Andre L. Williams v Commonwealth

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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Bray
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

ANDRE L. WILLIAMS

Vv. Record No. 2216-94-1 OPINION BY
JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, UR.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA NOVEMBER 21, 1995

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge

Benjamin M. Mason (Mason & Mason, on brief),
for appellant.

Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.

On appeal from his convictions of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute and importation of cocaine into the
Commonwealth, Andre L. Williams contends (1) that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine found on his
person and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to prove he
imported more than one ounce of cocaine into the Commonwealth.
The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

On both January 30 and February 6, 1993, Williams purchased
a round-trip ticket from Newport News to New York City, all
travel to be completed in one day. He paid cash for the tickets
in five, ten and twenty-dollar used bills. He traveled under the
names Johnson and Henderson, respectively. U.S. Air ticket
agent, Brenda Rummings, recognized Williams and realized he was

using different names. Her suspicion aroused, she reported this

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information to her supervisor, Cathy Reiger.
Both Ms. Rummings and Ms. Reiger met with Officer Safranek
of the airport police and gave him the information about
Williams' travel and his description. 	Safranek went to the final
check-in waiting area, where the two women pointed out Williams.
Safranek telephoned the Newport News Police Department and
arranged to meet Sergeant Dawes from vice-narcotics at the
airport at 8:00 p.m. 	They confirmed that Williams was on the
return flight to Newport News and was wearing the clothing that
Rummings had described.
After Williams disembarked from the plane, Safranek
approached him and said, "Excuse me, Mr. Henderson. 	May I talk
to you for a minute?" 	Williams' reply was not understandable.
Safranek repeated his request. 	Williams replied, "No," gave a
"head fake," and ran. 	He was caught by Sergeants Dawes and
Davenport. 	Immediately upon being apprehended, Williams said,
"It's in my coat pocket." 	Williams was removed to a prearranged
area, where he was searched. 	A package wrapped in brown tape was
removed from his sweatshirt pocket, and another package was
removed from his crotch. 	Both packages contained cocaine.
Williams was advised of his Miranda rights. 	In response to
the officers' questions, Williams
stated that the stuff was his, that he had gone to New
York to pick it up, that he had gone up there with
$10,000 and this was what he had come back with. 	He
stated there was approximately 19 ounces of powder and
one ounce of crack cocaine. . . . 	He also stated this
was his second trip, that on the first trip, he brought
back about half that amount. 	He stated . . . that he

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carried all his business to Norfolk.
Sergeant Dawes testified that based on his fifteen years of
experience working in narcotics and on several thousand arrests,
he suspected narcotics activity after speaking with Safranek. 	He
based his suspicion upon his knowledge (1) that New York was a
source for narcotics, (2) that Newport News was used as an entry
point for narcotics into the Commonwealth, (3) that the use of
aliases was common among persons involved in drug activity, and
(4) that paying cash in small bills for plane tickets was
indicative of drug activity. 	Dawes also testified that the
amount of cocaine found on Williams was inconsistent with
personal use.
Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress as evidence the cocaine found on his person.
He argues that Safranek had neither reasonable suspicion to
detain him nor probable cause to arrest him when approaching him
in the passenger waiting area. 	However, Safranek's approach
required neither predicate. 	"Law enforcement officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an individual
on the street, identifying themselves, and asking the individual
questions." 	Buck v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 298, 301-02, 456
S.E.2d 534, 535 (1995) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497 (1983)). 	Safranek effected no seizure by approaching
Williams. 	He sought merely to engage Williams in a consensual
encounter.

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Upon Safranek's inquiry, Williams ran. 	"Although flight
alone may not supply sufficient reason to suspect a person of
criminal activity, it may otherwise color apparently innocent
conduct and, under appropriate circumstances, give rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 	Id. at 303, 456
S.E.2d at 536.
Based on his experience as a narcotics detective, the
information he received from Safranek, and the fact that Williams
ran when approached by the police, Sergeant Dawes was justified
in stopping Williams to investigate his activity. 	"Under those
circumstances, the physical detention of [Williams] was
reasonable and lawful." 	Id.
After the officers restrained him, Williams immediately told
them, "It's in my coat pocket." 	This information, along with all
the other circumstances, gave the officers probable cause to
believe Williams possessed narcotics, and justified his arrest
and search without a warrant. 	"When an officer has probable
cause to arrest a person, the officer may search the person
. . . ." 	Id. at 304, 456 S.E.2d at 537. 	Therefore, the cocaine
found on Williams' person was admissible at trial.
Williams next contends that the trial court erred in finding
the evidence sufficient to support his conviction of transporting
cocaine into the Commonwealth. 	He argues that no evidence proved
that his flight was non-stop. 	Because Williams failed to make
this argument at trial, we will not consider it on appeal. 	Rule

5A:18.
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Affirmed.