Rawlings v. Rawlings

2010 UT 52
AMENDED OPINION*
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Donald Rawlings and 	No. 20090059
Jeanette Rawlings,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and
Paulette Rawlings,
Defendants and Petitioners.
___________________________________
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette
Rawlings, as Trustees of the Arnold
Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust;
Theron LaRell Rawlings; Bryce C.
Rawlings; and Carol Lynn R. Masterson,
Third-party Plaintiffs
and Petitioners,
v.
Donald Rawlings and Jeanette
Rawlings; and Donald Rawlings and
Jeanette Rawlings as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown, 	F I L E D
Third-party Defendants and
Respondents. 	September 3, 2010
---
Fourth District, Provo Dep’t
The Honorable Fred D. Howard
No. 970400260
Attorneys: 	M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs
and third-party defendants
Thomas W. Seiler, Provo, for defendants
M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for third-party plaintiffs
---
* 	The court has rewritten footnote 5.

1 See Due South, Inc. v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Bev. Control,
(continued...)
No. 20090059 	2
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether
the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court’s
imposition of a constructive trust. 	The parties in this case are
siblings who dispute the ownership of farm land transferred by
their father. 	The oldest sibling, Donald, received the land as
the grantee under a warranty deed. 	He contends that his father
transferred the land to him in exchange for payments he made on
some of his father’s debts. 	The family’s four other siblings and
their spouses (collectively, the “siblings”) contend that their
father deeded the land to Donald in an attempt to create a family
trust. 	During the time period surrounding this transfer, their
father had been diagnosed with cancer and owning the land made
him ineligible for welfare assistance. 	The siblings contend that
their father placed the property in their older brother’s name so
that he could act as trustee over the land and hold it for the
benefit of the family. 	The siblings also contend that, in the
decades since the transfer, the land was treated as a family farm
and that they have contributed to its care, maintenance, and
profitability.
¶2 	The district court credited the testimony of the
siblings and found that the oldest brother had been unjustly
enriched by accepting the siblings’ years of contributions to the
success of the farm. 	Accordingly, the court exercised its
equitable power to award a constructive trust in favor of the
siblings. 	The court of appeals reversed. 	Concluding that
certain of the district court’s findings of fact were
inconsistent with its award of a constructive trust, the court of
appeals held as a matter of law that the siblings could not
prevail on any theory of constructive trust. 	We exercised our
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008)
and granted the siblings’ petition for certiorari. 	We reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals.
BACKGROUND
¶3 	Because the parties do not dispute any of the trial
court’s findings of fact, we recite the facts in accordance with
those findings. 1

1 (...continued)
2008 UT 71, ¶ 2, 197 P.3d 82.
2 Dwayne’s given name is “Arnold Dwayne Rawlings,” but to
distinguish him from his father, we follow the parties’ lead in
referring to him as “Dwayne.”
3 The parcels were actually transferred to the sons and
their spouses. 	Because the fact of co-ownership does not alter
our analysis, and because we need to refer to the actions of the
brothers more often than we need to refer to the actions of their
spouses, we will generally omit mention of the spouses unless
their actions have independent relevance.
3 	No. 20090059
¶4 	The parties in this case are siblings whose father,
Arnold Rawlings, owned twenty-two acres of land near Orem, Utah.
In 1957, a few years before the events giving rise to this case
occurred, Arnold transferred approximately twelve acres to a
third party while retaining approximately ten acres that he
operated as a family farm. 	Between 1960 and 1967, Arnold
transferred portions of this farm land to his two oldest sons,
Donald and Dwayne Rawlings. 2 	The end result of these transfers
was that both Donald and Dwayne received parcels approximately
one acre in size on which to build their homes. 3 	Arnold retained
half an acre in the northeast corner of the property where his
house was located. 	Except for these assorted parcels of land,
the remainder of Arnold’s property remained undivided until March
24, 1967. 	On that day, he transferred to Dwayne a small parcel--
approximately half an acre immediately south of Donald’s land--
which Dwayne has held in trust for the other members of the
family. 	On the same day, Arnold transferred the remaining farm
property to Donald, in one undivided parcel, via a general
warranty deed. 	In contrast to the siblings’ claims that Donald
took the land as a trustee, Donald contends that this transfer
was compensation for his having paid certain debts on his
father’s behalf.
¶5 	The March 24 land transfers happened at a time when
Arnold’s health had substantially deteriorated. 	In October of
the year before, he was diagnosed with cancer. 	Later that year
he underwent surgery to remove a large tumor. 	Although he
labored to recover from this surgery, Arnold began radiation
treatments in January of 1967. 	He was hospitalized twice in the
coming months, and by March 24, his health was very poor.
¶6 	The siblings contend that the purpose of transferring
the farm property to Donald was to facilitate his eligibility for

4 The testimony of the siblings was not consistent with
regard to Arnold’s eligibility for welfare. 	Some of the siblings
indicated that Arnold was afraid that he would have to pay back
the value of any welfare assistance he received, and that this
would leave the farm property vulnerable to claims by the Welfare
Department. 	Because the parties do not dispute the trial court’s
finding that the transfer was necessary for Arnold to be eligible
for welfare, we recite the facts as found by the district court.
No. 20090059 	4
welfare assistance. 	Sometime prior to December 16, 1966, Donald
had contacted the State Welfare Department to discuss Arnold’s
eligibility, and it became apparent that Arnold would receive
assistance only if the farm property was not held in his name. 4
Thus, shortly before the March 24 transfers, Arnold discussed
with LaRell, his third oldest son, the need to take the property
out of Arnold’s name. 	They discussed the best means to effect
this, and LaRell suggested that the property be transferred to
Dwayne because LaRell believed Dwayne would be fair in his
dealings with the family. 	Ultimately, Arnold decided to transfer
the land to Donald instead. 	Arnold met once with LaRell and
Donald, and later with Dwayne and Donald, to discuss these plans.
The trial court credited this testimony and found that Donald
offered no evidence to rebut it.
¶7 	Around the time of the transfer, Donald and the
siblings also conducted other business relevant to the farm
property. 	First, in January of that year, Donald began telling
Dwayne that Arnold needed approximately $1,000 to pay off the
taxes on the farm. 	Dwayne borrowed the funds to pay these taxes
on his father’s behalf and gave the money to Donald. 	But it was
not until the March 24 transfer was complete that Donald used
this money to pay off the back taxes. 	Second, on the same day
that Arnold transferred the farm property to Donald, the siblings
and their spouses relinquished their interests in the farm
property to Donald via a quitclaim deed. 	Over time, the siblings
also transferred neighboring parcels of land to Donald to add to
the trust property.
¶8 	In the years after the transfer, Arnold continued to
struggle with his health, but also continued to manage and
collect the profits from the farm property until his death in
1971. 	Indeed, in the fall of 1969, Arnold struggled to complete
the harvest on his own. 	So, the next spring, Arnold began
corresponding with LaRell’s commanding officers in the military
in the hopes of having LaRell temporarily released from his
duties so he could return and help with the maintenance of the
farm. 	Arnold submitted notarized affidavits to this effect, and
had a number of people write letters in support of this effort.

5 	No. 20090059
These documents uniformly refer to the property as Arnold’s Farm
and refer to Arnold’s efforts to harvest crops and maintain the
farm, and given his health, the difficulty he faced doing it
alone.
¶9 	In addition to managing the property as a farm, Arnold
also managed family affairs on the farm: 	when Arnold’s youngest
son, Bryce, sought to locate a mobile home on farm property, it
was Arnold’s permission he sought, and it was Arnold who decided
the best location for the trailer. 	And less than a month after
Arnold’s death in 1971, Arnold’s widow, Cleo--not Donald--paid
the property taxes on all of the farm property.
¶10 	For years after Arnold’s death, the farm property was
managed in a manner consistent with it being held in trust for
the family. 	Bryce continued to live on the land for four or five
years after Arnold’s death. 	Donald consistently represented to
his siblings that income from the farm property was being used to
support their mother. 	Because of these representations, all of
the siblings, except Donald, worked in the orchard and helped to
maintain the farm property. 	When Donald was asked during his
deposition which of the siblings contributed to the operation of
the farm property, Donald answered, “All I know is that I
didn’t.”
¶11 	Arnold’s 1957 transfer of twelve acres south of the
farm property led to a boundary dispute regarding the southern
border of the farm property. 	During this dispute, Donald’s
representations to the family reinforced the idea that this land
was being managed for the benefit of the family. 	Specifically,
by 1974 a dispute had arisen over the location of the border
between the farm property and the land that Arnold had
transferred in 1957. 	Donald enlisted Dwayne to help erect a
fence at the boundary line in the hopes of settling this dispute
and protecting what Donald referred to as “Mother’s farm.”
Donald also induced his siblings to sign a quitclaim deed for the
farm property. 	He told them that the quitclaim deed encompassed
only the land being disputed, but it actually described the
entire farm property. 	The trial court found that this quitclaim
deed would have been unnecessary if Donald had owned the property
by virtue of the 1967 conveyance. 	Thus, it rejected Donald’s
contention that the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to clear up
the title problems on the southern boundary. 	When Donald settled
the boundary dispute for $52,000, he paid $500 each to Bryce and
Carol Lynn (Arnold’s only daughter), and $600 to Dwayne. 	He
offered $500 to LaRell, but LaRell refused to accept the money.
Donald also spent $5,000 to prepay burial funds for Cleo and to
buy her a car.

5 Donald also challenges the district court’s determination
that the statute of limitations was tolled until Donald first
made his siblings aware that he was treating the property as if
he were the sole owner. 	We have reviewed the arguments made by
both parties and the authorities cited in support of those
arguments, and find no error in the trial court’s resolution of
this issue. 	Accordingly, the statute of limitations does not
form an alternate basis for affirming the judgment of the court
of appeals.
No. 20090059 	6
¶12 	Not until after 1993 were the siblings made aware that
Donald considered the land to be his own property. 	A dispute
arose regarding a piece of the farm property that formed part of
the basis for a land exchange that Donald and Dwayne had
undertaken in 1978. 	In exchange for a piece of industrial
property valued at approximately $45,000, the two brothers each
contributed $15,000. 	A small piece of the farm property, valued
at approximately $15,000, constituted the remainder of their
contribution. 	The industrial property they received was
eventually divided into northern and southern halves, with each
brother responsible for one of the halves. 	In 1993, Donald
brought suit to establish himself as the owner of two-thirds of
this property. 	He alleged that he alone held title to the farm
property that formed part of the basis of the exchange. 	Alleging
that Dwayne had no interest in the farm property, Donald
contended that his share of the industrial property should
reflect the fact that he contributed $15,000 worth of land and
$15,000 in cash, whereas Dwayne only contributed $15,000 in cash.
The district court found that this suit, filed in 1997, was the
first repudiation by Donald of his trust responsibilities. 5 	In
response to Donald’s suit to quiet title, Dwayne and the siblings
filed counterclaims seeking imposition of a constructive trust.
¶13 	Donald’s version of events surrounding the 1967
transfer of farm property differs from that of the siblings. 	He
contends that Arnold had mortgaged the farm property prior to
being diagnosed with cancer and that Donald rescued the land from
foreclosure by paying off his father’s indebtedness. 	Thus, he
contends that the deed transferring the land is exactly what it
purports to be on its face: 	a general warranty deed transferring
fee simple ownership. 	He contends that Arnold, prompted by
Donald’s payments of this indebtedness, intended to give him the
farm property free of any implicit trust obligation.
¶14 	The trial court explicitly discredited this testimony
for a number of reasons. 	First, Donald had his own indebtedness
with the same bank, and during the time when he would have been

6 Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 13, 200 P.3d 662.
7 For purposes of this opinion, we decline to rely on the
court of appeals’ nomenclature. 	Specifically, it is unclear
whether it is consistent with our case law to distinguish between
“legal” constructive trusts and “equitable” constructive trusts.
In the past, we have referred to constructive trusts as
“equitable” remedies, even when they are based on oral express
trusts. 	See Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231-32 (Utah 1949).
We have also said that these remedies arise “by operation of
law,” insofar as they represent an exception to the statute of
frauds. 	See id.
The labels used by the court of appeals are a convenient way
(continued...)
7 	No. 20090059
paying off his father’s debts, his payments to the bank did not
increase in a manner consistent with making additional payments.
Second, after this litigation began, Donald’s wife, Jeanette,
altered the cancelled checks to the bank by inserting notes on
the memo line to make it appear as though the checks were written
to pay Arnold’s mortgage. 	Third, the evidence was not consistent
with the possibility of imminent foreclosure, because the bank
had neither sent any notices of default (as it would have been
required to do) nor attempted to foreclose on two vehicles that
were also part of the security for the loan.
¶15 	Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of
the siblings persuasive and rejected Donald’s version of events.
It concluded that the purpose of the transfer was to accommodate
Arnold’s attempts at becoming eligible for welfare, not in
exchange for payment of Arnold’s debt and not to transfer
ownership. 	It concluded the siblings had presented clear and
convincing evidence to support an “equitable need to impose a
constructive trust on the property.” 	It also concluded that
Donald and Jeanette had been unjustly enriched by keeping the
$1,000 that Dwayne paid toward the property taxes, by keeping the
bulk of the $52,000 received from the settlement of the boundary
dispute, and by keeping “other benefits from the use and
negotiations relative to the trust property.” 	Thus, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of the siblings, concluding that
the March 24 conveyance to Donald, along with the relevant
quitclaim deeds, created a constructive trust on the property
described therein.
¶16 	The court of appeals reversed this judgment. 6 	It began
by comparing the two different theories under which a
constructive trust may be imposed. 	One theory, which it called a
“legal constructive trust,” 7 	requires no showing of unjust

7 (...continued)
of summarizing the distinctions that are relevant in this case.
But, as we have said, “‘the forms and varieties of [constructive
trusts] are practically without limit.’” 	Parks v. Zions First
Nat’l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah 1983) (quoting Fitz-Gerald v.
Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 263 (Tex. 1951)). 	We are apprehensive
about adopting a categorization that may lead to confusion
outside the confines of this case.
Although the phrasing is less convenient, we refer to the
remedies in this case as either a constructive trust to give
effect to an oral express trust or as a constructive trust to
remedy unjust enrichment. 	Whether our holdings in this case will
apply to other forms of constructive trusts will depend on the
extent to which those other forms share characteristics with the
constructive trusts at issue in this case.
8 Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶¶ 13-15.
9 Id. ¶ 16.
10 Id. ¶ 18.
11 Id. ¶ 17.
12 Id.
No. 20090059 	8
enrichment. 	Instead, it concluded that in some cases a
constructive trust is imposed to give effect to a grantor’s
attempt to create an oral express trust. 8 	The court of appeals
contrasted this sort of constructive trust with “equitable
constructive trusts,” which are imposed to remedy unjust
enrichment. 9 	It then determined that the trial court had failed
to properly distinguish the two and had essentially used unjust
enrichment as a substitute for proof of an oral express trust. 10
It concluded that the siblings’ case must succeed or fail based
on whether they had proven Arnold’s intent to orally impose trust
obligations. 11 	According to the court of appeals, either Donald
had violated Arnold’s express wishes--which would make a legal
constructive trust the only appropriate remedy--or the farm
property belonged to Donald, in which case he had not been
unjustly enriched by his years of ownership. 12
¶17 	Having come to this conclusion, the court of appeals
acknowledged that it would normally be required to remand the
case for factual findings regarding the elements of a legal

13 Id. ¶ 20.
14 Id. ¶ 22.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. ¶ 23.
9 	No. 20090059
constructive trust. 13 	It did not do so, however, because such a
claim requires the party challenging a warranty deed to prove the
intent to create a trust. 14 	But here, one of the trial court’s
findings stated that “Arnold did not consider the conveyance to
be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property.” 	Relying
on this finding of fact, the court of appeals concluded that the
siblings’ claim must fail as a matter of law. 15 	It reasoned that
if Arnold did not intend to transfer ownership at all, then he
could not have intended to create a trust because creation of a
trust requires that title to the property be transferred to a
trustee. 16 	Thus, it dismissed the siblings’ claims as a matter
of law and instructed the trial court to enter judgment quieting
title to the property in favor of Donald. 17
¶18 	We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of
appeals correctly applied Utah’s law of constructive trusts.
Before us, the siblings argue that the court of appeals erred in
two ways. 	First, they argue that the court of appeals erred by
interpreting the trial court’s finding of fact in isolation and
in a manner inconsistent with its judgment. 	They contend that
the finding of fact regarding Arnold’s intent to transfer
ownership can, and should, be interpreted to mean that Arnold
intended to transfer bare legal title while maintaining the
beneficial interest in the land. 	They argue that such an
interpretation would support a constructive trust and that the
court of appeals erred when it held that they could not prevail
on this claim. 	Second, the siblings argue that the success of
the farm was based on years of effort and contribution by
everyone in the family. 	They rely on the trial court’s findings
regarding Dwayne’s payment of back taxes, the contribution of
labor by all of the siblings to keep the farm operational, and
the siblings’ assistance during the 1978 boundary dispute. 	All
of these contributions, they contend, support a finding of unjust
enrichment because their efforts were undertaken in reliance on
their belief that the land was being held in trust for their
benefit.

