State v. Deuel

2026 UT App 8

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAY RILE DEUEL,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230434-CA
Filed January 23, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable M. James Brady
No. 215400188

Emily Adams and Anna Grigsby,
Attorneys for Appellant
Jeffrey S. Gray and McKay Lewis,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN
concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 After an automobile accident in which he rear-ended
another vehicle, Christopher Jay Rile Deuel was charged with and
convicted of three counts of driving under the influence (DUI) and
one count of possession or use of a controlled substance. On
appeal, Deuel challenges his convictions, arguing that the trial
court erroneously admitted the entirety of a toxicology report that
confused the issue before the jury and that the trial court should
have allowed the admission of his written witness statement
under the statements-against-interest hearsay exception in the
evidence rules. We find merit in Deuel’s argument regarding the
toxicology report, and we accordingly reverse and remand the
State v. Deuel

matter for a new trial. We additionally provide some guidance on
the hearsay issue, which is likely to arise again in a new trial.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 21, 2021, Deuel was driving along a two-lane
highway in Cedar Fort, Utah, taking his fiancée (Fiancée) to a
doctor appointment. Another driver (Driver), who was a newly
licensed sixteen-year-old out delivering holiday gifts with two of
her younger relatives, was driving some distance ahead of Deuel
and was slowing down to make a left-hand turn. Fiancée later
explained that she “was in a lot of pain” at the time and when
their truck “hit a bump” in the road, she “gasped,” which caused
Deuel, who knew she suffers from epilepsy, to “look[] over at
[her] to make sure [she] wasn’t having a seizure.” Fiancée said
that the glance lasted “maybe a half a second” and that when
Deuel looked back to the road, Driver’s vehicle was “there
stopped” and Deuel “just didn’t have enough time to react to it,”
resulting in them hitting Driver’s vehicle going “[f]ifty miles an
hour.” Driver’s “vehicle was thrown from the roadway and spun
around to face the opposite direction.” Driver and both her
passengers were injured to some degree in the collision.

¶3 After police arrived at the accident site, a responding
officer (Officer) noted “that [Deuel] was rather agitated and
slightly aggressive towards those on the scene” and “that his eyes
were red and bloodshot.” These physical features, combined with
the fact that “this type of accident is fairly uncommon in broad
daylight,” made Officer “suspicious that impairment may be a
factor.” Deuel was placed in the back of a police vehicle while
Officer helped clear the accident scene. Video footage from a
camera inside the police vehicle showed Deuel “falling asleep or
nodding off” at one point during this wait.

¶4 After clearing the scene, Officer returned to the police
vehicle and asked Deuel to participate in field sobriety testing;

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Deuel consented, and the testing was recorded on Officer’s
dashboard camera. In the recording, Officer made no inquiry into
any “medical needs or pre-existing conditions” Deuel may have
had or whether “he was taking any prescribed medications that
might affect his ability to perform on the field sobriety tests.”
However, Deuel conveyed to Officer during the testing that he has
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and that this
makes it “hard for him to follow instructions.” Deuel also
communicated to Officer during testing that because his “toes are
numb” and “all fucked up,” he has “no equilibrium,” making
certain requested tasks difficult. Deuel further indicated that he
has “back problems” and a “[b]ad knee.” Nonetheless, no
accommodation was provided to Deuel during the testing to
address these limitations.

¶5 Officer administered the three standard field sobriety tests.
First, he performed a “horizontal gaze nystagmus” test. This
involves passing an item “in front of the person’s eyes back and
forth a number of different times” while looking for certain clues. 1
Out of the six total possible clues on this test, Officer “only
observed two,” but this “increased [his] suspicion” that Deuel was
impaired. Second, Officer performed “the nine-step walk-and-
turn test,” which has eight possible clues, with two clues
indicating impairment. On this test, Officer observed two clues—
one when Deuel stepped off the line he was asked to stay on and

1. Officer explained at the subsequent trial that a clue is “some
sort of identifying mark that [police] look for during . . . field
sobriety testing to help [them] determine whether or not
somebody’s impaired.” He described a cue, on the other hand, as
“an abnormality” that “isn’t a guaranteed” indication of
impairment but simply “additional evidence . . . [to] take into
consideration.” Thus, we focus primarily on the clues observed in
the testing and not the few cues Officer also mentioned (pinpoint
pupils, bloodshot eyes, fluttering eyelids, and distended neck
veins that indicated a fast heart rate).

