Vt Land Trust v. Kurt

7ermont Superior Court
Filed 12/13/24
Addison Unit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Addison Unit Case No. 23-CV-02766
7 Mahady Court

Middlebury VT 05753
802-388-7741
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Vermont Land Trust et al v. Kerry Kurt et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion for Summary Judgment; Motion to Dismiss; (Motion: 3; 4)
Filer: Justin B. Barnard; Kerry Kurt
Filed Date: September 05, 2024; October 14, 2024

This case involves potential violations of a conservation easement held by Vermont Land Trust
(VLT), Vermont Housing and Conservation Board (VHCB), and Vermont Agency of Agriculture, Food
and Markets (VAAFM) (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). The easement burdens land owned by Kerry Kurt
("Ms. Kurt"), who is a defendant in this action. The other named defendant is Keenan Kurt ("Mr. Kurt'),
who is Ms. Kurt's son and also goes by the name "Sovereign-Naan Keenan-Phillip Of-Allodium."
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their claims that Mr. Kurt's activities (including erection of
unauthorized structures) violate the terms of the easement and constitute trespass.

Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) (V.R.C.P. 56(c)) sets forth the procedure around
responding to motions for summary judgment. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
"file a paragraph-by-paragraph response, with specific citations to particular parts of materials in the
record that the responding party asserts demonstrate a dispute . . reproduc[ing] each numbered paragraph
of the moving party's statement before including the response thereto." V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2). Should a party
fail to submit the response required under this sub-part, the rule gives the court the option of
"consider[ing] the fact[s] undisputed for the purposes of this motion." V.R.C.P. 56(e)(2).

Ms. Kurt submitted a "Motion to Dismiss" that appears to respond to some of Plaintiffs' claims.
The court deems this submission to be an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment but
finds Ms. Kurt's filing does not meet the requirements of V.R.C.P. 56(e)(2). Specifically, Ms. Kurt failed
to respond to Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts or point the court to any evidence
disputing any of the statements. Thus, the court will treat the facts submitted by Plaintiffs as undisputed
for the purposes of this motion. Defendant's Opposition, filed 10/14/2024.

Undisputed Facts

In 1999, VLT conveyed a parcel of property to itself, VHCB, and VAAFM for the purpose of
placing a conservation easement on approximately 186 acres of land formerly known as the "Cota Farm
J
Parcel." Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (""SUMF"), 2. The deed for the land notes
that the primary purpose of the restriction is to "conserve productive agricultural and forestry lands in
order to facilitate active and economically viable farm use of the Protected Property now and in the
future." Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Exhibit 1, filed 9/5/24, at 1; SUMF q 8. The
restrictions required to achieve this purpose run with the land. SUMF Ex. 1 at 1, SUMF 1 6.

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As part of achieving this purpose, the easement forbids “residential, commercial, industrial, or
mining activities . . . except as specifically permitted under this grant.” SUMF Ex. 1 at 2, SUMF ¶ 10.
Additionally, the easement states that “no building, structure, or appurtenant facility or improvement shall
be constructed, created, installed, erected, or moved onto the Protected Property” except as permitted by
Plaintiffs. Id. “Permitted uses” include the right to construct, repair, or maintain “non-residential
structures” like barns and sugar houses, as long as the buildings are used “exclusively for agricultural and
forestry purposes” and have been approved in writing by Plaintiffs. SUMF Ex. 1 at 3, SUMF ¶ 11. The
restrictions allow for repair and replacement of buildings within the designated “old farmstead complex,”
which includes one residential building. Although the deed includes references to a planned new
residence, it also details procedures for vacating the old residence and clearly indicates that “Only one
residence shall be occupied on the protected property . . . .” SUMF Ex. 1 at 4, SUMF ¶¶ 13.

To enforce these restrictions, the deed lays out a multi-step process designed to encourage
voluntary compliance. Plaintiffs have the right to make regular inspections of any part of the property,
and they have a “right of reasonable access” in order to do so. Ex. 1 at 4, SUMF ¶ 17. If Plaintiffs become
aware of a violation of the terms of the easement, they must give notice to the property owner and
demand corrective action. Id. Should this notice fail to encourage the owner to bring the property into
compliance with the deed’s restrictions, its terms “entitle [Plaintiffs] to bring an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Grant . . . .” Ex. 1 at 5, SUMF ¶ 17.

In 2005, the prior owners of the Cota Farm Parcel (burdened by the 1999 conservation easement)
conveyed their property to Ms. Kurt and another individual. SUMF Exhibit 3, submitted 9/5/2024, at 1.
That other individual quitclaimed their interest in the land to Ms. Kurt in 2015, making her the sole owner
of the property. Id; SUMF ¶ 18. In 2017, Ms. Kurt purchased an additional 13 acres of land from the town
of Starksboro, which she added to the land burdened by the conservation easement through an amendment
to the original deed. SUMF Exhibit 5, submitted 9/5/24, at 1; SUMF ¶¶ 19-20. Prior to the amendment,
Ms. Kurt signed a document, called a “Baseline Documentation Report,” that attested to the condition of
both pieces of property and described the planned land transaction. SUMF Exhibit 6, submitted 9/5/2024.
This document affirmed that there were no structures on the land being added to the easement, nor were
any activities occurring on her property that were inconsistent with the original deed. SUMF Ex. 6, p. 3,
5, SUMF ¶ 21. Further, she signed the amendment to the original deed, which states that “In all other
respects, the Original Grant is unchanged and remains in full force and effect.” SUMF Ex. 5, p. 1.

In January 2023, a community member alerted VLT to the possibility of an unauthorized
structure being used as a residence on the property. SUMF Exhibit 9, submitted 9/5/2024, at 1.
Investigation by Plaintiffs revealed videos of a number of structures that did not comply with the terms of
the easement, posted by Mr. Kurt to a YouTube channel. SUMF ¶ 25-26. In March of that year, VLT
attempted to notify Ms. Kurt of noncompliance with the terms of the conservation restrictions, as required
by the deed. SUMF ¶ 28; SUMF Ex. 1, p. 4. After receiving no response, VLT delivered notice to Ms.
Kurt in person on May 6th, 2023. SUMF ¶ 29. On May 7th and 8th, counsel for VLT exchanged emails
with Mr. Kurt in which he acknowledged he built the unauthorized structures and asserted that VLT had
no rights in the 13-acre lot added to the original deed in 2017. SUMF Exhibit 12, submitted 9/5/2024, at
3; SUMF ¶ 30. Mr. Kurt also acknowledged that he was living on the property; during this exchange, he
asserted that when Ms. Kurt purchased the land in 2017, he had “settled said land, [and] lived there
permanently for many years . . . .” Id.; SUMF ¶31.

Summary Judgment Standards

A party is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” V.R.C.P. 56(a). A fact is material “‘if it might

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affect the outcome.’” In re Estate of Fitzsimmons, 2013 VT 95, ¶ 13, 195 Vt. 94 (quoting N. Sec. Ins. Co.
v. Rossitto, 171 Vt. 580, 581(2000) (mem.)). Allegations made in opposition to the
motion, if supported by admissible evidence, are regarded as true when determining if a genuine issue of
material fact exists. Morisseau v. Hannaford Bros., 2016 VT 17, ¶ 12, 201 Vt. 313. The benefit of
reasonable doubts and inferences goes to the nonmoving party. Id. “‘Where the moving party does not
bear the burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden of production by showing the court that
there is an absence of evidence in the record to support the nonmoving party’s case. . . . The burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to persuade the court that there is a triable issue of fact.’” Boulton v. CLD
Consulting Eng’rs, 175 Vt. 413, 417 (2003) (quoting Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., 164 Vt. 13, 18 (1995)).
“‘The nonmoving party may survive the motion if it responds with specific facts raising a triable issue,
and it is able to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case.’” State v. G.S. Blodgett
Co., 163 Vt. 175, 180 (1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 324 (1986)). “‘If the
nonmoving party fails to establish an essential element of its case on which it has the burden of proof at
trial, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.’” Washington v. Pierce, 2005
VT 125, ¶ 17, 179 Vt. 318 (quoting G.S. Blodgett, 163 Vt. 175 at 180).

