Hasemeyer v. Lefevre

2026 UT App 70

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ERIC HASEMEYER,
Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW LEFEVRE,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20250527-CA
Filed May 7, 2026

Fifth District Court, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Meb Anderson
No. 250500047

Justin W. Starr and Jonathan M. Burt,
Attorneys for Appellant
James W. Jensen, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred except
as to Part I(C), which represents the views of JUDGE TENNEY
alone.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Matthew LeFevre and Eric Hasemeyer are neighbors in a
rural part of southern Utah. LeFevre believes that he has an
easement that runs across the top of Hasemeyer’s property, and
LeFevre plans to use that easement to build an access road to
reach an undeveloped part of his property. On three occasions in
late 2024 and early 2025, LeFevre entered Hasemeyer’s property
with his tractor. On the first two of these occasions, LeFevre began
grading his planned road, destroying trees and vegetation as he
did. On the third occasion, LeFevre drove his tractor at
Hasemeyer’s wife before stopping the tractor and having a verbal
confrontation with Hasemeyer and his wife.
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶2 Hasemeyer subsequently obtained an ex parte civil
stalking injunction that prohibited LeFevre from accessing
Hasemeyer’s property. LeFevre challenged the ex parte civil
stalking injunction, but after an evidentiary hearing, the district
court re-issued it.

¶3 LeFevre now appeals the civil stalking injunction, and he
raises four issues for our review. First, LeFevre argues that the
court erred in concluding that his conduct satisfied the statutory
elements for such an injunction. Second, LeFevre argues that the
court erred when it improperly delayed scheduling the
evidentiary hearing. Third, LeFevre argues that the court was
legally prohibited from issuing the civil stalking injunction
because there was a pending civil case about the easement.
Finally, LeFevre challenges the scope of the civil stalking
injunction.

¶4 For the reasons set forth below, we see no reversible error
and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

The Disputed Easement

¶5 Hasemeyer and LeFevre are neighbors in a rural part of
southern Utah. Hasemeyer and his wife (Wife) moved into their
house in 2018, and LeFevre and his wife moved into their house
sometime thereafter. An easement of some sort historically ran
through the north end of Hasemeyer’s property and connected to
LeFevre’s property. Hasemeyer believes that the easement no
longer exists, while LeFevre believes that it still does. The

1. “In the context of a civil stalking injunction, we will recite the
facts in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings.”
Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, n.1, 530 P.3d 945 (quotation
simplified).

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

disputed easement is only accessible through a locked county
gate. LeFevre hopes to build a house on an undeveloped portion
of his property that he would access using the disputed easement.

Incidents Giving Rise to the Stalking Injunction

¶6 The events that gave rise to this case began with a
confrontation that occurred on October 14, 2024 (the October
incident). That day, LeFevre asked Hasemeyer if he could borrow
a key to the county gate. In making this request, LeFevre did not
say why he needed the key.2 Hasemeyer was mowing his back
lawn at the time, and he provided the key. A short time later,
Hasemeyer “saw trees moving and falling down” toward the back
of his property. Hasemeyer went to the back of his property and
found that LeFevre had destroyed two or three mature trees with
his tractor. When Hasemeyer confronted LeFevre and asked him
what he was doing, LeFevre responded that he was removing the
trees because he had an easement. Hasemeyer later said that this
put him “in a state of extreme emotional distress” and that he
vomited in the backyard as a result. LeFevre stopped removing
trees after Hasemeyer confronted him.

¶7 Hasemeyer retained an attorney, and on October 16, 2024,
this attorney sent LeFevre a cease-and-desist letter. The letter
noted that based on Hasemeyer’s counsel’s “preliminary review
of property deeds and related documents, the alleged easement
does not exist.” Hasemeyer’s counsel stated, however,
“Notwithstanding my preliminary review and findings, I have
ordered a title search related to the subject property and alleged
easement to formally ascertain the validity thereof.” The letter
“demand[ed]” that LeFevre “immediately cease and desist any
further trespass and damage” to Hasemeyer’s property.

2. Although the record indicates that “both parties now have a key
to get through” the county gate, at the time of the October
incident, only Hasemeyer had a key.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶8 Sometime after the October incident, LeFevre sent
Hasemeyer an email with a record survey that he believed
supported the existence of the easement. 3

¶9 On November 7, 2024 (the November incident), LeFevre
returned to the disputed easement with what the record refers to
as “heavy equipment” (although, in context, it seems to have
again been his tractor), and without Hasemeyer’s permission,
LeFevre removed additional trees and shrubs and began to grade
a road. 4

¶10 On February 17, 2025, LeFevre emailed Hasemeyer,
indicating that he was awaiting a response from Hasemeyer’s
counsel about the documentation he had sent that, in LeFevre’s
view, supported his claim that there was an easement. The
following day, Hasemeyer’s counsel wrote a second letter to
LeFevre. This letter contended that LeFevre only had an easement
through the southern part of Hasemeyer’s property—not the
northern part, which was where LeFevre had cut down the trees
and shrubs and was trying to build a road. The letter reiterated
the earlier demand that LeFevre “immediately cease and desist
any further trespass and damage to [Hasemeyer’s] property.”

¶11 On February 26, 2025 (the February incident), Wife was
working in a greenhouse in the backyard on the northern end of
the Hasemeyer property. Wife observed LeFevre doing work with
his truck and tractor, moving dirt on his property. When LeFevre
began driving his tractor toward the disputed easement, Wife
stepped out onto the path where LeFevre was approaching.
LeFevre was “going slow” and “knew [Wife] was there,” but he
did not stop until he was “right in front of [Wife’s] legs.” The

3. It is unclear from the record whether LeFevre sent this email
before or after he received the cease-and-desist letter.

4. It is unclear from the record whether either Hasemeyer or Wife
was present on this occasion.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

tractor was close enough to Wife that she could reach out and
touch it. Wife told LeFevre to stay off the Hasemeyer property,
and LeFevre responded by laughing. LeFevre then left, driving
back to his house by using a county road instead of the disputed
easement. In the meantime, Hasemeyer had seen Wife’s
interaction with LeFevre from inside his house, and he called 911
to report LeFevre’s trespass onto his property.

¶12 LeFevre returned to his property and put a blade extension
on his tractor. About 10 to 15 minutes after the initial
confrontation, and before police had responded to the 911 call,
LeFevre approached the disputed easement again in his tractor.
Wife saw LeFevre approaching from a distance, and when
LeFevre “turn[ed] the corner really quick” onto the disputed
easement, Wife took a short video of LeFevre’s approach with her
phone. Wife thought that LeFevre was moving “really, really
fast,” as opposed to the earlier encounter in which he was driving
slower. Wife saw LeFevre lifting the tractor’s blade as he
approached her. Wife thought LeFevre would stop, but he just got
“closer and closer.” Wife had to back up “two or three steps” to
get out of the way of the moving tractor, and LeFevre “kept
coming . . . even though [she] was backing up.” As LeFevre
continued coming toward her, Wife took a second short video.

¶13 Hasemeyer observed this encounter and left his house to
meet Wife. When Wife screamed for Hasemeyer, LeFevre stopped
the tractor. LeFevre exited the tractor, and he, Wife, and
Hasemeyer then had a heated conversation about the property
dispute. 5

¶14 Wife later testified that she felt “very concerned about [her]
own safety” during this encounter and that she felt like LeFevre’s
actions were “unreasonable” and “very scary.” She described
seeing his behavior “escalate.” Hasemeyer also testified that he

5. This confrontation was soon joined by LeFevre’s wife and a
friend, who had been walking nearby.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

was “afraid” for himself and Wife and that he didn’t “know what
could happen next.”

The Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction and LeFevre’s Request for an
Evidentiary Hearing

¶15 On March 7, 2025, Hasemeyer filed a petition for a civil
stalking injunction. In the request, Hasemeyer detailed the
October incident, the November incident, and the February
incident. Hasemeyer was listed as the sole Petitioner in the
request, but he also listed Wife as a witness to the stalking.
Hasemeyer asked the court to order LeFevre to (1) stay away from
his “home” and (2) have no contact with him or Wife.

¶16 The district court entered an ex parte civil stalking
injunction the same day. In the ex parte civil stalking injunction,
Wife was listed as an “Other Person[] Protected by this Order.”
The court ordered LeFevre not to contact either Hasemeyer or
Wife, and it further ordered LeFevre to “[s]tay away from” their
“current or future home, premises or property.”

¶17 On March 10, 2025, LeFevre filed a request for an
evidentiary hearing, and a hearing was subsequently scheduled
for March 24, 2025. At that hearing, LeFevre, who was represented
by counsel, indicated that he was prepared to proceed. The
district court, however, informed the parties that it was
“definitely not having an evidentiary hearing today.” In response,
LeFevre argued that the civil stalking injunction statute
“require[d] an evidentiary hearing for the Respondent within ten
days of being served” with the order. LeFevre then asserted that
the ex parte civil stalking injunction should be dismissed because
no evidentiary hearing was going to be held within the time set
forth by statute. The court responded, “I can just tell you that the
courts in this district don’t have the bandwidth to schedule these
hearings within ten days . . . .” The court expressed its view that
the statute required “a hearing” within ten days, but not
necessarily an “evidentiary hearing.” The court informed the

20250527-CA 6 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

parties that it would not have a two-hour window in which to
conduct an evidentiary hearing until June 4, 2025. But after further
discussion with the parties and the court clerk, the court agreed
to schedule an evidentiary hearing for April 7, 2025.

The Evidentiary Hearing

¶18 The evidentiary hearing was held on April 7, and in
support of the petition, Hasemeyer and Wife each testified about
the events described above and about how those events had
affected them. The two videos Wife took during the February
incident were admitted into evidence.

¶19 For his part, LeFevre called an officer (Officer) who had
been dispatched to Hasemeyer’s house after Hasemeyer had
called 911 during the February incident. Officer testified that Wife
had shown him the videos that she took of LeFevre approaching
her with the tractor. Officer said that “what [he] saw in the video
was that [Wife] had herself placed in front of the tractor with
ample amount of time to get out of the way.” Officer described
Wife as “willingly putting [her]self in that situation.”

¶20 LeFevre and his wife also testified. LeFevre testified that
there was no way to access the easement without cutting down
the trees and shrubs he had removed. He testified that he had
never approached the Hasemeyers or entered their property with
the “intention” of harassing, surveilling, or threatening them.

¶21 During this hearing, Hasemeyer, Wife, LeFevre, and
LeFevre’s wife also presented evidence about the property
dispute and about whether there was an easement. Both parties
introduced as exhibits various county documents supporting
their respective positions about whether the easement existed.

¶22 After the parties had presented the above evidence, the
court informed them that they had already gone 35 minutes over
the allotted time and that they would have to make closing

20250527-CA 7 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

arguments on another date. At this point, LeFevre informed the
court that he had filed a civil action to quiet title in the easement,
though he admitted that this filing had not yet been served on the
Hasemeyers. LeFevre made no further argument about any legal
impact of the quiet title case on this civil stalking case.

Closing Arguments and the Civil Stalking Injunction

¶23 The parties returned to court on April 21, 2025, for closing
arguments. Hasemeyer (through counsel) began by discussing the
“legal standards” that define stalking, which, as he put it, are
“that the person intentionally or knowingly engaged in a course
of conduct directed at a specific person” and “that the person
must know, or should know, that the course of conduct would
cause a reasonable person to fear for the person’s own safety, or
suffer emotional distress.” See Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a).
Hasemeyer then discussed the October incident, the November
incident, and the February incident, after which he argued that
these incidents collectively satisfied the legal standard for
stalking. Hasemeyer argued that “[e]ven if you have an easement,
you can’t do those types of things.”

¶24 By contrast, LeFevre (also through counsel) argued that
“this is about a property dispute” and that LeFevre’s actions were
“simply to try to access [his undeveloped property] to get it ready
for development.” LeFevre argued that the October incident did
not constitute stalking because Hasemeyer approached LeFevre
(not the other way around) and because LeFevre stopped cutting
down the trees once Hasemeyer spoke with him. LeFevre argued
that he went back onto Hasemeyer’s property again only after “he
found that he had an easement there.” LeFevre further argued
that the Hasemeyers “sought [LeFevre] out” in the February
incident and that it was “reasonable to believe that [LeFevre]
wasn’t trying to run [Wife] over.” LeFevre argued that he
“genuinely believed” he “had a property interest” and that he was
“just exercising [his] property rights.” LeFevre argued that it was
“reasonable” that the Hasemeyers were upset that LeFevre

20250527-CA 8 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

wanted to develop the easement, but he contended that a stalking
injunction “is not the reasonable way . . . to go about solving this
problem” because “entering an injunction in this matter against
[LeFevre] would have much greater ramifications than what a
temporary restraining order would do.”

¶25 At this point, the district court interrupted LeFevre’s
argument and proceeded to rule from the bench. The court started
out by saying that it was “not ruling today on whether there’s an
easement.” But the court then expressed its view that it was not
“reasonable for a neighbor to think that they get to create a road
without express permission of the county,” observing that “it’s a
county function to create roads.”

¶26 Turning to the merits, the court ruled that Hasemeyer had
“met [his] burden under the civil stalking injunction.” The court
opined that it “didn’t think it was close” when it “looked at the
video[s]” Wife had recorded of LeFevre approaching her in his
tractor. The court found “[t]here were two or more acts.” The
court observed that LeFevre was told to “stay off their property”
but that he “went back on their property[] and did so in a
menacing way.” The court referred to LeFevre “ripping out sage
brush and trees” and the property being “torn up.” The court
again repeated its conclusion that there were “two acts.” And the
court then found that “the Hasemeyer[s] [had] suffered emotional
distress, meaning significant mental or psychological suffering.”
The court thus ruled that LeFevre had “stalked sufficient enough
for” it to “make the stalking injunction permanent.” 6

6. The district court did not issue a written civil stalking injunction
after this hearing. Instead, as indicated, its oral ruling simply
made the ex parte injunction “permanent.” We note that although
the court used the term “permanent,” under both the terms used
in the ex parte civil stalking injunction and those used in the
governing statute, this injunction expires “three years after the
(continued…)

20250527-CA 9 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶27 On appeal, LeFevre argues that the district court erred in
four ways. First, he argues that the court erroneously concluded
that his conduct satisfied the elements of stalking. Second, he
argues that the court erred by delaying the evidentiary hearing
beyond what the civil stalking injunction statute allows. Third, he
argues that the court erred by issuing the civil stalking injunction
given that there was a pending civil action between the parties
about the easement. And fourth, he argues that the court erred by
issuing what he refers to as an “overbroad civil stalking
injunction.”

¶28 We review the district court’s “interpretation and
application of the stalking statute” for “correctness, affording no
deference to the district court’s legal conclusion.” Harris v. Hunt,
2024 UT App 117, ¶ 9, 557 P.3d 228 (quotation simplified). This
includes the court’s conclusion that LeFevre directed his conduct
at Hasemeyer. See Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d
835; Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 41, 541 P.3d 274. By
contrast, the district court’s conclusion that the conduct would
cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety or suffer
emotional distress is a question of fact that we review for clear
error. See Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 16; Richins, 2023 UT App 147,
¶ 42. 7

day on which the ex parte civil stalking injunction [was] served.”
See Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(c)(iii).

7. For purposes of providing clarity for future cases, we think it
helpful to expound on this a bit further. As will be discussed
shortly, when a respondent challenges an ex parte civil stalking
injunction, the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing,
after which the court decides whether to revoke or continue the
ex parte civil stalking injunction.
(continued…)

20250527-CA 10 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

As part of that ruling, a district court might issue findings
of fact before determining whether the conduct satisfied the
statutory elements. On appeal, an appellant might choose to argue
that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings
about who did what to whom. See, e.g., Sheeran v. Thomas, 2014 UT
App 285, ¶ 8 & n.3, 340 P.3d 797. If such an argument is made, the
appellate court would give the usual deference to the district
court’s factual findings (including to the court’s weighing of the
evidence). Our recent decision in Schmidt v. Petersen, 2025 UT App
12, 564 P.3d 526, provides a good example of this. There, after an
evidentiary hearing, the district court revoked an ex parte civil
stalking injunction. See id. ¶ 19. Of note, the court did not do so
based on a conclusion that the conduct at issue didn’t satisfy the
statutory elements; instead, the court concluded that the
petitioner had not sufficiently proven that the respondent even
did the things in question. See id. ¶¶ 18, 34. When the petitioner
challenged that ruling on appeal, we deferred to the district
court’s weighing of the evidence and its conclusion about what
facts had not been proven. See id. ¶¶ 22, 25, 31.
As discussed above, however, our cases have held that a
district court’s “interpretation and application of the stalking
statute” are reviewed “for correctness, affording no deference to
the district court’s legal conclusion.” Harris v. Hunt, 2024 UT App
117, ¶ 9, 557 P.3d 228 (quotation simplified); see also Ragsdale v.
Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 15 n.3, 491 P.3d 835 (providing that the
appropriate standard of review when interpreting and applying
the civil stalking statute is a question of law reviewed for
correctness). Thus, to make things clear for future cases: if an
appellant challenges a district court’s factual findings, those will
be reviewed under the standard of review applicable to factual
findings, but if an appellant instead challenges the court’s
interpretation of the statute or application of it, those issues will
be reviewed for correctness.
Turning to this appeal, the factual questions about who did
what and when are largely undisputed. As a result, we
(continued…)

20250527-CA 11 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

ANALYSIS

I. Stalking Elements

¶29 LeFevre first argues that his conduct did not support the
issuance of a civil stalking injunction. On the state of this record
and the controlling law, we disagree.

¶30 Utah’s civil stalking injunction statute allows a court to
issue an ex parte civil stalking injunction if the court has “reason
to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred.” Utah Code
§ 78B-7-701(4)(a). If an ex parte civil stalking injunction is issued,
the person against whom it was entered (the respondent) can
request a hearing to challenge it. See id. § 78B-7-701(5)(a). At that
hearing, the person requesting the injunction (the petitioner)
bears the burden of “show[ing] by a preponderance of the
evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has
occurred.” Id. § 78B-7-701(5)(b)(ii). Based on its consideration of
the evidence, “the court may modify, revoke, or continue the
injunction.” Id. § 78B-7-701(6)(a).

¶31 By statute, stalking contains two key elements. See Ragsdale
v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d 835. The first is whether the
respondent “engage[d] in a course of conduct directed at a specific
individual”; the second is whether the respondent knew or was
“reckless as to whether the course of conduct would cause a
reasonable person . . . to fear for the individual’s own safety or the
safety of a third individual” or “suffer other emotional distress.”

understand LeFevre’s arguments that we address in Part I(A) to
be about the court’s conclusion that the facts satisfied the elements
of the statute. Under settled standards of review, those arguments
are accordingly reviewed for correctness. By contrast, the
arguments that we address in Part I(B) concern the fear or distress
element. As noted, that aspect of the ruling is factual in nature and
is reviewed for clear error.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 8 “A district court may enjoin
an alleged stalker only if both elements are met.” Ragsdale, 2021
UT 29, ¶ 25.

¶32 Here, LeFevre argues that (A) he did not engage in a course
of conduct and (B) even if he did, it would not have caused a
reasonable person to fear for the safety of the individual or
another. We address each argument in turn.

A. Course of Conduct

¶33 By statute, a course of conduct “means two or more acts
directed at or toward a specific individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(i). A “single isolated act” therefore “cannot qualify as
a course of conduct.” Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 47,
541 P.3d 274 (quotation simplified).

¶34 In his brief, LeFevre makes two arguments about this
element: first, he argues that there were not two or more acts;
second, he argues that even if there were two or more acts, they
were not directed at “Hasemeyer or [Wife].”

1. Two or More Acts

¶35 LeFevre first challenges the district court’s conclusion that
there were two or more acts. In LeFevre’s view, the court
“identified only the February 2025 incident where LeFevre was
driving his tractor while [Wife] filmed him.” Although the court
could have perhaps been clearer, we read its oral ruling
differently than LeFevre does.

8. Utah Code section 76-5-106.5 defines “stalking” for purposes of
the criminal code, but as we’ve previously explained, these same
elements define “stalking” for purposes of a civil stalking
injunction as well. See Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 23 n.6,
530 P.3d 945.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶36 The petition for a civil stalking injunction expressly
invoked the October incident, the November incident, and the
February incident. The parties presented evidence about each
incident at the evidentiary hearing. And in closing arguments,
Hasemeyer invoked all three incidents as a basis for asking the
court to continue the civil stalking injunction. In doing so,
Hasemeyer repeatedly focused on LeFevre’s alleged trespasses,
his acts of destroying trees and vegetation, and the fact that,
during the February incident, LeFevre ran his tractor at Wife.

¶37 At the outset of the oral ruling, the court concluded that
there were indeed “two or more acts.” Elaborating, the court
found that after LeFevre “was told to stay off” Hasemeyer’s
property, he “resume[d] and went back on their property.” The
court referred to LeFevre “ripping out sage brush and trees” and
the property being “torn up.” And it also referred to the February
incident in which LeFevre drove “at [Wife] in a way to make her
have to back up.”

¶38 In context, the court’s reference to LeFevre entering
Hasemeyer’s property after being “told to stay off” seems to have
been a reference to both the November incident and the February
incident, insofar as LeFevre had been served with a cease-and-
desist letter in October 2024 and yet returned to the property on
both occasions. The court’s reference to LeFevre “ripping out sage
brush and trees” and the property being “torn up” appears to be
a reference to either the October incident or the November
incident (or both), inasmuch as LeFevre tore up vegetation with
his tractor on both occasions. 9 And the court’s reference to
LeFevre driving at Wife “in a way to make her have to back up”
was a clear reference to the February incident. So viewed, the
court appears to have found that there were two or more acts

9. By contrast, this statement doesn’t appear to be a reference to
the February incident, inasmuch as there was no testimony that
LeFevre tore anything up with his tractor that day.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

based on all of these facts, and this conclusion was supported by
the evidence.

2. Directed at a Specific Individual

¶39 As noted, the course of conduct element also requires that
the “two or more acts” be “directed at a specific individual.” Utah
Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i), (2)(a). In LeFevre’s view, the acts in
question did not satisfy this element because his only “purpose”
was to access his property through what he believed was a valid
easement. Responding to the claims about him removing trees, for
example, LeFevre asserts that there was “no evidence” that he did
so “for any reason other than to access his property.” In LeFevre’s
view, his actions therefore did not support a civil stalking
injunction because they were directed at property interests, as
opposed to being “directed at Hasemeyer, or indeed any
individual.” On the state of the statute and the current caselaw,
however, we conclude that the evidence satisfied this part of the
element. 10

10. Hasemeyer was the only named petitioner in the request for a
civil stalking injunction. As noted above, however, the district
court relied on LeFevre driving his tractor at Wife as one of the
predicate “acts,” and the injunction then specifically listed Wife
as a protected person.
In his briefing, LeFevre seems to have assumed that actions
taken against either Hasemeyer or Wife could satisfy the statute.
With slight variations in phrasing, for example, he repeatedly
asserted that none of his acts were “directed at Hasemeyer or any
other specific individual.” Indeed, at one point, he more
specifically asserted that no evidence showed that he “direct[ed]
any conduct at Hasemeyer or [Wife].”
But we see no place in the brief where LeFevre argued
(much less meaningfully) that (1) the act of driving the tractor at
Wife could not satisfy this element because she was not a named
(continued…)

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶40 The statute defines the term “[c]ourse of conduct” as “two
or more acts directed at or toward a specific individual,” and it
then says this “includ[es]” various actions that are set forth in a
statutory list. Id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). Among those are the
following:

(A) acts in which the actor follows, monitors,
observes, photographs, surveils, threatens, or
communicates to or about an individual, or
interferes with an individual’s property:

(I) directly, indirectly, or through any third
party; and

(II) by any action, method, device, or means;
or

(B) when the actor engages in any of the following
acts or causes someone else to engage in any of these
acts:

(I) approaches or confronts an individual;

[or] . . .

(III) appears at an individual’s residence or
contacts an individual’s neighbor, or enters
property owned, leased, or occupied by an
individual . . . .

Id.

petitioner or (2) the court should have differentiated between acts
directed at Hasemeyer and those directed at Wife. Instead, like the
district court, LeFevre’s brief essentially treats Hasemeyer and
Wife collectively. On the state of the briefing, we’ll follow suit.

20250527-CA 16 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶41 “[N]othing in the statute defines the term ‘directed at.’”
Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 31. “Nor does it expressly indicate that the
petitioner must be the ultimate target of a respondent’s course of
conduct.” Id. (quotation simplified). Rather, “under the statute’s
plain language, a respondent directs conduct at a petitioner by
engaging in behavior contemplated by the statute two or more
times.” Id. Accordingly, “regardless of whether a petitioner is a
respondent’s ultimate target, the fact that the respondent engaged
in any act proscribed by the statute two or more times makes his
or her conduct ‘directed at’ the petitioner.” Id. ¶ 32.

¶42 In Ragsdale, our supreme court further held that “the
person toward whom a respondent’s behavior is ‘directed at’ is
not necessarily determined by his or her subjective intent.” Id.
¶ 37. In the supreme court’s view, this question is “determined by
an objective assessment of whether the respondent engaged
in conduct prohibited by the stalking statute.” Id. The supreme
court thus held that a district court should not determine whether
the respondent “subjectively targeted” the petitioner, but the
court should instead “analyze[] whether” the respondent
“objectively engaged in conduct proscribed by the stalking
statute.” Id. ¶ 41.

¶43 We recently applied these principles in Harris v. Hunt, 2024
UT App 117, 557 P.3d 228. In that case, the district court concluded
that the respondent had committed stalking through a series of
Facebook posts. See id. ¶ 2. On appeal, the respondent argued that
“his posts on his personal Facebook page were not ‘directed at’”
the petitioner because he had “intended them to be seen only by
a limited number of followers and not by” the petitioner “or
anyone in his orbit.” Id. ¶ 12. But in express reliance on Ragsdale,
we held that the respondent’s “subjective intent regarding who he
thought was the target of his posts [was] largely irrelevant.” Id.
Because the Facebook posts qualified as acts for purposes of the
civil stalking statute, we held that they qualified as “a course of
conduct directed at” the petitioner “as that term is defined in
Utah’s stalking statute.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation simplified).

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶44 The same is true here too. Again, the stalking statute
includes acts in which the respondent “enters property owned . . .
by an individual,” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(III), or
“interferes with an individual’s property,” id. § 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(i)(A). It is undisputed that in each of the incidents
in question (i.e., the October incident, the November incident,
and the February incident), LeFevre entered property that
Hasemeyer owns. And in the October and November
incidents, LeFevre cut down trees on Hasemeyer’s property,
which would also constitute interference with Hasemeyer’s
property. 11

¶45 Moreover, the stalking statute also includes acts in which
the respondent “approaches or confronts an individual.” Id. § 76-
5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(I). LeFevre did so in the February incident by
driving his tractor toward Wife, as well as by engaging in a heated
confrontation with Hasemeyer and Wife on Hasemeyer’s
property.12

¶46 In short, there was evidence that LeFevre committed at
least two acts that could serve as predicate acts for purposes of the
stalking statute. These acts could accordingly support the

11. As discussed, LeFevre believed that he had a right to do so
because of an easement. But it’s undisputed that Hasemeyer
owned the property at all relevant times, which meant that, at
minimum, LeFevre was entering Hasemeyer’s property, which is
enough for the “two or more acts” part of this analysis.

