ainsworth v norwich edu

Termont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	07/21/26
Washington 	Unit
CIVIL 	DIVISION
Case 	No. 	25-CV-04798
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT
Washington 	Unit
65 	State 	Street
Montpelier 	VT 	05602
802-828-2091
www.vermontjudiciary.org
Stephanie 	Ainsworth 	v. 	Norwich 	University 	et 	al
ENTRY 	REGARDING 	MOTION
Title: 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(Motion: 	6)
Filer: 	Pietro 	J. 	Lynn
Filed 	Date: 	April 	24, 	2026
The 	motion 	is 	DENIED.
Plaintiff Dr. 	Stephanie 	Ainsworth 	was 	hired 	as 	an 	instructor 	at 	Norwich 	University
(Norwich) 	in 	2016 	and 	became 	a 	tenured 	professor 	in 2022. 	She 	resigned 	in 	2025 	after 	enduring,
she 	alleges, 	extensive 	sexual 	harassment, 	a 	violent 	sexual 	assault, 	and 	related 	discrimination.
Her 	January 	14, 	2026, 	second 	amended 	complaint 	asserts 	26 	counts. 	Defendants 	include
Norwich; 	Mr. 	Robert 	Berkey, 	Norwich's 	former 	Director 	of User 	Support 	Services, 	who 	is
alleged 	to 	have 	violently 	sexually 	assaulted 	Ms. 	Ainsworth 	after 	becoming 	obviously 	intoxicated
at 	Good 	Measure 	Pub 	and 	Brewery 	(Good 	Measure); 	and 	Good 	Measure.
Norwich 	has 	filed 	a 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	arguing 	that 	each 	of the 	25 	counts
asserted 	against it 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	It 	argues, in 	sum, 	that 	once 	one 	disregards 	the
allegations 	that 	are 	conclusory 	or 	conclusions 	of law 	masquerading 	as 	facts, 	the 	remaining
allegations 	either 	do 	not 	provide 	fair 	notice 	of the 	claims 	or 	do 	not 	sufficiently 	support 	particular
elements 	of the 	claims 	and 	consequently 	fail 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	complying 	with 	the 	spirit 	of Rules 	8
and 	12(b)(6). 	The 	claims 	against 	Mr. 	Berkey 	and 	Good 	Measure 	are 	not 	currently 	at 	issue.
1. 	Procedural 	Standard
Rule 	8 	requires 	that, 	while 	no 	"technical 	forms 	of pleading 	. 	. 	are 	required," 	V.R.C.P.
8(e)(1), 	a 	"pleading 	which 	sets 	forth 	a 	claim 	for 	relief 	. 	. 	[nevertheless] 	shall 	contain 	. 	. 	a 	short
and 	plain 	statement 	of the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief." 	V.R.C.P. 	8(a).
The 	Vermont 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	summarized 	the 	standard 	for 	determining 	whether 	a 	complaint
fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	as 	follows:
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“A motion to dismiss . . . is not favored and rarely granted.” This is especially
true “when the asserted theory of liability is novel or extreme,” as such cases
“should be explored in the light of facts as developed by the evidence, and,
generally, not dismissed before trial because of the mere novelty of the
allegations.” In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we consider whether, taking all of
the nonmoving party’s factual allegations as true, “‘it appears beyond doubt’ that
there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” We
treat all reasonable inferences from the complaint as true, and we assume that the
movant’s contravening assertions are false.
Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115, ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 309 (citations omitted). In
assessing a complaint for compliance with this standard, courts are not required to accept
“‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.”’ Rodrigue
v. Illuzzi, 2022 VT 9, ¶ 33, 216 Vt. 308 (quoting Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶ 10, 184
Vt. 1 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, “the threshold a plaintiff must cross in order to meet our
notice-pleading standard is ‘exceedingly low.’” Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575.
2. Background
Ms. Ainsworth has amended her complaint twice, ostensibly to improve accuracy and
provide additional detail. The current version is 71 pages long and not “short and plain” as
contemplated by Rule 8(a)(1). The court declines to summarize it in detail here. The thrust of it,
all that matters for present purposes, is as follows.
During her employment at Norwich, Ms. Ainsworth alleges that she was flagrantly
sexually harassed, principally by then-President Mark Anarumo and Mr. Berkey. She alleges
that Mr. Berkey also “used physical force . . . to commit . . . penetration . . . causing physical
injuries and trauma requiring medical treatment.” Although Mr. Anarumo’s and Mr. Berkey’s
employment eventually ended, Ms. Ainsworth’s complaints to Norwich officials were largely
ignored, not taken seriously, or disbelieved, leading to a retaliatory and defamatory environment.
“By May 2025, Plaintiff’s conditions at Norwich became intolerable. Plaintiff’s therapist opined
that continued employment with Norwich would cause Plaintiff severe harm.” She reluctantly
resigned her tenured position, characterizing it as a constructive discharge.
The following counts (all but #15) are asserted against Norwich:
1. Hostile work environment/sex (11/22–6/23);
2. Hostile work environment/sex (7/23–11/23);

