Signe Bergman, Appellant V. Ivan Moto, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
SIGNE BERGMAN,
Appellant,
v.
IVAN MOTO,
Respondent.
No. 85588-3-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
P ER CURIAM — Signe Bergman appeals from a trial court order declining to
impose a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) in the context of a marriage
dissolution proceeding against Ivan Moto. 	Bergman argues that the trial court legally
erred when it denied the DVPO. 	Specifically, Bergman claims (1) the court was
required to issue a DVPO under RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) after finding that she was
subjected to domestic violence by Moto, (2) the trial court misconstrued RCW 7.105.255
by concluding that it requires the court to conduct a separate risk analysis after finding
that domestic violence occurred, and (3) the trial court erred when it declined to impose
a DVPO based on two reasons, when the statute specifically prohibits denial of a DVPO
on each of those bases. See RCW 7.105.225(2)(e), (f).
We review the denial of a DVPO for abuse of discretion. 	Rodriguez v. Zavala,
188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). 	A trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision 	is 	based 	on 	untenable 	grounds 	or 	reasons, 	or 	is 	otherwise 	manifestly
unreasonable. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

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A decision based “on an erroneous view of the law” is necessarily an abuse of
discretion. 	Gildon v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wn.2d 483, 494, 143 P.3d 1196
(2006).
RCW 7.105.225(1) provides that “the court shall issue a protection order if it finds
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has proved the required criteria
in (a) through (f) of this subsection for obtaining a protection order under this chapter.”
(emphasis added). 	The “required criteria” that applies to a DVPO is a finding that “the
petitioner 	has 	been 	subjected 	to 	domestic 	violence 	by 	the 	respondent.” 	RCW
7.105.225(1)(a). 	The statute further provides six specific grounds upon which a trial
court “may not deny or dismiss a petition for a protection order.” 	RCW 7.105.225(2).
Those grounds are,
(a) 	The petitioner or the respondent is a minor, unless provisions in this
chapter specifically limit relief or remedies based upon a party’s age;
(b) 	The petitioner did not report the conduct giving rise to the petition to law
enforcement;
(c) 	A no-contact order or a restraining order that restrains the respondent’s
contact with the petitioner has been issued in a criminal proceeding or in a
domestic relations proceeding;
(d) 	The relief sought by the petitioner may be available in a different action or
proceeding, or criminal charges are pending against the respondent;
(e) 	The conduct at issue did not occur recently or because of the passage of
time since the last incident of conduct giving rise to the petition; or
(f) 	The respondent no longer lives near the petitioner.
RCW 7.105.225(2)(a)-(f).
In its oral ruling, the trial court “clearly” found that Bergman was “subjected to

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domestic violence” by Moto under RCW 7.105.225(1)(a). 	The court then determined
that, although the statute is not explicit, “it appears to suggest or recognize that courts
will further conduct a risk analysis of whether to grant or deny” a DVPO. And, although
statute prohibited the court from denying a DVPO based on the passage of time since
the incident, or because Moto no longer lives near Bergman, see RCW 7.104.255(2)(e),
(f), the court concluded that the statute allowed the court deny the DVPO for those
reasons “in combination.”
Moto concedes error. Moto acknowledges that, based on the court’s finding that
he perpetrated domestic violence against Bergman, the court was required to issue a
DVPO 	under 	RCW 	7.105.225(1)(a). 	Moto 	also 	acknowledges 	that 	the 	court’s
determination that it had discretion to deny the petition “if more than one of the
prohibited bases existed because it had implied discretion to undertake its own risk
analysis” is not supported by the statutory language.
We accept the concession of error. 	The trial court’s ruling was contrary to the
plain terms of RCW 7.105.255. 	The mandatory language of RCW 7.105.255(1)(a)
requires that the court issue a DVPO upon a finding of domestic violence without
additional assessment of risk. 	And, nothing in the statute suggests that the court may
rely on a reason listed under RCW 7.105.255(2)(a)-(f) to deny a DVPO if more than one
prohibited reason exists. 	Because the trial court misinterpreted RCW 7.105.255 in
denying the DVPO, we accept the concession, reverse the trial court’s order denying
the DVPO, and remand for further proceedings.1 	On remand, the trial court may
1 Because we accept the concession that the court legally erred in interpreting RCW 7.105.225, it is
unnecessary to address any other issues the Appellant raises.

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address any request for fees.
Bergman requests attorney fees on appeal on several grounds, but only in the
event that this court deems Moto’s concession of error “inadequate” or “otherwise
reject[s]” it. 	Accordingly, we decline to award fees on appeal and also deny Bergman’s
motion under RAP 9.11 to supplement the record with material related to appellate fees
as unnecessary.
Reversed and remanded.
FOR THE COURT: