In re Adoption of I.K.

2009 UT 70
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
In the Matter of the Adoption 	No. 20080554
of I.K., a minor child,
_____________________________
J.S.,
Appellant,
v.
P.K. and J.K.,
Appellees.
_____________________________
Act of Love Adoptions,
Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
J.S.,
Appellant. 	October 27, 2009
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder
No. 072900485
Attorneys: 	Clark R. Nielsen, Kathryn J. Steffey, Salt Lake City,
for appellant
Larry S. Jenkins, Richard J. Armstrong, Lance D.
Rich, Salt Lake City, for appellees
---
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	In this direct appeal, Appellant J.S. seeks to
challenge the adoption of I.K., his alleged daughter. 	We are
asked to determine (1) whether Utah’s adoption statute,

1 Formerly Utah Code section 78-30-4.14, this statute and
the entire Adoption Act were renumbered in February 2008.
Because none of the relevant language was changed, we cite to the
current version throughout this opinion.
No. 20080554 	2
specifically Utah Code sections 78B-6-120 to -122, 1 violates
J.S.’s due process rights as applied; (2) whether it was error
for the district court, finding that J.S. did not comply with New
Mexico law, to deny his motion to dismiss; and (3) whether the
district court erred in determining that J.S. lacked standing to
challenge the adoption. 	We hold that regardless of whether
sections 78B-6-120 to -122 would violate due process as applied
to J.S., the question is moot because he failed to meet the
requirements of New Mexico law. 	Accordingly, the district court
did not err by denying his motion to dismiss nor by determining
that he lacked standing. 	As a result, we affirm the district
court.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	In January and February of 2007, J.S. (the Natural
Father) and T.C. (the Birth Mother), residents of New Mexico,
engaged in a physically intimate relationship, resulting in the
pregnancy of the Birth Mother. 	Though the couple ended their
relationship in February 2007, the Birth Mother contacted the
Natural Father in March 2007 to inform him that she was pregnant
and intended to have an abortion. 	The Natural Father objected to
the abortion, but agreed to drive the Birth Mother to the
abortion clinic. 	Once at the clinic, personnel allegedly
informed the Birth Mother that she could not undergo the
procedure due to problems with her medical records. 	The Birth
Mother told the Natural Father that she would have someone else
drive her when she returned to have the abortion and that she did
not want the Natural Father to be further involved. 	However,
without informing the Natural Father, the Birth Mother did not
have an abortion and gave birth to Baby Girl C (now named and
referred to as I.K.) in October 2007. 	Though a permanent
resident of New Mexico, the Birth Mother delivered the baby in
Colorado, a state with which the Birth Mother had no connections.
¶3 	On November 11, 2007, without informing the Natural
Father, the Birth Mother consented to adoption and relinquished
the baby to Act of Love, a Utah adoption agency. 	The Birth
Mother did not have any other contacts with the State of Utah.
Act of Love placed I.K. with Utah adoptive parents, P.K. and J.K.
(the Adoptive Parents), who filed a petition for adoption in Utah
on November 13, 2007.

2 The Natural Father claims that he could not file with the
Putative Father Registry until he had obtained a paternity test,
which he has been unable to obtain without access to I.K.
3 	No. 20080554
¶4 	The Natural Father first received notice of I.K.’s
birth on November 4, 2007, when he was contacted by Family
Matters, a New Mexico adoption agency. 	The Natural Father
refused to consent to the adoption of I.K. and contacted an
attorney to protect his parental rights. 	Shortly after refusing
consent to Family Matters, the Natural Father received a phone
call from the Birth Mother, during which she asserted her
determination to place I.K. for adoption. 	The Natural Father
continued to object. 	Through his attorney, the Natural Father
filed a petition to establish paternity and custody in New Mexico
on November 20, 2007. 	The Natural Father also offered to provide
financial support for I.K. in December 2007, which the Birth
Mother refused. 	However, at no time did he file with the New
Mexico Putative Father Registry. 2
¶5 	Unaware of the pending Utah adoption case, the Natural
Father continued his paternity case in New Mexico. 	Only just
before an emergency custody hearing on January 23, 2008 did he
learn that the baby had been placed for adoption in Utah.
Nevertheless, proceeding with his case, on February 12, 2008, the
New Mexico court found the Natural Father to be the father of
I.K. and awarded him temporary custody during the paternity
action.
¶6 	One week earlier, on February 6, 2008, Act of Love
filed a Verified Petition to Determine Birth Father’s Rights
(Birth Father Petition) in Utah as a separate action from the
adoption case. 	On February 26, 2008, the Natural Father filed,
in Utah, a Verified Motion to Dismiss Adoption that requested
custody and a Motion to Transfer and Consolidate the Birth Father
Petition with the adoption case. 	The district court consolidated
the cases, but on April 30, 2008, after hearing oral argument,
denied the motion to dismiss the pending adoption. 	The district
court found that the Natural Father had failed to “establish his
legal rights in either Colorado, New Mexico or Utah before the
birth mother executed her relinquishment” and had not offered any
evidence “why he failed to do so or why it was somehow impossible
for him to do so.” 	The court also found that the Natural Father
failed to file notice with the New Mexico Putative Father
Registry as required by New Mexico law. 	The court treated the
Natural Father’s motion to dismiss as a request for intervention,
which it denied due to lack of standing. 	In denying the motion
to dismiss, the Utah court also rejected the Natural Father’s
argument that the New Mexico custody order should be given full

No. 20080554 	4
faith and credit under the United States Constitution. 	The court
concluded that full faith and credit was inappropriate because
neither the Adoptive Parents nor Act of Love were named as
parties and because it was a temporary, not final, order. 	It is
from the final order denying the motion to dismiss the pending
adoption that the Natural Father appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 	“Constitutional issues, including questions regarding
due process, are questions of law that we review for
correctness.” 	Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 1177.
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for correctness,
granting no deference to the district court. 	In re Adoption of
B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 1021. 	We also review
standing and intervention issues under a correctness standard.
See In re Adoption of K.C.J., 2008 UT App 152, ¶ 7, 184 P.3d
1239.
ANALYSIS
¶8 	The Natural Father seeks to enforce a parental right to
contest the adoption of I.K. 	Under Utah law, an unmarried
biological father must establish his parental rights by strictly
complying with certain statutory requirements. 	See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78B-6-120(1)(f), -121(1) to (5), -122(1) (2008). 	If he
fails to meet these requirements, the statute provides an
alternative three-part method for establishing parental rights.
First, the unmarried biological father must not have known, and
“through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have
known, before the time the mother executed a consent to adoption
or relinquishment of the child for adoption, that a qualifying
circumstance existed.” 	Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(A). 	A
qualifying circumstance exists when between the time of
conception and the date of the mother’s consent to adoption or
relinquishment of the child for adoption, (1) either the mother
or child permanently or temporarily resided in Utah; (2) the baby
was born in Utah; or (3) the mother intended to give birth to or
place the baby for adoption in Utah or under Utah law. 	Id.
§ 78B-6-122(1)(a). 	Second, the unmarried biological father must,
prior to the mother’s consent to adoption or relinquishment of
the child for adoption, have “fully complied with the
requirements to establish parental rights in the child, and to
preserve the right to notice of a proceeding in connection with
the adoption of the child” of the state where the child was
conceived or the last state where the father knew, or through
reasonable diligence should have known, that the mother resided.
Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B). 	Finally, the father must

