Maple View Acres Roadway Association, Respondent V. Vit Novak, Et Al., Appellants

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MAPLE VIEW ACRES ROADWAY
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent,
v.
VIT NOVAK and ZDENKA NOVAK,
Appellants.
No. 88029-2-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SMITH, J. — Vit and Zdenka Novak own a lot in a development managed
by Maple View Acres Roadway Association. In 2022, Maple View Acres initiated
a complaint foreclosing on 10 liens against Novak. Novak moved for a more
definite statement of the amended complaint. The court denied Novak’s motion
and granted CR 11 sanctions against Novak. Novak appealed.
Because Novak’s appeal is not an appeal from a “final judgment” within
the meaning of RAP 2.2(a)(1), and did “not dispose of all the claims or counts as
to all the parties,” nor did the superior court make an express direction for entry
of judgment supported by written findings, interlocutory review is not appropriate.
We dismiss the appeal. RAP 2.2(d), CR 54(b).
FACTS
Maple View Acres Roadway Association is a neighborhood association
that manages the Maple View Acres development in Skamania County. In 1991,
the original owners of Maple View Acres recorded the covenants, conditions, and

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restrictions, and bylaws (collectively, “CC&R”) for the development. In 1993,
Novak purchased a lot in the development. In 2021, Maple View Acres filed and
recorded 10 liens against Novak, alleging violations of Maple View Acres’
CC&Rs. In 2022, Maple View Acres initiated a complaint to foreclose on Novak’s
liens. In December 2023, Maple View Acres amended its complaint. Novak
moved for a more definite statement. Novak asserted they could not distinguish
which amendment of the CC&R was the basis of the suit. Maple View Acres
responded to Novak’s motion stating that the motion was merely a continuance
of Novak’s assertion of fraud and forgery and should be denied. Maple View
Acres requested attorney fees based on Civil Rule (CR) 11, alleging that Novak’s
motion was not “well grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, and [was]
imposed for an improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Novak replied, asking the
court to reject Maple View Acres’ request for attorney’s fees.
The superior court denied Novak’s motion for a more definite statement
and awarded judgment to Maple View Acres for $650. Novak then moved for
discretionary review. Division II of this court denied review of the denial of the
motion for a more definite statement, holding that Novak failed to show review of
the denial was appropriate under RAP 2.3(b). However, the court commissioner
determined that Novak’s motion for discretionary review of the judgment granting
CR 11 sanctions was warranted and converted it under RAP 5.1(c). The
commissioner held that the order for sanctions against Novak appeared to be in

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response to Maple View Acres’ motion for CR 11 sanctions, and therefore, was
appealable.
ANALYSIS
Under RAP 2.2(a), a party may appeal a final judgment entered in any
action or proceeding. A final judgment is “one that settles all the issues in a
case.” In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 392, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). If there is
no final judgment, a party may ask for discretionary review of any act of the trial
court that is not appealable as a matter of right. RAP 2.3(a). Discretionary
review may be accepted under specific RAP 2.3(b) considerations.
Circumstances warranting review include when the superior court has:
(1) . . . committed an obvious error which would render
further proceedings useless;
(2) . . . committed probable error and the decision of the
superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially
limits the freedom of a party to act;
(3) . . . so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by an
inferior court or administrative agency, as to call for review by the
appellate court; or
(4) . . . certified, or . . . all the parties to the litigation have
stipulated, that the order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and
that immediate review of the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.
RAP 2.3(b). The court generally disfavors interlocutory appeals. Hartley v.
State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 773, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Any order that adjudicates
fewer than all the claims does not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or
parties. Schiffman v. Hanson Excavating Co., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 681, 687-88, 513
P.2d 29 (1973). An order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims is “subject to

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revision at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment adjudicating the entire
action.” Schiffman, 82 Wn.2d at 688.
Here, Novak appeals the order and judgment on the defendant’s motion
for a more definite statement, but the order was not a final judgment on the
merits of the case. An entry of judgment for CR 11 sanctions does not meet the
criteria for review under RAP 2.2(d). The judgment for CR 11 sanctions disposed
of fewer than all of the claims, and the court did not make an express
determination supported by findings that an appeal could be taken. Furthermore,
the order does not fall into any of the circumstances for discretionary review
under RAP 2.3(b). Novak did not argue that trial court committed an obvious
error, that it altered the status quo, or that it departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings.
Because interlocutory review is not appropriate of this non-dispositive
ruling, we dismiss this appeal.
WE CONCUR: