State v. Curwick

2026 UT App 90

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL CURWICK,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240348-CA
Filed June 11, 2026

Third District Court, Silver Summit Department
The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik
No. 231500076

Freyja Johnson, Rachel Phillips Ainscough, and
Jessica Hyde Holzer, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Aubrey Bisbee,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 After Michael Curwick was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, the district court entered an order of restitution that
included an amount for lost wages for the kidnapping victim’s
mother (Mother). On appeal, Curwick asserts the district court
erred in imposing restitution for Mother’s lost wages, claiming the
State presented insufficient evidence of causation. We disagree
and affirm the district court’s restitution order.
State v. Curwick

BACKGROUND 1

The Aggravated Kidnapping

¶2 On July 9, 2021, Curwick was involved in an altercation
with a woman (Victim) who was staying with him in his
apartment. Early that morning, Curwick became angry and began
to accuse Victim of stealing from him. After Victim denied his
accusation, Curwick “start[ed] to flip out.” He grabbed Victim by
the neck and “held her up against the wall.” Over the next few
hours, Curwick continued to detain Victim. During this time, he
screamed at her, hit her in the face with a book and a large metal
flashlight, and kicked her in the ribs. At one point, Curwick
grabbed Victim by the hair and began whipping her around “like
a rag doll.” He then grabbed a pair of scissors and began “sawing”
off chunks of her hair. Curwick repeatedly threatened to kill
Victim and “told [her] directly [she] couldn’t leave.” Before the
police eventually intervened, Curwick made Victim write down
the names and addresses of family members “so he could go after
them, too.” 2

1. Our recitation of the facts is taken from Curwick’s trial,
sentencing, and restitution hearing. “Concerning the facts giving
rise to [Curwick’s] convictions, we review the record facts in a
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite them
accordingly.” State v. Watson, 2021 UT App 37, n.1, 485 P.3d 946
(cleaned up). Otherwise, “we recite the facts consistent with the
district court’s factual findings made in support of its restitution
order.” State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127, n.2, 521 P.3d 920.

2. Both Victim and Mother asserted that Curwick had threatened
Victim’s family members. We note that while the district court
found it was Mother’s “genuine belief” that Curwick had
threatened her, it never made an explicit factual finding on the
(continued…)

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State v. Curwick

¶3 Curwick was subsequently convicted of aggravated
kidnapping. 3 Afterward, Mother submitted a letter to the court
describing the negative effects both she and Victim continued to
experience as a result of Curwick’s crime, such as “interrupted
sleep, anxi[ety], panic, seclusion, fears,” post-traumatic stress, and
missed work.

The Order of Restitution

¶4 After Curwick’s sentencing, the State filed a motion
requesting restitution for Victim, Mother, and the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime (UOVC). The request included $7,259.34 in lost
wages for Mother—some of which had been reimbursed by
UOVC. The State provided proof of Mother’s employment and
income, a computation of the total number of work hours Mother
had missed “as a result of the kidnapping and assault of her
daughter,” and a list of payments made by UOVC. According to
the State, Mother had “missed work because of trauma” and “to
attend court hearings.” In support of that contention, the State
provided the following pieces of evidence.

¶5 First, the State presented a form completed by Mother’s
health care provider, documenting that she had been diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The provider
indicated Mother had first been seen on July 21, 2021, and was
experiencing “PTSD [and] panic attacks w[ith] labile emotions,”

record as to whether Curwick had done so or not. Curwick has
not asserted on appeal that he never made such threats, so we
view this fact as “consistent with” the court’s factual findings. See
Calata, 2022 UT App 127, n.2.

3. Curwick was also convicted of several other offenses not
relevant here. We further note that Curwick previously appealed
his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and this court affirmed
his conviction in an unpublished order.

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State v. Curwick

chest pain, and symptoms “related to mania” as a result of the
incident involving Victim. When asked about any “pre-existing
impairment,” the provider listed Mother’s history of “well-
controlled anxiety and depression” but noted that Mother’s
“diagnosed condition” of PTSD “result[ed] from [the] reported
incident.” Based on the diagnosis, Mother’s provider estimated
Mother would be unable to work from July 9, 2021, to September
30, 2021.

¶6 Second, the State also provided several claim forms that
Mother had filled out and submitted to UOVC for the days she
missed work. When asked to “specify the reason for missed work
and how it [was] related to the crime,” Mother explained, “The
perpetrator kidnapped my daughter. He threat[ened] to kill her,
me[,] and her siblings. He researched my add[ress],” and “I
attended the court. On court days I am too overwhelmed to think
and I cry all day [and] I talk with my daughter with updates and
support.”