Legal Analysis

In her Opposition, Ms. Kurt advances multiple arguments in support of her contention that
Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied. Ms. Kurt asserts that the unauthorized structures “preexist the ~13
acre lot easement [she] contracted to conserve in 2017.” Opposition at 1. She notes that she was “aware
of the established permanent residence upon the ~13 acre lot, which had clearly posted gates and property
lines at that time.” Id. Ms. Kurt states that the structures have been inaccessible to her since 2017 and that
they were established without her permission. Id. Because, in her view, “the structures and occupied
territory which existed at the time of the 2017 contract are not mine,” she contends that she must be
absolved of responsibility for compliance with the terms of the easement (“As I had no structures upon
the ~13 acre lot (nor do I now), I had no structures to declare to add to the easement.”). Opposition at 1-2.
Finally, as an aside, she makes an “allodial” claim of title1 to the 13 acres on behalf of her son allegedly
based in “Article 17 of the 1777 Vermont Constitution.” Id. at 2.

Plaintiffs respond that it does not matter who built the structures because Ms. Kurt added the 13
acres to the conservation easement through the amendment she signed in 2017. As the sole owner of the
land since that time, she is responsible for current compliance with the easement’s restrictions. Reply at 2-
3. Plaintiffs interpret Ms. Kurt’s assertions that the structures were built without her permission on land
that is inaccessible to her as an implied claim of Mr. Kurt’s adverse possession of the land. Putting aside
an analysis of the specific elements of that claim, Plaintiffs note adverse possession does not apply here
because the structures have not existed for the required statutory period (regardless of whether
construction began in 2014 or after). Reply p. 3. As such, Ms. Kurt remains the sole owner and is liable
for violations of the easement. Id. Even if these structures were built before the easement was amended in
2017, Plaintiffs argue their existence constitutes a current and ongoing violation of the easement’s terms.
Id.

Easement Violations

Vermont courts have repeatedly and consistently held that when an express easement is
unambiguous, courts must enforce the terms of the document as written, without the use of rules of
construction or extrinsic evidence. Post & Beam Equities Group, LLC v. Sunne Village Development
Prop. Owners Association, 2015 VT 60, ¶ 56, 199 Vt. 313 (citing DeGraff v. Burnett, 2007 VT 95, ¶ 20,

1 Allodial title is defined as the concept of “real property ownership without a duty of service to, control by, or

acknowledgement of any superior landlord.” Black’s Law Dictionary, allodial title, (12th ed. 2024).
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182 Vt. 314). The court, therefore, relies on the 1999 easement, the 2017 amendment to the easement, and
the baseline documentation report submitted by VLT and signed by Ms. Kurt to determine whether there
has been a violation of the easement. SUMF Ex. 1, filed 9/5/24; SUMF Ex. 2, filed 9/5/24; Plaintiffs’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Exhibit 6, submitted 9/5/2024.

The terms of the original deed (containing the easement), amendment, and documentation report
function as a binding contract. See Field v. Costa, 2008 VT 75, ¶ 27, 184 Vt. 230 (Vermont Supreme
Court refers to “contractual rights set forth in the conservation easement” in explaining why it refused to
find land trust liable for tortious interference with contract). Further, the language of the 2015 quitclaim
deed elucidates the property’s chain of title and makes clear that Ms. Kurt is the sole owner. SUMF Ex. 3,
p. 1.

When Ms. Kurt signed the baseline documentation report and 2017 amendment to the original
deed, she attested that: there were “no structures on the land being added [to the easement]”; “there are no
activities ongoing on [her] property that are inconsistent with this grant as amended; and “[i]n all other
respects [aside from the addition of land], the Original Grant is unchanged and remains in full force and
effect.” SUMF Ex. 6, p. 3, 5; SUMF Ex. 5, p. 1. As noted above, the original deed forbids residential,
commercial, industrial, and mining activities, as well as the erection of structures not approved by the
easement holders, in pursuit of the preservation of productive agricultural and forest land. SUMF Ex. 1, p.
1. Additionally, the original deed unambiguously states that “Only one residence shall be occupied on the
protected property . . .,” a phrase which admits no other possible meaning. Id. at 4. Viewing these
documents in conjunction, it is clear that Ms. Kurt extended the prohibition on unauthorized activities and
structures, as well as the restriction limiting the number of residences, to the 13-acre parcel she purchased
in 2017. See DeGraff, 2007 VT 95, ¶ 20 (reiterating that deeds must be considered as a whole to arrive at
a consistent meaning, and that a deed term is ambiguous only if reasonable people could interpret it
differently); SUMF Ex. 1, p. 1, 4; Ex. 5, p. 1; SUMF Ex. 6, p. 3, 5. She also represented that conditions
on her property were in conformity with the deed’s requirements and took responsibility for ensuring
future compliance. Id.

