Troy Donahue Barksdale v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Coleman, Bumgardner and Lemons
Argued at Salem, Virginia
TROY DONAHUE BARKSDALE MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1184-98-3 	JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
MARCH 2, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
Charles M. Stone, Judge
J. Grady Monday (Monday & Monday, on brief),
for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
Troy Donahue Barksdale was convicted in a bench trial of
grand larceny of a firearm, possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, and statutory burglary. 	On appeal, Barksdale
contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
larceny and burglary convictions.
"'Possession of property recently stolen is prima facie
evidence of guilt of the crime of larceny, and throws upon the
accused the burden of accounting for that possession.'" 	Hope v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 381, 385, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990)
(en banc) (quoting Fout v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 184, 190, 98
S.E.2d 817, 821 (1957)). 	Furthermore:
"[W]hen evidence has been introduced, which,
if believed, establishes that a house has
been broken and entered and goods stolen

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therefrom, and warrants an inference beyond a
reasonable doubt that the breaking and
entering and the larceny of the goods were
committed at the same time, by the same
person or persons, as a part of the same
transaction, upon principal and authority the
exclusive possession of the stolen goods
shortly thereafter, unexplained or falsely
denied, has the same efficiency to give rise
to an inference that the possessor is guilty
of the breaking and entering as to an
inference that he is guilty of the larceny."
Fout, 199 Va. at 190-91, 98 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting Drinkard v.
Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1074, 1083, 178 S.E. 25, 28 (1935)).
Barksdale does not deny that he was in possession of
recently stolen property, nor does he deny that the evidence
supports an inference that the breaking and entering and the
larceny were committed at the same time.
When confronted, Barksdale lied about his name, fled from
the arrest and ultimately issued two conflicting exculpatory
statements explaining how he came into possession of the gun.
However, "[t]he fact finder need not believe the accused's
explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal his
guilt." 	Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608,
610 (1981); Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354
S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en banc). 	Additionally, Barksdale's false
statement of material fact and his decision to flee entitled the
fact finder to draw inferences supporting guilt. 	See Welch v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 525, 425 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1992).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible

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therefrom, Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218
S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975), the evidence was sufficient to support
the larceny and burglary convictions. 	Accordingly, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.