State Of Washington, Respondent V. Danyielle Michelle Slothaug, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79962-2-I
) consolidated with
Respondent, ) Nos. 79963-1-I, 79964-9-I,
) and 79965-7-I
v. )
)
DANYIELLE MICHELLE SLOTHAUG, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
)
VERELLEN, J. — Danyielle Slothaug appeals her high end standard range
sentence contending the court failed to apply the correct standard to her request
for a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA). Slothaug does not establish
the trial court applied the incorrect standard or otherwise abused its discretion
when it denied her request for a DOSA.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2017, the State charged Slothaug with 14 theft-related felonies across
four cause numbers. Slothaug pleaded guilty to all 14 felonies. The State
recommended a high-end standard range sentence. Slothaug requested a DOSA
or a parenting sentencing alternative (PSA). After two sentencing hearings, the
court imposed a high-end standard range sentence of 57 months on each count.

No. 79962-2-I/2
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Slothaug appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. DOSA
Slothaug contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
DOSA request.
Generally, the trial court’s decision of whether to grant a sentencing
alternative is not reviewable on appeal.1 But the defendant may challenge the
“procedure by which a sentence was imposed.”2 When a defendant is eligible for
a sentencing alternative, the judge must “meaningfully consider whether a
sentencing alternative [is] appropriate.”3 This includes whether “‘the offender and
the community will benefit’” from the alternative sentence.4 The sentencing court
abuses its discretion when it categorically refuses to consider an alternative
sentence for an individual or an entire class of offenders.5
Here, the court denied Slothaug’s request for either a DOSA or a PSA.
Immediately following the denial, the court stated:
I have to look at your actions, and I also have to look at this baby,
who has not really met you, and who has a whole life ahead of her.
So I have to look at both of those things. It’s not just about you, it is
about your family.
1 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 338, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 343.
4 State v. Smith, 118 Wn. App. 288, 292, 75 P.3d 986 (2003) (quoting
RCW 9.94A.660(2)).
5 Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342.

No. 79962-2-I/3
3
And so I have to try and figure out whether it’s worth it for me
to take a risk on you and put you into treatment for a long period of
time and then, you know, the outpatient treatment that would happen
after that. And what does that mean to this little girl who is growing
up and maybe doesn’t have permanency. So there’s so many things
that I factor into this decision.[6]
Slothaug concedes the court’s consideration of her child was relevant to the
PSA request, but Slothaug contends the court impermissibly considered her child
and applied the incorrect legal standard when it denied her DOSA request.
The record contains overwhelming evidence to support the court’s denial of
Slothaug’s DOSA request. At the time of sentencing, Slothaug had an extensive
criminal history. Slothaug admitted the court had revoked a previous DOSA. And
she started committing the current offenses two months after her release from a
previous incarceration.
At the first sentencing hearing, in March 2019, the court continued the
hearing “to give Ms. Slothaug a chance to put her money where her mouth is.”7
The court directed Slothaug “to have a bed date,” “to see that you get in there,”
and “to see that you stay there, and . . . to see how this progresses.”8 The court
wanted “to see whether we appear to be going in the right direction.”9 By the
second sentencing hearing in May 2019, Slothaug had not started treatment.
In State v. Grayson, the sentencing court denied Grayson’s request for a
DOSA “because of the fact that the State no longer has money available to treat
6 Report of Proceedings (RP) (May 6, 2019) at 85.
7 RP (Mar. 14, 2019) at 68.
8 Id. at 69.
9 Id. at 71.

No. 79962-2-I/4
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people who go through a DOSA program.”10 On appeal, our Supreme Court
emphasized that the sentencing court did not articulate any other reason for
denying the DOSA.11 The court determined the sentencing court abused its
discretion even though “there were ample other grounds to find that Grayson was
not a good candidate for DOSA.”12
Here, unlike Grayson, the court did not indicate the denial of the DOSA was
based solely on an inappropriate concern. At both hearings, Slothaug’s defense
counsel emphasized the PSA request. In response, the court also emphasized
parenting concerns related to the PSA. But at the initial hearing, the court
expressly asked Slothaug about her history of relapses: “What about when you
did the prior DOSA?” and “Why did you start using again?”13 The court decided it
needed more information “to see if we appear to be going in the right direction.”14
The court expressed concern about Slothaug’s commitment to treatment. The
court ultimately made its decision about the PSA based on concerns about the
child.
A fair reading of the record is that the court’s denial of a DOSA was based
on “whether it’s worth it for me to take a risk on you and put you into treatment for
a long period of time.”15 Consistent with Slothaug’s history of relapses, her prior
10 154 Wn.2d 333, 337, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005).
11 Id. at 342.
12 Id.
13 RP (Mar. 14, 2019) at 63-64.
14 Id. at 71.
15 RP (May 6, 2019) at 85.

No. 79962-2-I/5
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failed DOSA, and her failure to “put her money where her mouth was” by getting a
treatment bed in the two months before the continued sentencing hearing, the
court applied the correct standard for a DOSA.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.
II. Statement of Additional Grounds
In a statement of additional grounds, Slothaug asks this court to reverse the
sentencing court’s denial of her DOSA request. She discusses her long-term drug
addiction, her lack of prior long term in-patient treatment, and her belief that she
will be successful in treatment. But Slothaug made these same arguments before
the sentencing court, and she does not establish that trial court abused its
discretion in rejecting these arguments.
Therefore, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: