State of Washington v. Don Phillip Stentz

36593-0Washctapp19.05.2020

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
DON PHILLIP STENTZ,
Appellant.
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No. 36593-0-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PENNELL, C.J. — Don Phillip Stentz appeals his conviction for residential
burglary, arguing the trial court lacked a factual basis to accept his Alford1 plea.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Mr. Stentz was charged with six felonies related to theft of property from his
estranged wife’s home. Mr. Stentz was in custody at the time of the thefts. The State’s
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
FILED
MAY 19, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 36593-0-III
State v. Stentz
2
theory was that Mr. Stentz was responsible for the break-in because he directed his
former cellmate to commit the crime.
The parties reached an agreement whereby Mr. Stentz would plead guilty to two
felonies: residential burglary and violation of a no-contact order. Mr. Stentz admitted to
the no-contact order violation, but entered an Alford plea as to the burglary. He agreed
the trial court could refer to the State’s probable cause statement and/or police reports as
the factual basis for his burglary plea.
The probable cause affidavit recounted that Mr. Stentz had instructed his former
cellmate to take property from the home of his estranged wife, including a vehicle and
boat parked at the property, and a black duffel bag and two firearms stored in the
basement. It further alleged he had drawn for his cellmate a map of the property, advised
them of his wife’s work hours, and told them what to do with the property after its
acquisition.
During the change of plea colloquy, the prosecuting attorney summarized the
factual basis for Mr. Stentz’s burglary plea. The prosecutor clarified that Mr. Stentz was
not alleged to have been present at the scene of the burglary. Instead, the State’s evidence
was that Mr. Stentz recruited his former cellmate to unlawfully enter his wife’s residence
and purloin several pieces of property.
No. 36593-0-III
State v. Stentz
3
The trial court accepted Mr. Stentz’s pleas and imposed a total sentence of 84
months’ imprisonment. Mr. Stentz now appeals, arguing the trial court lacked a factual
basis for accepting his Alford plea to residential burglary.
ANALYSIS2
A trial court “shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea.” CrR 4.2(d). This responsibility has particular
importance in the Alford context, where a defendant seeks to plead guilty despite
maintaining innocence. State v. D.T.M., 78 Wn. App. 216, 220, 896 P.2d 108 (1995).
In assessing the factual basis for a plea, the court may look to any reliable source of
information on the record, including a prosecutor’s proffer regarding expected evidence
at trial. State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 369-70, 552 P.2d 682 (1976).
Mr. Stentz argues the facts proffered in support of his Alford plea were inadequate
because the information charged him as a principal, not an accomplice, and no facts in the
record support finding him guilty as such.
Mr. Stentz’s argument is contrary to Washington’s law on accomplice liability.
“The complicity rule in Washington is that any person who participates in the commission
2 Mr. Stentz has filed a one-page statement of additional grounds for review
under RAP 10.10, indicating he is satisfied with the briefing submitted by his attorney.
Our analysis is therefore guided solely by the issues raised through counsel.
No. 36593-0-III
State v. Stentz
4
of the crime is guilty of the crime and is charged as a principal.” State v. Silva-Baltazar,
125 Wn.2d 472, 480, 886 P.2d 138 (1994); see also RCW 9A.08.020. The State need not
specify in its charging document that the defendant’s guilt is based on accomplice liability.
Instead, “an information that charges an accused as a principal adequately apprises [them]
of [their] potential liability as an accomplice.” State v. Lynch, 93 Wn. App. 716, 722, 970
P.2d 769 (1999). Given the state of the law, the fact that Mr. Stentz was not present at
the time of the crime did not render the State’s facts insufficient to justify acceptance of
his plea. Any confusion on the State’s theory of liability was clarified at the time of Mr.
Stentz’s plea.
Mr. Stentz also claims the evidence submitted in support of his plea failed to show
he directed his former cellmate to steal property from inside the home of his estranged
wife. According to Mr. Stentz, the facts showed he told his cellmate to only take property
located outside.
Mr. Stentz’s characterization of the record is inaccurate. According to the affidavit
of probable cause, Mr. Stentz specifically instructed his former cellmate to go into the
basement of his wife’s residence and purloin a duffel bag and firearms. This was
sufficient to justify a judgment of conviction for residential burglary.
No. 36593-0-III
State v. Stentz
5
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________
Pennell, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Siddoway, J.
______________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, J.

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