State v. Rein Kolts

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal
revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions by email at: Reporter@vtcourts.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State
Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made
before this opinion goes to press.

2026 VT 10

No. 25-AP-079

State of Vermont Supreme Court

On Appeal from
v. Superior Court, Addison Unit,
Criminal Division

Rein Kolts January Term, 2026

Michael S. Kupersmith, J. (Ret.)

Evan Meenan, Deputy State’s Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew Valerio, Defender General, and Marshall Pahl, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for
Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton and Waples, JJ., and Barra, Supr. J., and Cohen, J. (Ret.),
Specially Assigned

¶ 1. EATON, J. Defendant Rein Kolts appeals his convictions of aggravated sexual

assault. He makes three arguments on appeal. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it

denied his motion for acquittal on count two; that the trial court violated his constitutional rights

by allowing a conviction based on a lower standard of proof than constitutionally required; and

that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting prior-bad-act evidence. We conclude that the

State presented sufficient evidence for conviction. However, because we also conclude that

defendant’s constitutional rights were violated by an erroneous jury instruction, we reverse and

remand for a new trial. Thus, we do not reach defendant’s evidentiary argument concerning

evidence of a prior bad act.
¶ 2. In 2018, N.H., then twenty, revealed to her parents that defendant, her uncle, had

sexually assaulted her as a child. Following an investigation into the events, the State charged

defendant with two counts of aggravated sexual assault pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8). Count

one alleged oral sexual contact between defendant and N.H. Count two alleged penetrative sexual

contact. Both charges describe the relevant contact occurring between January 1, 2005, and

December 31, 2011. In May 2024, a jury found defendant guilty of both counts. Defendant timely

appealed to this Court. As explained more fully below, we reverse and remand.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count Two

¶ 3. We begin with defendant’s argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence on

count two. As in all criminal cases, “the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each

element of the alleged offense.” State v. Anderkin, 145 Vt. 240, 243, 487 A.2d 142, 143 (1984).

Relevant to the charge at issue here, a conviction for aggravated sexual assault pursuant to 13

V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8) requires that defendant sexually assaulted the victim, and that, at the time of

the assault, the victim was under the age of thirteen.1 See also 13 V.S.A. § 3252 (outlining

elements of “sexual assault”).

¶ 4. While N.H. testified that defendant sexually assaulted her at least fifty to sixty

times, at trial, the State largely focused its evidence on two specific instances. Relevant to count

one, N.H. testified that defendant first forced her to perform oral sex when she was about “six or

seven.”

¶ 5. Relevant to count two, N.H. testified that defendant penetrated her “a handful of

times” in defendant’s barn, but, according to N.H., the “most significant” instance occurred when

she was “in the sixth grade.”

1
The record indicates that the State elected not to charge defendant with sexual assault
pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 3252 as a lesser-included offense.
2
¶ 6. Following the State’s evidence, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on

count two, arguing that the State had failed to meet its burden to prove both elements of 13 V.S.A.

§ 3253(a)(8). Specifically, defendant asserted that the circumstantial evidence presented by the

State was insufficient to support a conclusion that N.H. was under the age of thirteen at the time

of the assault in the barn. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for acquittal.

¶ 7. In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for acquittal, we apply the same

standard used by the trial court. State v. Davis, 2018 VT 33, ¶ 14, 207 Vt. 346, 186 A.3d 1088.

We view the evidence presented “in the light most favorable to the State, excluding any modifying

evidence, and determine whether it is sufficient to fairly and reasonably convince a trier of fact

that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted).

¶ 8. As we have frequently articulated, “[a] jury,” not a court, “is in the best position to

weigh facts and deliver a verdict, particularly in close fact-dependent cases.” State v. Cameron,

2016 VT 134, ¶ 5, 204 Vt. 52, 163 A.3d 545. Accordingly, the standard for judgment of acquittal

“is a highly deferential standard.” Id. We have also explained that “[a] jury may draw rational

inferences from the circumstantial evidence to determine whether disputed ultimate facts

occurred.” State v. Perrault, 2017 VT 67, ¶ 30, 205 Vt. 235, 173 A.3d 335 (quotation omitted).

