Paula Michelle Ratliff v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Haley, Petty and Powell
Argued at Salem, Virginia
PAULA MICHELLE RATLIFF
OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 2085-07-3 	JUDGE JAMES W. HALEY, JR.
FEBRUARY 24, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
Keary R. Williams, Judge
Robert M. Galumbeck (Galumbeck, Dennis & Kegley, on brief), for
appellant.
Jennifer C. Williamson, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F.
McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Code § 18.2-51.4 states in relevant part: “Any person who, as a result of driving while
intoxicated in violation of § 18.2-266 . . . in a manner so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
reckless disregard for . . . life, unintentionally causes . . .” serious, permanent bodily injury shall
be guilty of a Class 6 felony. (Emphasis added.) Paula Michelle Ratliff (“Ratliff”) entered a
conditional guilty plea to a violation of this statute, preserving for appeal only her contention
that, under the emphasized language, her intoxication must result from alcohol consumption, not
the controlled drugs she admittedly ingested. We reject that contention and affirm.
FACTS
On May 13, 2003, Ratliff drove her vehicle across the centerline of a highway in front of
an on-coming motorcycle, resulting in serious and permanent injury to its operator and a
passenger on the same.

Trooper Gene Crouse of the Virginia State Police arrived on the accident scene. He had
arrested Ratliff twelve days earlier for drunk driving. He testified: “[s]he was disoriented the
first time I’d arrested her but she was a lot more so this time. . . . She stated that she hadn’t taken
anything that day, any medication . . . but said she did have trouble maintaining consciousness
. . . .”
Ratliff denied she suffered any injury in the accident and was taken to a magistrate’s
office, where blood was withdrawn. An analysis of her blood, admitted into evidence without
objection, showed no evidence of alcohol, but did reveal the presence of benzolyecgonine (a
cocaine metabolite), alprazolam (Xanax), and methadone. On brief, Ratliff admits she “[did]
have controlled substances (drugs) in her system.”
After making a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, Ratliff entered a conditional
guilty plea to maiming another as a result of driving while intoxicated, reserving her right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of her pretrial motion to this Court. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Ratliff’s argument on appeal presents a pure question of statutory interpretation. This
Court reviews the trial court’s interpretation of statutes de novo. Saponaro v. Commonwealth,
51 Va. App. 149, 151, 655 S.E.2d 49, 50 (2008). Code § 18.2-51.4 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Any person who, as a result of driving while intoxicated in
violation of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially similar
thereto in a manner so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
reckless disregard for human life, unintentionally causes the
serious bodily injury of another person resulting in permanent and
significant physical impairment shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Code § 18.2-266 reads:
§ 18.2-266. Driving motor vehicle, engine, etc., while intoxicated,
etc. — It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any
motor vehicle, engine or train (i) while such person has a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by
- 2 -

volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath as indicated
by a chemical test administered as provided in this article,
(ii) while such person is under the influence of alcohol, (iii) while
such person is under the influence of any narcotic drug or any
other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or
any combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his
ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely,
(iv) while such person is under the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug or drugs to a degree which impairs his ability to drive
or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely, or (v) while
such person has a blood concentration of any of the following
substances at a level that is equal to or greater than: (a) 0.02
milligrams of cocaine per liter of blood, (b) 0.1 milligrams of
methamphetamine per liter of blood, (c) 0.01 milligrams of
phencyclidine per liter of blood, or (d) 0.1 milligrams of
3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine per liter of blood. A charge
alleging a violation of this section shall support a conviction under
clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v).
Ratliff argues that Code § 18.2-51.4 applies only to drivers who cause serious bodily
injury to another person resulting in permanent and significant physical impairment as a result of
the driver’s alcoholic intoxication. According to Ratliff, the definition of intoxicated provided in
Title 4.1 of the Code [“a condition in which a person has drunk enough alcoholic beverages to
observably affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or
behavior,” Code § 4.1-100,] and also mentioned in our Supreme Court’s decision in Gardner v.
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 81 S.E.2d 614 (1954), compels the conclusion that Code
§ 18.2-51.4 cannot apply to her conduct because the relevant definition applies only to persons
who, unlike Ratliff, have consumed alcoholic beverages. We disagree.
‘“[T]wo statutes which are closely interrelated must be read and construed together and
effect given to all of their provisions.’” Meierotto v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 1, 4, 646
S.E.2d 1, 2 (2007) (quoting Zamani v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 59, 63, 492 S.E.2d 854, 856
(1997)). Code § 18.2-51.4 expressly applies to a person who violates its terms while “driving
while intoxicated in violation of § 18.2-266.” Subsection (iii) of Code § 18.2-266 expressly
- 3 -

applies to any person who drives a motor vehicle “while such person is under the influence of
any narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any
combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor
vehicle . . . .”
‘“The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious,
narrow or strained construction . . . .’” Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 776, 781, 595
S.E.2d 27, 30 (2004) (quoting Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422,
424-25 (1992)). Reading Code §§ 18.2-51.4 and 18.2-266(iii) together, as we must, their plain,
obvious, and rational meaning is that a person violates Code § 18.2-51.4 when he or she
recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person resulting in permanent and significant
physical impairment to that person while operating a vehicle under the influence of any narcotic
drug which impairs the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle in violation of Code
§ 18.2-266(iii).
The language of Code § 18.2-36.1 supports our conclusion. The section provides, in
pertinent part, that: “[a]ny person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of
clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially similar thereto
unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.”
In enacting Code § 18.2-36.1, the legislature decided that violations of certain subsections of
Code § 18.2-266, but not other subsections, are punishable as involuntary manslaughter if any of
the enumerated violations result in the death of another person. However, Code § 18.2-51.4
applies to violations of Code § 18.2-266 generally; the section’s application is not limited to
particular subsections thereof. When a statute’s application is expressly and specifically limited
with reference to one subject, the omission of specific limitations from the text of a similar
- 4 -

statute concerning a related subject tends to show the existence of a different legislative intent.
See Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 284, 448 S.E.2d 625, 629 (1994). In other words, if the
legislature had intended to embrace the definition of intoxication suggested by Ratliff, they
would have included in the text of Code § 18.2-51.4 language expressly applying that section to
violations of Code § 18.2-266(i) only.
The Code, moreover, contains no provision applying the definition of intoxication
mentioned in Code § 4.1-100, and relied upon by Ratliff, to Code § 18.2-51.4. This definition is
part of Title 4.1 of the Code (“Alcoholic Beverage Control Act”). “Code § 4.1-100 limits its
definitions of terms . . . to Title 4.1, applying the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act. There is no nexus in statute or case law between the provisions of Titles 4.1 and 18.2 to
substantiate the argument to transmorph the definition of non-identical terms in one to the other.”
Crislip v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 66, 70, 554 S.E.2d 96, 98 (2001) (refusing to limit
definition of “in public” for purposes of Code § 18.2-388 (“Profane Swearing and intoxication in
public”) to the definition of “public place” adopted in Code § 4.1-100). Moreover, by the
express terms of Code § 4.1-100, the definitions only apply “unless the context requires a
different meaning.”
Ratliff argues that, even though the Code applies the definition of intoxication mentioned
in Code § 4.1-100 to Title 4.1 only, our Supreme Court applied this definition to former Code
§ 18-75 (now Code § 18.2-266) when it decided Gardner. Because Gardner has never been
overruled, the argument continues, that decision’s definition of alcoholic intoxication continues
to apply to any prosecution under Code § 18.2-266.
In Gardner, the trial court offered the following jury instruction: “The Court instructs the
jury that the phrase ‘under the influence of intoxicating beverages’ means that a person has
- 5 -

voluntarily taken such an amount of alcoholic beverage as to make him act differently from what
he would have done if he had taken none.” Gardner, 195 Va. at 952-53, 81 S.E.2d at 618.
Holding that this definition was too broad, our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s
conviction, noting that “[t]he General Assembly adopted its own definition of intoxication. It is
as follows: ‘Any person who has drunk enough alcoholic beverages to so affect his manner,
disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior, as to be apparent to
observation, shall be deemed to be intoxicated.’” Id. at 954, 81 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting § 4-2(14)
of the Code of 1950 (currently part of Code § 4.1-100)).
In Gardner, the theory of the Commonwealth was that the defendant violated the law by
driving after consuming alcohol. See id. at 953, 81 S.E.2d at 619. None of the evidence from
the defendant’s trial suggested that he was driving under the influence of other drugs. Moreover,
former Code § 18-75, when Gardner was decided, provided as follows:
§ 18-75. Driving automobile, engines, etc., while intoxicated. - No
person shall drive or operate any automobile or other motor
vehicle, car truck, engine or train while under the influence of
alcohol, brandy, rum, whiskey, gin, wine, beer, lager beer, ale,
porter, stout or any other liquid beverage or article containing
alcohol or while under the influence of any narcotic drug or other
self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature.
§ 18-75 of the Code of 1950 (now Code § 18.2-266) (emphasis added).
The fact that driving under the influence of any narcotic drug was already prohibited at
the time of Gardner – and indeed was prohibited by the very statute that the defendant in that
case was accused of violating – shows that Ratliff is mistaken with respect to the applicable
scope of the definition of intoxication mentioned in Gardner. The success of Ratliff’s argument
depends on our adopting the view that Gardner applied the definition of intoxication of former
Code § 4-2(14) to all prosecutions alleging any violation of former Code § 18-75, and thus
- 6 -

embraced an interpretation of the law that effectively nullified the final clause of former Code
§ 18-75. Put another way, if any successful prosecution for driving while intoxicated under
former Code § 18-75 required the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant met the definition
of alcoholic intoxication found in former Code § 4-2(14), then Gardner made a dead letter of the
portion of the statutory text that makes it a crime to drive while under the influence of any
narcotic drug.
There are three reasons why we do not believe such a broad reading of Gardner is
reasonable. First, it is a settled principle of statutory construction that “every part of a statute is
presumed to have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless absolutely
necessary.” Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Pshp., 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998).
Ratliff’s argument depends on the doubtful premise that our Supreme Court ignored this
principle in deciding Gardner and treated as meaningless the clause of former Code § 18-75
concerning drugs. Second, if our Supreme Court really had concluded that Gardner was among
the rare cases in which it was “absolutely necessary” to make a nullity of a major part of the
statute, we believe the Court would have 1) announced that this is what it was doing and
2) explained its reasons for doing so. Yet the Gardner opinion contains no language suggesting
an intention to do either. Finally, the facts of Gardner did not require that our Supreme Court
decide whether the definition of intoxication of former Code § 4-2(14) also applied to
prosecutions alleging that the defendant drove under the influence of drugs. There was no
evidence that the defendant in Gardner had used any drugs, and the only evidence of intoxication
at his trial was evidence of alcoholic intoxication. Gardner, 195 Va. at 953, 81 S.E.2d at 619.
Because the question presented in this case was not necessary for the resolution of Gardner, a
further assumption of Ratliff’s argument is that our Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion
- 7 -

- 8 -
when it decided Gardner. We refuse to make that assumption. See Commonwealth v. Harley,
258 Va. 216, 219, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (Supreme Court of Virginia traditionally declines
to issue advisory opinions).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Ratliff’s motion to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that, as a matter of law, her conduct did not violate Code § 18.2-51.4.
Because Ratliff entered a conditional guilty plea in the trial court, reserving only her right to
appeal the trial court’s ruling on her pretrial motion, our holding with respect to that question
requires that we affirm her conviction.
Affirmed.