18 See State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 957.
19 See Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 15, 222
P.3d 55.
20 Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 42, 189 P.3d 51 (citing
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (Utah
1995)).
21 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Fuel Co. v.
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ¶ 9, 79 P.3d
945).
22 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998).
No. 20090059 	10
¶19 	We conclude that the district court’s findings were
sufficient to support imposition of a constructive trust. 	In
deciding that the findings of fact regarding Arnold’s intent
foreclosed the siblings from prevailing on a claim of unjust
enrichment, the court of appeals erred. 	The trial court acted
within the bounds of its discretion in imposing a constructive
trust. 	Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20 	When reviewing cases pursuant to a writ of certiorari,
this court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not that
of the district court. 18 	The court of appeals’ holding that the
siblings could establish neither an oral express trust nor unjust
enrichment is a legal determination that we review for
correctness. 19
¶21 	With regard to the imposition of a constructive trust,
the availability of such a remedy is also a question of law
reviewed for correctness. 20 	But if such a remedy is available,
the “‘trial court is accorded considerable latitude and
discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, and
[it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its
discretion.’” 21
¶22 	Finally, because “[u]njust enrichment must remain a
flexible and workable doctrine. . . . we afford broad discretion
to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to
the facts.” 22
ANALYSIS

23 Parks v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah
1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237
S.W.2d 256, 263 (Tex. 1951)). 	We do not intend to suggest that
the legal theories discussed herein are the only valid bases for
imposing constructive trusts. 	We have no need to, and do not,
consider the other circumstances wherein a constructive trust
would be an appropriate remedy or what shape such a remedy might
take. 	See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, ¶ 17, 61 P.3d
982 (discussing availability of a constructive trust as a remedy,
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-104(5) (1999), when an otherwise
valid insurance policy is held by one who lacks an insurable
interest).
24 In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982).
25 Jewell v. Horner, 366 P.2d 594, 598 (Utah 1961) (quoting
Chambers v. Emery, 45 P. 192, 195 (Utah 1896)).
26 Id. at 597. 	See also Parks, 673 P.2d at 596; Nielson v.
Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 171
(continued...)
11 	No. 20090059
¶23 	The siblings contend that the trial court was correct
in imposing a constructive trust, either as a means of giving
effect to an oral express trust, or as a means of remedying
unjust enrichment. 	Thus, they argue that the court of appeals
erred in two ways. 	First, they argue that the court of appeals
misinterpreted the trial court’s findings of fact and that these
findings actually demonstrate Arnold’s intent to create a trust
to benefit the family. 	Second, they argue that the trial court
was correct in finding that Donald had been unjustly enriched and
that the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. 	As such,
they claim that the trial court had discretion to award a
constructive trust under either theory.
¶24 	In addressing the siblings’ claims, we keep a number of
important principles in mind. 	First, we affirm our prior
statement that “‘the forms and varieties of these trusts . . .
are practically without limit.’” 23 	We also note that, in cases
involving transfers of land, imposing a constructive trust will
often “alter a deed or other writing which is regular in form and
is presumed to convey a clear and unambiguous title.” 24 	We have
recognized that altering deeds in this way may make it difficult
for a landowner to “rest in the security of his title to
property, however solemn might be the instrument on which it was
founded.” 25 	To mitigate this effect, we require that the
evidence offered to overcome a deed must be “clear and
convincing.” 26

26 (...continued)
P.2d 392, 394-95 (Utah 1946).
27 Parks, 673 P.2d at 598.
28 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. b (1959).
No. 20090059 	12
¶25 	Even given this elevated burden of proof, we agree with
the siblings with regard to their claim for unjust enrichment.
First, we hold that the court of appeals incorrectly determined
that the siblings must succeed or fail based solely on the intent
underlying Arnold’s transfer of land. 	Rather, a claim for an
oral express trust is independent from a claim for unjust
enrichment, and either claim may support imposition of a
constructive trust. 	Second, because unjust enrichment is a
flexible doctrine and because trial courts have broad discretion
in fashioning remedies for unjust enrichment, we hold that the
court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s award of a
constructive trust. 	Because we affirm the trial court’s finding
of unjust enrichment and its imposition of a constructive trust
on that basis, we need not determine whether the siblings also
could have prevailed in their attempt to establish an oral
express trust. 	In order to explain our conclusions, we find it
useful to articulate the legal standards for the types of
constructive trust at issue in this case.
I. 	CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE A REMEDY THAT MAY BE IMPOSED WHERE A
PARTY HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED OR WHERE NECESSARY TO GIVE
EFFECT TO AN ORAL EXPRESS TRUST
¶26 	The siblings argue that a constructive trust may be
imposed under either of two distinct causes of action. 	One is a
cause of action to establish an oral express trust. 	The other is
a claim for unjust enrichment. 	Oral express trusts have “certain
fundamental characteristics” in common with traditional trusts
because, like traditional trusts, they are the manifestation of a
settlor’s intent with regard to property. 27 	The main such
characteristic is the imposition of obligations on a trustee “to
act for the benefit of [beneficiaries] as to matters within the
scope of the [trust].” 28 	Like trusts created by a valid writing,
constructive trusts imposed to give effect to oral express trusts
are adequately characterized as “‘a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it and subjecting the person in whom the

29 Parks, 673 P.2d at 598 (quoting 5 A. Scott, The Law of
Trusts § 462.1 (1967)).
30 See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2007).
31 See Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949).
32 Id.
33 See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987);
Parks, 673 P.2d at 597-98; Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511,
513 (Utah 1976); Haws, 209 P.2d at 231-32. 	We have also adopted
section 44 of the Restatement of Trusts. 	See Parks, 673 P.2d at
597-98 & n.12; Taylor v. Turner, 492 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1972).
Section 44 applies where the transferor intends to establish a
trust for the benefit of himself. 	Id.; see Restatement (Second)
of Trusts § 44. 	Where a party relies on section 44, the third
circumstance justifying imposition of a constructive trust is
different than the relevant circumstances under section 45. 	See
id. § 44(1)(c). 	The party may not prevail by showing that the
transfer was made in anticipation of death (as is the standard
under section 45), but may prevail by showing that “the transfer
was made as security for the indebtedness of the transferor.”
Id. 	Because the siblings argue that they are the intended
beneficiaries, section 44 does not apply here.
13 	No. 20090059
title is vested to equitable duties to deal with it for the
benefit of others.’” 29
¶27 	Where a transfer of land was made with the intent to
create such a trust, the trust will generally fail unless
evidenced by a writing that complies with the Statute of
Frauds. 30 	Because oral express trusts do not meet these
requirements, they will only be given effect in “certain
circumstances.” 31 	In these instances, the constructive trusts
are deemed to “arise[] by operation of law and [are] not within
the statute of frauds.” 32
¶28 	We have recognized that constructive trusts may be
imposed in the circumstances set forth in section 45 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (the “Restatement of Trusts”). 33
This section applies when the transferor of land intends for the
transfer to benefit someone other than the transferor or the
transferee:
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land
transfers it inter vivos to another in trust
for a third person, but no memorandum