We note, however, that “evidence that gives rise to mere suspicion of guilt or leaves guilt uncertain

or dependent upon conjecture is insufficient.” State v. Durenleau, 163 Vt. 8, 10, 652 A.2d 981,

982 (1994). In sum, “[a] court shall grant the motion for acquittal only if the prosecution has failed

to put forth any evidence to substantiate a jury verdict.” Perrault, 2017 VT 67, ¶ 30 (emphasis

added) (quotation omitted).

¶ 9. The record indicates that the State introduced the following evidence regarding

N.H.’s age. N.H. was born on May 5, 1998. Defendant began to sexually assault N.H. in 2005,

the year she turned seven. According to N.H.’s testimony, the first assault occurred in defendant’s

art studio when N.H. was “six or seven” years old. Defendant continued to assault N.H. for a

3
number of years, including multiple assaults in defendant’s barn. N.H. testified that the last “stark”

sexual assault in the barn occurred when she was “in the sixth grade.” At trial, when asked whether

the barn N.H. was referencing was the “same barn where [defendant] made you have sex with him

when you were age eleven and under,” N.H. agreed. N.H. also testified that she could not “set a

clear date on the last assaults” but answered affirmatively to a question asking her to confirm that

the assaults “stopped” when she was “eleven or twelve.” On cross-examination, N.H. agreed that

the “last time” was when she was “twelve or thirteen.”2 N.H. also explained that she was twenty-

five when she testified before the jury on May 2, 2024.

¶ 10. We conclude that, based on the State’s evidence, a juror could fairly and reasonably

conclude that N.H. was under the age of thirteen when defendant assaulted her in his barn. As

described above, the record indicates that N.H. agreed that the assaults in the barn occurred when

she was “eleven and under.” Additionally, in response to another question, N.H. confirmed that

the assaults “stopped” when she was “eleven or twelve.” Both of N.H.’s answers sufficiently

support the conclusion that she was under thirteen at the time of the specified assault in the barn.

See Perrault, 2017 VT 67, ¶ 30 (“A court shall grant the motion for acquittal only if the prosecution

has failed to put forth any evidence to substantiate a jury verdict.” (quotation omitted)).

¶ 11. Defendant points to N.H.’s testimony that the specified assault in the barn occurred

when she was “in the sixth grade” and argues that this is insufficient for conviction. According to

defendant, this evidence requires “the assumption or inference of facts not in evidence” to reach

the conclusion that N.H. was under the age of thirteen at the time of the assault in the barn.

Specifically, defendant asserts that, to conclude N.H. was under the age of thirteen “the court and

2
It is unclear whether N.H. understood the questions asked by defendant’s attorney to be
referencing the “last” assault in the barn, or the “last” assault generally. Indeed, N.H. testified
that, in addition to the assaults in the barn, other penetrative assaults occurred in defendant’s great
room on his couch, in his car, and in defendant’s main or secondary bed. According to N.H., the
assault she described in the barn was the “most significant time,” and she believed defendant
penetrated her after the assault in the barn but could not “recall particular memories” of those
assaults.
4
jury had to assume that seven years passed between sixth grade and high-school graduation” but

argues that “[t]here was no evidence of that—it is simply an assumption.” We disagree.

¶ 12. We have frequently stated that a jury can “employ rational inferences to bridge

factual gaps left by circumstantial evidence.” Durenleau, 163 Vt. at 14, 652 A.2d at 984. Here,

the evidence introduced about N.H.’s academic career indicates a typical progression through

school. N.H. graduated from high school in 2016, the year she turned eighteen. N.H. graduated

from college four years later in 2020, the year she turned twenty-two. N.H. also testified that, at

the time of the trial, she was a PhD student. While not the only conclusion a jury could reach, the

significant circumstantial evidence supporting N.H.’s typical academic progression supports the

conclusion that in the sixth grade, N.H. was under the age of thirteen. See State v. Messier, 146

Vt. 145, 150-51, 499 A.2d 32, 37 (1985) (explaining “[t]he State is not required to exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence in proving its case” and “[t]he trier of fact is not required to

search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence, and elevate them to the

status of a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)).

¶ 13. Defendant also points to N.H.’s testimony that she was “twelve or thirteen” when

the “last time” occurred. According to defendant, this testimony requires the conclusion that the

evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that N.H. was under the age of thirteen during the assault

in the barn. Even assuming that the barn assault was the “last time,” defendant’s argument does

not prevail. As described above, N.H. answered two questions concerning when the assaults

stopped. N.H. testified both that the “last time” occurred when she was “twelve or thirteen” and

also answered in the affirmative that the assaults “stopped” when she was “eleven or twelve.” To

the extent that these statements are in conflict, conflicting evidence does not prevent a juror from

drawing rational inferences to reach an ultimate conclusion. See State v. Tenney, 143 Vt. 213,

216, 464 A.2d 747, 748 (1983) (“[W]e have consistently held that it is the exclusive province of

the jury, . . . to resolve . . . contradictions.” (quotation omitted)). Furthermore, “[c]redibility

5
questions raised by the evidence at trial are ‘entirely within the province of the jury.’ ” State v.

Hammond, 2012 VT 48, ¶ 14, 192 Vt. 48, 54 A.3d 151 (quoting State v. Hinchliffe, 2009 VT 111,

¶ 22, 186 Vt. 487, 987 A.2d 988). Indeed, a reasonable juror could have deemed both statements

credible and thereby concluded that N.H. was twelve at the time of the “last” assault.

¶ 14. Necessarily viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented

by the State “is sufficient to fairly and reasonably convince a trier of fact” that N.H. was under the

age of thirteen during the relevant assault in the barn, and, therefore, “that the defendant is guilty.”

Davis, 2018 VT 33, ¶ 14 (quotation omitted) (requiring courts to “grant a judgment of acquittal

only when there is no evidence to support a guilty verdict” (quotation omitted)). For these reasons,

the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on count two.

II. Jury Instructions

¶ 15. Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s reasonable-doubt instruction violated

his federal constitutional rights and amounted to plain error.3 Defendant does not argue that his

rights under the Vermont Constitution were violated. As a result, we consider only whether

defendant’s federal due-process rights were violated by the challenged jury instruction. We

conclude that: the definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” provided by the trial court

impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of proof; it thereby prejudicially interfered with

defendant’s federal constitutional right to due process; the error was obvious under prevailing

federal law; and lastly, in the interest of fairness, integrity, and reputation of judicial proceedings,

we must correct this error. We overrule State v. Levitt, 2016 VT 60, 202 Vt. 193, 148 A.3d 204,

to the extent it conflicts with this holding.

3
Defendant argues that the trial court committed structural error when it incorrectly
defined “beyond a reasonable doubt” and, in the alternative, defendant argues that the same
conclusion can be reached under the plain-error standard. We do not reach defendant’s structural-
error argument because we conclude that the trial court’s definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt”
was plain error.
6
¶ 16. In State v. Levitt this Court considered whether jury instructions that at one point

defined “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” violated the defendant’s constitutional

rights under the U.S. constitution. 2016 VT 60, ¶ 5. We emphasized that federal precedent did

not require the use of any specific words to define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Furthermore,

in considering Vermont cases addressing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in various other

contexts and precedent from “sister state[]” courts, we concluded that the instruction as a whole

was not “sufficiently misleading to be reversible error.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. We highlighted that “any

potential diminishment of the State’s burden” through the use of the term “great certainty” in the

jury instruction was “balanced by the trial court’s emphasis upon the presumption of innocence

afforded to [the] defendant,” in addition to “the repeated references to the reasonable doubt

standard without further attempts to define the term,” and “the weight jurors should attach to any

doubt they feel, even if it cannot be articulated.” Id. ¶ 13. In considering controlling federal

precedent on this issue, we conclude that Levitt did not properly assess the erroneous instruction.