12. Again, the district court treated Hasemeyer and Wife
collectively, and LeFevre has not challenged that aspect of the
decision on appeal. Moreover, we note that LeFevre argues that
the verbal confrontations do not count because the Hasemeyers
initiated them. But again, the second confrontation in the
February incident occurred after LeFevre had left the property
and had voluntarily returned, this time with a blade attached to
his tractor.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

conclusion that LeFevre had engaged in “a course of conduct
directed at [Hasemeyer], as that term is defined in Utah’s stalking
statute.” Harris, 2024 UT App 117, ¶ 14 (quotation simplified).

B. Fear or Emotional Distress

¶47 The second element of stalking turns on whether the
respondent “knows or is reckless as to whether the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person: (i) to fear for the
individual’s own safety or the safety of a third individual; or (ii) to
suffer other emotional distress.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a)(i)–
(ii). Emotional distress “means significant mental or
psychological suffering, whether or not medical or other
professional treatment or counseling is required.” Id. § 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(ii)(A).

¶48 When assessing such a claim, a court “should consider the
course of conduct cumulatively” rather than “consider[ing] each
act in isolation.” Richins, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 66 (quotation
simplified). When viewed cumulatively, “acts that seem perfectly
innocent or even well intentioned may constitute stalking.”
Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45 (quotation simplified); see also Richins,
2023 UT App 147, ¶ 66 (noting that an appellant’s argument
“misconstrue[d] the law” when it suggested that a district court
should look at each act leading to a course of conduct “separately”
to determine whether the act “in isolation would . . . have caused
a reasonable person to feel fear or emotional distress”). “For
example, conduct such as sending the victim a dozen roses may
seem benign and loving to the casual observer, but could mean a
very different thing when understood in the context of the
victim’s experience.” Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45 (quotation
simplified). Courts thus consider such things as the petitioner’s
“background,” the petitioner’s “knowledge of and relationship
with” the respondent, “any history of abuse between the parties,
and the cumulative effect” of the respondent’s “repetitive
conduct.” Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 29, 530 P.3d 945
(quotation simplified).

20250527-CA 19 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶49 Here, the relevant circumstances include the following:

• In the October incident, LeFevre entered Hasemeyer’s
property and cut down two or three mature trees with his
tractor, and he did so without Hasemeyer’s permission.

• Almost immediately after the October incident, Hasemeyer
retained counsel, who sent LeFevre a cease-and-desist
letter demanding that LeFevre refrain from “any further
trespass and damage” to Hasemeyer’s property.

• Despite having received the cease-and-desist letter,
LeFevre returned to Hasemeyer’s property in November,
removed additional trees and shrubs, and began to grade a
road.

• Around this time, LeFevre sent Hasemeyer documents that
he claimed showed he had a valid easement.

• In the February incident, LeFevre attempted to drive his
tractor onto the disputed easement, but Wife stepped in
front of him. Although LeFevre was “going slow,” he knew
Wife was there and did not stop until he was “right in front
of [Wife’s] legs.” Wife asked LeFevre to leave the property,
and LeFevre laughed.

• LeFevre then briefly left Hasemeyer’s property, but when
he returned a short time later with a blade extension on his
tractor, he was driving “really, really fast.” Wife stood in
the disputed easement, thinking LeFevre would stop, but
LeFevre just got “closer and closer” to her before ultimately
stopping.

¶50 When these acts are viewed cumulatively, we’re not
persuaded that the district court clearly erred when it determined
that LeFevre’s course of conduct would cause a reasonable person
to suffer fear or other emotional distress. LeFevre engaged in a

20250527-CA 20 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

pattern of escalating behavior that involved entering the property,
damaging trees and vegetation, and, in the final incident, driving
a tractor toward Wife. And LeFevre did so despite receiving a
cease-and-desist letter from an attorney. In these circumstances,
the court could reasonably conclude that the cumulative effect of
this conduct would cause emotional distress to a reasonable
person.

¶51 The court therefore did not err in concluding that LeFevre’s
conduct satisfied the second element of the stalking statute.
Because we have also concluded that the evidence supported the
conclusion that LeFevre engaged in a course of conduct, we reject
this aspect of LeFevre’s appeal.

C. Suggested Course Correction 13

¶52 In Part I(A) of this opinion, we addressed LeFevre’s claim
that the course of conduct element of stalking was not satisfied
because he never directed his acts at an individual. On the basis
of current caselaw, we affirmed. If I were writing on a blank slate,
however, I would have viewed this differently. And I think it’s
appropriate here to take the admittedly unusual step of writing
separately to suggest that the caselaw regarding this element
should be re-examined.

¶53 At the outset of the controlling statute, the term “[c]ourse
of conduct” is defined as “two or more acts directed at or toward
a specific individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). In the next
subsection, the statute repeats the same phrase, stating that
an “actor commits stalking if the actor intentionally or knowingly
. . . engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific
individual.” Id. § 76-5-106.5(2).

13. As indicated above, Part I(C) represents the views of Judge
Tenney alone.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶54 As discussed above, Ragsdale held that “the person toward
whom a respondent’s behavior is ‘directed at’ is not necessarily
determined by his or her subjective intent.” 2021 UT 29, ¶ 37.
“Instead, it is determined by an objective assessment of whether
the respondent engaged in conduct prohibited by the stalking
statute.” Id. Thus, according to Ragsdale, a district court should not
determine whether the respondent “subjectively targeted” the
petitioner. Id. ¶ 41.14

¶55 But in light of the plain language of the statute, I think this
approach is misguided. And I also think it leads to an
interpretation of the civil stalking statute that is too broad and
creates systemic problems.

¶56 Starting with the statutory language, again, the statute
turns on whether the respondent’s acts were “directed at . . . a
specific individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i) (emphases
added). The statute then lists a series of acts that can satisfy this
portion of the course of conduct element. These include, as
discussed, interfering with or even entering the individual’s
property. See id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A), (B)(III). And they also
include a range of other acts, such as appearing at the individual’s
workplace, contacting a neighbor, or sending materials to the
individual. See id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(II)–(IV).

14. I think it’s at least possible that what Ragsdale meant was that
the question is whether a reasonable person would objectively
think that the respondent subjectively intended to direct the acts
at the individual. But that’s not what Ragsdale said. And if
subjective intent is indeed the ultimate question under the
analysis, it would make little sense to superimpose an objective
person gloss on top of it. Questions of intent are commonly
resolved by circumstantial evidence. As a result, as with any other
case, the parties in a stalking case could seek to prove that the
respondent had the requisite intent by pointing to circumstantial
evidence.

