BAHSOUN v. MOONEY

2026 UT App 18

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAZEN BAHSOUN,
Appellee,
v.
COLLEEN ELIZABETH MOONEY,
Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20251317-CA
Filed February 12, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Richard Pehrson
No. 234901965

Colleen Elizabeth Mooney, Appellant Pro Se
David C. Blum, Attorney for Appellee
Virginia L. Sudbury, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, DAVID N.
MORTENSEN, and JOHN D. LUTHY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Colleen Elizabeth Mooney seeks to appeal the divorce
decree in the underlying case. This matter is before the court on
its own motion for summary disposition based on lack of
jurisdiction due to an untimely filed notice of appeal. We dismiss
the appeal.

¶2 Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty
days after the entry of a final order or judgment. See Utah R. App.
P. 4(a); Garver v. Rosenberg, 2015 UT 39, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 380. If a notice
of appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the appeal. Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App
299, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616. The district court entered the divorce decree
Bahsoun v. Mooney

on September 24, 2025. Mooney’s notice of appeal was filed on
October 25, 2025—thirty-one days after the entry of the decree. 1
Accordingly, the notice of appeal from the decree was not timely
filed. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the
appeal. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 8, 5 P.3d 649.

¶3 Despite this, Mooney contends that a document captioned
“Respondent’s Request for a New Trial and Reconsideration of
Terms in Decree,” which was filed on October 22, 2025, tolled the
time to appeal pursuant to rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Rule 4(b) provides that the time to file a notice of
appeal from the judgment “runs from the entry of the dispositive
order” resolving certain postjudgment motions. Utah R. App. P.
4(b)(1). Under the rule, “a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure” will toll the time to appeal. Id.
R. 4(b)(1)(D). However, motions to reconsider and “other
similarly titled motions will not toll the time for appeal because
they are not recognized by [the] rules.” Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24,
¶ 7, 135 P.3d 861.

¶4 “In our system, the rules provide the source of available
relief.” Id. ¶ 8. “[T]he form of a motion does matter because it
directs the court and litigants to the specific, and available, relief
sought.” Id. Accordingly, “when a party seeks relief from a

1. Mooney asserts that her notice of appeal was not filed earlier
because of technical difficulties experienced by her e-filing service
provider and that her late filing should therefore be excused.
However, “the filing date and time is not when the filer submits
the document to their Service Provider. For purposes of electronic
filing, the file date will be the date and time recorded when the
filing was received and was posted by the court’s electronic filing
manager.” A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 11, 416 P.3d 465 (cleaned up).
“The filer is responsible for a timely filing. Best practice is to allow
adequate time to file a time-sensitive document.” Id. ¶ 12 (cleaned
up).

20251317-CA 2 2026 UT App 18
Bahsoun v. Mooney

judgment, it must turn to the rules to determine whether relief
exists, and if so, direct the court to the specific relief available.” Id.
Mooney’s document did not cite rule 59 in either the caption or
the body of the request, and it was not identified as a motion
within the rules of civil procedure. Although “an improper
caption is not fatal to a motion,” State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25, ¶ 35,
540 P.3d 614 (cleaned up), a motion must have some substantive
basis to enable a court to construe it as a motion within the rules,
id. Here, Mooney’s single-paragraph document requested a new
trial and reconsideration without providing any rule or legal basis
and without clearly relying on any of the grounds for a new trial
set forth in rule 59. The document was insufficient to be
construed, even generously, as a motion for a new trial under rule
59, and it therefore did not toll the time to appeal. Indeed, the
district court struck the document as frivolous.

¶5 In sum, because Mooney’s request for a new trial and
reconsideration did not toll the time to appeal, her notice of
appeal was untimely filed and this court lacks jurisdiction over
this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

20251317-CA 3 2026 UT App 18