Kevin O. Crump v Colonial Masonry, Inc., et al

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff
KEVIN O. CRUMP
v. 	Record No. 0537-95-1 	MEMORANDUM OPINION*
PER CURIAM
COLONIAL MASONRY, INC. 	NOVEMBER 21, 1995
AND
NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Gregory E. Camden (Rutter & Montagna, on
briefs), for appellant.
William C. Walker; Donna White Kearney
(Taylor & Walker, on brief), for appellees.
Kevin O. Crump appeals a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Commission denying his application seeking
compensation for an occupational disease on the basis that he
failed to prove that his bilateral pneumonitis was a disease
within the meaning of "disease" under the Workers' Compensation
Act ("the Act"). 	We reverse the commission's decision based upon
our holding in Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21 Va. App. 65,
461 S.E.2d 431 (1995).
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
In Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438
S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), we defined "disease" as:
any deviation from or interruption of the
normal structure or function of any part,
organ, or system (or combination thereof) of
the body that is manifested by a
characteristic set of symptoms and signs and
whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may

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be known or unknown.
"[T]he definition enunciated in Piedmont [has been
recognized by this Court] as the general and accepted meaning of
the term 'disease,' a term which is presumed to be known by the
legislature and is employed by it without restriction in Code
§§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401." 	Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21
Va. App. 65, 68, 461 S.E.2d 431, 435 (1995).
Pneumonitis is defined as "inflammation of the lungs."
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1039 (26th ed. 1985).
Using this general medical definition of pneumonitis, as we did
for carpal tunnel syndrome in Perdue, we find that it places
pneumonitis within the definition of disease set forth in
Piedmont and approved of in Perdue.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. 	R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 	We
uphold the commission's factual findings if supported by credible
evidence. 	James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512,
515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
As in Perdue, Crump's condition did not present as an
obvious, sudden, mechanical or structural change in his body.
Rather, credible evidence supported a finding that this condition
constituted a disease as defined in Piedmont. 	We conclude that
the commission erred in finding that Crump's pneumonitis is not a
condition characterized as a "disease" within the meaning of the

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Act.
Accordingly, we reverse the commission's decision and remand
this case for the commission to consider whether Crump's
condition arose out of and in the course of his employment as
required by the Act.
Reversed and remanded.