Plaintiffs’ rights to inspect the property and bring an action for violations of the deed’s terms can
be discerned from a reading of the plain language of the original deed, but they have additional support in
Vermont’s statutes. Under the section of the original deed labeled “Enforcement of the Restrictions,” the
deed gives Plaintiffs the “right of reasonable access to the protected property” in order to “assure
compliance with all of the covenants and restrictions herein.” SUMF Ex. 1, p. 4. The deed also “entitle[s]
[Plaintiffs] to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Grant” after
they give the property owner notice of noncompliance and a chance to correct the violation(s). Id. at 5.
The statutory counterpart to these deed provisions can be found in 10 V.S.A. §6307, which deals with
enforcement of property interests. That section provides that “the State agency, or the qualified
organization may institute injunction proceedings to enforce the rights of the . . . State agency, or
qualified organization, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and may take all other
proceedings as are available to an owner of real property under the laws of this State to protect and
conserve its right or interest.” 10 V.S.A. §6307(a) (emphasis added); see 10 V.S.A. §822; Nelson v.
Bacon, 113 Vt. 161, 172 (1943); J. Jay, “Enforcing Perpetual Conservation Easements Against Third-
Party Violators”, 32 UCLAJELP 80, 110 (2014); see also 10 VSA §6301a(1), (2) (including VHCB and
VAAFM among the list of “State agencies,” and listing VLT as a “qualified organization”). Thus, it is
clear Plaintiffs in this case have the authority to bring an action for violation of the easement’s terms.

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Trespass

Under Vermont law, “‘A person who intentionally enters or remains upon land in the possession
of another without a privilege to do so is subject to liability for trespass.’” Jones v. Hart, 2021 VT 61, ¶
66, 215 Vt. 258 (quoting Harris v. Carbonneau, 165 Vt. 433, 437 (1996)) (emphasis added). The
Vermont Supreme Court expounded on the elements of this offense in Nesti v. Vermont Agency of
Transportation, noting that “Liability for trespass arises when one intentionally enters or causes a thing to
enter the land of another . . . .” Nesti, 2023 VT 1, ¶ 24, 217 Vt. 423 (citing Canton v. Graniteville Fire
Dist. No. 4, 171 Vt. 551, 552 (2000) (mem.)). The Court affirmed the principle that a “thing”, such as a
structure, can be the basis for a trespass claim when it denied the plaintiffs’ request for damages in
DeGraff v. Burnett. That case concerned a deeded easement over two connected lots. When the plaintiffs
(who held the easement) claimed damages after the defendant removed improvements made by the
plaintiffs on the defendant’s lot that exceeded the bounds of their easement, the court declared that
“[p]laintiffs committed a trespass by making improvements on [d]efendants’ land in support of a right of
access they did not enjoy,” and denied their request. DeGraff, 2007 VT 95, ¶ 34. Further, the Court has
found that “[a] permanent injunction may be awarded in response to a continuing trespass because
damages are inadequate to address the wrong.” Evans v. Cote, 2014 VT 104, ¶ 8, 197 Vt. 523. State v.
Gillard established that recorded easements suffice to establish possession of land for the purpose of
imposing criminal liability for trespass in a disputed boundary situation. State v. Gillard, 2013 VT 108, ¶¶
17, 18, 23, 195 Vt. 259. In Gillard, individuals who had trespassed on easements held by a utility
company claimed they were on the land with the permission of neighboring property owners, who
disputed the boundaries of the easements. The court rejected this argument, finding that “jurors had ample
evidence from which to determine . . . [the utility] was in rightful possession of the land on which
defendants were arrested . . . .” Id. ¶ 23. Courts in other states have allowed claims for civil trespass on
conservation easements in violation of statutory prohibitions. Madison Land Conservation Tr., Inc. v.
Suppa, No. CV165037477S, 2018 WL 2599646, at *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2018) (finding
Defendant’s entry onto land protected by a conservation easement and removal of trees to be a trespass in
violation of CT statute).