5 	No. 20080554
demonstrate a “full commitment to his parental responsibilities.”
Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(C). 	If the unmarried biological father
fails to “fully and strictly comply” with these requirements, he
is “considered to have waived and surrendered any right in
relation to the child, including the right to . . . consent, or
refuse to consent, to the adoption of the child.” 	Id. § 78B-6-
122(2).
¶9 	In this case, it is undisputed that the Natural Father
did not comply with the first set of Utah’s statutory
requirements. 	Therefore, he seeks to establish his parental
rights through the alternative method. 	Arguably, under the first
prong, the Natural Father did not know of a qualifying
circumstance prior to the Birth Mother’s relinquishment of the
baby for adoption. 	Neither the Birth Mother nor the baby ever
resided in Utah, even temporarily. 	The baby was not born in
Utah, and the record reveals no indication that the Birth Mother
intended to give birth to the baby in Utah. 	Although the Birth
Mother did place the baby for adoption with a Utah adoption
agency, the Natural Father did not become aware of this fact
until just before January 23, 2008, more than two months after
the Birth Mother relinquished the baby for adoption. 	For these
reasons, the Natural Father asserts he met the first prong.
However, we need not decide this issue because we find that he
failed to satisfy the second prong. 	A failure at any stage of
this alternative method for establishing parental rights is fatal
to the Natural Father’s appeal.
¶10 	Under the second prong, the Natural Father had to
comply with the law of New Mexico, where the baby was conceived.
New Mexico law allows an unmarried biological father to establish
his parental rights by initiating a paternity action. 	See N.M.
Stat. §§ 32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(1), -17(A)(5) (2008). 	The Natural
Father initiated his paternity action in New Mexico on November
20, 2007, nine days after the Birth Mother relinquished the baby
for adoption. 	This action clearly failed to comply with the Utah
deadline. 	However, the Natural Father argues that applying the
Utah deadline is a violation of his due process rights. 	The
question then remains whether he complied with New Mexico law,
for if not, he failed to comply with Utah law.
¶11 	As to the third prong of the test, because we
hereafter conclude that the Natural Father failed to satisfy the
second prong, we need not consider whether he demonstrated a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities. 	Thus, we turn next
to the discussion of whether the Natural Father complied with New
Mexico law.

No. 20080554 	6
I. 	THE NATURAL FATHER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH NEW MEXICO LAW
¶12 	The Natural Father filed his paternity action after the
Birth Mother relinquished the baby for adoption and after the
Adoptive Parents filed an adoption petition. 	We first must
determine whether this action was timely under New Mexico law
applicable at the time the Natural Father filed his action in the
courts of New Mexico.
A. 	The New Mexico Court of Appeals Decision in Helen G. I Was
Reversed by the New Mexico Supreme Court and Is Not the Rule of
Law
¶13 	The Natural Father argues that he complied with New
Mexico law applicable at the time he filed his paternity action.
The New Mexico adoption statute requires consent to adoption from
an “acknowledged father,” which status may be obtained by filing
an action for paternity. 	N.M. Stat. §§ 32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(1),
-17(A)(5) (2008). 	Though the statute does not specifically
provide a deadline for this action, the New Mexico courts have
interpreted it. 	At the time the Natural Father filed his
paternity action, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had recently
decided Helen G. v. Mark J.H. (Helen G. I), 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2006), declaring that in order to establish parental rights
as an acknowledged father, the time for filing a paternity action
is during the pendency of the adoption proceeding. 	Id. at 105.
The Natural Father argues that this was the then-current binding
law. 	Thus, because the Adoptive Parents’ adoption case was still
proceeding at the time the Natural Father filed his paternity
action, he argues that his filing was timely under New Mexico
law. 	On the other hand, the Adoptive Parents and Act of Love
(collectively Adoptive Parties) argue that because the Helen G. I
case was pending certiorari review before the New Mexico Supreme
Court at the time of the Natural Father’s paternity action
filing, the court of appeals decision had not yet become law.
Rather, they assert that the New Mexico Supreme Court decision,
filed on November 26, 2007, that reversed the court of appeals,
is the correct statement of New Mexico law at the relevant time.
See Helen G. v. Mark J.H. (Helen G. II), 175 P.3d 914 (N.M.
2008). 	We agree with the Adoptive Parties.
¶14 	When a case is granted certiorari review, it remains
unresolved until the higher court takes final action. 	This is
not to say that lower courts do not have the obligation to follow
an intermediate appellate decision until it is reviewed. 	Indeed,
“[w]hen the court of appeals renders a decision on an issue, that
decision is automatically part of the law of this state, unless

