State Of Washington, Respondent V. Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
MOHAMED, ABDIRIZAK OMAR,
DOB: 03/06/1990,
Appellant.
No. 80964-4-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PER CURIAM — Abdirizak Omar Mohamed was convicted following a bench
trial of one count of criminal impersonation in the first degree, for which he was
sentenced to 12 months; and one count of possession of a controlled substance
in violation of RCW 69.50.4013, for which he was sentenced to 16 months. On
appeal, he contends that the possession conviction must be reversed because
former RCW 69.50.4013(1) (2017), the possession statute, is either
unconstitutional or implies a knowledge element that the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State concedes that the possession conviction must be vacated under
State v. Blake, in which our Supreme Court held former RCW 69.50.4013(1)
unconstitutional and, thus, void. 197 Wn.2d 170, 195, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The
State asserts that because Mohamed’s criminal impersonation conviction was an

No. 80964-4-I/2
2
“unranked” offense,1 his possession conviction had no effect on the sentence
therefor, which Mohamed has completed. Accordingly, the State argues, this
court can give Mohamed no further relief than to vacate the possession
conviction and dismiss that charge. Mohamed, who has not filed a reply brief,
does not argue otherwise.
We reverse Mohamed’s conviction of possession of a controlled
substance, and we remand to the trial court to vacate that conviction and dismiss
the underlying charge.
FOR THE COURT:
1 An “unranked” offense is one for which no standard sentencing range has been
established and for which “the court shall impose a determinate sentence which may include not
more than one year of confinement; community restitution work; a term of community custody . . .
not to exceed one year; and/or other legal financial obligations.” RCW 9.94A.505(2)(b); see also
State v. Vazquez, 200 Wn. App. 220, 226, 402 P.3d 276 (2017) (“The punishment for an
unranked offense . . . is not governed by the sentencing tables.”).