In addition to Plaintiffs’ ability to bring an action for violations of easement terms, Vermont
statutory law makes clear that easement holders have a right to exclude others from the property. For
example, the law gives qualified organizations the right to “take all other proceedings as are available to
an owner of real property . . .” to enforce their rights. 10 V.S.A. §6307(a). The right to exclude others has
long been recognized by courts across the United States as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property . . . .” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979). Thus, it follows that because Plaintiffs in this case are in the same position as a landowner,
who have the unquestionable right to exclude trespassers, Plaintiffs also possess the right to sue for
trespass on their easement.

Mr. Kurt has admitted both that he built the nonconforming structures that are in violation of the
conservation restrictions and that he has taken up residence on the land. SUMF Ex. 12, p. 3; SUMF ¶ 30-
31. When Ms. Kurt signed the original conservation easement, she accepted the limits on her use of the
land as set forth in the easement, which she extended to the 13-acre parcel by amendment.2 SUMF Ex. 1,
p. 1; SUMF Ex. 5, p. 1. Pursuant to those documents, Plaintiffs clearly have the authority to enforce their

2 Although some situations require analysis of multiple factors to discern whether a conveyance creates a property

interest that runs with the land, the term as used in the easement here simply means that the conservation restrictions
upon this particular piece of land would continue to burden any future owner of the land and are not tied to a
particular owner. Black’s Law Dictionary, covenant running with the land, (12th ed. 2024); Federated Retail
Holdings, Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 820 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. 2012); see also Gardner v. Jefferys, 2005 VT 56,
¶¶ 6-8, 178 Vt. 594.
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rights. These include the right to determine whether a structure falls within the parameters of the
easement’s stated purposes as well as to limit the number of allowable residences on the land. Coupled
with the statutory protections offered for conservation easements, Plaintiffs may pursue injunctive relief
and also take steps to enforce their right to exclude. See 10 V.S.A. §6307(a); 10 V.S.A. §822. Mr. Kurt is
not the landowner, he does not have any legally cognizable interest in the land, and he is not a party to the
conservation easement.

None of the arguments advanced by Defendants thwart Plaintiffs’ claims of easement violations
and trespass. Ms. Kurt’s first argument—that the structures predate the signing of the contract in 2017—
has no effect on the current and ongoing violations of the easement which are occurring now. Defendants’
Opposition, p. 1. As the sole owner of both parcels, Ms. Kurt’s signature on the amendment adding the 13
acres to her property functioned as an attestation that the conditions on her property conformed with the
terms of the easement and made her liable for future violations. Field, 2008 VT 75, ¶ 27; SUMF Ex. 6, p.
3, 5; SUMF Ex. 5 p. 1. The evidence offered by Plaintiffs leaves no doubt that violations of the easement
are occurring. SUMF ¶ 25-26. She is, therefore, liable for violations of the easement.

Adverse possession & allodial title

Adverse possession is the “doctrine by which title to real property is acquired” from another
individual “as a result of such use or enjoyment over a specified period of time.” Black’s Law Dictionary,
adverse possession (12th ed. 2024). In Vermont, “[a]dverse possession is a common law cause of action . .
. not specifically controlled by Vermont statute, except in the sense that such an action can be brought
only after the statute of limitations . . . has run.” Roy v. Woodstock Community Trust, Inc., 2013 VT
100A, ¶ 35, 195 Vt. 427. To adversely possess property, an individual must establish possession that is
“open, notorious, hostile and continuous throughout the statutory period of fifteen years.” Nesti, 2023 VT
1, ¶ 18 (quoting First Congregational Church of Enosburg v. Manley, 2008 VT 9, ¶ 13, 183 Vt. 574);
Rowe v. Lavanway, 2006 VT 47, ¶ 15, 180 Vt. 505; 12 V.S.A. §§501-502.