7 	No. 20080554
and until contravened by this court, the legislature, or the
people through the processes authorized for the making of new
law.” 	Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, ¶ 16, 44 P.3d 734.
Thus, a lower court is not free to act in opposition to a court
of appeals decision simply because the decision is under review
by a higher court. 	See, e.g., Lakeside Cmty. Hosp. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 461 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (D. Nev. 1978)
(“[T]his Court is duty bound to follow the law as articulated by
the Court of Appeals for this Circuit. 	That a writ of certiorari
has issued from the United States Supreme Court to the Court of
Appeals does not relieve this Court of that duty.” (internal
citation omitted)). 	However, once the certiorari review is
complete and a decision is announced by the higher court, that
new decision becomes the law in that case, replacing the decision
announced by the intermediate court to the extent it reverses,
vacates, or otherwise modifies it. 	The new ruling also has
retroactive effect. 	Thus, the decision of the court of appeals
in Helen G. I, though binding on lower courts at the time it was
announced, represented an intermediate step in a case that was
not yet final. 	Now that certiorari review is complete, the
decision of the supreme court in Helen G. II constitutes the
binding rule of law. 	As such, we look next at the New Mexico
Supreme Court decision.
B. 	The New Mexico Supreme Court Decision in Helen G. II Does
Have Retroactive Effect
¶15 	The decision announced by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Helen G. II reversed the New Mexico Court of Appeals and
declared that the time for filing a paternity action in order to
establish parental rights is “before the initiation of adoption
proceedings.” 	175 P.3d at 920 (emphasis added). 	However, the
Natural Father asks us not to apply this decision retroactively.
To determine whether a New Mexico Supreme Court decision that
reverses the New Mexico Court of Appeals should apply
retroactively, we must turn to the law of New Mexico. 	New Mexico
has “adopt[ed] a presumption of retroactivity for a new rule
imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case.” 	Beavers v.
Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1383 (N.M.
1994). 	However, absent an express declaration within the
individual opinion, “the presumption may be overcome by a
sufficiently weighty combination of one or more of the Chevron
Oil factors, which [the New Mexico Supreme Court has] espoused.”
Id. at 1383. 	The parties have devoted substantial discussion to
these factors. 	The presumption of retroactivity, and the
exception to it, apply only when a judicial opinion announces a
“new rule.” 	Id. 	Indeed, “[t]he issue of retroactive effect
arises only when a court’s decision overturns prior case law or
makes new law.” 	Santillanes v. New Mexico, 849 P.2d 358, 366

3 The trial court found, and the Natural Father does not
challenge the fact, that he failed to establish his parental
rights under the law of any other state.
No. 20080554 	8
(N.M. 1993). 	On the contrary, when a court interprets for the
first time an existing, legislatively-created statute, the
judicial decision is not considered to be a new rule, but merely
clarification of the existing rule. 	See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994) (“A judicial
construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what
the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the
case giving rise to that construction.”); Id. n.12 (“[W]hen this
Court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of
what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it
became law.”); Kendrick v. Dist. Att’y of Phila. County, 916 A.2d
529, 538 (Pa. 2007) (“‘Therefore, when we have not yet answered a
specific question about the meaning of a statute, our initial
interpretation does not announce a new rule of law. 	Our first
pronouncement on the substance of a statutory provision is purely
a clarification of existing law.’” (quoting Fiore v. White, 757
A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2000))). 	Accordingly, a first-time
interpretation of an existing statute is to be applied
retroactively.
¶16 	In the case of Helen G. II, the New Mexico Supreme
Court interpreted a provision of an existing statute that it had
not previously interpreted. 	175 P.3d at 916. 	Specifically, the
court interpreted the provision in the New Mexico Adoption Act
requiring an unmarried biological father to file a paternity
action in order to establish his right to consent to an adoption.
The court said that to be timely, the petition must be filed
“before the initiation of adoption proceedings.” 	Id. at 920. 	As
such, the decision was a first-time statutory interpretation and
not a new rule. 	Therefore, under New Mexico law, the deadline
set for establishing acknowledged father status announced in
Helen G. II applies retroactively. 	The Natural Father failed to
meet that deadline and consequently failed to comply with the
requirements set forth by New Mexico law. 	As a result, he also
did not meet the Utah law requirement of compliance with another
state’s law 3 and failed to establish his parental rights. 	See
Utah Code § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B). 	Therefore, his consent was
not required by Utah law for the adoption, and it was not error
for the district court to deny his motion to dismiss the
adoption.
C. 	The Natural Father Did Not Meet the Deadline to Qualify Under
the “Any Other Factor” Element of the New Mexico Statute