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3. Hostile work environment/sex (11/23–5/25);
4. Hostile work environment/crime victim status (11/23–5/25);
5. Hostile work environment/physical or mental impairment 11/23–5/25);
6. Discrimination based on sex;
7. Discrimination based on crime victim status;
8. Discrimination based on physical or mental impairment;
9. Retaliation for protected activity;
10. Sexual assault and battery;
11. Intentional infliction of emotional distress;
12. Negligent hiring, retention, supervision, failure to warn, negligent undertaking,
and negligent failure to disclose;
13. Negligence and gross negligence (premises, operations, and security);
14. Negligent infliction of emotional distress;
16. Breach of employment contract;
17. Breach of implied employment contract;
18. Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
19. Breach of employment contract (investigation records);
20. Breach of implied contract (investigation records);
21. Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (investigation records);
22. Promissory estoppel;
23. Unjust enrichment;
24. Constructive discharge;
25. Defamation per se; and
26. Ordinary defamation.
Ms. Ainsworth pleading leaves few, if any, legal stones unturned. Norwich dissects each
claim in detail. Its motion to dismiss is 48 pages long. Ms. Ainsworth responds in greater detail.
Her principal opposition brief is 95 pages.
Much of the protracted briefing by both parties is unnecessary. On a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is not
required to include every detail so that, if all are taken as true, the asserted claim would be
proven. The plaintiff is required only to provide fair notice of a claim that does not clearly lack
legal merit.
For Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, Norwich has put the complaint under far too powerful a
microscope and has failed to draw inferences in Ms. Ainsworth’s favor.

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Nor do Norwich’s protestations that the allegations are too conclusory for it to understand
the claims have merit. If the allegations are so vague that Norwich truly is unable to determine
how to respond, the proper course would be a motion for more definite statement. V.R.C.P.
12(e). Such an outcome is unwarranted given the lengthy and detailed pleading of record.
In any event, the court generally would not dismiss for mere lack of detail without first
giving the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiency. See 5 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216
(4th ed.) (“Of course, if the requisite allegations are not in the complaint and a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is made under [Rule] 12(b)(6), the
pleader should be given the opportunity to amend the complaint, if she can, to show the existence
of the missing elements.”). Yet Norwich seeks dismissal, not further detail. Ms. Ainsworth
repeatedly requests an opportunity to amend if the court should agree that any allegations are
insufficient, and Norwich expressly opposes any such amendment.
The bill of particulars was phased out long ago. See 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1375
(3d ed.) (“A major objective of the [contemporary] rules was to eliminate the practice of using
multiple, complex pleadings and a series of corrective motions to elicit the facts underlying the
plaintiff’s claim and to narrow the issues in the case.”).
The more productive path forward in this case is discovery and Rule 56 practice that will
be grounded in and circumscribed by evidence in the record and allow the court to discern the
facts and nature of the dispute beyond the limited analysis of Rule 12(b)(6).
ORDER
Norwich’s motion to dismiss is Denied.
Electronically signed on 7/16/2026 7:01 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d)
__________________________________
Daniel Richardson
Superior Court Judge