Muir v. Wasatch Front Waste and Recycling

2024 UT App 48

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUZANNE M. MUIR,
Appellant,
v.
WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT AND
JASON L. GATES,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20221054-CA
Filed April 4, 2024

Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan
No. 220902274

Joshua P. Berrett, Attorney for Appellant
Gregory N. Hoole, Attorney for Appellees

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Suzanne M. Muir and Jason L. Gates were involved in a
vehicular collision between Muir’s SUV and a garbage truck
driven by Gates but owned by Wasatch Front Waste & Recycling
District (Wasatch). Over two years after the collision, Muir filed
suit against Wasatch and Gates alleging negligence on the part of
Gates and vicarious liability on the part of Wasatch. She sought
damages for her ongoing and future pain, suffering, and injuries.
Wasatch and Gates filed a motion to dismiss, contending that
Muir’s suit was untimely because it had been commenced after
the two-year statute of limitations provided by the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah (the GIA) had expired. The district court
ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice.
Muir v. Wasatch Front

¶2 Muir now appeals, arguing that the court’s application of
the GIA was incorrect. She contends that her “notice” of
Wasatch’s status as a governmental entity was not triggered until
weeks after the collision occurred and, therefore, that the statute
of limitations was tolled until such time as she “should have
known” about Wasatch’s governmental status. Because the
district court correctly applied the statute of limitations, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

¶3 On March 16, 2020, while driving her SUV, Muir was
involved in a collision with a garbage truck driven by Gates. 2
Immediately following the collision, the drivers exchanged
information, and each received a Driver Exchange of Information
form from the police officer who responded to the scene. The
information form specified that the garbage truck was owned by
“WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLE” and insured through
“GOVERNMENT TRUST.” Within a few days, Muir retained
counsel, and on March 20, 2020, counsel faxed a letter of
representation and a request for confirmation of policies to
Wasatch’s insurance carrier, identifying “Your Insured” as
“WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT.” On
April 15, 2020, Muir received a response from the insurance

1. When we review a court’s decision regarding a motion to
dismiss, “we accept all facts alleged as true, and indulge all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” HKS Architects Inc.
v. MSM Enters. LTD, 2021 UT App 70, ¶ 17, 496 P.3d 228
(quotation simplified).

2. Because the underlying facts of the collision are not disputed,
we have no need to recount them here.

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

carrier on the letterhead of “Constitutional State Services, TPA[3]
For Utah Local Governments Trust.” There, the matter sat for
many months, and then on March 3, 2021, Muir filed a notice of
claim consistent with the requirements of the GIA. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63G-7-401, -402 (LexisNexis 2019 & Supp. 2023).

¶4 On April 12, 2022, Muir filed her complaint against Gates
and Wasatch, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. The
defendants responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that
Muir’s complaint was untimely and should be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” see
Utah R. Civ. P 12(b)(6), because the suit was commenced after the
two-year statute of limitations specified by the GIA had expired,
see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). 4
The defendants contended that a claim governed by the GIA
arises “when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run,” see id.
§ 63G-7-401(1)(a), but acknowledged that the statute of limitations
may be tolled until such time as “a claimant knew, or with the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known: (i) that the
claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or the
governmental entity’s employee; and (ii) the identity of the
governmental entity or the name of the employee,” id.
§ 63G-7-401(1)(b). Quoting our Supreme Court’s decision in
Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156, the
defendants asserted that “Utah law mandates strict compliance
with the requirements of the [GIA],” id. ¶ 12, and that a plaintiff’s

3. “TPA” is an abbreviation for third-party administrator.

4. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at
the relevant time do not differ from those currently in effect in any
way material to this appeal, we cite the current version of the code
for convenience.

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

“failure to comply . . . requires a trial court to dismiss a
complaint,” id. ¶ 16.

¶5 Muir opposed the motion to dismiss. She principally
contended that her complaint was timely because she “lacked
notice—actual, constructive, or inquiry—that Wasatch . . . was a
governmental entity” and under the GIA, the two-year statute of
limitations may be tolled until such time as she “knew, or with the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,” that she had
a claim against a governmental entity and the identity of the
governmental entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(1)(b).

¶6 Muir argued that the defendants “failed to show” how she
should have known about Wasatch’s status as a governmental
entity earlier. 5 She further asserted that, following the collision,
she had diligently tried to identify Wasatch’s status. She

5. In so arguing, Muir seemingly misunderstood section
63G-7-401(1)(c) of the Utah Code. Under this section, “The burden
to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the
claimant.” Therefore, while Muir is correct in arguing that
Wasatch did not “show” how she should have exercised
reasonable diligence, this was not Wasatch’s burden; it was
Muir’s.
We previously addressed reasonable diligence in McTee v.
Weber Center Condominium Ass’n, 2016 UT App 134, 379 P.3d 41.
In that case, we determined that “reasonable diligence under the
statute seems to require that a person who suffered an injury take
the steps that someone of ordinary prudence would take to
discern whether she had a claim and whether it was against a
particular governmental entity.” Id. ¶ 16 (quotation simplified).
We noted that “the reasonable diligence standard does not require
a plaintiff to exhaust all possibilities,” but “a plaintiff who focuses
on only one or two sources, while turning a blind eye to the
existence of other available sources, falls short of this standard.”
Id. (quotation simplified).

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

contended that her research, which included Wasatch’s corporate
webpage, multiple web searches, and multiple police reports, did
not point her to anything suggesting that Wasatch was a
governmental entity. To the contrary, she argued, Wasatch’s
website included the top-level domain designation of “.org,”
which she argued was more indicative of a private entity—as
opposed to the “.gov” designation, which would be more clearly
indicative of a governmental entity. Based on her research, Muir
contended that there were no practical indications that she
“should have known” that Wasatch was a governmental entity or
that her claim fell under the GIA until April 15, 2020, when she
received the insurance carrier’s letter on the letterhead of
“Constitutional State Services, TPA For Utah Local Governments
Trust.” She contended that this case should be distinguished from
Amundsen v. University of Utah, 2019 UT 49, 448 P.3d 1224, in
which our Supreme Court held that there were numerous clear
indicators that a physician working at a University of Utah clinic
was working for a governmental entity. See id. ¶ 35. She asserted
that before receiving the letter on April 15, 2020, any information
she had been given or had obtained was insufficient to put her on
inquiry notice regarding Wasatch’s status and the applicability of
the GIA’s abbreviated statute of limitations.

¶7 Muir also argued that “the question of when a plaintiff
knew or should have known sufficient facts to trigger a statute of
limitations presents a classic factual dispute that should be
resolved by the finder of fact.” See Arnold v. Grigsby, 2010 UT App
226, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 294 (quotation simplified), aff’d on other grounds,
2012 UT 61, 289 P.3d 449. But she recognized that “[w]here the
evidence is so clear that there is no genuine factual issue, . . . the
determination can be made as a matter of law.”

¶8 In its reply, the defendants made two arguments. First,
they argued that Muir bore the burden to show reasonable
diligence because the GIA plainly indicates that “[t]he burden to
prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant.”

20221054-CA 5 2024 UT App 48
Muir v. Wasatch Front

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(1)(c). Second, they asserted Muir
had actual or, at the very least, inquiry notice of Wasatch’s status
because the information form provided to Muir on the very date
of the collision, March 16, 2020, clearly showed that Wasatch
owned the garbage truck and that it was insured by
“GOVERNMENT TRUST.” Additionally, the defendants pointed
to the letter Muir sent to Wasatch’s insurance carrier on March 20,
2020, that listed Wasatch’s full name as “WASATCH FRONT
WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT,” with the “district” reference
further demonstrating that Muir “knew” or “should have known”
that she was “dealing with a government district.” Thus, the
defendants argued, the information possessed by Muir “would
have removed any doubt” about Wasatch’s status or, at the very
least, triggered a duty of inquiry that could have easily been
satisfied with a simple phone call on March 20, 2022, or a day or
two thereafter. The defendants argued that based on the
information form and the insurance letter, “no reasonable juror
could conclude that [Muir] did not have either actual notice or
inquiry notice” and, thus, no genuine issue of fact precluded
dismissal.

¶9 The district court heard argument on the motion to
dismiss. The parties’ arguments were consistent with their written
submissions. Ruling from the bench and later memorializing its
ruling in a written order, the court concluded that the defendants’
arguments were “well placed and well taken,” and the court
dismissed the case with prejudice.

¶10 Muir appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Muir contends that the district court incorrectly
determined that she “knew” or “should have known” that
Wasatch was a governmental entity before April 12, 2020—the
date two years before she filed her complaint—and, therefore, that

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

the court erred in dismissing her complaint as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The
propriety of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
a question of law that we review for correctness.” HKS Architects
Inc. v. MSM Enters. LTD, 2021 UT App 70, ¶ 17, 496 P.3d 228
(quotation simplified). Accordingly, “we accept all facts alleged
as true, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Id. (quotation simplified). 6 Such a motion should be
granted “only when, assuming the truth of the allegations that a
party has made and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to that party, it is clear that the party is
not entitled to relief.” Calsert v. Estate of Flores, 2020 UT App 102,
¶ 9, 470 P.3d 464 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶12 The question before us is whether the court correctly
determined that Muir’s complaint was untimely. This question
turns on whether Muir exercised reasonable diligence in inquiring

6. In briefing the motion to dismiss, both sides filed additional
materials for the district court’s consideration. Neither side
objected. The court considered this supplemental information,
and Muir does not claim the court erred in this regard. See
generally Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“If, on a motion asserting the
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion must be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties must be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.”). The materials are part of the record
on appeal, and we likewise have considered them in deciding this
case.