34 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1959).
35 See Jewell v. Horner, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (Utah 1961).
36 See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1253 (Utah 1998)
(upholding court’s equitable ruling that imposed constructive
trust to remedy unjust enrichment); Parks, 673 P.2d at 600.
37 Parks, 673 P.2d at 599 (alteration in original) (quoting
Restatement of Restitution § 160 (1937)).
No. 20090059 	14
properly evidencing the intention to create a
trust is signed, as required by the Statute
of Frauds, and the transferee refuses to
perform the trust, the transferee holds the
interest upon a constructive trust for the
third person, if, but only if,
(a) the transferee by fraud, duress or undue
influence prevented the transferor from
creating an enforceable interest in the third
person, or
(b) the transferee at the time of the
transfer was in a confidential relation to
the transferor, or
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor
in anticipation of death. 34
In short, the imposition of a constructive trust under this
section of the Restatement of Trusts requires proof that the
transferor of land intended to create a trust and that one of the
three identified circumstances existed at the time of the
transfer. 	And where proving this intent will be contrary to an
otherwise valid deed, the evidence of the trust must be clear and
convincing. 35
¶29 	As with claims based on an oral express trust, claims
of unjust enrichment can support the imposition of a constructive
trust. 36 	To this end, we have adopted the formulation set forth
at section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution: 	“a
constructive trust may arise ‘where a person holding title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it . . . .’” 37 	A claim for unjust enrichment
in Utah requires proof of three elements:

38 Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1247-48 (quoting Am. Towers Owners
Ass’n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996)).
39 Id. at 1245.
40 673 P.2d at 598-99.
41 Id. at 600.
42 See id. at 597.
15 	No. 20090059
“(1) a benefit conferred on one person by
another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by
the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the
acceptance or retention by the conferee of
the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to
retain the benefit without payment of its
value.” 38
We have also noted that unjust enrichment plays an important role
as a tool of equity: 	“[u]njust enrichment law developed to
remedy injustice when other areas of the law could not,” and
therefore “must remain a flexible and workable doctrine.” 39
¶30 	Because of the flexible nature of the unjust enrichment
doctrine, a constructive trust is an available remedy even in
cases where a plaintiff might assert alternative legal theories
to support imposition of a constructive trust. 	Nothing about the
constructive trust that is imposed to give effect to an oral
express trust does anything to preclude the imposition of a
constructive trust as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.
¶31 	Indeed, in Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the
plaintiff brought claims under sections 44 and 45 of the
Restatement of Trusts, as well as a claim for unjust
enrichment. 40 	Although the trial court found the plaintiff’s
claim was not one for an oral express trust, we affirmed the
trial court’s finding of unjust enrichment and its decision to
impose a constructive trust as a remedy. 41 	We also explicitly
rejected the notion that a party seeking to prove the existence
of an oral express trust could not, where the facts would support
it, also seek recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment. 42
Thus, our cases establish the availability of both types of
constructive trust sought in this case. 	And where the facts and
law will support it, a plaintiff may alternatively pursue both
kinds of constructive trust within the same lawsuit.

43 Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 18, 200 P.3d
662.
44 Id. ¶ 19.
No. 20090059 	16
¶32 	Having articulated the law as it relates to the
siblings’ claims, we now address the issue presented in this
case: 	whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial
court’s imposition of a constructive trust. 	Because of the
manner in which the court of appeals resolved the issue, we first
turn to the court of appeals’ conclusion regarding oral express
trusts, and then examine the court of appeals’ conclusion
regarding unjust enrichment.
II. 	THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN BASING ITS CONCLUSION SOLELY
ON WHETHER ARNOLD INTENDED TO CREATE AN ORAL EXPRESS TRUST
¶33 	The court of appeals incorrectly concluded that,
because the trial court’s findings did not support an oral
express trust, the siblings could not prevail on a theory of
unjust enrichment. 	As discussed, our prior cases reveal two
distinct legal causes of action that the siblings were free to
pursue in this case. 	To the extent they have alleged that Arnold
intended to create a trust that would inure to their benefit,
they have stated a claim consistent with the cause of action set
forth at section 45 of the Restatement of Trusts. 	If the
siblings successfully proved this case, the trial court could
have imposed a constructive trust on the farm property to give
effect to Arnold’s intent. 	To the extent that the siblings have
argued that Donald wrongfully retained the benefits of their
contributions to the farm property, they seek a remedy for unjust
enrichment. 	Where a party has successfully proven its case for
unjust enrichment, the trial court has authority to impose a
constructive trust as a remedy.
¶34 	In reviewing our prior cases and the court of appeals’
opinion in this case, we are satisfied that the court of appeals
articulated these legal standards correctly, but that it
misconstrued the relationship between these causes of action. 	It
determined that the siblings had attempted to use the law of
unjust enrichment as a substitute for the law of oral express
trusts. 43 	As such, it determined that the law imposed upon it a
binary choice: 	either Arnold intended that Donald take the land
as trustee, or the actions Donald took during his years of
ownership were not unjust. 44
¶35 	In fact, there is the potential for significant overlap
in this case. 	If Arnold intended that Donald take the land as