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one when “he had to put his arms out to help him maintain
balance.” Third, Officer performed the “one-leg stand” test. Of the
four possible clues on this test, Officer observed two—that Deuel
“swayed” and that “his arms came away from his body greater
than six inches to help him maintain balance.” Officer testified
that two or more clues on this test are indicative of impairment.

¶6 Officer then administered two additional field sobriety
tests that he had been trained to perform. First, he performed the
“lack of convergence” test, wherein he passed his finger around
Deuel’s face in a circular motion, getting closer with each turn, to
see if Deuel was “able to naturally go cross eyed.” Officer
performed the test twice, and Deuel “was unable to go cross eyed”
either time. Finally, Officer performed the “modified Romberg
test,” which involved having Deuel close his eyes and estimate the
passage of thirty seconds. For each of the two times Officer
performed this test, Deuel “counted extremely fast,” once
estimating the thirty seconds at eighteen seconds and once
estimating the thirty seconds at fifteen seconds.

¶7 After administering the five field sobriety tests, Officer
concluded that Deuel “was impaired and unsafe to [operate] a
motor vehicle,” and Officer placed Deuel under arrest. Deuel was
then transported to the hospital “to be checked for injury,” and
while there, Deuel consented to a blood draw. The results of that
testing later showed 23 nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) of
amphetamine and 386 ng/mL of methamphetamine in Deuel’s
blood. Thereafter, a toxicology report detailing these findings was
prepared by a toxicologist (Toxicologist).

¶8 Deuel was ultimately charged with three counts of DUI
(one count each for Driver and her two passengers) and one count
of possession or use of a controlled substance. The case proceeded
to trial.

¶9 At trial, the State called Officer as its first witness, and he
testified to the events recounted above. During Officer’s

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testimony, the State presented security camera footage that it had
obtained from a nearby residence that showed the collision.
Although the footage does not clearly show whether Driver’s turn
signal was on, it does confirm that Driver’s “vehicle was slowing
to make a left-hand turn, and [Deuel’s] pick-up truck struck it
directly from behind.” Officer testified that this was inconsistent
with Deuel’s original statement to him that Driver’s “car just
pulled out in front of him out of nowhere.” During cross-
examination, defense counsel (Counsel) walked through the
dashboard camera video footage of the field sobriety tests
conducted on Deuel, asking Officer about Deuel’s repeated
statements about his physical and mental limitations and Officer’s
failures to attempt to provide accommodation responsive to those
limitations.

¶10 After Officer testified, Counsel brought an issue about the
admissibility of the toxicology report to the attention of the trial
court. Counsel stated that the defense was “willing to stipulate to
the findings on the report” but was objecting to its admission
under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid.
403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”). Counsel asserted that parts of the report
itself would “confus[e] the jury on the issues,” specifically
pointing to the portions of the report that set forth “clinical
reference ranges [that] have been reported” and that discussed
“exposure” versus “impairment.” Counsel also argued that
unless the State presented an expert witness with the “expertise
and the ability to explain exactly what the ranges mean,” then
they were not relevant information for the jury to consider. The
trial court responded, “[A]t this point I’m not going to exclude it,
but if there is foundation that you feel needs to be laid, . . . I’ll
address it at the appropriate time . . . .”

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¶11 The State next called Driver and her two passengers to
testify regarding the accident and their resulting injuries. Each
testified that Driver’s turn signal was on as she prepared to turn
left.

¶12 As its final witness, the State called Toxicologist, who had
conducted the testing on Deuel’s blood sample and prepared the
resultant toxicology report. During Toxicologist’s testimony, the
State offered the report into evidence, and Counsel renewed his
rule 403 objection. The trial court denied the objection, stating,
“I’m going to allow this to be admitted, it would be certainly
subject to cross examination and clarification.”

