Kyle Hart v. Johanna Swift

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 24-AP-086
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

OCTOBER TERM, 2024

Kyle Hart* v. Johanna Swift } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Lamoille Unit,
} Family Division
} CASE NO. 23-DM-00350
Trial Judge: Mary L. Morrissey

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Husband appeals pro se from the dismissal of his motion to modify an out-of-state
spousal-support order for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

The record indicates the following. The parties were divorced in Massachusetts in March
2018 pursuant to a separation agreement. Pursuant to their agreement, husband was ordered to
pay wife $1050 per week for her “support and maintenance,” beginning in December 2017 and
continuing indefinitely. The parties’ children were fifteen and eighteen at the time of the
agreement and given the spousal-support payment referenced above, they agreed that “neither
party shall pay child support to the other.”

In February 2023, husband moved to register the parties’ divorce order in Vermont,
indicating that he had been living in Vermont for three-and-a-half years. He also moved to
modify his maintenance obligation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court determined that
it lacked jurisdiction to modify the 2017 Massachusetts order regarding spousal support. The
court explained that while Vermont courts could modify and enforce child-support orders from
other states (once those orders were properly registered in Vermont and other requirements were
satisfied), see 15B V.S.A. § 1609, the same was not true of spousal-support orders. In the latter
case, the issuing court, here Massachusetts, retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify
such orders. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209D, § 2-211(a) (West 2024) (“A tribunal of the
commonwealth issuing a spousal support order consistent with the law of the commonwealth has
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order throughout the existence
of the support obligation.”). Vermont law is consistent with this provision, providing that “[a]
tribunal of this State may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state
or foreign country having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order under the law of that
state or foreign country.” 15B V.S.A § 1211. Consequently, because Massachusetts had
“continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order throughout the existence
of the support obligation,” the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over husband’s
request.

Husband argues on appeal that the court did have jurisdiction to modify the order. He
states that he assumed that if a Vermont court could register the spousal-support order, it could
also modify the order. In support of his argument, he cites to § 611(a) of the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act (UIFSA), which corresponds to 15B V.S.A. § 1611(a). Husband also argues
that the terms of the parties’ separation agreement do not provide Massachusetts with continuing
jurisdiction if the parties no longer reside there.

We reject these arguments. The court acknowledged that it could register an out-of-state
spousal-support order but recognized that this did not mean it could modify it. Its decision is
based on the plain language of the law. In support of his position, husband cites statutory
provisions that relate to child-support orders, not spousal-support orders. Section 1609 of Title
15B sets forth the “[p]rocedure to register a child support order of another state for
modification.” (Emphasis added.) Section 1611(a), cited by husband, identifies the
requirements that must be satisfied before a Vermont court “may modify a child support order
issued in another state which is registered in this State.” (Emphasis added.) These provisions do
not establish that the court had jurisdiction to modify spousal-support orders, nor do they
undermine the court’s analysis above. See, e.g., Spalding v. Spalding, 886 So. 2d 1075 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting similar argument and explaining that UIFSA allows for
modification of child-support orders by nonissuing state but not for modification of spousal-
support orders).

Husband’s remaining argument is equally without merit. He references the following
provision in the parties’ agreement:

This Agreement has been executed or completed in Massachusetts
and is a Massachusetts contract, and all matters affecting its
interpretation and enforcement and the rights of the parties
hereunder shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts without regard to choice of law principles . . . . To
the extent applicable law will permit and subject to any arbitration
provisions contained herein, the courts of Massachusetts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction (both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction) relative to any disputes or other matters arising under
or related to this Agreement so long as one or both parties resides
in Massachusetts. Each party irrevocably submits and consents to
such jurisdiction if permitted by applicable law, and each party
irrevocably waives, to the fullest extent he or she may effectively
do so under applicable law, (i) any objection he or she may have or
hereafter have to designating the jurisdiction and venue of any
action, suit or proceeding related to this Agreement and (ii) any
claim that such action, suit or proceeding has been brought in an
inconvenient forum.

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This provision makes clear that the parties’ agreement is “governed by the laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Under Massachusetts law, the Massachusetts court that
issued the spousal-support order “has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal
support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
209D, § 2-211(a) (West 2024). The court did not err in concluding here that it lacked
jurisdiction over husband’s motion to modify.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

William D. Cohen, Associate Justice

Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

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