45 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998).
46 Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 22.
47 Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
48 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 1 (2005).
49 See In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 589
(continued...)
17 	No. 20090059
trustee, then it was both inequitable and a violation of the
intended trust for Donald to retain for himself benefits that
should have flowed to the trust. 	In such a case, a constructive
trust imposed to give effect to the oral trust would also have
remedied the related unjust enrichment. 	But even if the siblings
could not prove Arnold’s intent to create such a trust, Donald’s
actions, as found by the trial court, are the sort that would
also support a claim of unjust enrichment. 	Assuming the siblings
prevailed on this theory, the constructive trust would not be
imposed to give effect to Arnold’s intent; it would be imposed to
give effect to the judgment of a court, sitting in equity,
regarding how best “to remedy injustice when other areas of the
law [can] not.” 45
¶36 	The court of appeals’ departure from our case law
appears to be the result of its reliance on a single finding of
fact interpreted in isolation. 	In its findings of fact, the
trial court states that “Arnold did not consider the conveyance
to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property.” 	In
its conclusions of law, the trial court reinforces this point:
“The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to
transfer ownership rights to Donald.” 	The court of appeals
equated this finding with a finding that Arnold “did not intend
to transfer the farm into trust.” 46 	Thus, it concluded that this
finding precluded any oral express trust and that a constructive
trust therefore could not be imposed. 47
¶37 	The siblings argue that the court of appeals simply
misinterpreted this finding of fact, and that it should be
understood to mean that Arnold intended to transfer only legal
title to Donald, while establishing a beneficial interest for the
family. 	The siblings’ urged interpretation is consistent with
general trust principles: 	“The fundamental nature of a trust is
the division of title, with the trustee being the holder of legal
title and the beneficiary that of equitable title.” 48 	Thus,
every time a settlor creates a trust there is some interest in
the trust res that is not transferred to the trustee. 49 	In fact,

49 (...continued)
(“There must be an intent by the settlor to confer a beneficial
interest in the property in some other person.” (emphasis
added)).
50 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 341(1) (1959) (“[I]f
the legal title to the trust property and the entire beneficial
interest become united in one person who is not under an
incapacity, the trust terminates.”).
51 Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 23.
52 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
No. 20090059 	18
if ever the trustee also becomes the sole beneficiary, all
interests in the trust property will reside in the trustee and
legal and equitable title will merge. 50 	So, for Arnold to have
intended to create a trust, he necessarily would have intended to
convey to Donald something less than his full ownership rights.
Otherwise, no equitable interest would be held on behalf of the
beneficiaries.
¶38 	The siblings also urge that the court of appeals’
interpretation of this finding of fact is an unreasonable
construction of the trial court’s judgment. 	After all, the
siblings note, the court of appeals’ disposition of the case
upheld Donald’s ownership of the land. 51 	The siblings argue that
this is absurd because it is directly contrary to the finding of
fact on which the court of appeals relied. 	Given the
alternative, they argue that the court of appeals had a duty to
interpret the trial court’s findings in a manner favorable to its
judgment.
¶39 	Regardless of the merits of these arguments, if the
siblings are to prevail on the theory that Arnold intended to
create an oral express trust, the siblings must not only overcome
this ambiguous finding of fact, they must also establish one of
the other circumstances set forth in section 45 of the
Restatement of Trusts. 52 	They urge us to find that Donald stood
in a confidential relationship with respect to Arnold. 	There are
some findings of fact--relating to Arnold’s deteriorating health,
his anxiety regarding welfare coverage, and Donald’s role in the
property transfer--that may support the conclusion that Donald
and Arnold had a confidential relationship. But there are also
findings of fact that suggest otherwise--LaRell and Dwayne both
occupied positions of trust vis a vis their father and
participated in discussions about how best to handle the land

53 In Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636-37 (Utah 1984), we
described confidential relationships as being, at least in part,
a function of inequality between the parties. 	So, to the extent
that the circumstances surrounding the transfer enhanced Donald’s
influence over his father, it was also likely mitigated by the
similarly close, though perhaps not quite equivalent,
relationships LaRell and Dwayne occupied with respect to their
father.
54 See Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025-26 & n.5 (Utah
1987) (requiring joinder of a decedent’s estate before
adjudicating the terms of a constructive trust that would inure
to the benefit of the decedent’s estate). 	Donald urges us to
affirm the court of appeals on the alternative ground that any
trust would necessarily have included Arnold and Cleo--who were
not joined in this suit--as beneficiaries. 	While joinder may
have been required to adjudicate all of the interests allegedly
created by Arnold’s oral express trust, the siblings’ claims for
unjust enrichment are based on benefits they conferred on Donald,
and are therefore wholly independent of any similar claim that
might be advanced by Cleo or Arnold’s estate. 	Thus, it is not
fatal to the siblings’ claim for unjust enrichment that neither
Arnold’s estate nor Cleo were made parties to this lawsuit.
19 	No. 20090059
transfer. 53 	The trial court’s conclusions of law do not address
whether Donald’s relationship with his father met our standard
for a confidential relationship. 	Further, unresolved issues
remain regarding the terms of the trust, including how Arnold’s
interest would have descended after his death. 54
¶40 	We decline to address these questions for the first
time on appeal. 	It is sufficient for our purposes to say that
the court of appeals erred when it concluded that the siblings’
failure to prove an oral express trust necessarily precluded a
finding in their favor under a theory of unjust enrichment.
Because the two claims may be pursued independently, we need not
determine whether the trial court’s findings might support a
claim under section 45 of the Restatement of Trusts. 	Rather, as
will be discussed below, the court of appeals erred in reversing
the trial court’s finding of unjust enrichment and its imposition
of a constructive trust as a means of remedying this unjust
enrichment.