¶13 Toxicologist testified regarding the contents of her
toxicology report. She relayed that Deuel had tested positive for
amphetamine and methamphetamine, with the sample
containing 386 ng/mL of methamphetamine. The State then
directed Toxicologist to the following language from the report
that explained the methamphetamine findings: “Stimulant effects
have been reported at blood concentrations up to 100 ng/mL with
toxicity reported above 200 ng/mL. The reporting limit is 20
[ng/mL] in blood and 100 ng/mL in urine. If a urine result is
reported, it indicates prior exposure, not impairment.” When
questioned as to the meaning of this language, Toxicologist
explained that “you would expect to see some sort of effects on [a]
person when they’re at 100 [ng/ML]” and that “when you start
getting into toxicity you’re looking at the difference between
whether or not something can be harmful or helpful.” And when
specifically asked to provide the toxicity level for
methamphetamine, Toxicologist simply responded, “The report
has it as 200 nanograms per milliliter.” Toxicologist did not assert
any toxicity level apart from this reference to the report.

¶14 On cross-examination, Counsel asked Toxicologist about
the test results and their relationship to impairment, and
Toxicologist answered, “I can’t determine any degree of

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impairment based on my results, but I can talk about what you
would typically expect to see.” Counsel also questioned
Toxicologist as to how the toxicity level was determined, and
Toxicologist responded, “I would assume it was based on case
study research, but otherwise I can’t say for certain.” Counsel then
referenced the language in the report about exposure versus
impairment based on a urine sample and asked, “[W]ith blood is
there a standardized way for you to be able to detect impairment
or just detection? . . . [S]imilar to that urinary statement that’s
included in the toxicology report, is there a way for you to know
based on a number whether or not a person is impaired?”
Toxicologist answered, “The best way we can tell is just those
numbers that are provided in the report.” However, she also
again acknowledged that there was no “set number” that
indicated impairment.

¶15 The State then rested, and the defense presented its case,
first recalling Officer as a witness. Counsel showed Officer a
written witness statement that Deuel had completed on the day of
the accident. But when Counsel moved to introduce the written
statement into evidence, the State objected on hearsay grounds.
Out of the presence of the jury, the trial court told Counsel that
the statement was indeed hearsay and that if the defense chose to
provide Deuel’s testimony in this way, “then he [could] be cross
examined.” Counsel argued that the statement should be allowed
in as a statement against interest under rule 804 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Counsel asserted that
because Deuel admitted in his statement to “being distracted”
before the collision, the statement was “obviously a statement
made against his own interest.” The court responded that the
statement was “still going to be a statement by [Deuel]” and that
the court would “allow cross examination if it’s admitted.” At this
point, Counsel asked no further questions of Officer and moved
on to call his next witness without introducing Deuel’s statement
into evidence.

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State v. Deuel

¶16 Fiancée next testified, explaining that she had lived with
Deuel for four years and that he had several mannerisms that may
appear “abnormal” to others, including that “he mumbles,” “he
slurs his words a lot,” and “he can’t sit down or he goes to sleep.”
She related that Deuel “struggle[es] with some serious health
issues,” has “severe ADHD,” and has “[v]ery serious hearing
issues.” And although Fiancée was aware that Deuel “still had
occasionally been using methamphetamine,” she believed that he
was “not at all” impaired by methamphetamine on the day of the
accident and that his driving that day was not unsafe. She
explained that she had seen Deuel impaired by
methamphetamine previously and that at those times he “goes
and hides and just avoids people.” In contrast, Fiancée stated that
the speech, behavior, and mannerisms exhibited by Deuel in the
police videos (when he was waiting in the police car and when he
was participating in the field sobriety tests) are “just how he is.”
As to the accident itself, Fiancée stated that Driver’s car was
“stopped in the middle of the highway” with “no signal” and that
she did not “even recall seeing brake lights.” Finally, Fiancée
admitted that she had prior convictions for both forgery and theft
by deception.

