Medel v. State

1 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2008 UT 32
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Frank Medel, Jr., No. 20060160
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
F I L E D
State of Utah,
Respondent and Appellee. April 25, 2008
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable L. A. Dever
No. 030913641
Attorneys: Meghan H. Vernetti, Daniel J. Wadley, Nicole A.
Skolout, Wesley D. Felix, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Erin Riley,
Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake
City, for respondent
---
PARRISH, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Frank Medel, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief. Medel, who pled guilty to four
felonies, alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose more
than one hundred documents that were responsive to his discovery
requests. Medel argues that he is entitled to post-conviction
relief because the prosecution’s failure to disclose these
documents prior to the entry of his guilty pleas violated his
right to due process under Brady v. Maryland.1 Alternatively,
Medel argues that the previously undisclosed documents constitute
“newly discovered evidence,” independently entitling him to
relief. The district court dismissed Medel’s petition on
procedural grounds as an improper “successive petition,” a
conclusion that Medel now challenges.

2 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)(a) (2002). We note that
changes have been made to the PCRA since this case was argued.
First, the legislature recodified Title 78, a change that went
into effect on February 7, 2008. Second, the legislature also
revised the PCRA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 to -202, a change
that will go into effect on May 5, 2008. Because the renumbering
does not change our analysis, and because the substantive changes
do not apply, we cite to the version of the PCRA cited by the
parties in their briefs.
3 United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“Having pleaded guilty, a defendant’s only avenue for
challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not
voluntarily or intelligently enter his plea.”).
4 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)(e).
No. 20060160 2
¶2 We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Medel’s
petition on alternative grounds. Specifically, we conclude that
Medel’s petition fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. First, Medel has not shown that his “conviction was
obtained or [his] sentence imposed in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution.”2 Because the entry of
a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any pre-plea constitutional
violations, a petitioner may collaterally attack a conviction
arising from a guilty plea only by showing that his plea was
entered involuntarily or unknowingly.3 In this case, however,
there is nothing contained in the undisclosed evidence that would
render Medel’s pleas either involuntary or unknowing. Second,
Medel’s pleadings do not satisfy the requirements for relief
under the newly discovered evidence exception of the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (“PCRA”).4 We accordingly affirm
the district court’s dismissal of Medel’s petition for
post-conviction relief.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In February 1987, Medel was arrested and charged with
sixteen first degree felonies in three separate cases. The three
cases involved sexual assaults on three victims: Cheryl Wall,
Shelly Meredith, and Michelle Bridges. Shortly after Medel’s
arrest, his counsel served three motions for discovery on the
prosecution. The motions for discovery requested all evidence
available under then-existing law. Among other things, Medel
requested: (1) statements of the defendant; (2) the criminal
record of the defendant; (3) physical evidence seized from the
defendant and any reports or analysis thereof; (4) evidence known

3 No. 20060160
to the State tending to negate or mitigate the defendant’s guilt;
(5) police or investigative reports; (6) a list of witnesses the
State intended to call; (7) recordings or reports of statements
made by witnesses; (8) reports regarding scientific or
psychological examinations, including polygraph reports; and
(9) photographs, fingerprints, or other evidence taken by the
State, including reports analyzing the evidence.
¶4 The prosecution voluntarily responded to each request,
but produced only the police reports from the three criminal
cases and a copy of a lineup transcript. Medel asserts that the
prosecution failed to produce over one hundred documents in its
possession that fell within the scope of his discovery requests.
¶5 In April 1987, the prosecutor offered Medel a plea
bargain, which Medel accepted in June. In accordance with the
plea agreement, Medel pled guilty to two counts of forcible
sodomy, one count of object rape, and one count of aggravated
sexual assault. In exchange, the prosecutor dropped the other
twelve felony charges. As a result of his guilty pleas, Medel
was sentenced to four consecutive sentences of five years to
life.
I. FIRST PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
¶6 Four years later, in 1991, Medel filed his first
petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the first petition was dismissed in January 1993. Medel
then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Judge Medley
denied the motion in April 1995, finding that Medel’s pleas were
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Judge Medley’s decision
noted that before Medel entered his pleas, he reviewed detailed
probable cause statements, “demonstrating that [he] understood
the nature and elements of the offenses” to which he pled. Judge
Medley also noted that defense counsel reviewed each affidavit
with Medel “paragraph by paragraph, line by line prior to entry
of the pleas” and that the district court performed a detailed
plea colloquy. Based on the record as a whole, Judge Medley
found that Medel’s guilty pleas to all four first degree felonies
were knowing and voluntary. Medel appealed. In an unpublished
memorandum decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment,
with one exception regarding sentencing.
¶7 After Medel’s petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied by this court in 1998, he filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the federal district

5 Medel v. Galetka, 537 U.S. 1009 (2002) (denying petition
for writ of certiorari); Medel v. Galetka, 36 F. App’x 644 (10th
Cir. 2002) (affirming district court denial of habeas corpus
petition).
6 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
No. 20060160 4
court of Utah. The federal court denied the petition, and Medel
appealed the denial without success.5
II. SECOND PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
¶8 In June 2003, Medel filed this petition for
post-conviction relief, contending that the prosecution violated
his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland6 by failing to
disclose potentially exculpatory evidence before he entered his
guilty pleas. Medel grounds his Brady claim on the results of
several GRAMA requests that he filed in 2003. The State’s
response to these requests indicates that the State failed to
disclose certain evidence in its possession before it entered
into plea negotiations with Medel. According to Medel, the State
“knew of the undisclosed evidence’s potentially exculpatory or at
least mitigating value and knew that timely disclosure would
jeopardize any chances of gaining pleas of guilty in all three
criminal cases.”
¶9 The undisclosed evidence on which Medel bases his Brady
claim can be grouped into two categories. The first consists of
a psychological report from Dr. Michael DeCaria (“DeCaria Report”
or “Report”). The second includes all other undisclosed evidence
(the “other undisclosed evidence”).
A. The DeCaria Report
¶10 The DeCaria Report documents DeCaria’s psychological
examination of Medel in February 1987. The purpose of the
examination was to evaluate Medel’s eligibility for supervised
release. In the Report, DeCaria notes that Medel’s “memory and
sensory processes appeared intact.” Moreover, Medel “was
oriented to person, place, time, and situation . . . . There was
no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or looseness of
association.” Despite these observations, however, DeCaria noted
that Medel showed “evidence of psychotic thought processes” and
that Medel’s “psychotic behavior may take the form of an active
fantasy life and a failure to distinguish adequately between fact
and fantasy.” DeCaria also noted that Medel had “poor impulse
control” and “rebelliousness,” which DeCaria found consistent
with “antisocial acting out,” particularly when intoxicated.

5 No. 20060160
¶11 Medel asserts that if he had received the DeCaria
Report prior to pleading guilty, it would have convinced him to
go to trial and assert a defense of diminished capacity. He also
argues that the Report demonstrates that he was not competent to
plead guilty.
B. The Other Undisclosed Evidence
¶12 The other undisclosed evidence is far more nebulous.
It consists of several items allegedly in the State’s possession
prior to Medel’s guilty pleas, including: medical evaluations of
two of the victims, victim statements from all three victims,
physical evidence from Medel’s car obtained pursuant to a search
warrant, reports analyzing physical evidence taken from Medel, a
composite drawing of a police suspect, lineup cards used by the
victims, follow-up reports from the sheriff’s office,
photographic and criminal records of two alternative suspects,
and police reports summarizing the evidence in the cases.
¶13 Medel asserts that this other undisclosed evidence
contains impeachment material that would have helped him evaluate
the strength of the State’s case. He argues that this evidence
may have convinced him to go to trial rather than plead guilty.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DISMISSAL
¶14 In February 2006, Judge Dever of the Third District
Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Medel’s petition.
Judge Dever dismissed the petition on procedural grounds, holding
that it was barred by the PCRA as an improper “successive
petition” because it contained claims that “could and should have
been raised in his previous petition for post-conviction relief
and good cause has not been shown for excusing this failure.”
¶15 In dismissing the petition, Judge Dever considered and
then rejected the potentially applicable exceptions to the
procedural bars of the PCRA. He concluded that the evidence the
State withheld would not have changed Medel’s motivation to plead
guilty because “the plea agreement allowed [him] to plead guilty
to four first-degree felonies in exchange for the dismissal of
twelve additional felony counts, and . . . the new information
was not the type of evidence that would raise a reasonable doubt
about [his] guilt.” Judge Dever also concluded that the withheld
evidence did not render Medel’s pleas unknowing or involuntary.
Specifically, the DeCaria Report did not suggest that Medel’s
guilty pleas were involuntary or unknowing because the Report’s
purpose was to assess Medel’s risk to the community, not to
determine his competence to plead guilty. Judge Dever also noted

7 Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6, 169 P.3d 441;
Medved v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d 913 (“[T]he propriety
of a motion to dismiss is a question of law . . . .” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
8 State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quoting
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158).
9 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (2002).
10 Id. § 78-35a-104(a)-(e).
11 Id. § 78-35a-105.
No. 20060160 6
that Medel had previously attempted to withdraw his guilty pleas
and that the court had, after “careful consideration,” rejected
this request on the basis that his pleas were knowingly and
voluntarily entered. It is from these rulings that Medel now
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶16 The district court’s decision granting the State’s
motion to dismiss presents questions of law that we review for
correctness.7 On review, we may affirm the district court’s
holding based on “‘any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record,’” even if it differs from the district court’s approach
and was not urged by the parties.8
ANALYSIS
¶17 Under the PCRA, “[t]he petitioner has the burden of
pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
necessary to entitle [him] to relief.”9 To meet this initial
burden, the petitioner must demonstrate that his conviction or
sentence was imposed unlawfully, or that his conviction or
sentence violated the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution, or that new evidence has been discovered that would
demonstrate “that no reasonable trier of fact could have found
[him] guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence
received.”10 The State may defend a petition for post-conviction
relief by asserting that the claim is procedurally precluded
under Utah Code section 78-35a-106.11 Once the State has pled
grounds for preclusion, the burden shifts back to the petitioner

12 Id.
13 Id. § 78-35a-106(1)(d), (e).
14 Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ¶ 16, 128 P.3d 1123.
15 Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989).
16 Id.
17 2005 UT 56, ¶¶ 5, 25.
18 Id. ¶ 21 (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035).
7 No. 20060160
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim should
not be precluded.12
¶18 In this case, Medel argues that the State violated his
constitutional right to due process by failing to disclose
material evidence before the plea negotiations. In response, the
State argues that Medel’s Brady claim is precluded because it
could have been raised in an earlier proceeding. Specifically,
the State argues that Medel’s petition is barred because it
constitutes a successive petition or was filed outside the
limitations period13 because Medel could have submitted his GRAMA
requests before filing his first petition for post-conviction
relief.
¶19 Because the State argues that Medel’s claim is
precluded, the burden shifts back to Medel to disprove preclusion
by a preponderance of the evidence.14 Medel identifies two
reasons why his Brady claim should not be precluded. First, he
argues that his claim is based on “new facts not previously known
which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might
change the outcome of the trial.”15 Alternatively, he argues
that his claim was “overlooked in good faith with no intent to
delay or abuse the writ.”16
¶20 We previously have allowed a Brady claim to survive the
PCRA procedural bar. In Tillman v. State, we allowed a Brady
claim to proceed nineteen years after trial because a GRAMA
request revealed previously undisclosed transcripts impeaching
the State’s main witness.17 We reasoned that procedural defaults
(such as the ban on successive petitions) should not be
determinative in those rare and unusual circumstances in which
“‘an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of
a constitutional right has occurred,’” making it unconscionable
not to reexamine the issue.18

19 Id. ¶ 92.
20 Id. ¶ 94.
21 Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980)
(explaining that in post-conviction cases, “[i]f the sufficiency
of the allegations depends at all on the facts alleged, plaintiff
is entitled to have the facts alleged viewed in the light most
favorable to him”).
22 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)(a)-(d).
23 See id. § 78-35a-104(1)(e).
No. 20060160 8
¶21 This case, however, is distinguishable from Tillman.
In Tillman, the State had failed to disclose a transcript
suggesting that its crucial trial witness had been coached into
giving more believable testimony and that even the investigating
officer initially did not believe her. We reasoned that “[w]hile
the suppressed transcripts do not contain any earthshattering
revelations, they do contain significant evidence that damages
the credibility of the prosecution’s star witness and undermines
critical aspects of the prosecution’s theory as to why the death
penalty was justified.”19 Because there was a “significant
possibility” that Tillman would have received a more favorable
sentence if the State had disclosed the evidence, we concluded
that the State’s failure to disclose the evidence prior to
Tillman’s trial violated his right to due process.20 Unlike
Tillman, however, Medel pled guilty. Medel’s guilty plea
significantly changes the due process analysis and limits
available post-conviction remedies.
¶22 Both Medel and the State focus their energy on whether
Medel’s petition is barred on procedural grounds. We are
convinced, however, that the procedural layers of this case have
blurred the most important element of a petition for
post-conviction relief. Namely, in order to proceed with a
petition for post-conviction relief, a petitioner’s pleadings
must contain sufficient facts that, when viewed in the light most
favorable to him,21 demonstrate some obvious injustice or the
violation of a constitutional right.22 Alternatively, a
petitioner may identify newly discovered material evidence
demonstrating that no reasonable trier of fact could have found
him guilty.23
¶23 We are convinced that Medel’s claims fail this
fundamental requirement. Even if we presume that the facts
alleged in Medel’s petition are true, he has failed to
demonstrate that his conviction violates the United States

24 State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1159.
25 See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
26 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
27 State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 1987).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980) (quoting
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)).
9 No. 20060160
Constitution or the Utah Constitution or that the withheld
evidence qualifies as “newly discovered evidence” requiring that
his conviction be vacated. Because we have authority to affirm
the district court’s decision on any grounds apparent in the
record,24 we affirm its decision on the basis that Medel’s
petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.25
I. MEDEL HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THE VIOLATION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
¶24 Medel first argues that he is entitled to post-
conviction relief because the State violated his right to due
process by failing to disclose material exculpatory evidence in
its possession prior to the entry of his guilty pleas. In Brady
v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”26 In Utah, when the
prosecutor responds voluntarily to a discovery request, as the
prosecutor did in this case, two duties arise.27 First, in order
to ensure that the defense will not be misled by assuming that
specifically requested material does not exist, the prosecution
must either produce all of the material requested or specifically
identify material that will not be produced.28 Second, the
prosecution has a continuing duty throughout the proceedings to
disclose any additional material evidence that falls within the
scope of the request.29 Even in the absence of a discovery
request, the prosecution “has a constitutional duty to volunteer
obviously exculpatory evidence and evidence that is so ‘clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution
notice of a duty to produce.’”30 These duties are imposed in
recognition of the prosecutor’s unique role in our system of

31 Knight, 734 P.2d at 917 (quoting State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985)).
32 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
33 Id. at 678; see also id. at 682 (“The evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”).
34 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
35 Id. at 633.
36 United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 494 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
37 State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) (“The
(continued...)
No. 20060160 10
justice, which helps ensure that the “‘trial is a real quest for
truth and not simply a contest between the parties to win.’”31
¶25 Although the prosecution is under a continuing duty to
disclose evidence, this duty is not limitless. The prosecutor is
not required to “deliver his entire file to defense counsel.”32
Rather, the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence
constitutes “constitutional error . . . only if the evidence is
material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence
in the outcome of the trial.”33 And in cases where the defendant
pleads guilty, thereby waiving his right to trial, his
constitutional right to evidence is even more limited. In United
States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that there is no
constitutional right to impeachment evidence34 or evidence
regarding affirmative defenses during the plea bargaining
process.35
A. Medel’s Guilty Pleas Effected a Waiver of All
Nonjurisdictional Challenges to His Conviction, Leaving Only the
Challenge That His Pleas Were Unknowing or Involuntary
¶26 Medel’s post-conviction remedies are limited in light
of his guilty pleas. By entering a knowing and voluntary guilty
plea, a defendant “waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to
[a] conviction.”36 This waiver includes pre-plea constitutional
violations.37 Thus, “[h]aving pleaded guilty, a defendant’s only

37 (...continued)
general rule applicable in criminal proceedings . . . is that by
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives
all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations.”); see also Benvenuto v. State, 2007
UT 53, ¶ 31, 165 P.3d 1195 (same).
38 Wright, 43 F.3d at 494.
39 See id. at 495 (citing three decisions in which the court
held that a guilty plea did not bar later Brady claims and two
decisions holding that entry of a guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of any Brady claims).
40 Id. at 496.
11 No. 20060160
avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not
voluntarily or intelligently enter his plea.”38
¶27 The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether
the entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a Brady claim,
and federal circuit courts of appeal that have addressed the
issue are not in agreement.39 The Tenth Circuit has opened the
door to post-conviction challenges based on Brady claims by
recognizing that “under certain limited circumstances, the
prosecution’s violation of Brady can render a defendant’s plea
involuntary.”40 We agree that there may be circumstances where
undisclosed evidence may render a guilty plea involuntary. In
this case, however, the undisclosed evidence was affirmative
defense and impeachment evidence that neither suggests factual
innocence nor shakes our confidence in the outcome of the
proceedings. Accordingly, Medel has not demonstrated that the
withheld evidence rendered his pleas involuntary.
B. Medel Cannot Show That the Undisclosed Evidence Rendered His
Pleas Involuntary Because It Is Non-Material Affirmative Defense
and Impeachment Evidence That Neither Demonstrates Factual
Innocence Nor Shakes Our Confidence in the Outcome
¶28 According to the United States Supreme Court, there is
no constitutional right to impeachment evidence or affirmative
defense evidence during the plea bargaining process. In United
States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that a guilty plea could not be “voluntary” unless the
prosecutor first disclosed material impeachment evidence that he