9 	No. 20080554
¶17 	The Natural Father also argues that in the event he did
not establish his parental rights by timely filing a paternity
action in New Mexico, his actions also qualified him as an
acknowledged father under a different statutory provision of New
Mexico law.
¶18 	Under the New Mexico adoption statute, an unmarried
biological father may establish parental rights for an adoptee
under six months of age at the time of placement by obtaining the
status of acknowledged father. 	In New Mexico, an individual
earns this status by satisfying any one of seven requirements,
which include filing a paternity action, as previously discussed,
or through “any other factor the court deems necessary to
establish a custodial, personal or financial relationship with
the adoptee.” 	N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(1), (7) (2008).
¶19 	The Natural Father claims to have satisfied this “any
other factor” requirement. 	He argues that because, once he
learned of the child’s birth, he took reasonable steps to become
an acknowledged father by filing a paternity action, and he
offered support for the child to the Birth Mother, his actions
constitute factors that established the required relationship.
However, as the Adoptive Parties assert, this requirement is also
subject to the deadline announced in Helen G. II. 	Indeed, the
New Mexico Supreme Court stated that “a biological father [may]
take any other action prior to the filing of the adoption
petition that the court ‘deems necessary to establish a
custodial, personal or financial relationship with the adoptee.’”
Helen G. II, 175 P.3d at 925 (emphasis added) (quoting N.M. Stat.
§ 32A-5-3(F)(4)(a)(7)).
¶20 	The Natural Father both filed his paternity action and
offered financial support after the Adoptive Parents filed their
petition for adoption. 	Accordingly, he did not timely comply
with New Mexico law and thus failed to meet the requirements of
Utah law.
II. 	THE NATURAL FATHER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NEW MEXICO LAW
RENDERS HIS DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT MOOT
¶21 	The Natural Father has failed to establish his parental
rights under either New Mexico or Utah law. 	As a consequence, no
due process rights accrue to him with regard to the adoption
proceeding. 	As previously explained, the Utah Adoption Act
requires an unmarried biological father without knowledge of a
Utah adoption to comply with another state’s requirements for
establishing parental rights “before the mother execute[s] a
consent to adoption or relinquishment of the child for adoption.”
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B) (2008).