20250527-CA 22 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶57 But under the structure of the statute, all of these acts are
placed under the umbrella of the operative element—namely,
whether they were “directed at or toward a specific individual.”
Id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). If they weren’t “directed at or toward a
specific individual,” they accordingly don’t qualify as an “act”
that would support a civil stalking injunction.

¶58 In my mind, the phrase “directed at” naturally
contemplates an act that is both intentional and targeted. And
various dictionaries bear this out. When confronted with
questions of statutory interpretation, “we begin our interpretive
task by examining the ordinary meaning or usually accepted
interpretation of the statutory language.” State v. Hatfield, 2020 UT
1, ¶ 17, 462 P.3d 330 (quotation simplified). “When interpreting
statutes, we look to the ordinary meaning of the words, using the
dictionary as our starting point.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also
Utah Code § 68-3-11 (“Words and phrases are to be construed
according to the context and the approved usage of the language
. . . .”).

¶59 Here, one dictionary defines “directed” as “pointed,
aimed, or sent toward a place or object.” 15 Another dictionary
defines “direct” (as in “to impart orally”) as “to adapt in
expression so as to have particular applicability.” 16 Consistent
with these definitions, another dictionary defines the phrase
“direct something at someone/something” as “to aim something
in a particular direction or at a particular person.” 17 To me, all of

15. Directed, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/brows
e/directed [https://perma.cc/Y43G-9TPV].

16. Direct, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/direct [https://perma.cc/J6M8-47B7].

17. Direct something at someone/something, Cambridge Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/direct-at
[https://perma.cc/9FAU-Y2KK].

20250527-CA 23 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

these definitions suggest an intentional and targeted act. For
example, I don’t think that a person would be said to “aim
something . . . at a particular person” if reaching that person
wasn’t the intended point. Put differently, as a matter of ordinary
usage, I don’t think one would say that a person had accidentally
aimed at a particular target.

¶60 I think this conclusion is reinforced by what appears at the
back end of the same statutory provision. Again, the statute
requires proof that the acts were directed at or toward “a specific
individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). To me, this naturally
suggests (and indeed explicitly says) that there must be proof that
the respondent wasn’t just committing acts that could impact
some person, but that the respondent was committing acts that
were targeting a particular person.

¶61 True, while dictionaries are “often helpful,” they “are
not always the alpha and omega of the search for statutory
meaning.” Armenta v. Unified Fire Auth., 2025 UT 26, ¶ 23, 573 P.3d
1283. Where warranted, courts should also look to “the
relevant context of the statute (including, particularly, the
structure and language of the statutory scheme).” Id. ¶ 26
(quotation simplified). But I think the structure of this statute only
reinforces the point. Again, the various things that the statute lists
as acts that can qualify as a course of conduct are all placed under
the broader requirement that they be “directed at” the specific
individual.

¶62 I also think it’s significant that this language appears
within a stalking statute. Black’s Law Dictionary defines stalking
as the “offense of following or loitering near another, often
surreptitiously, to annoy or harass that person or to commit a
further crime such as assault or battery.” Stalking, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). To me, this likewise
suggests that stalking is generally understood to involve an act or
series of acts that are intentional and targeted at a particular
person—which, again, is what our statute says.

20250527-CA 24 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶63 Indeed, it seems to me that the actor’s subjective intent is
often the very thing that differentiates stalking from other
behavior. To use just one example: our statute provides that a
“[c]ourse of conduct” can include “enter[ing] property owned,
leased, or occupied by an individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(III). Suppose that a teenager is repeatedly
crossing through a neighbor’s backyard while playing night
games. I wouldn’t regard that teenager as engaging in conduct
that is “directed at or toward a specific individual.” Id. § 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(i). But suppose instead that a spurned lover is
repeatedly entering the backyard of his former partner at night. I
think that this behavior would naturally be viewed as an act that
targets the former partner as a specific individual. And the thing
that would make these two scenarios different is the actor’s
subjective intent. The teenager is trespassing because he or she
wants to enter the property to play in a game, but the spurned
lover is trespassing as a means of targeting this particular person.
By removing subjective intent from the analysis, I think that
Ragsdale broadened the scope of the stalking statute, thereby
sweeping in conduct that doesn’t fit the statute and isn’t really
stalking at all.

¶64 Indeed, I think this case provides another example of this
problem. As discussed, most of the conduct at issue involves
LeFevre entering Hasemeyer’s property with a tractor, and on
two of the occasions, LeFevre used it to damage Hasemeyer’s
property. Hasemeyer believed that LeFevre had no right to do so,
but LeFevre thought that he could because of an easement. No one
has contended that LeFevre was doing this because of personal
animus toward Hasemeyer—i.e., that he was entering the
property because of some grudge. Instead, this was about who
has rights to this land.

¶65 In a separate civil case, the parties are currently litigating
the question of whether the easement exists. But what’s striking
to me about all this is that this is a property dispute that has
somehow morphed into a stalking case without any real

20250527-CA 25 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

indication that Hasemeyer is being targeted as an individual. It’s
a decidedly odd fit, and while I think our result is compelled by
the caselaw, I don’t think it’s compelled by the language or
structure of the statute.

¶66 Finally, it’s worth pointing out that adding subjective
intent back into the mix would not leave property owners in a case
like this one without a remedy. In his brief in this appeal, for
example, LeFevre asserts that “Hasemeyer could (and should)
have sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction” under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “that would
have been more tailored to the parties’ needs.” See Utah R. Civ. P.
65A(f) (providing that a court may issue a restraining order or
preliminary injunction if, among other things, “the applicant will
suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues”). As
a systemic matter, this seems right to me. If a case is about
interference with property, there are other mechanisms for
obtaining temporary relief. But by design, the stalking statute is
supposed to stop harm that’s directed at an individual.

¶67 Given all this, I think that current precedent takes the
stalking statute to a place that it’s not supposed to go. I
accordingly think that it should be reconsidered in the
appropriate case. 18

18. In theory, if subjective intent were added back into the analysis
of this case, it could be argued that because LeFevre drove the
tractor at Wife twice during the February incident, those two
separate acts alone could support the civil stalking injunction (i.e.,
without also relying on LeFevre having trespassed on and
destroyed property). But while the arguments and the ruling
below did include, as predicate acts, LeFevre driving the tractor
at Wife, they were largely focused on the trespass and destruction
of property. In any event, the two tractor threats were fairly close
in time, but the district court did not conclude that they qualified
(continued…)

20250527-CA 26 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

II. Evidentiary Hearing

¶68 LeFevre next argues that the district court improperly
failed to hold an evidentiary hearing within ten days of his
request. Because of this failure, LeFevre then argues that the court
should have “vacated” the ex parte civil stalking injunction. We
disagree.

¶69 If a petitioner obtains an ex parte civil stalking injunction,
the statute states that “[w]ithin 10 days after the day on which the
ex parte civil stalking injunction is served, the respondent is
entitled to request, in writing, an evidentiary hearing on the civil
stalking injunction.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(a). The statute then
states that the “court shall hold a hearing requested by the
respondent at the earliest possible time and within 10 days after
the day on which the request is filed with the court unless the
court finds compelling reasons to continue the hearing.” Id. § 78B-
7-701(5)(b)(i).