55 Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 17, 200 P.3d
662.
56 See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1247-48 (Utah 1998).
No. 20090059 	20
III. 	THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DONALD WAS NOT
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY THE CONTRIBUTIONS HIS SIBLINGS MADE TO THE
FARM PROPERTY OVER SEVERAL DECADES
¶41 	The court of appeals held that because Donald was the
transferee under a deed, his acceptance of his siblings’
contributions to the land could not be unjust. 55 	In so holding,
the court of appeals erred. 	The standard for determining whether
a person has been unjustly enriched requires a court to determine
whether the defendant accepted and retained benefits conferred by
the plaintiff under such circumstances as to make it inequitable
for the defendant to retain those benefits without compensating
the plaintiff. 56
¶42 	The court of appeals’ conclusion does not adequately
take into consideration the circumstances under which Donald
accepted many of the benefits conferred by his siblings. 	As
found by the trial court, the reason the siblings continued to
work on the trust property after Arnold’s death was that Donald
led them to believe it was their “Mother’s farm.” 	Dwayne paid
$1,000 in property taxes with the understanding that Arnold
needed the money. 	He did not intend to pay off taxes on land
that would soon be owned by Donald. 	And when the siblings
relinquished their interests via the 1978 quitclaim deed and
contributed other parcels of land to the farm property, they did
so with the understanding that they were assisting in clearing up
title problems so that Donald could litigate the dispute on their
behalf. 	The trial court found all of these benefits, along with
“other benefits from the use and negotiations relative to the
trust property,” to be conferred under circumstances that gave
rise to unjust enrichment.
¶43 	We hold that these findings were sufficient to support
the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust. 	The first
element of a claim for unjust enrichment--that the siblings
confer a benefit on Donald--has clearly been met. 	Further, as to
the second element, there can be no doubt that Donald was aware
of these benefits. 	He acknowledged in his testimony that he knew
that all of the siblings were contributing to the maintenance of
the farm property even though he was not. 	He redistributed small
amounts of the settlement proceeds to his siblings while keeping
the bulk for himself. 	And he prompted Dwayne to pay $1,000
toward the property taxes and made no attempt to return the money

57 970 P.2d at 1244-45. 	Because some of the land at issue
in Jeffs was situated in Arizona, we are aware that much of our
analysis in that case concerned the unjust enrichment law of
Arizona. 	See id. at 1243. 	But our holding regarding the
discretion a trial court should be afforded in an unjust
enrichment case was based on Utah law, and did not depend on the
substantive differences, if any, between the unjust enrichment
standards employed in Utah and Arizona. 	See id. at 1244-45.
58 See id. at 1244-45.
59 Id. at 1244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 	No. 20090059
after Arnold executed the deed purporting to transfer the land to
Donald.
¶44 	The dispute in this case centers on the third element
of a claim for unjust enrichment. 	The trial court found that,
for decades, Donald represented to his siblings that the farm
property was being used to support their mother. 	Their
contributions to the farm’s operation were made because they
believed these representations. 	Arnold’s management of the farm
in the years prior to his death reinforced the idea that the farm
was considered a family farm.
¶45 	In a manner consistent with our precedent, we decline
to weigh for ourselves the relative equities of these actions.
In Jeffs v. Stubbs, we announced our rationale for granting trial
courts broad discretion in imposing constructive trusts to remedy
unjust enrichment. 57 	The reasons for granting broad discretion
articulated in Jeffs play an important role in this case. 	First,
determining whether the circumstances surrounding the parties’
interactions were inequitable is a fact-intensive process for
which trial courts are uniquely suited. 58 	The nature of this
equitable determination requires balancing the ramifications of
an entire course of conduct. 	The trial court, having heard all
of the evidence in context, is in the best position to undertake
this balancing. 	Second, cases of unjust enrichment require the
trial judge to “observe[] ‘facts,’ such as a witness’s appearance
and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate
courts.” 59 	We are keenly aware that trial courts are in the best
position to make determinations about credibility and veracity.
This is especially the case where, as here, the legal standard
being applied requires the court to determine what is equitable.
We are also mindful that all of these observations will not
necessarily be included in the record on appeal.

60 Id. at 1245.
61 Our analysis in Jeffs was an application of a test
announced in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 1994).
See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244-45. 	We have subsequently modified
this test by eliminating a separate factor that analyzed whether
it was difficult to identify the “outcome determinative”
considerations underlying a body of law. 	See State v. Levin,
2006 UT 50, ¶ 29, 144 P.3d 1096 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	Although we found that portion of the analysis to be
unworkable, we noted that “in the rare instances where [it] may
be important, it could fall under the umbrella of other policy
considerations.” 	Id. ¶ 30. 	For this reason, we do not believe
that our reformulated version of this test would have led to a
different result in Jeffs. 	Nor do we believe it mandates a
different result here.
62 Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 18, 200 P.3d
662. 	The court of appeals also employed a standard for finding
unjust enrichment that differs slightly from the test we have
articulated in this opinion. 	We are unable to discern whether
this impacted the court of appeals’ conclusion, but given our
disposition under the correct standard, we need not examine
whether the court of appeals was led astray by use of this
different standard. 	To avoid future confusion, we take this
opportunity to address the appropriate circumstances for use of
the standard employed by the court of appeals.
Relying on our statements in Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., the
court of appeals stated, “‘[c]ourts recognize a constructive
trust as a matter of equity where there has been (1) a wrongful
act, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) specific property that can be
traced to the wrongful behavior.’” 	Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478,
¶ 16 (quoting Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, 2007 UT 39, ¶ 34, 164 P.3d
353). 	Instead of discussing Donald’s actions in terms of whether
his retention of benefits was inequitable, the court of appeals
(continued...)
No. 20090059 	22
¶46 	In Jeffs, these considerations led us to conclude that
we must “afford broad discretion to the trial court in its
application of unjust enrichment law to the facts.” 60 	We
reaffirm that conclusion here. 61
¶47 	The court of appeals’ decision does not appropriately
defer to the trial court’s judgment with regard to the claim for
unjust enrichment. 	Specifically, the court of appeals concluded
that the trial court had grafted equitable considerations into
its inquiry regarding Arnold’s intent to create an oral express
trust. 62 	But in so concluding, the court of appeals rejected

