336 Cote Hill Road Zoning Permit Appeal 2025-036 - Decision on Motion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT
Environmental Division Docket No. 25-ENV-00080
32 Cherry St, 2nd Floor, Suite 303,
Burlington, VT 05401
802-951-1740
www.vermontjudiciary.org

336 Cote Hill Rd. Zoning Permit Appeal #2025-036

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1)
Filer: Tyler Mumley
Filed Date: November 10, 2025
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion, filed on November 21, 2025, by Hannah Farda.
The motion is GRANTED.
This matter involves Hannah Farda’s appeal of the Town of Morristown (Town)
Development Review Board’s (DRB) denial of her prior appeal of a building permit issued to Tyler
Mumley for the construction of a duplex at property located at 336 Cote Hill Road, Morristown,
Vermont (the Property). Mr. Mumley moves to dismiss this matter pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) or,
in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(c). Ms. Farda opposes the
motion.
V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. A motion for failure to state a claim may not be granted unless it is beyond doubt that
there are no facts or circumstances that would entitle the Appellant to relief. Colby v. Umbrella, Inc.,
2008 VT 20, ¶ 5, 184 Vt. 1 (citation omitted). We take all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and “assume that the movant’s contravening assertions are false.” Alger v. Dep’t
of Labor & Industry, 2006 VT 115, ¶ 12, 181 Vt. 309 (citation omitted).
A Rule 12(c) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a party’s arguments, much like a 12(b)(6)
motion. See Hinesburg Hannaford Water Quality Cert., No. 114-8-14 Vtec, slip op. at 2 (Vt. Super.
Ct. Envtl. Div. Aug. 11, 2015) (Walsh, J.) (noting that review under 12(c) and 12(b)(6) is quite similar
and that “a purely legal issue . . . is . . . appropriate for resolution on the pleadings.”). “When
considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court must ‘take the facts as pleaded by the
nonmoving party as true,’ and we may only grant the motion if the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, based only on ‘facts as asserted in the pleadings.”’ Town of New Haven v.

Page 1 of 4
Clark, No. 25-3-13 Vtec, slip op. at 1 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Feb. 14, 2014) (Durkin, J.) (quoting In
re Knapp, 152 Vt. 59, 63 (1989); V.R.C.P. 12(c)). In the context of a de novo appeal to this Court,
which begins not with a complaint but with a notice of appeal and Statement of Questions, the
“pleadings” are typically sparse. See In re Conlon CU Permit, No. 2-1-112 Vtec, slip op. at 1 (stating
that the Environmental Division views the notice of appeal and Statement of Questions as the
pleadings).
Ms. Farda’s Statement of Questions contains narrative and legal argument but functionally
poses two Questions for the Court’s review in this case. First, based on her allegations that the rent
charged at the duplex will be unaffordable in Lamoille County and that the intended tenants are
traveling medical professionals, she asks whether the duplex complies with the intention of Act 47
(sometimes referred to as the HOME Act). Second, assuming the above is answered in the negative,
she asks whether the permit should be rescinded. Taken together, the Court understands Ms. Farda’s
Questions to functionally assert that the application must be denied because the project does not
create affordable housing and/or Mr. Mumley intends to rent the units to traveling medical
professionals. Alternatively, she asserts that the permit must be denied because duplexes are not
allowed in the relevant zoning district, the RRA district, as defined by the Town zoning regulations.
In 2023, the Legislature passed Act 47. In relevant part, the Act amended portions of Title
24, Chapter 117 of the Vermont Statutes. Section 4412 thereof sets forth the required land
development provisions that “shall apply in every municipality.” 24 V.S.A. § 4412. The provisions of
§ 4412 apply to every municipality “[n]otwithstanding any existing bylaw . . . .” 24 V.S.A. § 4412.
As amended, § 4412(d) requires that “[i]n any district that allows year-round residential
development, duplexes shall be an allowed use with dimensional standards that are not more restrictive
than is required for a single-unit dwelling . . . .” 24 V.S.A. § 4412(1)(d). 1 For the purposes of Chapter
117, “duplex” is defined as “a residential building that has two dwelling units in the same building and
neither unit is an accessory dwelling unit.” 24 V.S.A. § 4303(39). 2 Affordable housing and housing
developments are separately defined and not cross-referenced within Chapter 117.