¶70 As noted, LeFevre requested an evidentiary hearing on
March 10, 2025, which was three days after the court issued the ex
parte civil stalking injunction. The court held a hearing on March
24, and at that hearing, it said that it would not take evidence until
April 7. After taking evidence at the April 7 hearing, the court
continued the matter until April 21. At that April 21 hearing, the
court heard closing arguments and then ruled on the injunction.
Thus, the gap between LeFevre’s request and the initial
evidentiary hearing was 28 days, and the gap between his initial
request and the ultimate ruling was 42 days. These are the delays
that LeFevre targets on appeal.

as separate acts under the framework set forth in our cases for
resolving this kind of question. See, e.g., Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT
App 147, ¶¶ 47–55, 541 P.3d 274; Hardy v. Hardy, 2020 UT App 88,
¶ 8, 467 P.3d 931.

20250527-CA 27 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶71 In their respective briefs, the parties have advanced several
competing arguments about how this should have proceeded.

¶72 First, in defending what happened below, Hasemeyer
points out that Utah Code section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i) only says that
a court must hold “a hearing” within ten days of the request. In
his view, any hearing will do, and because the March 24 hearing
was held within ten business days of the request, he thinks the
court complied with its obligations. In response, LeFevre asserts
that section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i)’s reference to “a hearing” must
mean “an evidentiary hearing.” On the question of what kind of
hearing is required, we agree with LeFevre. 19

¶73 As noted above, when courts interpret a statutory
provision, one of the things that courts look to is the statute’s
“context,” and this includes “the structure and language of the
statutory scheme.” Armenta, 2025 UT 26, ¶ 26 (quotation
simplified). Here, section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i) requires a court to
“hold a hearing requested by the respondent at the earliest
possible time and within 10 days after the day on which the
request is filed.” In context, this seems to be a clear reference to
the immediately preceding statutory provision—section 78B-7-
701(5)(a)—which allows a respondent to request “in writing, an
evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction.” And this
interpretation is reinforced by the statutory provisions that
immediately follow. In section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(ii), the statute
states that “[a]t the hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by
the respondent has occurred.” (Emphases added.) These are clear
references to an evidentiary hearing, as opposed to some other

19. Hasemeyer does not provide legal support for his assertion
that the statute requires the hearing to be held within ten business
days. In any event, this does not matter in this case. As indicated
below, we conclude that the statute requires an evidentiary
hearing, and the evidentiary hearing that was ultimately held
occurred well beyond ten business days.

20250527-CA 28 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

kind of hearing. And section 78B-7-701(6)(a) then provides that
“[a]t the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the
injunction.” (Emphasis added.) This, too, seems to be a reference
to the actions that the court can take after receiving evidence on
the allegations supporting the request for a civil stalking
injunction. For these textual reasons, we agree with LeFevre that
section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i)’s reference to “a hearing” refers to the
evidentiary hearing that the court must hold within ten days if
requested by the respondent.

¶74 Second, in challenging what happened below, LeFevre
argues that the district court never found that there were
“compelling reasons to continue the hearing” as required by
section 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i).

¶75 It’s true that when the district court said, at the March 24
hearing, that it would not hold the evidentiary hearing until April
7, the court did not use the phrase “compelling reasons.” But
unlike LeFevre, we don’t regard this as being dispositive.
“Unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume
that the district court actually considered” the matter and
“necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but simply
failed to record the factual determination it made.” Globe
Contracting LLC v. Hour, 2025 UT App 98, ¶ 43, 575 P.3d 235
(quotation simplified).

¶76 Here, at the March 24 hearing, the parties and the district
court had a discussion about this exact issue. LeFevre pointed the
court to this very statutory scheme, asserted that he had “filed
specifically for an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to the [statute],”
and stressed his view that the statute “require[d] an evidentiary
hearing for [LeFevre] within ten days of being served of the
order.”20 In response to those assertions, the court stated that it

20. The latter part of this assertion was incorrect. As indicated, the
statute requires the court to hold the evidentiary hearing “within
(continued…)

20250527-CA 29 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

was continuing the hearing because it didn’t have the “bandwidth
to schedule these hearings within ten days.” The court noted that
“what we need to do today . . . is set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing,” and the court recognized “the sooner the better.” The
court noted that its “practice” with respect to civil stalking
injunctions had been that “we come in, we set an evidentiary
hearing, and we set it down the road. I understand that there’s
need for some immediacy here . . . .”

¶77 In our view, given the nature of the arguments that had
been presented, the court’s statement about the need to continue
the evidentiary hearing because of “bandwidth” issues is most
reasonably interpreted as being a statement that the court’s
bandwidth issues were the compelling reason that justified
continuing the evidentiary hearing. In this sense, we conclude
that this was an implied finding.

¶78 This leads to LeFevre’s final argument, which is that the
court’s “bandwidth” and scheduling issues were not sufficiently
compelling so as to allow it to continue the evidentiary hearing—
either as a matter of law or on the facts of this case. We disagree.

¶79 The district courts in this state are under increasing
demands in terms of their caseloads. On an aggregate level, the
volume of cases alone creates obvious scheduling problems. And
we also note that the civil stalking statute is not the only legal
provision that requires a court to hold a particular hearing within
a delineated (and usually short) time frame. See, e.g., Utah Code
§ 38-9-205(3)(b) (requiring a court to “schedule a hearing within
10 days to determine whether [a] document is a wrongful lien”);

10 days after the day on which the request is filed with the court
unless the court finds compelling reasons to continue the
hearing.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i). But still, for these
purposes, we think it’s significant that LeFevre was clearly
invoking the ten-day rule, albeit based on the wrong triggering
date.

20250527-CA 30 2026 UT App 70
Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

id. § 77-15-6(4)(a) (requiring a court to “hold a hearing to review
the defendant’s competency” “[w]ithin 15 days” after receiving
an evaluator’s report on competency); id. § 77-20-206(2)(b)
(providing that a “judge who is unable to hold a detention hearing
within 14 days of the date of an individual’s first appearance shall
make a good faith effort to identify another judge who has the
ability to conduct the detention hearing within 14 days of the date
of the individual’s first appearance”); Utah R. Crim P. 7(e)(2)
(providing that if a criminal defendant requests a preliminary
hearing, the “hearing will be held within a reasonable time, but
not later than 14 days after the request, if the defendant is in
custody for the offense charged, and not later than 28 days after
the request, if the defendant is not in custody”).

¶80 In addition, we note that judges are often called upon to
preside over trials that can last days or weeks or sometimes
longer. And we further note that in some districts, there are only
a few judges.

¶81 Putting all this together, it seems clear enough that if a
particular judge is tasked with conducting an evidentiary hearing
on a civil stalking injunction within ten days of a request, that
request may well conflict with an ongoing trial or some other
hearing that also cannot be rescheduled, or it may instead
conflict with something else on the judge’s calendar that
cannot reasonably be moved. Depending on the circumstances,
we think that such calendaring difficulties can qualify as a
compelling circumstance that could justify continuing an
evidentiary hearing.

¶82 But that said, the statutory command in question is direct.
Again, it expressly requires a district court to hold such a hearing
“within 10 days after the day on which the request is filed with
the court unless the court finds compelling reasons to continue the
hearing.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(b)(i). And in context, there is
obvious reason for the statutory urgency. An ex parte civil
stalking injunction can put serious restraints on a person’s life,

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potentially prohibiting that person from visiting places or people
who are important in the person’s life. And because the initial
injunction is an ex parte injunction, this means that the respondent
has not yet had the opportunity to even contest the underlying
allegations. Thus, the purpose of this statutory scheme is to give
the respondent a chance to speedily challenge the ex parte civil
stalking injunction in court.

¶83 In light of these concerns, we don’t agree that a district
court can delay the evidentiary hearing for just any reason.
Instead, we believe that when a court decides whether it’s
appropriate to delay such a hearing, the court should balance
(1) how compelling the reasons are for delaying the evidentiary
hearing against (2) any assertion by the respondent of how he or
she would be prejudiced by the extra delay (which would include,
among other things, the nature and importance of the restrictions
at issue).

¶84 To put this in the context of the justification at issue here—
scheduling difficulties—if a court were in the midst of a multi-
week murder trial, for example, such difficulties would provide a
more compelling reason than they would if the court had several
available days with no hearings. On the other side of the
balancing, if the ex parte civil stalking injunction at issue
prohibited the respondent from doing something critically
important—going to work or seeing his or her children, for
example—the court would need a more compelling reason to
delay the hearing than it would if the ex parte civil stalking
injunction did not interfere with things that are as important. We
also think it would matter how long the extra delay is. A court
would need a more compelling reason to delay an evidentiary
hearing by a matter of weeks than it would to delay a hearing by
just a few days. In conducting such a balancing, however, we
stress that because this scheme is intended to allow a respondent
to challenge an ex parte injunction, a court should do what it can
to hold the evidentiary hearing as expeditiously as possible if it
cannot hold the hearing within ten days of the request.

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

¶85 Turning to this case, the justification offered by the court
had to do with scheduling problems, and the court noted that the
next available two-hour window was over two months out. But
even so, after discussing things further, the court agreed to
schedule the evidentiary hearing for an earlier slot on April 7,
2025, which was a little less than a month after the request. When
the parties’ presentation of evidence ran over the allotted time, the
court concluded that hearing on April 21, which was about a
month and a half after the request.

¶86 Given that the statute gives ten days as the presumptive
timeframe, we would hope that in most cases, an evidentiary
hearing on an ex parte civil stalking injunction could happen and
be concluded sooner than a month and a half after the request. But
that said, we note here that the ex parte civil stalking injunction in
question did not keep LeFevre from seeing people in his life, nor
did it keep him from accessing his house or place of employment.
Instead, it prohibited LeFevre from entering his neighbor’s
property—and, by extension, using the claimed easement to build
an access road to an undeveloped part of his own property. While
we’re sensitive to LeFevre’s claim that this delayed his ability to
build his desired house, we don’t regard these concerns as being
so pressing that the district court could not reasonably delay the
evidentiary hearing by about a month and a half to accommodate
its scheduling issues. For these reasons, we’re not persuaded that
there was any reversible error based on this delay.

III. Ability to Issue the Civil Stalking Injunction

¶87 LeFevre next argues that as a matter of law, the court could
not issue the civil stalking injunction because there was a pending
civil case regarding the easement. In support of this argument,
LeFevre points to other types of protective orders that are
available under Utah law and notes that some of them have
statutory provisions that provide guidance on how the court’s
determination in those matters can interact with “a pending civil
action between the parties.” LeFevre argues that in the civil

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Hasemeyer v. LeFevre

stalking injunction scheme, on the other hand, there is no
statutory basis “that permits a petitioner to seek a ‘civil stalking
injunction’ while a separate civil action is pending.” LeFevre
argues that this difference is “intentional” and that, “[u]nderstood
in context,” and by way of what’s essentially negative legislative
inference, “a petitioner is barred from seeking” a civil stalking
injunction if there are “other pending proceedings.”

¶88 This is a creative argument, but we have no occasion to
address it. “Under our adversarial system, the parties have the
duty to identify legal issues and bring arguments, and if they fail
to raise an issue at the appropriate time, they risk losing the
opportunity to have the court address that issue.” Hillam v. Hillam,
2024 UT App 102, ¶ 30, 554 P.3d 1137 (quotation simplified). “An
issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to the
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to
rule on it.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443
(quotation simplified). “Although new arguments, when brought
under a properly preserved issue or theory, do not require an
exception to preservation, an argument based upon an entirely
distinct legal theory is a new claim or issue and must be separately
preserved.” Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 30 (quotation simplified).

¶89 In the proceedings below, LeFevre only mentioned the
pending civil case in passing at the close of the evidentiary
hearing. But we see no place where he ever argued that the
separate civil case legally prevented the district court from issuing
a civil stalking injunction, much less where he advanced the
intricate theory he advances on appeal. This issue is accordingly
unpreserved, and we therefore decline to address it.

IV. Scope of the Civil Stalking Injunction

¶90 Finally, LeFevre argues that the civil stalking injunction
was too broad. In his view, civil stalking injunctions are subject to
“specific, statutorily defined parameters,” which are not
“limitless.” Yet according to LeFevre, “the district court

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effectively quieted title in the disputed easement in Hasemeyer by
broadly ordering LeFevre to ‘stay away’ from Hasemeyer’s home,
premises or property for at least the next three years.” He thus
argues that the civil stalking injunction “should have been more
limited.”

¶91 But in our view, these restrictions were within the scope of
the district court’s discretion for a properly issued civil stalking
injunction. The governing statute affords the district court broad
discretion in defining the terms of the injunction. The relevant
subsection provides a list of potential relief options—including
restraining the respondent from coming near the petitioner’s
residence—followed by the directive that the court may include
in the injunction “any other relief necessary or convenient for the
protection of the petitioner and other specifically designated
individuals under the circumstances.” Utah Code § 78B-7-
701(4)(a)(iv) (emphasis added). And while LeFevre points out that
these restrictions conflict with his claim that there’s an easement,
we note that the question of whether this easement exists is
currently before a different district court judge in the separate
civil case. If LeFevre prevails in that litigation, he would then be
entitled to return to this case and ask the court to modify or revoke
the injunction. See id. § 78B-7-701(8) (providing that a civil stalking
injunction may be dissolved or modified if the respondent shows
good cause). But for now, and on the state of the current record
and procedural posture, we are not persuaded that the injunction
is overly broad.

CONCLUSION

¶92 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we see no error in
the court’s decision to issue a civil stalking injunction. We
accordingly affirm.

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