Ms. Kurt appears to be making an implied claim of adverse possession based on her description
of the unauthorized structures as an “established permanent residence” with “clearly posted gates and
property lines” that was “established without [her] permission and participation . . . .” Defendants’
Opposition, p. 1. These factors strongly resemble the requirements identified by Vermont’s courts as
necessary to adversely possess property. However, in her Opposition, Ms. Kurt omits what is arguably the
most important factor—that the hostile use must continue for a minimum of fifteen years. In
correspondence with the court and Plaintiffs’ attorney, both Ms. Kurt and Mr. Kurt have represented that
he “settled” the property in 2014. SUMF Ex. 12, p. 1; Defendant’s “Email re: Motion to Dismiss”, filed
10/14/24, p. 1. Regardless of how his occupancy is characterized, Mr. Kurt has not met the statutory
period of fifteen years. As a result, Mr. Kurt cannot have adversely possessed the land in question, and no
consideration of the other adverse possession factors is required.

Finally, the court finds the claim of “allodial” title put forward by Ms. Kurt on Mr. Kurt’s behalf
lacks support in caselaw, Vermont’s constitution, recognition by any court in this country, or the
evidentiary record in this case. Allodial title is defined as the concept of “real property ownership without
a duty of service to, control by, or acknowledgement of any superior landlord.” Black’s Law Dictionary,
allodial title, (12th ed. 2024); see also Reutov v. American Home Mortgage Acceptance Inc., No. 3:23-CV-
01172-JR, 2024 WL 232315, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2024) (quoting United States v. Miljus, No. CIV. 06-
1832PK, 2007 WL 4287608, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2007) (“‘Allodial title creates absolute ownership in
the title holder, free and clear of any lien, mortgage, rent, service, property tax obligation, or other
encumbrance.’”). As Plaintiffs note, courts presented with these claims have “uniformly rejected” them,
including this court. Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-C-1191, 2013 WL 1192767, at *1 (E.D.

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Wis. Mar. 22, 2013); Golrick v. Vermont Department of Taxes, No. 22-CV-04365 (Vt. Super. Ct., Jan. 11,
2024). Neither the original 1999 deed nor the 2017 amendment contains any language that could be
interpreted as describing an “allodial” grant of title. In fact, both deeds make reference to the legally
recognized chain of title in establishing ownership of the property at issue. SUMF Ex. 1, p. 1, SUMF Ex.
5, p. 1. Defendants point to no relevant law or evidence in the record, beyond their own assertions, that
could possibly undermine the extremely clear language at issue in both the easement and the relevant
statutes. As such, the court rejects these claims.

Conclusion

The plain language of the Conservation Easement gives Plaintiffs the authority to determine
whether structures built and activities conducted on Ms. Kurt’s property comply with the terms of their
easement. Their authority to do so, in addition to their authority to bring suit for violations of the
easement, derives from current State statutes in addition to the language of the easement. Evidence
provided by Plaintiffs establish clear and ongoing violations of the Conservation Easement. Defendants
offer no viable defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, the court declares that the “Unauthorized
Structures” identified in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts violate the terms of the
easement and grants Plaintiffs’ requested injunction. SUMF ¶ 25-26. Defendants must remove all
structures from the 13-acre parcel (identified by Plaintiffs in Exhibit 5 to their Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts) within 60 days of this order and must not construct any new structures not in compliance
with the Conservation Easement. Further, the court declares that Mr. Keenan Kurt, through his
unauthorized residence and admitted construction of unauthorized structures upon the 13-acre parcel, has
trespassed upon the Conserved Land. Mr. Kurt must vacate his residence on the 13-acre parcel within 30
days of this court’s order.

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted. To the extent not already determined by the
granting of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, defendant Kerry Kurt’s motion to dismiss is
denied.

Plaintiffs may submit a proposed judgment order within ten days of the date of this order.

Signed Electronically on December 12, 2024 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

_________________________________________
David Barra
Superior Court Judge

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