¶7 Finally, the State submitted a sworn declaration from one
of UOVC’s restitution specialists (Restitution Specialist)
explaining Victim’s and Mother’s applications for assistance. The
declaration explained the steps UOVC had taken to determine
eligibility, such as reviewing the police report from the incident.
As to Mother’s lost wages, the declaration stated Mother “missed
work both for mental health concerns caused by [Curwick’s]
criminal conduct[] and to attend [Curwick’s] court proceedings.”
It explained that UOVC contacted Mother’s employer; “contacted
[Mother’s] mental health provider, who confirmed that [Mother]
was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of the criminal incident, and
that it left her unable to work from July 9, 2021, to September 30,
2021”; and also obtained “confirmation from court employees that
[Mother] had in fact attended court to verify lost wages for
attending court proceedings.”

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State v. Curwick

¶8 The district court held a restitution hearing at which the
State offered this same evidence. After hearing arguments, the
court ruled from the bench. It found, among other things, that the
evidence “support[ed] a finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that . . . Curwick’s criminal conduct proximately caused
[Mother’s] loss of income.” The court concluded that the medical
form, Mother’s written statements, and Restitution Specialist’s
declaration, “[t]aken together,” were sufficient to show proximate
cause. Accordingly, the court ordered Curwick to pay restitution
in an amount that included Mother’s lost wages.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Curwick challenges the district court’s order of restitution
for Mother’s lost wages as lacking sufficient evidence of
proximate cause. “We review a district court’s finding of
proximate cause for clear error. Thus, when a defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support a restitution order,
the defendant must demonstrate that the clear weight of the
evidence contradicts the court’s ruling.” State v. Murray, 2023 UT
App 52, ¶ 37, 530 P.3d 982 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Evidence of Proximate Cause

¶10 The Crime Victims Restitution Act provides that a
convicted defendant shall be ordered “to pay restitution to all
victims” “(i) in accordance with the terms of any plea agreement
in the case; or (ii) for the entire amount of pecuniary damages that
are proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of

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State v. Curwick

the defendant.” 4 Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a). In this context,
“the proximate cause standard requires a showing that the crime,
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produced the injury and that the injury would not have
occurred absent the crime.” State v. Murray, 2023 UT App 52, ¶ 36,
530 P.3d 982 (cleaned up). “The burden is on the State to prove
proximate cause,” which “requires proof of two elements: (1) but-
for causation and (2) foreseeable harm.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Furthermore, a [district] court’s restitution award must rely on a
sufficient evidentiary basis, and it may award restitution only in
cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where the
commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury
or damages.” State v. Devore, 2026 UT App 33, ¶ 41, 587 P.3d 1007
(cleaned up).

¶11 Here, Curwick contends the district court erred “by
ordering restitution for Mother’s lost wages without adequate
evidence of causation.” He asserts the medical form, Mother’s
written statements, and Restitution Specialist’s declaration “did
not support that Mother’s lost wages were proximately caused by
[his] conduct.” The State, in turn, argues the court correctly relied
not only on those documents but also on Mother’s victim impact
letter. In response, Curwick argues “[t]he district court did not
indicate that it relied on Mother’s victim impact letter to support
its proximate cause determination” and, even if it had, the letter
would “not tip the scales.” But we need not determine whether
the district court considered Mother’s letter because, even without

4. While Mother was not a direct victim of the aggravated
kidnapping, the statute broadly defines a victim as “any person
who has suffered pecuniary damages that are proximately caused
by the criminal conduct of the defendant,” including “a parent . . .
of a victim.” Utah Code § 77-38b-102(27)(a), (b)(iv).

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State v. Curwick

it, the court was presented with sufficient evidence of proximate
cause. 5

A. The Medical Form

¶12 The State’s evidence that Curwick’s criminal conduct
proximately caused Mother’s lost wages included the medical
form filled out by Mother’s health care provider. According to the
form, Mother’s provider diagnosed her with PTSD and estimated
she would be unable to work for approximately twelve weeks
because of the crime. Curwick contends the court was wrong to
rely on the medical form, arguing the form did not attribute
Mother’s trauma to the kidnapping or contain any “medical
opinion or conclusion” that Mother’s preexisting mental health
conditions “were exacerbated by [his] actions.” Curwick is
mistaken. The provider noted Mother had a history of “well-
controlled anxiety [and] depression” but specifically indicated
that Mother’s PTSD diagnosis “result[ed] from” the criminal
incident. (Emphasis added.) The medical form was thus direct
evidence of the causal relationship between Curwick’s conduct
and Mother’s PTSD and subsequent inability to work.

B. Mother’s Written Statements

¶13 The State also presented several claim forms that Mother
had personally filled out and submitted to UOVC. The forms
contained written statements from Mother describing her reasons
for missing work, asserting Curwick had threatened to kill her
and Victim and describing the crime’s effect on her mental health
and ability to work (e.g., “On court days I am too overwhelmed
to think and I cry all day . . . .”). Curwick challenges the sufficiency
of these statements for a variety of reasons, including
characterizing them as a poor substitute for sworn testimony.