¶ 17. We begin with the jury charge at issue in this case. In relevant part, the trial court

defined the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in its jury instruction as follows:

Few things in life are absolutely certain. To say that you believe
something beyond a reasonable doubt is to say that you are
convinced of it with great certainty. But proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not require you to be absolutely or one hundred percent
certain.

¶ 18. Defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial and thus did not preserve

this argument. “We review unpreserved challenges to jury instructions for plain error.” State v.

Blanchard, 2021 VT 13, ¶ 25, 214 Vt. 225, 256 A.3d 567; see also V.R.Cr.P. 52(b) (“Plain errors

or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the

attention of the court.”). We consider four factors to determine if plain error occurred: “(1) [T]here

must be an error; (2) the error must be obvious; (3) the error must affect substantial rights and

result in prejudice to the defendant; and (4) we must correct the error if it seriously affects the

7
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Welch, 2020 VT 74, ¶ 8,

213 Vt. 114, 249 A.3d 319 (quotation omitted).

¶ 19. We have described plain error in the jury-instruction context as the extraordinary

circumstance “ ‘when the entire charge undermines our confidence in the verdict’ and ‘the error

affected a substantial right and had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury’s deliberations.’ ” Id.

(quoting State v. Alzaga, 2019 VT 75, ¶ 18, 211 Vt. 111, 221 A.3d 378). As part of this analysis,

“[w]e read jury instructions in their entirety, not piecemeal, to ensure that they breathe the true

spirit of the law, and there is no fair ground to say that the jury has been misled.” Id. (quotation

and alteration omitted).

¶ 20. In criminal trials, jury instructions play a critical role in ensuring that defendants’

constitutional rights are protected. Indeed, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

‘protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.

39, 39 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and citing Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979)), overruled in part on other grounds by Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof “plays a vital

role in the American scheme of criminal procedure” because “[i]t is a prime instrument for

reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. As such,

“[r]eduction of the government’s burden of proof . . . is impermissibly inconsistent with the

constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 629 (5th

Cir. 1977) (quotation omitted); see also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per

curiam) (reversing and remanding case where “the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary

for the Government to carry its burden . . . [b]ecause such a requirement is plainly inconsistent

with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.”).

8
¶ 21. This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have not required or encouraged trial courts

to define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 158 Vt. 640, 641, 603 A.2d

1128, 1129 (1992) (holding there was no error when reasonable doubt was not defined); Victor v.

Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due

process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor

requires them to do so as a matter of course.”). Indeed, this Court has warned that “[d]efining

‘reasonable doubt’ is a hazardous undertaking because it seems the more said about it to the jury,

the less protection that concept provides the accused.” State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 302, 561

A.2d 392, 396 (1989). When a court elects to define the term “beyond a reasonable doubt,”

however, the definition must be commensurate with “utmost certainty,” as the U.S. Supreme Court

established in In re Winship. 397 U.S. at 363; see, e.g., Cage, 498 U.S. at 41 (“It is our

view, . . . that the instruction at issue was contrary to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ requirement

articulated in Winship.”); Victor, 511 U.S. at 6 (“The constitutional question in the present

cases, . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to

allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard.”); Brown v. Greene,

577 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 2009) (“If there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the

instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard, then the

charge is constitutionally deficient.” (quotation omitted)).

¶ 22. Under this standard, the trial court’s use of the term “great certainty” to define

“beyond a reasonable doubt” was error. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (explaining “[i]t is critical

that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in

doubt whether innocent men are being condemned” and, therefore, “every individual going about

his ordinary affairs [must] have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a

criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty”); Welch,

2020 VT 74, ¶ 8 (describing “there must be an error” as first factor of plain-error analysis

9
(quotation omitted)). As commonly understood, the term “utmost” is defined as “of the greatest

or highest degree.” Utmost, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster

.com/dictionary/utmost [https://perma.cc/B8K4-9XPT]. The term “great” is defined as

“remarkable in magnitude, degree, or effectiveness.”4 Great, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/great [https://perma.cc/6GQL-J74E]. Just as “great

certainty” is not synonymous with “greatest certainty,” a “remarkable degree of certainty” is not

synonymous with the “highest degree of certainty.” Consequently, the trial court’s use of the term

“great certainty” to define “beyond a reasonable doubt” did not meet the requirements of due

process. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Any jury instruction defining

‘reasonable doubt’ that suggests an improperly high degree of doubt for acquittal or an improperly

low degree of certainty for conviction offends due process.”).

¶ 23. Indeed, our conclusion in this case that the term “great certainty” is insufficient

conforms with other prominent federal cases applying the Winship requirement. In Cage v.

Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt as

“doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty” and “an actual substantial doubt.” 498 U.S. at

40. The Court examined the plain meaning of the terms “grave” and “substantial” and determined

that, when read in parallel, the terms “suggest[ed] a higher degree of doubt than is required for

acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard.” Id. at 41. Accordingly, the Court concluded that

the instruction “allow[ed] a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the

Due Process Clause.” Id. Applying that reasoning to the instant case, the term “great,” like the

terms “substantial” and “grave,” suggests a degree of doubt that would allow a finding of guilt

based on a degree of proof below what is required by the Due Process Clause. See id.

4
Other definitions include “notably large in size” and “large in number or measure.”
Great, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/great
[https://perma.cc/6GQL-J74E].
10
¶ 24. Similarly, in Victor v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the term

“substantial doubt” in jury instructions. Victor, 511 U.S. at 18. The relevant instruction stated,

“[a] reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence . . . as

distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful

conjecture.” Id. The Court agreed with the defendant’s argument that the term “substantial doubt”

could problematically “overstate[] the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal.” Id. at 19.

However, the Court pointed out that the charge at issue distinguished an “actual and substantial

doubt” from one “arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful

conjecture.” Id. at 20. It concluded that the instruction did not violate the defendant’s

constitutional rights because, in the context of those instructions, the term “substantial” merely

“inform[ed] the jury only that a reasonable doubt is something more than a speculative one.” Id.5

The Court also explained “[i]n any event, the instruction provided an alternative definition of

reasonable doubt: a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act,” which “is a

formulation [the U.S. Supreme Court had] repeatedly approved.” Id.

¶ 25. Accordingly, this Court’s reasoning in Levitt that any diminishment of the State’s

burden due to an erroneous instruction could be balanced by “emphasis upon the presumption of

innocence,” the absence of “further attempts to define the term,” and “the weight jurors should

attach to any doubt they feel, even if it cannot be articulated,” was an error. 2016 VT 60, ¶ 13.

¶ 26. Both in this case and in Levitt, the relevant portion of the jury instructions—“[t]o

say that you believe something beyond a reasonable doubt is to say that you are convinced of it

with great certainty”—cannot be interpreted but to decrease the level of certainty required for

conviction from “beyond a reasonable doubt” and “utmost certainty” to something less. In both

5
In Victor, the Court distinguished Cage by acknowledging that “the words ‘substantial’
and ‘grave,’ as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required
for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard” but also explained that the Court “did not hold
that the reference to substantial doubt alone was sufficient to render the instruction
unconstitutional.” Id. (quotation omitted).
11
cases, the instructions in their entirety did not include other language distinguishing, altering, or

otherwise defining “beyond a reasonable doubt.”6 In Levitt, this Court reasoned that any

diminishment to the term was balanced, among other things, by “repeated references to the

reasonable doubt standard without further attempts to define the term.” Id. We cannot continue

to agree with that reasoning. Once an incorrect definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” was

used by the trial court, without more, that error could not be mitigated by mere repetition of the

incorrectly defined term. Indeed, we “must assume that the jurors followed the instructions given

them by the trial court,” which, requires that we presume the jury applied the definition provided

to them by the court and did not alter their understanding of the already-defined term when the

term was repeated by the court. State v. Barrett, 132 Vt. 369, 375, 320 A.2d 621, 625 (1974).

Ultimately, because “[w]e presume that jurors follow the law as set forth in the instructions given

to them,” State v. Webster, 2017 VT 98, ¶ 22, 206 Vt. 178, 179 A.3d 149, and because the

instructions told the jury to apply an unconstitutional standard, we conclude that “there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that violat[ed]

the Constitution,” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quotation omitted). See Welch,

2020 VT 74, ¶ 8 (describing plain error in jury instructions when charge “undermines our

confidence in the verdict” (quotation omitted)).

¶ 27. We conclude that the erroneous jury instruction here unconstitutionally affected

and interfered with defendant’s constitutional rights. See id. (describing third factor of plain error

6
The instructions later included the following language: “[a] reasonable doubt may arise
from the evidence or from the lack of evidence” and instructed the jurors to “ask yourselves
whether on the basis of your reason and judgment, you have a reasonable doubt about the matters
I have instructed you to decide.” Additionally, the instructions explained: “[y]ou must find the
defendant not guilty when you have a reasonable doubt, even if you believe he is probably guilty”;
“[y]ou may find him guilty only if you have no reasonable doubt;” and, later, “[u]nder no
circumstances may a guilty verdict be based upon conjecture or suspicion.” Despite the repetition
of the term “beyond a reasonable doubt,” this language did not provide any alternative definition,
or distinguish, alter, or otherwise explain the degree of doubt required. Instead, it reinforced that
“beyond a reasonable doubt” meant what the trial court said it did when it defined the term as
“great certainty.”
12
analysis as “the error must affect substantial rights and result in prejudice to the defendant”

(quotation omitted)).

¶ 28. The State asserts that, even if this Court holds that the jury instruction was an error,

the error was not “obvious,” and therefore not plain. See id. (explaining factors of plain-error

analysis, including “the error must be obvious” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Koons, 2011

VT 22, ¶ 13, 189 Vt. 285, 20 A.3d 662 (“A plain error is one that is clear or obvious under existing

law.”); U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (“ ‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or,

equivalently, ‘obvious.’ ”). According to the State, this Court’s decision in Levitt forecloses a

conclusion that the error is obvious. 2016 VT 60, ¶ 13 (concluding “any potential diminishment

of the State’s burden” by defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” was balanced

by remainder of instructions and therefore instructions did not amount to plain error when viewed

as whole).

¶ 29. We conclude that the jury-instruction error was obvious for purposes of the plain-

error assessment. Although Levitt found no plain error, it certainly made clear that “attempting to

define reasonable doubt is a ‘hazardous undertaking,’ ” and explicitly “discourage[d] trial judges

from trying such an explanation.” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Francis, 151 Vt. at 302, 561 A.2d at 396). The

decision also cautioned that absent the specific context, specific instruction, or a cogent objection,

a similar definitional explanation may be an error. Id.

¶ 30. Levitt is not the only case that has included such a warning. Indeed, both this Court

and the U.S. Supreme Court have frequently warned that “[d]efining ‘reasonable doubt’ is a

hazardous undertaking because it seems the more said about it to the jury, the less protection that

concept provides the accused.” Francis, 151 Vt. at 302, 561 A.2d at 396; see also McMahon, 158

Vt. at 641, 603 A.2d at 1128 (same); State v. Haskins, 2016 VT 79, ¶ 35, 202 Vt. 461, 150 A.3d

202 (same); State v. Redmond, 2020 VT 36, ¶ 39, 212 Vt. 242, 234 A.3d 958 (same); Miles v.

United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (“Attempts to explain the term ‘reasonable doubt’ do not

13
usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.”); Holland v. United States, 348

U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (explaining attempts to define “beyond a reasonable doubt” may lead to jury

confusion).

¶ 31. Furthermore, because this is a federal constitutional question, federal law is

controlling and the standard is clear. See Koons, 2011 VT 22, ¶ 13 (“A plain error is one that is

clear or obvious under existing law.”). Indeed, “[o]n questions arising under the Federal

Constitution decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling upon this Court.”

State v. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92, 121, 59 A. 201, 210 (1904); see also State v. Prouty, 94 Vt. 359, 365,

111 A. 559, 562 (1920) (explaining where issue concerned violation of due process pursuant to

federal Constitution, “as to that question, [this Court is] controlled by the decisions of the Federal

Supreme Court”). The U.S. Supreme Court has set a firm benchmark for jury instructions that

define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. Clear federal precedent also

explains that any deviation below that standard violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. See

Victor, 511 U.S. at 20; Cage, 498 U.S. at 41. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that

where an instructional error makes it impossible to determine whether a jury has found a defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this “vitiates all the jury’s findings.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (emphasis omitted). This firm federal precedent, along with this Court’s

acknowledgement in Levitt that the term may “diminish” the State’s constitutionally required

burden, places the constitutionality of the relevant definition into question.

¶ 32. Our reasoning in State v. Judkins is relevant to this obvious-error analysis. 161 Vt.

593, 594, 641 A.2d 350, 351-52 (1993) (mem.). In Judkins, we approached the obvious-error

analysis by asking whether the trial court should have foreseen a future decision from this Court

holding that warrantless electronic monitoring violated Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont

Constitution. Id. (citing State v. Blow, 157 Vt. 513, 520, 602 A.2d 552, 556 (1991)). We

considered reasoning from other state courts analyzing their own constitutions in addition to U.S.

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Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 594, 641 A.2d at 352. We concluded that our decision had not

been foreseeable to the trial court—and therefore did not rise to the level of “obvious error”—

because “almost without exception, the jurisdictions that considered the same issue,” including the

U.S. Supreme Court, had come to the opposite conclusion. Id. We noted that “[t]wenty-five states

had adopted the federal approach” and “[o]nly two” had agreed with this Court’s ultimate

conclusion. Id.

¶ 33. The inverse is true here. In this case, we consider whether it was foreseeable or

whether the court “should [have] easily recognize[d]” that, on a federal constitutional issue, this

Court would conclude that federal precedent controls and overrides our precedent. Id. at 594, 641

A.2d at 351 (quotation omitted); see also Koons, 2011 VT 22, ¶ 13 (“A plain error is one that is

clear or obvious under existing law.”). We conclude that our decision to overturn the relevant

portions of Levitt was foreseeable. In addition to the analysis laid out above, it is relevant that no

other state or federal Court has affirmed the use of “great certainty” to define “beyond a reasonable

doubt” in jury instructions. See, e.g., 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1103 (2026) (citing only Vermont

caselaw when describing use of “great certainty” in definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt”

standard). In fact, the Tenth Circuit has used “great certainty” to describe the clear and convincing

evidence standard; in White v. American Airlines, Inc., the Tenth Circuit explained that “the clear

and convincing evidence standard applies to . . . areas of the law, where a need for great certainty

is required.” 915 F.2d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).

¶ 34. Accordingly, and considering all this together, we conclude that the trial court

should have been “on notice” of the error in its jury instruction. Judkins, 161 Vt. at 594, 641 A.2d

at 351-52 (considering whether holding was “otherwise so transparent as to put the trial court on

notice” in plain-error analysis). The second factor in the plain error analysis is sufficiently met.

¶ 35. Lastly, we consider whether the error implicates “the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Welch, 2020 VT 74, ¶ 8 (quotation omitted). We conclude

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that it would be unfair to defendant and harmful to the public reputation of Vermont’s judicial

system to allow a definition of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in direct contravention of

the requirements outlined in Winship. Cf. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 265-66 (2010)

(holding that “an error that does not affect the jury’s verdict does not significantly impugn the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process” (quotation omitted)). We decline

to allow such an error to continue and, consequently, overrule the relevant portions of Levitt and

its progeny. See State v. Shores, 2025 VT 62, ¶ 27, __ Vt. __ , 350 A.3d 471 (explaining we “do

not lightly overrule precedent” but “at the same time we are not slavish adherents to prior

decisions” (quotation omitted)).

¶ 36. We hold that defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” is plain

error, and, consequently, we must reverse and remand.

III. Prior Bad-Act Evidence

¶ 37. Finally, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion when it improperly

admitted evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts. Because we reverse and remand on the

constitutional issue raised by defendant, we need not and do not address this issue.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

FOR THE COURT:

Associate Justice

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