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

into Wasatch’s governmental status, given her early knowledge
that Wasatch was a “district” and was insured by
“GOVERNMENT TRUST.” We perceive no error in the court’s
dismissal of Muir’s complaint.

¶13 In Utah, the GIA governs, among other things, “all claims
against governmental entities or against their employees or
agents arising out of the performance of the employee’s duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority.”
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2019). A claim is
“any asserted demand for or cause of action for money or
damages . . . against a governmental entity or against an employee
in the employee’s personal capacity.” Id. § 63G-7-102(2) (Supp.
2023). “[A] claim arises when the statute of limitations that would
apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.” Id.
§ 63G-7-401(1)(a). See Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 11, 445 P.3d
521 (“A statute of limitations begins to run when the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action occurs.”) (quotation
simplified). The GIA imposes an abbreviated statute of limitations
that specifies that “a claimant shall commence the action within
two years after the claim arises,” 7 Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-403(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023), but provides that the
statute of limitations may be tolled until such time as “a claimant
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known: (i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental
entity or the governmental entity’s employee; and (ii) the identity
of the governmental entity or the name of the employee,” id.

7. The GIA statute of limitations cuts off claims arising from
vehicular accidents by half the usual time. Ordinarily, “a
four-year statute of limitations applies to the filing of a personal
injury lawsuit based on negligence.” McTee v. Weber Center Condo.
Ass’n, 2016 UT App 134, ¶ 12, 379 P.3d 41. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-2-307(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023) (“An action may be
brought within four years . . . for a claim involving personal
property damage to the aggrieved party’s motor vehicle[.]”).

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

§ 63G-7-401(1)(b) (emphasis added). Importantly for the case
before us, “[t]he burden to prove the exercise of reasonable
diligence is upon the claimant.” Id. § 63G-7-401(1)(c). In reviewing
these claims, Utah appellate courts “consistently have interpreted
the [GIA] to require strict compliance by plaintiffs.” GeoMetWatch
Corp. v. Utah State Univ. Rsch. Found., 2018 UT 50, ¶ 58, 428 P.3d
1064 (quotation simplified). See Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001
UT 109, ¶ 12, 37 P.3d 1156 (noting that Utah courts impose “strict
compliance with the requirements of” the GIA).

¶14 It is undisputed that Muir was involved in a collision with
Wasatch’s garbage truck on March 16, 2020, and that she filed her
complaint more than two years later on April 12, 2022. Assuming
the truth of the facts asserted in her complaint, Muir’s complaint
was obviously filed beyond the GIA’s two-year statute of
limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403(2)(b). The GIA
indicates that “a claim arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to
run,” id. § 63G-7-401(1)(a), and generally, “the statute of
limitations begins to run when the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action occurs,” Thomas, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 11
(quotation simplified). Therefore, because Muir’s complaint
hinged solely on the collision, the statute of limitations would
have run from the date of the collision and, accordingly, Muir’s
complaint would be untimely if the general rule applied.

¶15 But as previously noted, the GIA provides that the statute
of limitations “does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or,”
as relevant here, “with the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known,” that the claim was “against the governmental
entity.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(1)(b)(i). And as explained
above, the burden to demonstrate reasonable diligence is borne
by the plaintiff. See id. § 63G-7-401(1)(c).

¶16 Muir contended that she was unaware of Wasatch’s status
until she received the letter on April 15, 2020, from Constitutional

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State Services. Thus, she insists, her complaint was timely when
she filed it on April 12, 2022. Her complaint explained that in the
four days following the collision, Muir visited Wasatch’s website
and that she performed various other inquiries into Wasatch
sufficient to establish its full name. But despite having all this
information, Muir contended that she “lacked notice—actual,
constructive, or inquiry—that Wasatch . . . was a governmental
entity until weeks or months following the crash.”

¶17 We are not persuaded. Utah has long held that “inquiry
notice occurs when circumstances arise that should put a
reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his
part.” First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 838
(Utah 1998) (quotation simplified). “Whatever is notice enough to
excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry
is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led.
When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he
shall be deemed conversant of it.” Id. (quotation simplified). In
Salt Lake, Garfield & Western Railway Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 291
P.2d 883 (Utah 1955), our Supreme Court addressed the nature of
a plaintiff’s inquiry notice. In that case, the Court reasoned that
“means of knowledge and knowledge itself, are in legal effect, the
same thing where there is enough to put a party on inquiry.” Id.
at 885 (quotation simplified). The Court further explained:

A person has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to
avoid information, and then say that he had no
notice; he does wrong not to heed the signs and
signals seen by him. It will not do to remain
wil[l]fully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable,
and it is no excuse for failure to make an inquiry,
that if made, it might have failed to develop the
truth.