4 Utah Code section 78-30-4(3) was the 1983 predecessor to
the current section 78B-6-121(3). 	Section 78-30-4(3) required a
man claiming paternity to protect his parental rights “by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the
department of health . . . prior to the date the illegitimate
child is relinquished or placed with an agency licensed to
provide adoption services or prior to the filing of a petition by
a person with whom the mother has placed the child for adoption.”
Id. § 78-30-4(3)(a), (b) (Supp. 1983).
No. 20080554 	10
¶22 	We have previously held this deadline in the Utah
adoption statute to be facially valid. 	See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 689 (Utah 1986) (stating that
prior cases have established the facial validity of Utah Code
section 78-30-4(3) (Supp. 1983) 4); Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah 1984) (holding that the
provisions of section 78-30-4(3) for terminating an unwed
father’s parental rights for a newborn infant are facially valid
because the state has a compelling interest in speedy and final
custody determinations and the statute is narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal). 	However, we have also found the statute
unconstitutional as applied when an unwed father “‘is successful
in showing that the termination of his parental rights was
contrary to basic notions of due process, and that he came
forward within a reasonable time after the baby’s birth.’” 	Baby
Boy Doe, 717 P.2d at 689 (quoting Ellis v. Soc. Servs. Dep’t of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250,
1256 (Utah 1980)). 	If the father can make such a showing, the
court can prevent termination by applying the common law
impossibility exception to the statutory deadline, which is
available “where a father does not know of the need to protect
his rights,” such that “there is no ‘reasonable opportunity’ to
assert or protect parental rights.” 	Id. at 691.
¶23 	Thus, under the impossibility exception articulated in
Baby Boy Doe and similar cases, the Natural Father argues that
applying this statutory deadline is a violation of his due
process rights. 	If we were to reach this issue, the Adoptive
Parties argue that amendments to the statute have eliminated the
common law impossibility exception. 	Indeed, when Ellis and Baby
Boy Doe were decided, the statute did not contain a provision
allowing an unmarried biological father to establish his parental
rights in another state. 	Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d at 688 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (Supp. 1983)). 	However, the
legislature amended the statute first to allow an unmarried
biological father to file within ten days of the time it became
possible for him to file, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 (Supp.
1990), and later to allow him to preserve parental rights in
another qualifying state. 	Id. § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B) (2008).

5 The Natural Father asks us to give full faith and credit
to the New Mexico district court order determining his paternity
and granting him temporary custody of I.K. 	However, this
argument is not at issue. 	The February 8, 2008 paternity order
was of no force and effect because he had not established his
initial right to make the determination. 	Because he missed the
(continued...)
11 	No. 20080554
We have not yet dealt with whether, in light of these statutory
amendments, the common law impossibility exception still exists.
However, we need not reach that question here.
¶24 	While we note that this case would likely not present a
due process violation as applied because the Natural Father had
sufficient opportunity to protect his parental rights, the fact
remains that he failed to comply with New Mexico law. 	Without
establishing his parental rights in Utah or another state, the
Natural Father effectively lost those rights and any due process
rights associated with them.
III. 	FAILURE TO ESTABLISH PARENTAL RIGHTS DEPRIVED THE NATURAL
FATHER OF STANDING TO INTERVENE IN THE ADOPTION PROCEEDING
¶25 	Finally, the Natural Father argues that the district
court erred in holding that he lacked standing to intervene in
the adoption proceeding because the New Mexico district court
order determining his paternity and right to custody was
sufficient to give him an interest in the proceeding, regardless
of Utah’s determination of his parental rights. 	The Natural
Father’s standing claims arise under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Utah case law. 	We will discuss both grounds.
A. 	Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 Does Not Provide the Natural
Father with Standing to Intervene
¶26 	The Natural Father first claims standing under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 24, which grants a timely application for
intervention “when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action
and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest.” 	Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). 	According to the rule, the
party must have an interest in the proceeding. 	In the case of an
adoption, that interest would amount to parental rights in the
child. 	As previously discussed, the Natural Father failed to
timely establish his parental rights under either Utah or New
Mexico law. 	Therefore, without parental rights, he has no
interest in the proceeding that would endow him with standing to
intervene under rule 24. 5