41 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 633 (“[T]he need for this information is more
closely related to the fairness of a trial than to the
voluntariness of a plea . . . .”).
45 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)
(“The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. Its
purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur.”).
46 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628-29.
47 Id. at 631 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985)).
No. 20060160 12
would have been required to disclose had the defendant gone to
trial.41
¶29 Ruiz involved a plea agreement that required the
accused to waive the right to impeachment evidence and
affirmative defense evidence. To determine the constitutionality
of this requirement, the Court asked “whether the Constitution
requires [a] preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment
information” in order for the plea to be voluntary.42 The Court
concluded that the Constitution does not require pre-plea
disclosure of impeachment evidence because “[i]mpeachment
information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial,
not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary . . . .”43 The
Court came to an identical conclusion regarding affirmative
defense evidence.44
¶30 The Ruiz holding clarified that the prosecution’s
constitutional duty of disclosure under Brady derives from the
defendant’s right to due process,45 which is closely related to
trial. “When a defendant pleads guilty he . . . forgoes not only
a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional
guarantees.”46 Evaluating the due process considerations at
stake, the Court balanced the nature of the defendant’s interest
against the value of the additional safeguard and the adverse
impact imposed on the government’s interests by requiring the
additional disclosure.47 The Court reasoned that imposing a
constitutional obligation on the prosecution to provide
impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea would

48 Id. at 632.
49 Id. at 631.
50 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
51 536 U.S. at 625 (alteration in original).
52 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004).
53 Id.
13 No. 20060160
require the government to “devote substantially more resources to
trial preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the
plea-bargaining process of its main resource-saving
advantages.”48 Moreover, it “could seriously interfere with the
Government’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are
factually justified.”49
¶31 This distinction between pre-guilty-plea rights and
trial-related rights is also reflected in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Brady v. United States:
The rule that a plea must be intelligently
made to be valid does not require that . . .
[the defendant] correctly assess every
relevant factor entering into his decision.
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his
plea merely because he discovers long after
the plea has been accepted that his calculus
misapprehended the quality of the State’s
case . . . .50
¶32 Our holding that the prosecution is under no duty to
disclose mere impeachment evidence during the plea bargain
process does not imply that the prosecution can characterize all
evidence as impeachment or affirmative defense evidence, thereby
avoiding its disclosure duty under Brady. It is important to
note that the plea agreement addressed by the Supreme Court in
Ruiz explicitly stated that “any [known] information establishing
the factual innocence of the defendant” would be turned over to
the defendant on a continuing basis.51 Thus, we do not view Ruiz
as endorsing a rule declaring that the “prosecutor may hide, [and
the] defendant must seek”52 as long as there is a plea bargain on
the table. As the Supreme Court noted in Banks v. Dretke, such a
rule has never been tenable in our system of due process.53
Surely, if there is any evidence suggesting factual
innocence--even if it is impeachment evidence--the prosecution
will always have a constitutional obligation to disclose that

54 Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
55 Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ¶¶ 29-32, 128 P.3d 1123
(holding that to determine whether the evidence is material,
courts consider whether in light of the entire record (1) the
absence of the evidence would deprive the defendant of a fair
trial or (2) the favorable evidence would put the case in a
different light such that it would undermine confidence in the
verdict).
No. 20060160 14
evidence to the defendant before plea bargaining begins. While
making the prosecution’s job more difficult, this obligation
reflects “the special role played by the American prosecutor in
the search for truth in criminal trials.”54
¶33 We therefore conclude that, in order for a guilty plea
to be rendered involuntary based on the prosecution’s failure to
disclose evidence, a petitioner must establish that the evidence
withheld by the prosecution was material exculpatory evidence.
We now examine the evidence withheld in this case and conclude
that it does not constitute such evidence.
1. The DeCaria Report
¶34 Medel focuses heavily on DeCaria’s psychological
report, alleging that it “might have dramatically affected” his
willingness to accept the plea agreement. Medel also suggests
that the Report shows that he suffered from “diminished
capacity,” thereby demonstrating that he lacked the competence to
enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. We are
unpersuaded.
¶35 We first address Medel’s argument that the DeCaria
Report suggests he lacked the capacity to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea. We then conclude that the Report is not material
because, when viewed in light of the entire record, the isolated
and contradictory comments referring to Medel’s mental state do
not shake our confidence in the validity of his guilty pleas.55
The Report does not conclude that Medel was incompetent, and
there is sufficient evidence in the record indicating that he
was, in fact, competent to enter a knowing and voluntary plea.
¶36 The comments on which Medel relies are contradictory
and isolated. In the Report, DeCaria comments that Medel
experienced “psychotic thought processes.” DeCaria also notes,
however, that Medel’s “memory and sensory processes appeared
intact” and that Medel was “oriented to person, place, time, and
situation” with “no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or