Id. at 885–86 (quotation simplified). Thus, we must determine if
Muir had a duty of inquiry notice—assuming her knowledge that

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

the garbage truck was owned by a waste and recycling district
and that it was insured by “GOVERNMENT TRUST” was
somehow not enough to disclose governmental involvement—
and, if so, whether the court correctly determined that she did not
demonstrate that she exercised reasonable diligence in tying
down that important detail more definitely.

¶18 In Amundsen v. University of Utah, 2019 UT 49, 448 P.3d
1224, the plaintiff argued that her many visits to a University of
Utah clinic for repeated consultations were insufficient to put her
on inquiry notice about her physician’s status as a government
employee. See id. ¶¶ 28, 30. Our Supreme Court concluded that a
simple inquiry about the physician’s status was a reasonable
expectation when coupled with the informational indicators
presented. See id. ¶¶ 32–41. Similarly, in the case at hand, Muir
was presented with several indicators that Wasatch was a
governmental entity, triggering her duty of demonstrating
reasonable diligence in getting information that would confirm or
dispel that likelihood.

¶19 First, the insurance form provided directly to Muir
following the collision indicated that the garbage truck involved
in the collision was insured by “GOVERNMENT TRUST.” While
it is conceivable that including “government” in a name is not
dispositive on the question of whether the government is
involved, it is surely sufficient to suggest that it may well be and
sufficient to pique a reasonable person’s duty to inquire further to
confirm or dispel the distinct possibility that it is.

¶20 Second, the complaint acknowledged that Muir undertook
additional inquiry to establish Wasatch’s status. Muir again
correctly argues that victims of car crashes are not required to do
a “‘deep dive’ through the internet” to determine governmental
status. But as our Supreme Court held in Amundsen, a direct
inquiry asking about a party’s governmental status is not overly
burdensome and, due to its relative ease and resulting clarity, can

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

demonstrate a plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence. See id.
¶¶ 39, 41. The website Muir visited—and screenshots of what she
saw were attached to her memorandum in opposition to
Wasatch’s motion to dismiss—included phone numbers and an
email address. Neither Muir nor her attorney said they called and
asked whether Wasatch was a private company or a
governmental entity. While Muir reads much into the website
address ending in “.org” rather than “.gov,” neither Muir nor her
attorney claimed to have sent an email to the address provided
inquiring as to Wasatch’s possible governmental status.

¶21 Finally, Muir’s complaint acknowledged that within four
days, she knew, with our emphasis, that Wasatch’s full name was
“WASATCH FRONT WASTE & RECYCLING DISTRICT.” Muir
is correct that there are businesses or other entities that might
choose to include “district” in their names for any number of
reasons. And simply including “district” in a name is not a
dispositive indicator of status as a governmental entity. The
District, for example, is a shopping mall in South Jordan, Utah.
And District Coffee Co. does business in downtown Salt Lake
City. But districts that are governmental entities abound: water
districts, sewer districts, school districts, mosquito abatement
districts, district courts, and so on. Given this reality, one cannot
turn a blind eye to the distinct possibility that “district” may well
connote governmental involvement. One must at least exercise
reasonable diligence by inquiring about that possibility. And
Muir did not claim that she or her attorney did so, much less that
she or her attorney inquired and were misled.

¶22 In sum, immediately following the collision, Muir was
presented with the identity of Wasatch’s insurance carrier, which
had “GOVERNMENT” in its name, and within four days she
knew Wasatch’s full name, which included “DISTRICT.” These
terms were sufficient to put her on inquiry notice. And the district
court correctly concluded that Muir did not demonstrate that she

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Muir v. Wasatch Front

exercised reasonable diligence to determine Wasatch’s
governmental status. 8

CONCLUSION

¶23 Muir’s complaint was filed more than two years after the
collision that gave rise to her claim. Several indicators suggested
the likelihood that the garbage truck with which Muir collided
was owned by a governmental entity. She is charged with a duty
of inquiry concerning whether such was indeed the case and had
the burden to prove that she exercised reasonable diligence in
ascertaining whether a governmental entity indeed owned the
truck. The district court correctly concluded that she did not
allege facts that, if true, would meet that burden. We therefore
affirm its decision dismissing her complaint with prejudice.

8. As previously noted, see supra ¶ 3, Muir managed to file her
pre-suit notice of claim within one year of the collision, as
required by Utah Code section 63G-7-402.

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