lamson v goode

Order Page 1 of 2
234-5-17 Wrcv Lamson vs. Goode et al
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Windsor Unit
12 The Green
Woodstock VT 05091
802-457-2121
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Case No. 234-5-17 Wrcv
Gregory Lamson
Plaintiff
v.
James Goode and Chase Locke
Defendants
Decision on Post-Judgment Motions
Generally, the rule is that parties are responsible for their own attorney fees unless there is a
specific statutory, contractual, or equitable reason for an award shifting those responsibilities to the
opposing party. Southwick v. City of Rutland, 2011 VT 105, ¶ 5, 190 Vt. 324; DJ Painting, Inc. v.
Baraw Enterprises, Inc., 172 Vt. 239, 246 (2001); Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 255 (1986); State
v. Whitingham School Bd., 140 Vt. 405, 407 (1981). One of the applicable statutory reasons is set forth
in the Vermont Prompt Payment Act: the court is authorized to award attorney fees to “the
substantially prevailing party in any proceeding to recover any payment within the scope” of the
Prompt Payment Act. 9 V.S.A. § 4007(c).
The determination of whether any party “substantially prevail[ed]” in a construction-contract
dispute is a matter of discretion for the trial court. Fletcher Hill, Inc. v. Crosbie, 2005 VT 1, ¶ 12, 178
Vt. 77. A court may consider whether one party was the net victor in the case, whether one side
achieved a “comparative victory” on the issues actually litigated, and whether one side achieved a
greater award “proportionally” to “what was actually sought.” Burton v. Jeremiah Beach Parker
Restoration and Const. Mgmt. Corp., 2010 VT 55, ¶ 8, 188 Vt. 583 (mem.) (internal quotations
omitted). A court may also decide “that neither party substantially prevailed.” Birchwood Land Co.,
Inc. v. Ormond Bushey & Sons, Inc., 2013 VT 60, ¶ 36, 194 Vt. 478; Trombly Plumbing & Heating v.
Quinn, 2011 VT 70, ¶ 13, 190 Vt. 552 (mem.).
Here, the dispute started with the construction of a pond in 2017. A civil complaint was filed in
2017 and the parties spent the next 2,982 days litigating the case. After a five-day jury trial, the jury
split its verdict and awarded a net amount (after accounting for prejudgment interest) of $4,450.68 in
favor of defendants. This was a mere fraction of the amounts requested at trial. Neither party obtained
what they wanted from the construction dispute. Neither party obtained an outcome that justified the
expenditure of time and money on the case. Neither party substantially prevailed in this litigation.

Defendants 	have 	argued 	that 	they 	prevailed 	on 	the 	PPA 	claim 	"because 	that 	issue 	was 	not
submitted 	to 	the 	jury 	for 	its 	consideration," 	referencing 	that 	the 	court 	did 	not 	instruct 	the 	jurors 	on 	the
definitions 	of 	what it 	means 	to 	be 	a 	contractor 	or 	an 	owner. 	Yet 	other 	aspects 	of 	the 	PPA 	were
submitted 	to 	the 	jury, 	including 	a 	full 	consideration 	of 	the 	contractual 	dispute, 	a 	determination 	of 	the
date 	on 	which 	payment 	was 	due, 	and 	whether 	any 	amounts 	were 	withheld 	in 	good 	faith. 	Any
instructions 	about 	the 	definitions 	of 	"contractor" 	and 	"owner" 	were 	unnecessary 	because 	those 	issues
were 	completely 	undisputed 	at 	trial. 	Neither 	party 	objected 	to 	the 	omission 	of those 	definitions, 	and 	the
jury 	returned 	a 	verdict 	in 	favor 	of plaintiff 	on 	the 	contract 	claim. 	Given 	those 	observations, 	and 	taking
into 	consideration "the 	broader range 	of 	claims 	at 	issue 	in 	the 	case," 	which 	generally 	all 	shared 	a
common 	core 	of 	evidence 	and 	arose 	from 	the 	same 	dispute, 	Nystrom 	v. 	Hafford, 	2012 	VT 	60, 	1 	19, 	192
Vt. 	300, 	the 	court 	denies 	the 	motion 	to 	amend 	the 	judgment 	and 	reiterates its 	conclusion 	that 	neither
party 	substantially 	prevailed 	in 	this 	litigation.
Plaintiff 	has 	argued 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	an 	additional 	penalty 	under 	9 	V.S.A. 	§ 	4007(b). 	The
request 	is 	denied 	because 	the 	jury 	specifically 	found 	that 	payment 	was 	not 	wrongfully 	withheld.
Finally, 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	defendants' 	motion 	for 	litigation 	costs 	can 	be 	construed 	as 	seeking 	an
award 	of 	costs 	pursuant 	to 	Vermont 	Civil 	Procedure 	Rule 	54, 	the 	court 	is 	aware 	of 	its 	discretion 	to
award 	costs 	to 	the 	prevailing 	party 	and 	declines 	any 	such 	award, 	both 	because 	no 	request 	was 	made 	in
a 	sufficiently-particular 	way, 	and 	because 	the 	equities 	strongly 	favor 	each 	party 	to 	this 	case 	bearing 	the
consequences 	of 	their 	own 	litigation 	choices. 	Peterson 	v. 	Chichester, 	157 	Vt. 	548, 	553 	(1991); 	10
Wright 	& 	Miller, 	Federal 	Practice 	and 	Procedure: 	Civil 	4th 	§ 	2679.
For 	these 	reasons: 	(1) 	Defendant's 	Motion 	to 	Reconsider 	or 	in 	the 	Alternative 	to 	Amend
Judgment 	to 	Include 	Attorneys' 	Fees 	and 	Expenses 	(MPR 	#35), 	filed 	July 	24, 	2025, 	is 	denied; 	(2)
Plaintiff's 	Motion 	for 	Attorney's 	Fees 	(MPR 	#36), 	filed 	July 	28, 	2025, 	is 	denied; 	and 	(3) 	Defendant's
Motion 	to 	Award 	Attorneys' 	Fees 	and 	Litigation 	Expenses 	(MPR 	#37), 	filed 	July 	31, 	2025, 	is 	denied.
Electronically 	signed 	on 	Friday, 	August 	29, 	2025 	pursuant 	to 	V.R.E.F. 	9(d).
H. 	Dickson 	Corbett
Superior 	Court 	Judge
Vermont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	09/02/25
Windsor 	Unit
Order 	Page 	2 	of 2
234-5-17 	Wrcv 	Lamson 	vs. 	Goode 	et 	al