George A. Langhorne v Joanne Langhorne

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
GEORGE A. LANGHORNE MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 0810-98-4 	PER CURIAM
NOVEMBER 10, 1998
JOANNE LANGHORNE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
James W. Haley, Jr., Judge
(Sandra C. Graves; Rinehart & Strentz, on
briefs), for appellant.
(Owaiian M. Jones, on brief), for appellee.
George A. Langhorne appeals the decision of the circuit
judge denying his Motion for Entry of an Amended Qualified
Domestic Relations Order. 	He contends that the trial judge's
ruling did not comport with the formula in the final decree of
divorce or the recommendations of the commissioner in chancery.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. 	Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the trial judge's decision. 	See Rule 5A:27.
The record on appeal contains neither a transcript nor a
written statement of facts. 	However, we conclude that the record
is sufficient to decide the question raised by Langhorne because
the final decree of divorce stated that the commissioner's report
was adopted "and made a part of this Decree of Divorce." 	The
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

- 2 -
decree of divorce also provided as follows:
To facilitate the parties' use of this Decree
and as and for information to third parties
who may be affected thereby, certain of the
Court's findings will be hereinafter set out,
but in no event shall this Decree be deemed
to be inconsistent with this Court's rulings
pursuant to the Commissioner's
recommendations.
The decree of divorce further provided that Langhorne's wife was
entitled to "forty percent (40%) of the marital share of
[Langhorne's] disposable retired pay to be calculated by . . .
[a] formula," which is based upon a fraction and described in the
decree. 	The fraction has as its denominator "total years
military service."
Langhorne contends that both the commissioner and the trial
judge intended to use as the denominator a number equal to his
years of active and reserve service. 	Although the record is
sufficient for our review, we hold that Langhorne's contention
lacks merit.
The commissioner's report described the marital share as a
fraction, "the denominator of which is the total number of months
of credited service which generate, or which will generate upon
future retirement, the retirement benefit." 	Although the
commissioner found "the total credited service through this
writing is 325 months," that finding is clearly subject to the
operative language defining the method by which the denominator
is to be fixed, i.e., "the total number of months of credited
service which generate . . . the retirement benefit."

- 3 -
Furthermore, the commissioner qualified his finding by noting
that "[t]he denominator cannot be determined until . . .
Langhorne's retirement." 	At Langhorne's retirement, the plan
administrator counted as creditable service only Langhorne's
years of active military service.
The marital share was based upon Langhorne's creditable
service. 	See Code § 20-107.3(G)(1). 	Furthermore, the
commissioner's numerical error did not affect the numerator of
the fraction. 	The evidence does not support Langhorne's position
that the trial judge could expand his "creditable service" for
retirement purposes by requiring the plan's administrator to
count his years of reserve service. 	Langhorne's years of reserve
service did not influence his retirement benefits and, thus, are
not included in the denominator's specification of "the total
number of months of credited service which generate, or which
will generate upon future retirement, the retirement benefit."
Based upon the precise language of the formula that is contained
in the final decree of divorce, we hold that the trial judge did
not err by refusing to amend the qualified domestic relations
order.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision.
Affirmed.