15 No. 20060160
looseness of association.” Although the suggestion that Medel
experienced “psychotic thought processes” is concerning, when
viewed in context, it is insufficient to convince us that Medel’s
guilty pleas were involuntary.
¶37 Even if we accept the comments relating to Medel’s
“psychotic thought processes,” DeCaria’s evaluation was not
conducted to evaluate Medel’s ability to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea. Rather, the purpose of the assessment was to
determine the level of risk Medel would pose to the community if
put on supervised release. As the district court noted, this
assessment does not show that Medel was unable to voluntarily and
knowingly enter a plea.
¶38 Finally, the evidence in the Report neither puts the
case in a different light nor undermines our confidence in the
validity of Medel’s pleas. In 1994, Medel litigated this same
issue, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas based on his claim
that they were not voluntary or knowing. Judge Medley rejected
Medel’s claim in a thorough memorandum opinion that followed an
evidentiary hearing. Judge Medley noted the procedures from
which Medel benefitted prior to pleading guilty. First, Medel
received “detailed probable cause statements,” demonstrating that
he understood “the nature and elements of the offenses which he
entered pleas to.” Second, Medel received experienced guidance
during the plea process. Medel’s defense counsel, a veteran of
the Legal Defenders Office, engaged in multiple conversations
with Medel discussing the sixteen felonies with which he had been
charged, the elements of those offenses, and the evidence
relating to those elements. Medel’s counsel prepared Medel’s
plea affidavits and reviewed them with Medel “paragraph by
paragraph, line by line prior to the entry of the pleas.”
Defense counsel also discussed with Medel the rights he would
lose by pleading guilty, including his appeal rights. Finally,
the presiding judge conducted a detailed plea colloquy before
accepting Medel’s pleas. In light of this evidence, Judge Medley
found that Medel had entered his guilty pleas knowingly and
voluntarily. When considered in this context, DeCaria’s isolated
statement is simply insufficient to undermine the conclusion that
Medel voluntarily and knowingly entered his pleas.
¶39 Our confidence in the validity of Medel’s pleas is
further supported by reviewing our approach in an analogous case.
In State v. Arguelles, we reviewed Arguelles’s plea colloquies
for evidence to determine whether he was competent when he pled

56 2003 UT 1, ¶ 50, 63 P.3d 731.
57 Id. ¶ 53.
58 Id. ¶¶ 50, 54.
59 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (2003).
60 See 536 U.S. at 633.
No. 20060160 16
guilty.56 We noted that Arguelles was coherent during each
hearing, that he responded to questions appropriately, that he
repeatedly affirmed his choice to plead guilty, and that he
participated fully in the hearings and indicated that he
understood them. We also noted that the trial judge and the
magistrate had ample opportunity to observe Arguelles’s demeanor,
which did not indicate mental defects, and that neither standby
counsel (because Arguelles had refused counsel) nor the State had
expressed any concern over his behavior.57 In light of this
evidence, we held that there was no “substantial question of
possible doubt” as to Arguelles’s competence when he pled
guilty.58
¶40 In Medel’s case, his defense counsel and the judge also
had ample opportunity to observe his demeanor. In light of
Medel’s thoroughly reviewed conduct during the plea proceedings
and the abundant opportunities for Medel’s counsel and the
presiding judge to notice any mental deficiencies, the isolated
statements in the DeCaria Report do not constitute material
evidence that shakes our confidence in the validity of Medel’s
guilty pleas.
¶41 We now turn to Medel’s argument that the DeCaria Report
would have “dramatically affected” his willingness to plead. We
conclude that even if the Report would have convinced Medel to go
to trial, the State’s failure to disclose the Report did not
violate Medel’s constitutional rights because the evidence in the
Report does not suggest factual innocence. Medel asserts that
the DeCaria Report would have convinced him to go to trial and
assert a diminished capacity defense. Under Utah law, diminished
capacity is an affirmative defense,59 and under United States v.
Ruiz, there is no constitutional right to evidence relating to
affirmative defenses.60 Accordingly, the State’s failure to
produce the DeCaria Report before entering into plea negotiations
with Medel did not violate his constitutional rights.
2. The Other Undisclosed Evidence

17 No. 20060160
¶42 It is difficult to thoroughly evaluate the other
evidence alluded to in Medel’s briefs because Medel has been
unable to conduct discovery or obtain all of the materials
referred to in the GRAMA report. As a result, Medel’s arguments
before us depend on hopeful characterizations of what the
withheld evidence might contain. For example, Medel asserts that
the prosecution had access to physical evidence that was
“potentially exculpatory” and medical reports from the rape
victims that “could possibly have exonerated Medel as the alleged
rapist.” If there is truth to these characterizations, the
prosecution’s failure to disclose such material exculpatory
evidence would clearly violate Medel’s constitutional right to
due process. We find nothing in the pleadings, however,
supporting this dramatic characterization of the undisclosed
evidence.
¶43 Medel argues that “he would not have pled guilty to the
specific crimes he pled to had he known [about the undisclosed
evidence].” But it is difficult to give this assertion much
weight in light of the record as a whole. As previously
discussed, Medel made three discovery requests of the State. In
response, he received only police reports and a lineup
transcript. He thereafter pled guilty to four felonies, and the
prosecution dismissed the other twelve charges. While we
acknowledge the possibility that an innocent individual may
nevertheless plead guilty, the paucity of the evidence produced
in response to Medel’s discovery requests would seem to indicate
that the State had a weak case. Such an indication would appear
to render it more likely, rather than less likely, that Medel
would elect to go to trial. Indeed, it is difficult to believe
that Medel felt coerced and overwhelmed by the prosecution’s case
when it appeared to boil down to only police reports and a lineup
transcript.
¶44 Moreover, neither Medel’s characterization of the
undisclosed evidence nor the record itself suggests that it
contained the type of exculpatory material that would have
convinced Medel to proceed to trial. Despite Medel’s hopeful
characterizations of what the evidence might contain, he never
alleges that the undisclosed evidence suggests factual innocence.
This conclusion is well illustrated by the documents that were
attached as an addendum to Medel’s reply brief. We are unable to
find any exculpatory information at all in these documents.
¶45 The addendum includes several police reports concerning
the investigation of the Michelle Bridges rape. These reports
reveal that Bridges consistently described the assault, in
varying levels of detail, to several different members of the
police force. In each report, she described the suspect’s

No. 20060160 18
vehicle in great detail. She also stated that after she was
released by her attacker, she wrote down his licence plate
number. That number was 821AFL, the same licence plate number
registered to a Lauralee Medel residing at Medel’s residence.
Moreover, when Bridges was taken to the impound lot, she
immediately identified Medel’s vehicle as the vehicle of her
attacker. Bridges also stated that her attacker had a tattoo of
a skull on his left shoulder and that he was wearing white tennis
shoes. When the police arrested Medel, he was wearing “white
tennis type shoes” and his “physical description closely matched
that which the victim had given [the police].”
¶46 The only inconsistency apparent in this series of
reports is clearly a typo. While describing Medel’s appearance
after he was taken into custody, the police report states that
“the physical description closely matched that which the victim
had given us, including a tattoo of a skull on the victim’s left
upper arm.” Despite the reference to the victim’s arm, the
context of the sentence makes clear that the police report was,
in fact, referring to the suspect’s arm. In short, the
undisclosed evidence in the addendum establishes that Bridges
consistently described the event, the physical characteristics of
her attacker, and the inside of his car to three separate
officers. We see nothing in such evidence that could qualify as
exculpatory.
¶47 The documents identified by Medel as potentially
exculpatory in the Shelly Meredith case are less extensive, but
are similarly devoid of exculpatory material. One useful piece
of information that the documents did provide, however, was
clarification of Medel’s allegation that Meredith identified an
alternative suspect when presented with a photo lineup. The
actual police report clarifies that Meredith “had a friend with
her who had also had a run in with the suspect.” The report
makes clear that Meredith’s friend--not Meredith herself--was
actually the person who identified the alternative suspect from
the photo lineup. Meredith then said he looked “somewhat like
the suspect.”
¶48 Medel also relies on the fact that the police were
investigating a separate suspect. The Meredith report reveals,
however, that Meredith rejected this other suspect as her
attacker, even after the police specifically pointed out his
picture and asked her if she recognized him. In conclusion,
nothing in the pleadings identifies any undisclosed exculpatory
evidence.

61 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)(e) (2002) (emphasis
added).
62 Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Utah 1983)
(quoting Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976)).
63 Id. at 1107.
64 Id.
19 No. 20060160
II. THE WITHHELD EVIDENCE DOES NOT QUALIFY AS NEWLY DISCOVERED
MATERIAL EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CREATE REASONABLE DOUBT
ABOUT MEDEL’S GUILT
¶49 Medel also fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to
post-conviction relief under the newly discovered material
evidence rule because the undisclosed evidence does not create a
reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. Under the PCRA, a
petitioner may file a claim for relief based on “newly discovered
material evidence” if: (1) neither the petitioner nor his
counsel knew of, or could have discovered through reasonable
diligence, the evidence before or at the time of trial; (2) the
material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence already
known; (3) the evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(4) “viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject
to the sentence received.”61
¶50 The cumulative requirement of this statute is
consistent with our case law requiring that the undisclosed
evidence cast doubt on the validity of the petitioner’s
conviction. “There is no violation of due process if the
evidence demonstrates only a ‘mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense or might
have affected the outcome of the trial . . . .’”62
¶51 For example, in Codianna v. Morris, the prosecution
failed to voluntarily disclose eleven depositions, four witness
statements, and an unrecorded witness statement.63 To determine
whether this failure was a constitutional violation meriting
post-conviction relief, we asked whether the evidence “create[d]
a reasonable doubt of petitioner’s guilt when viewed in the
context of the entire trial record.”64 Although the petitioner
claimed that the evidence was exculpatory, we concluded that
because the evidence was “tangential or cumulative, and [did] not
create a reasonable doubt of petitioner’s guilt” in the context
of the record, there was no violation of due process in the

65 Id. at 1108.
66 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980).
No. 20060160 20
prosecution’s failure to disclose.65 Similarly, in State v.
Jarrell, we concluded that no due process violation occurred
because the excluded evidence “would not have raised a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the defendant.”66 Thus, under the PCRA,
as well as our due process case law, newly discovered evidence
merits post-conviction relief only if the evidence would create a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.
¶52 In this case, we conclude that the additional evidence
does not create a reasonable doubt as to Medel’s guilt. Although
Medel lists several pieces of evidence that the prosecution
failed to disclose, he does not explain how those pieces of
evidence are exculpatory. This failure is fatal to his claim in
light of the fact that he pled guilty after reviewing detailed
probable cause statements regarding the nature and elements of
the offenses to which he pled. Thus, Medel failed to show that
no reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty in light
of the newly discovered evidence.
CONCLUSION
¶53 Medel does not claim factual innocence, nor does he
argue that the newly discovered evidence is so powerful that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty. Rather,
his argument boils down to a claim that the undisclosed documents
“would have provided him with a better understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution’s case and would have
made him better suited to determine whether to enter into the
plea agreement proposed by the State.” This claim is nothing
more than a statement that the undisclosed evidence would have
given him better bargaining power, may have convinced him to try
his luck with a jury, or may have convinced him to assert an
affirmative defense of diminished capacity. But none of these
facts demonstrates a violation of Medel’s constitutional rights.
¶54 The justice system is not a sporting event in which
each side has a right to exploit every tactical advantage
available. Important constitutional rights like due process are
not conceived to give the accused a “sporting chance” against the
machinery of the State. Rather, constitutional protections are
in place to ensure that only the guilty are deprived of their
liberty. When an individual knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily pleads guilty, he waives these constitutional
protections. There is little social advantage to giving an

21 No. 20060160
individual who miscalculated the strength of his case the
tactical advantage of a trial when all evidence points to the
fact that he committed the crimes to which he knowingly and
voluntarily pled.
¶55 We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Medel’s
petition because we conclude that it fails to state a claim.
Medel has not shown that his constitutional rights were violated
or that he meets the requirements for relief based on newly
discovered evidence.
---
¶56 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish’s
opinion.