ally bank v richardson

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Washington Unit
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Case No. 25-CV-04901
Ally Bank v. Reid Paul et al
ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Dismiss; Reply ; Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Amended Answer
Filings (Motion: 4; )
Filer: Marcus E. Pratt; Marcus E. Pratt
Filed Date: May 07, 2026; May 15, 2026
Plaintiff Ally Bank has filed two motions to dismiss. Neither motion has been opposed.
After reviewing the filings, the Court finds good cause in both to Grant Plaintiff’s motions.
The first motion concerns Defendant Reid Paul. As Plaintiff notes, Reid Paul has not
been served and is not, based on his prior bankruptcy, subject to a deficiency claim. Given that
the replevin has occurred, there is no further claim, and the complaint against Reid Paul is
Dismissed with Prejudice. V.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and (6).
The second motion is slightly more complicated.
Defendant Bryn Paul has filed a counterclaim action against Ally Bank seeking $10,500
in storage fees for holding the replevined truck from June 14, 2025 until April 10, 2026. This
claim falls under 23 V.S.A. §§ 2151–2155, which permits a “landowner on whose property an
abandoned motor vehicle was discovered or has been relocated” to collect fees from the owner
for storage of the vehicle. Plaintiff seeks to dismiss the complaint on two grounds. First, it notes
that Defendant has omitted a necessary party by not bringing this action against his brother, Reid
Paul, the owner of record, at the time of abandonment. Second, it claims that the notice of
abandonment was improper as Ally Bank was not the owner and a primary lienholder in the
truck. Defendant Bryn Paul has not responded to this motion or either of Plaintiff’s arguments.
Bryn Paul’s complaint states that on or about October 6, 2022, his brother, Reid Paul,
registered the subject motor vehicle with the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicle. Reid Paul
used Bryn Paul’s home address in Wolcott, Vermont. Bryn Paul states that on or about October
20, 2024, Reid Paul “abandoned” the motor vehicle at Bryn Paul’s Wolcott property. The
Complaint does not state how this abandonment occurred. On June 11, 2025, Bryn Paul filed an
Abandoned Motor Vehicle Certification form with the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles.
As primary lienholder, Ally Bank was notified by the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles on
June 17, 2025, of this reported abandonment. A second notice was sent on June 26, 2025. There
is no evidence or allegation that Bryn Paul sought to dispose of the abandoned vehicle or sought
a transfer of title under 23 V.S.A. § 2156.

Ally Bank filed the present replevin action on November 5, 2025. Bryn Paul still had
custody and control of the vehicle at that point. Plaintiff initially attempted to seize the motor
vehicle on March 11, 2026, but Bryn Paul objected, and the parties came to court on April 2,
2026 and arranged for the vehicle to be removed on April 10, 2026 pursuant to the Court’s
replevin order.
Under these facts, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Bryn Paul has failed to name a
necessary party in Reid Paul. V.R.C.P. 12(b)(7). During all critical times, the motor vehicle’s
owner of record was Reid Paul. There is no evidence or allegation that Reid Paul was notified
that the vehicle was being treated as an abandoned vehicle. Moreover, any claim to
compensation for storage of the vehicle must necessarily include Reid Paul, who as owner, had
placed the motor vehicle on his brother’s property where it was registered.
Additionally, the Court finds that there is a legal flaw in Bryn Paul’s claim. While 23
V.S.A. § 2155 permits a towing company or landowner to charge a storage fee, it is within
process laid out in 23 V.S.A. § 2154(a)(2) and the larger statutory scheme for a landowner or
towing company to establish title to an abandoned motor vehicle. Under Section 2154(a)(2), the
Department of Motor Vehicles, once notified, must send out notices to the last known registered
owner and lienholder. Twenty-one days after the two notices, if neither owner nor lienholder
responds, then the Department “shall issue a certificate of abandoned motor vehicle with
appropriate title or salvage title.” 23 V.S.A. § 2154(a)(2). If an owner or lienholder wishes to
reclaim the vehicle, then they must notify the Department and pay or make arrangements to pay
the towing and storage fees to the Department’s satisfaction. Id. at (a)(2) and (b).
In the present case, there has been no claim that Bryn Paul obtained a salvage title to the
vehicle, merely that he started the process of having the vehicle declared abandoned. Given that
Plaintiff never agreed to have Bryn Paul store the vehicle, the only claim that he can make to
such fees comes under 23 V.S.A. § 2155. But, the only mechanism for collecting such amounts
lies under 23 V.S.A. § 2154, which as noted above conditions reclamation of title on the payment
or resolution of such fees. Nothing in either Section 2155 or 2154 gives a landowner a private
right of action to collect such fees outside of the abandoned motor vehicle process. Given that
Bryn Paul’s pleading is not premised on his claim to title and given the fact that he is seeking to
enforce this claim to fees through a private right of action, the Court cannot find a legal right to
such an action. V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
Finally, Defendant Bryn Paul has not opposed or filed a response to Plaintiff’s renewed
motion to dismiss. This motion was filed on May 15, 2026, and any opposition was due no later
than June 14, 2026. Specifically, Defendant Bryn Paul has not challenged Plaintiff’s arguments
as to lack of necessary party and failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court accepts
Plaintiff’s positions on those points and grants the motion to dismiss. See Pharmacists Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Myer, 2010 VT 10, 1 18, 187 Vt. 323, 325 (“failure to oppose the motion effectively
waived the claims”).

ORDER
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to dismissal of Defendant Bryn
Paul’s counterclaims. With this dismissal and the dismissal of all claims from Plaintiff against
Defendants, the present matter is Dismissed with Prejudice pursuant to the provisions of
V.R.C.P. 12(b) (5), (6), and (7). Each party shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees.
Electronically signed on 6/22/2026 7:18 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)
__________________________________
Daniel P. Richardson
Superior Court Judge