5. Curwick has not argued foreseeability on appeal, so we
consider only whether the State proved but-for causation.

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State v. Curwick

While his criticism may go to the relative evidentiary weight of
Mother’s statements, those statements still provided at least some
evidence of causation.

C. Restitution Specialist’s Declaration

¶14 Finally, the State’s evidence of proximate cause included
the sworn declaration from Restitution Specialist. The declaration
explained Mother’s application for assistance from UOVC and the
steps UOVC had taken to determine her eligibility. Curwick
argues the district court’s reliance on Restitution Specialist’s
declaration was improper, pointing to our decision in State v.
Blake, 2022 UT App 104, 517 P.3d 414.

¶15 In Blake, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution to
reimburse UOVC for its payment of a victim’s medical bills. See
id. ¶ 7. The State had presented a bare-bones list of payments
made by UOVC and proffered testimony from two UOVC
representatives regarding “the standard processes the office
usually employed before authorizing any payment.” Id. ¶¶ 4–6.
“Neither representative had personal knowledge regarding the
payments in question, but they explained that before UOVC
would authorize a payment, a claims analyst would . . . verify that
the treatment received was ‘crime-related.’” Id. ¶ 6. The State
argued that UOVC’s authorization of the payments was “proof
enough” that the victim’s medical bills were proximately caused
by the defendant’s conduct. Id. We reversed the district court’s
order of restitution, explaining that “a restitution order based
almost exclusively on such trust in UOVC’s methods and its
assessment of ‘crime-relatedness’ inappropriately delegates the
determination of proximate cause to UOVC” and concluding that
“the evidence presented by the State was not sufficient to allow
the court to make its own, independent determination as to
causation.” Id. ¶¶ 12–13 (cleaned up).

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State v. Curwick

¶16 Here, Curwick argues that by relying on Restitution
Specialist’s statements, the district court did what Blake forbade.
But Curwick takes our holding in Blake too far; while a district
court may not simply treat UOVC’s ultimate determination of
“crime-relatedness” as sufficient evidence of proximate cause, id.
¶ 12, it does not follow that the court may not rely upon any
statements from UOVC.

¶17 This distinction is demonstrated in State v. Murray, 2023 UT
App 52, 530 P.3d 982. There, the district court issued a restitution
order that included the victim’s lost wages that had been
reimbursed by UOVC. See id. ¶¶ 1, 7. At the restitution hearing,
the State presented testimony from a UOVC representative
regarding UOVC’s handling of the victim’s application for
assistance. See id. ¶ 9. As to the victim’s lost wages, the
representative testified about the extent of the victim’s missed
work, including that UOVC had received documentation from the
victim’s employer as well as a corroborating “health provider
statement.” Id. ¶ 10. The State also presented testimony from the
victim, who testified “about the effects of the [crime] on her
psyche and her ability to function.” Id. ¶ 40.

¶18 We subsequently affirmed the district court’s order of
restitution for the victim’s lost wages, noting that the victim’s
testimony, “coupled with the evidence presented by UOVC about
the days that she missed at work, was sufficient to support the
court’s finding that [the defendant’s] criminal conduct
proximately caused [the victim] to miss this work, thereby
causing these damages.” Id. ¶ 49. Murray thus illustrates that there
are circumstances in which a district court may properly consider
statements from UOVC when evaluating proximate cause. While
the court may not substitute UOVC’s judgment for its own,
evidence of the steps taken and information gathered by UOVC
in a victim’s case may often be useful to the court when making

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“its own, independent determination as to causation.” 6 See Blake,
2022 UT App 104, ¶ 13 (cleaned up).

¶19 Here, like in Murray, the declaration from Restitution
Specialist contained specific details about the approval process for
Mother’s claims, such as UOVC contacting Mother’s mental
health provider to confirm that she was unable to work for several
months due to her PTSD from the kidnapping incident. The
district court did not err by relying on that information. And like
the other evidence presented by the State, Restitution Specialist’s
declaration also showed that Mother’s lost wages were caused by
Curwick’s criminal conduct.

¶20 In sum, having reviewed the evidence presented to the
district court—including the medical form, Mother’s written
statements, and Restitution Specialist’s declaration—we are not
persuaded that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of
proximate cause. We agree with the district court that, “[t]aken
together,” the State’s evidence was sufficient to establish that
Curwick proximately caused Mother’s lost wages.

CONCLUSION

¶21 Because Curwick has not demonstrated that the clear
weight of the evidence contradicts the district court’s ruling, we
affirm the order of restitution requiring him to pay Mother’s lost
wages.

6. Curwick places great importance on the presence of victim
testimony in Murray. But victim testimony is not required for a
district court to consider evidence from UOVC. See State v. Blake,
2025 UT 21, ¶¶ 43–44, 582 P.3d 705 (upholding a restitution order
supported only by materials and testimony provided by UOVC).

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