5(...continued)
deadline required by New Mexico law to qualify as an acknowledged
father, the district court in New Mexico was unable to grant him
any rights. 	Thus, in the event we did give full faith and credit
to the February 8 order, which determination we do not make
today, we could give no more credit to the order than New Mexico
would give. 	As the order would be of no force or effect in New
Mexico, we need not grant it any greater status.
No. 20080554 	12
B. 	Utah Common Law Does Not Provide the Natural Father with
Standing to Intervene
¶27 	The Natural Father next argues that under Utah case
law, his New Mexico paternity order was sufficient to vest in him
a protectable interest, regardless of whether Utah had determined
his parental rights. 	For this argument, he relies on a Utah
Court of Appeals case, In re Adoption of K.C.J., 2008 UT App 152,
184 P.3d 1239. 	In K.C.J., the court of appeals majority said,
[T]he presence or absence of parental rights
does not determine whether a person has
standing to intervene in an adoption
proceeding. 	Rather, what is required is a
person’s direct interest in the subject
matter of the litigation such that [his or
her] rights may be affected, for good or for
ill, and this interest may arise from the
intervenor’s status or circumstances.
2008 UT App 152, ¶ 11 (alterations in original) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). 	In K.C.J., the Utah
district court found standing where the putative father had
obtained an apparently valid paternity order in Oklahoma during
the Utah adoption proceeding, but after the mother’s
relinquishment of the child for adoption. 	Id. ¶ 18. 	The court
of appeals affirmed the putative father’s standing to intervene,
stating, “Although . . . [the putative father] may have failed to
comply with the Utah law governing unmarried biological fathers,
he apparently acted within the laws of the State of Oklahoma.”
Id. 	Thus, he had a “‘protectable interest in the litigation’”
and was “entitled to have his right to further participation
adjudicated after presenting relevant evidence and legal
arguments in support of his claims.” 	Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Gedo v.
Rose, 2007 UT App 154, ¶ 7, 163 P.3d 659). 	Thus, as the Adoptive
Parties suggest, under K.C.J., an unwed father with a valid
paternity order from another state is entitled to the opportunity
to argue the effect of that order in Utah. 	Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.

13 	No. 20080554
¶28 	In the instant case, the Utah district court afforded
the Natural Father the opportunity to argue the effect of his New
Mexico paternity order; he argued the validity of the order under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in his briefing before the
district court. 	Although the court later rejected his arguments,
refusing to enforce the paternity order, the Natural Father was
afforded the due process required under K.C.J.
¶29 	In addition, in K.C.J. the court granted standing based
on a valid Oklahoma paternity order. 	Id. ¶ 18. 	Here, the
Natural Father does not have a valid paternity order from another
state that vests him with an interest sufficient for standing.
As explained above, because the Natural Father failed to file his
paternity action within the time required by New Mexico law, he
did not establish his status as an acknowledged father, and the
later paternity order was of no force or effect. 	As a result, he
gained no legal rights in New Mexico and the district court
correctly found that he did not have standing to intervene in the
adoption proceeding.
CONCLUSION
¶30 	The Natural Father filed his paternity action in New
Mexico after the Utah adoption proceedings had begun. 	While the
New Mexico statute grants acknowledged father status upon the
filing of a paternity action, filing must occur before the
initiation of an adoption proceeding. 	The New Mexico Court of
Appeals decision in Helen G. I allowing for filing during the
pendency of an adoption proceeding does not constitute binding
law because it was reversed on certiorari review. 	The New Mexico
Supreme Court’s reversal of the case, requiring filing prior to
the initiation of an adoption proceeding, was binding because as
a first-impression statutory interpretation, it did not announce
a new rule of law and therefore had retroactive effect.
Accordingly, the Natural Father failed to comply with New Mexico
law, and it was not error for the district court to deny his
motion to dismiss the adoption. 	Because the Natural Father
failed to establish his parental rights in New Mexico, he also
failed to accrue the concomitant due process rights with regard
to application of the Utah deadline for establishing his parental
rights. 	Finally, the district court did not err by finding that
the Natural Father lacked standing to intervene because his New
Mexico paternity order was invalid and of no force or effect and
therefore did not grant him a protectable interest in the
adoption proceeding.
¶31 	Affirmed.
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No. 20080554 	14
¶32 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Wilkins’
opinion.