62 (...continued)
examined whether Donald’s conduct was “wrongful” within the
meaning of this test. 	Id. ¶¶ 16-17. 	Since this standard
requires unjust enrichment and a wrongful act, it suggests that
unjust enrichment, by itself, will not support a constructive
trust. 	This is incorrect.
Wilcox involved a situation where an insurer was forced into
involuntary liquidation. 	See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ¶ 7. 	The
insurer had paid Anchor Wate’s claim under circumstances that
constituted a preferential transfer under the Utah Insurers
Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. 	See id. ¶¶ 7-9. 	Such a
payment is roughly analogous to a preferential payment to one
creditor at the expense of other creditors in the context of
bankruptcy. 	See id. ¶ 11.
Anchor Wate argued that, by permitting the insurer to pay
less than the full value of Anchor Wate’s claim, the insurer was
unjustly enriched. 	See id. ¶¶ 34-38. 	Drawing on the bankruptcy
analogy, we stated
“[w]henever a debtor retains a benefit
afforded it by a creditor without paying
that creditor in full, the estate is
arguably ‘unjustly enriched.’ 	Yet this
situation is a result of a . . . policy
choice incorporated into [our statutes],
and born of the reality that an
insolvent debtor, by definition, is
unable to satisfy in full the debts owed
to its creditors. 	In light of this
. . . policy choice and the reality that
other similarly situated creditors are
also receiving less than full payment of
their claims, . . . retention of the
[d]isputed [f]unds subject to pro-rata
distribution is not ‘unjust’ under the
circumstances.”
Id. ¶ 36 (first alteration in original) (quoting First Sec. Bank
of Utah v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498, 507-08 (D. Utah 1993)).
We take this opportunity to clarify our articulation of the
rule in Wilcox. 	The requirement of a “wrongful act” was a
response to the unique nature of the claims in that case, and the
concession that unjust enrichment arguably occurs whenever a
debtor’s obligations are discharged by operation of law. 	See id.
¶ 34 (citing bankruptcy cases as the authority for employing this
standard); see also id. ¶ 11 (looking to bankruptcy law for
guidance because “federal bankruptcy law and the voidable
preference provisions of the Liquidation Act share the common
(continued...)
23 	No. 20090059

62 (...continued)
purpose of effectuating proportionate distribution of the
debtor’s assets among its creditors” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). 	In such situations, we will not impose a constructive
trust absent a showing of a “wrongful act.” 	Without the unique
considerations present in a preferential transfer case, or a
closely analogous case, we reaffirm our position that unjust
enrichment, in the traditional sense of an inequitable retention
of benefits, will support imposition of a constructive trust,
even absent wrongful conduct.
63 Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ¶ 17.
64 See Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1239-40.
65 See id.
66 See id.
No. 20090059 	24
the theory of unjust enrichment as a valid, alternative, and
independent theory on which the trial court’s imposition of a
constructive trust could legitimately rest.
¶48 	Further, the court of appeals concluded that “the only
wrongful act alleged by the Siblings is [Donald’s] failure to
comply with Arnold’s expressed intentions.” 63 	But this clearly
conflicts with the trial court’s findings regarding the siblings’
contributions to the farm property and their understanding that
Donald was acting in their interests. 	Even if Donald was the
legitimate owner of this property at all times after the 1967
transfer, he was not unequivocally entitled to retain the fruits
of his siblings’ labor on the farm, the amount of tax payments
Dwayne made with the understanding they would be used for
Arnold’s benefit, the value of the property transferred under the
siblings’ quitclaim deeds, the settlement proceeds from the 1978
dispute that were retained by Donald, and contributions by the
siblings of other property to Donald.
¶49 	Jeffs is instructive on this point as well. 	In that
case, the United Effort Plan Trust (the “UEP”) owned title to
land. 64 	Members of a religious group affiliated with the trust
were permitted to occupy the land. 65 	The UEP encouraged these
occupants to make improvements to the land by leading them to
believe they could occupy the land for their lifetimes. 66 	After
they were removed from the land, the occupants brought a number
of claims, including claims for unjust enrichment, against the

67 See id. at 1239.
68 See id. at 1246.
69 Id. at 1247 (quoting Restatement of Restitution § 40
cmt. d (1937)).
25 	No. 20090059
UEP. 67 	The UEP defended on the grounds that, because the
occupants knew the UEP held title to the land when they made
improvements, it was not unjust for the UEP to keep those
improvements even after the occupants were no longer permitted to
reside on the land. 68 	Relying on the Restatement of Restitution,
we rejected the UEP’s position, and held that “an owner ‘cannot
retain a benefit which knowingly he has permitted another to
confer upon him by mistake.’” 69 	The Restatement position carries
even more force in this case because here, unlike in Jeffs, the
siblings did not know for decades that Donald claimed title to
the land. 	Put simply, even if the court of appeals correctly
concluded that Donald owned the farm property, this did not
insulate Donald’s conduct from being inequitable.
¶50 	Thus, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial
court’s judgment that Donald had been unjustly enriched. 	The
trial court found that a number of benefits had been conferred on
Donald by the siblings because of the siblings’ understanding
that the land was being used as a family farm. 	Rather than
assert his ownership of the land, Donald accepted and retained
these benefits. 	Given the broad discretion that we afford trial
courts when they apply the law to the facts in unjust enrichment
cases, we hold that the court of appeals erred in reversing the
trial court’s judgment. 	The trial court’s legal conclusion was
not absolutely precluded as the court of appeals determined, but
was adequately supported. 	We therefore reverse the judgment of
the court of appeals, and affirm the trial court’s imposition of
a constructive trust in favor of the siblings.
CONCLUSION
¶51 	We hold that the trial court acted within the bounds of
its discretion in imposing a constructive trust in favor of the
siblings. 	Unjust enrichment is a cause of action separate from
an attempt to prove the existence of an oral express trust.
Thus, even if the siblings have failed to prove the existence of
an oral express trust in this case, something we assume without
deciding, they were still free to pursue their claim of unjust
enrichment as an independent cause of action. 	The trial court
explicitly found that Donald had been unjustly enriched, and
numerous of its factual findings support that judgment. 	Given

No. 20090059 	26
the broad discretion that must necessarily be afforded trial
courts when they apply the law of unjust enrichment to the facts
of a given case, we disagree with the court of appeals’
conclusion that imposition of a constructive trust was not an
available or appropriate remedy in this case. 	The judgment of
the court of appeals is therefore reversed.
---
¶52 	Chief Justice Durham, Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant’s
opinion.