¶17 The defense then called Deuel’s mother (Mother) as a
witness. Mother testified that Deuel had called her right after the
accident and that she had immediately driven the four miles from
her home to the accident site. She stated that she had the
opportunity to see and speak with Deuel and that she noticed
nothing “uncommon or strange” about his behavior. She said that
he was worried that his father, who had recently died, would be
upset about the damaged truck “from beyond the grave.” She also
testified, consistently with Fiancée’s observations, that when
Deuel was impaired by methamphetamine, “[h]e would go off in
his own little world.” Mother referenced Deuel’s many health
challenges, including “a bad foot,” “a bad knee,” “a really bad
shoulder,” “back problems,” “hearing issues,” and speech that
was affected due to his hearing issues. And Mother believed that

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Deuel would often self-medicate with methamphetamine in an
attempt to treat his ADHD. Mother testified that due to Deuel’s
various medical issues, she was not surprised that he struggled
with parts of the field sobriety tests.

¶18 The defense rested, the jury was instructed, and the
attorneys made their closing arguments. The prosecutor
recognized the State’s burden to show that Deuel was incapable
of safely operating a vehicle and then highlighted Officer’s
testimony regarding Deuel “nodding off” in the back of the police
vehicle as well as Deuel’s behavior during, and the results of, the
field sobriety tests. The prosecutor also highlighted the toxicology
report and stated, “As you heard [Toxicologist] testify, stimulant
effects have been reported up to 100 nanograms, and toxicity has
been reported at 200 nanograms, but he had 386 nanograms of
methamphetamine in his system.”

¶19 In response, Counsel argued that the toxicity number that
the prosecutor “wanted to throw at” the jury did not “have any
impact whatsoever on whether or not a person is impaired.”
Counsel reminded the jury, “Methamphetamine affects people
differently. The Legislature has not given a specific number like
they have with alcohol.”

¶20 The jury convicted Deuel as charged, and he timely
appealed his convictions.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶21 Deuel’s first assertion of error involves the trial court’s
refusal to exclude the toxicology report under rule 403 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. “[W]e review a trial court’s decision to admit
or exclude evidence under rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Beverly, 2018 UT 60, ¶ 23, 435 P.3d 160. “A [trial] court
abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard or if its

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decision is beyond the limits of reasonability.” State v. Richins,
2025 UT 10, ¶ 18, 568 P.3d 1046 (quotation simplified).

¶22 Deuel next challenges the trial court’s refusal to admit into
evidence his written witness statement under the hearsay
exception for statements against interest. See Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(3). “In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the
admission of evidence, appellate courts review the threshold
statement of the legal principle governing admission or exclusion
for correctness, the findings of facts pertinent to a determination
for clear error, and the ultimate ruling on admissibility for abuse
of discretion.” State v. Farmer, 2025 UT App 57, ¶ 37, 569 P.3d 267
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 522 (Utah 2025). 2

ANALYSIS

I. The Toxicology Report

¶23 Deuel first argues that the trial court erred in denying his
objection to the toxicology report. He argues that the toxicology
report was inadmissible under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence because its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the dangers of confusing the issues and
misleading the jury. His argument does not center on the report
results that disclosed the specific levels of amphetamine and
methamphetamine measured in his blood sample—indeed, Deuel
was willing to stipulate to those facts—but on a paragraph in the
report that set forth levels at which “[s]timulant effects” and
“toxicity” of methamphetamine “have been reported” and that
discussed “exposure” versus “impairment.” He argues that the
jury “could have reviewed the report and determined that [he]

2. Deuel additionally advanced a merger argument in his initial
brief on appeal. But in his reply brief, he withdrew that argument,
and we therefore do not address it further.

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State v. Deuel

must have been impaired because the level of methamphetamine
in his blood far exceeded the toxicity level.” We agree.

