration.”
In a condemnation action, a government entity must submit a petition in
superior court seeking a determination that the taking of private property is needed
for a public use, a jury determination of the amount of compensation to be paid to
the owner of the property at issue, and transfer of title. RCW 8.08.010; Pub. Util.
Dist. No. 2 of Grant County v. N. Am. Foreign Trade Zone Indus., LLC, 159 Wn.2d
555, 565, 151 P.3d 176 (2007). As a matter of law, Amana—and its sole proprietor,
Abdulfhafid—had a statutory right to compensation for the taking of Amana’s
leasehold interest by the county for flood control and salmon habitat restoration.
Although Abdulfhafid argues that his interest in the outcome of the litigation had

No. 79670-4-I/13
- 13 -
no value, the sheriff’s return of service indicates his interest in the claim was sold
to Pan Abode for $95,000.
The trial court did not err in concluding that Abdulfhafid’s interest in the
condemnation lawsuit was subject to execution by sheriff’s levy.
Accrual of Post-Judgment Interest on Judgment
Abdulfhafid next maintains that Pan Abode waived its right to collect interest
from 2006 to 2016. His argument is based on Pan Abode’s 2016 petition to extend
the judgment and its proposed judgment summary both of which stated: 	“5.
Interest Owed to Date of Judgment: $N/A.” 	Abdulfhafid contends this statement
constituted a waiver of any accrued post-judgment interest. 	Pan Abode argues
the reference to interest in paragraph 5 of its petition and the order extending the
judgment was to pre-judgment, not post-judgment, interest. 	Pan Abode has the
better argument.
The original judgment provided that “the total judgment amount shall bear
interest from and after the date of entry of this judgment at the rate of 12% per
annum, until fully paid.” 	Pan Abode’s petition to extend the judgment referred to
“interest owed to date of judgment.” 	The “date of judgment” was July 16, 2006.
An extended judgment is not a new judgment. 	It merely increases the length of
time during which Pan Abode may execute on a pre-existing judgment. In addition,
the petition indicated that the “Judgment Balance, Fees and Costs shall bear
interest at 12% per annum.” The only logical interpretation of the phrase “interest
owed to date of judgment” in the petition and in the updated judgment summary is

No. 79670-4-I/14
- 14 -
that no pre-judgment was awarded but post-judgment interest has continued to
accrue at the expressly stated rate of 12 percent per annum.
We therefore reject Abdulfhafid’s contention that Pan Abode waived its right
to post-judgment interest from the date of the 2006 judgment to the date the court
extended that judgment in 2016.
Abdulfhafid’s Request for CR 11 Sanctions
Abdulfhafid contends the trial court erred in rejecting his request for CR 11
sanctions against Pan Abode’s attorneys. 	Below, Abdulfhafid requested the
imposition of sanctions based on counsel’s “deception before the ex parte court.”
CR 11 sanctions are appropriate if the following three conditions are met:
“(1) The action was not well grounded in fact; (2) it was not warranted by existing
law; and (3) the attorney signing the pleading has failed to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the factual or legal basis of the action.” 	Manteufel v. Safeco Ins. Co.
of America, 117 Wn. App. 168, 176, 68 P.3d 1093 (2003). 	We review a court’s
decision on CR 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. Marina Condo. Homeowner’s
Ass’n v. Stratford at Marina, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 249, 263, 254 P.3d 827 (2011).
Abdulfhafid contends Pan Abode’s attorneys violated CR 11 in four ways:
(1) deceiving the ex parte court regarding the amount he owed under the judgment;
(2) “recklessly” obtaining a writ of execution based on an erroneous judgment; (3)
pursuing a sheriff’s sale even after discovering the error in the extended judgment;
and (4) obtaining a new writ of execution after Abdulfhafid filed a motion to quash
the writ of execution.

No. 79670-4-I/15
- 15 -
Abdulfhafid 	did 	not 	demonstrate 	that 	Pan 	Abode’s 	counsel 	acted
deceptively or recklessly when they filed a petition to extend the judgment. 	The
trial court found Pan Abode had not acted with duplicity and we cannot find on this
record that they were reckless in not reflecting the bond payment in the petition to
extend the judgment. 	Pan Abode explained how the error occurred to the trial
court, it found no basis for Abdulfhafid’s claim of deception, and it found Pan Abode
to be the prevailing party. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Abdulfhafid’s request for CR 11 sanctions.
Attorney Fee Award to Pan Abode
Abdulfhafid challenges the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Pan Abode
under the parties’ license agreement. “We review the legal basis for an award of
attorney fees de novo and the reasonableness of the amount of an award for abuse
of discretion.” 	Hulbert v. Port of Everett, 159 Wn. App. 389, 407, 245 P.3d 779
(2011).
Here, the license agreement provides in pertinent part: “The substantially
prevailing party in any litigation arising hereunder shall be entitled to its reasonable
attorneys’ fees and court costs, if any.” 	In Abdulfhafid’s motion to vacate the
extended judgment, he sought attorney fees and costs based on this same
provision of the license agreement. Because this litigation arises under the license
agreement, and Pan Abode prevailed, we affirm the trial court’s decision to award
attorney fees.
Because Abdulfhafid does not prevail here, we deny his request for attorney
fees on appeal. 	But under the terms of the licensing agreement, Pan Abode, as

No. 79670-4-I/16
- 16 -
the prevailing party, is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 	RAP
18.1(a). 	Therefore, we grant Pan Abode’s request for attorney fees subject to
compliance with RAP 18.1(d).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: