State v. Mullins

2005 UT 43
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, No. 20040161
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Morris T. Mullins,
Defendant and Appellant. July 8, 2005
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Sixth District, Richfield Dept.
The Honorable David L. Mower
No. 011600140
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Christopher D.
Ballard, J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Att’ys Gen.,
Salt Lake City, R. Don Brown, Richfield, for
plaintiff
Keith C. Barnes, Randall C. Allen, Cedar City, for
defendant
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DURRANT, Justice:
¶1 The sole question presented in this appeal is whether a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea remains pending, even after the
entry of a final judgment of conviction, if that motion was
improperly denied. Defendant Morris T. Mullins argues that the
district court improperly denied his timely motion to withdraw
his guilty plea by failing to enter findings of fact relating to
the motion’s denial. Later in the proceedings, the district
court declined to consider the merits of two additional motions
filed by Mullins seeking the withdrawal of his plea. Mullins
filed those motions well past the statutorily set deadline,
leading the district court to rule that it lacked jurisdiction
over the matter. Mullins appeals from that ruling, arguing that
his subsequent motions related back, for jurisdictional purposes,
to his first motion, which he asserts remained pending due to its
allegedly improper denial. We conclude that Mullins’s first
motion to withdraw his plea was not pending when his subsequent
motions were filed, and we therefore affirm the district court.

1 Section 77-13-6 was amended in 2003, eliminating the thirty-
day time limit and instead providing that a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea must be made “before sentence is announced.” Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (2003). This change does not affect the
outcome in this matter, as Mullins’s motions were untimely under
both versions of the statute.
No. 22040161 2
BACKGROUND
¶2 Amy Davis, a seventy-eight-year-old woman, was
discovered dead in her Richfield home, the victim of murder and
rape. Investigation of the crime led police to arrest Mullins,
who was ultimately charged with aggravated murder and rape.
Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, Mullins agreed to
plead guilty to aggravated murder. In exchange for the guilty
plea, the State agreed to not seek the death penalty, to drop the
rape charge, to allow the district court to determine whether
Mullins should be granted a parole opportunity, and to not oppose
efforts by Mullins to obtain a transfer to another state.
¶3 A few months later, Mullins filed a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the plea was secured while
he was under duress and that critical aspects of the plea
agreement had been misrepresented to him by his attorney.
Specifically, Mullins alleged that his attorney misled him to
believe that by pleading guilty he would not only avoid the death
penalty, but would also receive the possibility of parole. After
a hearing, the district court denied the motion without issuing a
written order. Mullins was subsequently sentenced to life in
prison without parole. The district court entered a final
judgment of conviction to that effect on May 6, 2002.
¶4 On July 9, 2002, Mullins filed a second pro se motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, once again arguing that he did not
have the opportunity to meaningfully discuss the ramifications of
his plea with his counsel. On November 24, 2003, Mullins filed a
third motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this time through newly
appointed counsel. Some time later, the district court entered
an order stating that it had no jurisdiction to consider
Mullins’s additional motions because they were filed more than
thirty days after the entry of his plea.1 See Utah Code § 77-13-
6(2)(b) (2001).
¶5 Mullins contends that the district court erred in
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second
and third motions. Specifically, Mullins argues that the
district court improperly denied his first motion to withdraw his

3 No. 20040161
plea and that, as a result, that motion remained pending beyond
the entry of his final judgment of conviction. According to
Mullins, the district court’s jurisdiction over his subsequent
motions was thereby preserved because the motions related back to
his first, timely motion. We have jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(h) (2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 We review legal conclusions concerning the existence of
jurisdiction for correctness and afford no deference to the
district court. State v. McGee, 2001 UT 69, ¶ 6, 31 P.3d 531;
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 919 (Utah 1993).
ANALYSIS
¶7 Mullins’s position on appeal is that an improperly
denied motion to withdraw a guilty plea remains pending even if a
final judgment of conviction consistent with the plea has been
entered. For the reasons detailed below, we conclude that his
position is inconsistent with our prior case law and, if
accepted, would cause serious mischief to the appeals process.
¶8 When a final disposition of a case is entered by a
district court, any unresolved motions inconsistent with that
disposition are deemed resolved by implication. See Zions First
Nat’l Bank v. C’est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980)
(implying that a final judgment inconsistent with an unaddressed
motion disposes of the motion by necessary implication); see also
State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 238 (holding that
a judgment that is inconsistent with an unaddressed motion
disposes of that motion by necessary implication); cf. Utah Farm
Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1987)
(holding that a motion to strike was granted by implication due
to a subsequent grant of summary judgment); Colosimo v. Roman
Catholic Bishop, 2004 UT App 436, ¶ 14, 104 P.3d 646 (holding
that an unaddressed motion inconsistent with a granted summary
judgment was disposed of by necessary implication).
¶9 In this case, the district court entered a final
judgment of conviction on May 6, 2002. The entry of that
judgment, by necessary implication, effectively disposed of
Mullins’s first timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We
acknowledge that the district court failed to enter a written
order specifically denying that motion and that the final
judgment of conviction was silent with respect to that motion.
However, as evidenced by minute entries in the record, it is

2 On appeal, both Mullins and the State assume that the
failure to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea within the statutory
limitation period deprives a district court of jurisdiction to
consider the merits of such a motion. That assumption is
consistent with our recent holding in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT
34, __ P.3d __, in which we removed any lingering doubt as to the
jurisdictional consequences of a failure to seek a timely
withdrawal of a plea. As Merrill makes clear, the untimeliness
of Mullins’s second and third motions to withdraw deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to entertain those motions.
No. 22040161 4
clear that the district court was aware of the motion, considered
it, and then rejected it after a hearing.
¶10 Mullins further claims that his first motion was
improperly denied due to an alleged failure on the part of the
district court to enter adequate findings of fact into the
record. However, whether a motion is denied properly or
improperly is irrelevant to an analysis of whether that motion
remains “pending.” See, e.g., Geraci v. Senkowski, 23 F. Supp.
2d 246, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that “pending,” as used in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) means “yet to be decided”); Black’s Law
Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “pending” as
“[r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision”). An improper final
decision is still a decision, and any concerns with that decision
should be addressed on appeal. If we were to allow improperly
denied motions to remain pending beyond the entry of a final
judgment of conviction, we would effectively eliminate the
limitations period governing such motions. Additionally, such a
rule would result in a logical quagmire in which no decision on a
motion could ever be considered “final” for purposes of appeal
unless the motion was properly denied, as an improperly denied
motion would remain “pending.” Such a result is untenable and
illogical.
¶11 Because Mullins’s first motion to withdraw his plea was
not pending at the time his subsequent motions were filed, we
conclude that Mullins’s subsequent motions did not relate back,
for jurisdictional purposes, to his first motion. Consequently,
we affirm the district court’s order.2
CONCLUSION
¶12 We conclude that the district court’s entry of a final
judgment of conviction disposed of Mullins’s first motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Because Mullins’s subsequent motions
to withdraw his plea were filed beyond the time limitation

5 No. 20040161
specified by statute, the district court had no jurisdiction to
address the merits of those motions. Affirmed.
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¶13 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant’s
opinion.