¶24 To convict, the State bore the burden to prove that Deuel
was operating a vehicle while under the influence of a drug “to a
degree that render[ed] [him] incapable of safely operating a
vehicle.” Utah Code § 41-6a-502(1)(b). Unlike in a case with a DUI
charge based on alcohol consumption, when considering a DUI
charge based on drug use, there is no chemical test result that will
alone meet the elements of the charge. Compare id., with id. § 41-
6a-502(1)(a) (providing that the DUI offense is proven when “a
subsequent chemical test shows that the [driver] has a blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of
the test”). Thus, the toxicology report’s discussion of the levels of
reported stimulant effects and toxicity, as well as its reference to
impairment, were not directly probative of the issue here, that is,
whether Deuel’s methamphetamine use had rendered him
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. While the State argues that
the threshold numbers were probative because they “help[ed]
contextualize how much methamphetamine [Deuel] had in his
system,” we do not agree that this is so, at least without further
expert testimony about how these threshold numbers were
developed and what they meant in relation to the ability to safely
operate a vehicle. And we agree with Deuel that without this
further information, the report’s mention of a specific “toxicity”
level of 200 ng/mL was likely to confuse the issues and mislead
the jury into thinking that a test result far above that amount
indicated significant impairment that would render a person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. Thus, the trial court
exceeded its discretion in allowing the admission of the report in
its entirety.

¶25 The State counters that even if the admission of the toxicity
portion of the toxicology report was an abuse of discretion, the
result of such admission was harmless. See State v. Reece, 2015 UT
45, ¶ 33, 349 P.3d 712 (“An error is harmless and does not require

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reversal if it is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings.” (quotation simplified)). In support of its
argument, the State points to what it characterizes as “the
overwhelming evidence of [Deuel’s] guilt” as well as the facts that
Counsel successfully elicited from Toxicologist that there is no set
amount of methamphetamine that is indicative of impairment
and that Counsel reiterated that concession in his closing
argument.

¶26 We disagree with the State. First, while we recognize that
“[e]rrors are often harmless where there is overwhelming
evidence in the record of the defendant’s guilt,” id., we do not
agree that this case can be characterized in such a way. There was
some dispute among the witnesses about whether Driver had her
turn signal on immediately before the accident, and the security
footage introduced at trial did nothing to clear up that dispute.
Nor did the security footage show Deuel swerving, stumbling, or
exhibiting any classic signs of impairment. Additionally, the
results of the field sobriety tests were weak. The standard tests
revealed only six out of eighteen possible clues, and in conducting
these tests, Officer made no accommodations to address the
cognitive and physical limitations Deuel raised that had the
potential to impact his performance. Further, there was at least
some corroborating evidence of these cognitive and physical
limitations in the form of Mother’s and Fiancée’s trial testimony.
While the State points to some inconsistent or curious statements
made by Deuel and Fiancée, as well as to Fiancée’s “prior crimes
of dishonesty,” we are not convinced that these considerations are
sufficiently significant to convince us that admission of the
toxicology report in its entirety was harmless.

¶27 Second, although Counsel was able to elicit Toxicologist’s
admission that there was no “set number” for impairment,
Toxicologist also stated in that same exchange that the “best way”
she could tell whether a person was impaired was “those numbers

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that are provided in the report.” And while Counsel did argue in
closing that a chemical test result in the toxic range “doesn’t have
any impact whatsoever on whether or not a person is impaired,”
the prosecutor had relied on the toxicity level to suggest just the
opposite: “[Toxicologist] testified that [Deuel] had 386 nanograms
of methamphetamine in his system at the time that his blood was
drawn. . . . 386 nanograms. As you heard [Toxicologist] testify,
stimulant effects have been reported up to 100 nanograms, and
toxicity has been reported at 200 nanograms, but [Deuel] had 386
nanograms of methamphetamine in his system.” Thus, we are not
convinced that Counsel’s efforts on this front did much to lessen
the harm of admitting the toxicology report.

¶28 Because we conclude that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in admitting the toxicology report in its entirety, and
because we cannot “conclude there is no reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings,” id.
(quotation simplified), we vacate Deuel’s convictions and remand
this case to the trial court for a new trial.

II. Deuel’s Written Statement

¶29 While our decision as to the toxicology report is dispositive
of this appeal, we also choose to address the issue related to
Deuel’s written statement to police, as that issue is likely to arise
again in a new trial. 3 See State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 49, 416 P.3d

3. Deuel also raises, in the alternative, an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim related to the admissibility of his written statement,
accompanied by a motion for a remand under rule 23B of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) (“A
party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to
remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact,
necessary for the appellate court’s determination of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.”). Because we have already
(continued…)

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1132 (“Although it is unnecessary to our decision, we retain the
authority to reach issues when we believe our analysis could
prove helpful on remand.”); State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61, 192
P.3d 867 (recognizing that when there are “other issues presented
on appeal that will likely arise during retrial,” appellate courts
have “discretion to address those issues for purposes of providing
guidance on remand”). So, while we need not review the trial
court’s specific admissibility decision made during trial, we
provide the following guidance to the court should it be faced
with a similar admissibility challenge at a new trial.

¶30 Deuel argues that his written police statement was
admissible under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 804
identifies several situations in which the court may allow
evidence of out-of-court hearsay statements made by a declarant
who is “unavailable as a witness.” Utah R. Evid. 804(b). One such
exception is a statement against interest, that is, a statement that
(1) “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have
made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made,
it . . . had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to . . .
criminal liability” and (2) “is supported by corroborating
circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” Id. R.
804(b)(3).

¶31 Rule 804 enumerates several situations in which a
declarant is considered unavailable as a witness, including the
situation where the declarant “is exempted from testifying about
the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court
rules that a privilege applies.” Id. R. 804(a)(1). “One such privilege
is the declarant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.” United States v. Morrow, 79 F.4th 1169, 1179 (10th
Cir. 2023). And “[w]hile a witness may not be able to claim the

determined that Deuel is entitled to a new trial, we need not
address this additional argument on appeal, and we accordingly
also deny the rule 23B motion.

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privilege indirectly through counsel, a defendant in his own
criminal trial may unequivocally claim the privilege through his
attorney.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 65, 272 P.3d 769.
Thus, Deuel’s claim of this privilege would, as the State concedes,
render him unavailable as a witness for purposes of rule 804.

¶32 But the unavailability of the declarant is simply a
preliminary requirement for the application of the rule 804
hearsay exceptions. Once unavailability has been established, the
court’s analysis must turn to the other requirements of rule 804
that focus on the reliability of the declarant’s statement. See State
v. Farmer, 2025 UT App 57, ¶ 38, 569 P.3d 267 (“[B]oth
requirements [of rule 804(b)(3)] guard against fabrication and
ensure that the statement is sufficiently trustworthy to warrant
exempting the statement from the general rule against hearsay.”),
cert. denied, 574 P.3d 522 (Utah 2025). As to the statement against
interest exception, the court must further find that the declarant’s
statement had “so great a tendency” to expose the declarant to
criminal liability that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s
position would have made [the statement] only if the person
believed it to be true,” and that “corroborating circumstances . . .
clearly indicate [the statement’s] trustworthiness.” Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(3). While these are discretionary determinations to be
made by the trial court in the first instance, we take this
opportunity to briefly address the standard in making the first of
these two determinations, as Deuel’s appellate arguments seem to
understate the requirement regarding an exposure to criminal
liability.

¶33 Deuel argues that the statement against interest exception
should apply here because “[t]here is a possibility that [Deuel’s]
conduct could have constituted reckless driving” and therefore
his statement “exposed him to criminal liability.” But even if a
declarant’s “statements have at least some tendency to expose him
to criminal liability, this does not necessarily mean that his
statements have a sufficient tendency to expose him to punishment

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that a reasonable person would not utter them if they were not
true.” State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 21, 362 P.3d 1216. In making
the determination of whether a statement has a sufficient tendency
to expose the declarant to liability, the court must “look to the
circumstances under which the statement was given,” id. ¶ 19
(quotation simplified), and in doing so, the court is “entitled to
weigh the tendency of [the declarant’s] statement[] to expose him
to criminal liability against [his] other motives for uttering the
statement[],” id. ¶ 21. Thus, a statement that raises some potential
for criminal liability does not necessarily meet the requirement of
this hearsay exception, particularly when one can readily
conceive of self-serving motivations the declarant may have had
to make the statement at issue. 4 These considerations should all
be a part of the trial court’s admissibility analysis should this issue
again arise upon remand.

CONCLUSION

¶34 The trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the
toxicology report over Deuel’s rule 403 objection, and such error
was harmful. We therefore reverse Deuel’s convictions and
remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial.

4. Knowing he was suspected of DUI, a statement suggesting he
was only distracted and perhaps only guilty of reckless driving is
not obviously a statement against Deuel’s interest.

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