1 In her opposition to the pending motion, Ms. Farda places weight on the first two sentences of § 4412(1)(d)

which states that “Bylaws shall designate appropriate districts and reasonable regulations for multiunit or multifamily
dwellings. No bylaw shall have the effect of excluding these multiunit or multifamily dwellings from the municipality.”
24 V.S.A. § 4412(1)(d). The controlling provision in this appeal is the language specific to duplexes because it is more
specific than the language related to all multiunit or multifamily homes. See In re Pederzani, 2024 VT 82, ¶ 12 (“When
there are two conflicting provisions in an ordinance, the specific provision is held to as an exception to the general
provision.”) (quoting In re Application of Lathrop Ltd. P’Ship I, 2015 Vt 49, ¶ 31, 199 Vt. 19).
2 It is not disputed that the building constitutes a duplex.

Page 2 of 4
Section 4412 is clear and unambiguous. See Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vt. Hum. Rts.
Comm’n, 2023 VT 63, ¶ 13 (“Our primary objective when construing a statute is to give effect to the
intention of the Legislature. In effectuating that intent, [w]e examine the plain language of the statute,
and if this language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute according to its terms”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Any duplex that meets the definition of § 4303(39) is an allowable
use in any zoning district in which year-round residential development is allowable. There is no
requirement that the units within the duplex be “affordable,” as that term is defined by Chapter 117,
or be rented to certain individuals.
This plain language interpretation of the statute is clearly consistent with the purpose of Act
47. 3 The full name of Act 47 is “An act relating to housing opportunities made for everyone.” The
amendments to Chapter 117 adding or deleting language generally have the effect of reducing
regulatory burdens on various types of housing development in local zoning. Some of the
amendments concern affordable housing developments. Some of the amendments concern any
housing developments. By its plain language, purpose of Act 47, generally, is to mitigate effects of a
housing shortage by alleviating some local regulatory burdens for certain housing developments.
Here, that purpose is effectuated by making duplexes, defined as two residential units in one building,
an allowable use in any district where year-round residences are allowable. 24 V.S.A. § 4412(1)(d).
Presumably, this increases the number of the zoning districts in which duplexes would be allowable
across Vermont and, potentially, expands the number of duplexes within the state. As the Act says in
its full title, it is intended to address housing opportunities for “everyone,” not any specific group of
people. The Court’s interpretation is therefore consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Thus, through Act 47, duplexes became an allowable use in the Town in every district that
allows year-round residential development, subject to dimensional restrictions. Because it is
undisputed that year-round residential uses are allowable in the applicable zoning district, duplexes
became an allowable use in this district at the time the amendment became effective. See Revised
Statement of Questions at 2 (filed Nov. 17, 2025) (including the use table of the applicable zoning
regulations). This provision applies “notwithstanding any existing bylaw.” Thus, Ms. Farda’s assertion

3 The Court can find no readily available purpose statement for Act 47. Ms. Farda’s Statement of Questions

quotes two summary statements related to the purpose of the Act but provides no citations. The Court cannot find these
quotations in any legal database. In any event, this Court’s interpretation is consistent with this quoted language, whatever
its origin, which states that the Act’s purpose is to be “part of a multipronged approach to mitigating the housing crisis . .
. .” This statement indicates that the purpose of the act, as discussed herein, is to provide additional housing in Vermont.
This Court’s interpretation is consistent with that goal as it interprets § 4412(1)(d) as making duplexes allowable uses in
more districts, regardless of renter’s status or rent amount.

Page 3 of 4
that the project on appeal is inconsistent with the Town’s zoning regulations or must be denied
pursuant to the regulations because duplexes are not allowed in this district must fail. Because
§ 4412(1)(d) applies notwithstanding the existing regulations, it does not matter that the Regulations
have not been updated to reflect the amendments to 24 V.S.A. § 4412(1)(d). 24 V.S.A. § 4412. Thus,
Mr. Mumley is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Question of whether the use is allowable
in the district.
There being nothing within 24 V.S.A. § 4412 requiring a duplex’s units be affordable or rented
to any particular type of individual(s), Mr. Mumley is entitled to judgment on Ms. Farda’s first
Question because the intended tenant(s) or rental amount have no bearing on whether § 4412 applies
to the project. Because these considerations are not relevant, Mr. Mumley is also entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on Ms. Farda’s second Question, and these considerations do not present grounds
to rescind the permit or otherwise deny it.
For these reasons, Mr. Mumley is entitled to judgment on the pleadings and his motion is
GRANTED.
This concludes the matter before the Court. A Judgment Order accompanies this Entry
Order.
Electronically signed December 31, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(D).

Thomas G. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court, Environmental Division

Page 4 of 4